Developing a framework to improve retail category management through category captain arrangements

Manufacturers and retailers have divergent profit objectives. A manufacturer wants to maximize the profits of its own brands. The retailer, on the other hand, wants to maximize the profit of the entire product category. In spite of these apparently diverging profit objectives, both manufacturers and retailers are increasingly realizing that profit margins of both can be increased through cooperation rather than confrontation. Category management is one such cooperative strategy that often involves the appointment of a leading manufacturer as the “category captain”. A category captain advises the retailer on the best way to price, display, and promote products in a category, including those of the competitors. This arrangement, therefore, ensures retail efficiency but raises doubt about possible misuse of power by the category captain to circumvent fair competition. In this paper, we outline the antitrust concerns about this arrangement, and provide a framework that effectively addresses these concerns.     

Retailer Dynamic Pricing and Ordering Decisions: Category Management versus Brand-by-Brand Approaches

This paper provides a framework for retailer pricing and ordering decisions in a dynamic category management setting. In this regard, the key contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we develop a multi-brand ordering and pricing model that endogenizes retailer forward buying and maximizes profitability for the category. The model considers (i) manufacturer trade deals to retailers, (ii) ordering costs incurred by the retailer, (iii) retailer forward buying behavior, and (iv) both own- and cross-price effects of all the brands in the category. Second, we use this model to compare differences in ordering and pricing decisions, and in profits, resulting from using a category management versus a brand-by-brand management approach. Our approach allows us to derive implications in a dynamic setting about the impact of interdependence among the brands upon decisions on pass-through of trade deals and retailer order quantity. We show that category management results in noticeably higher profits versus brand-by-brand and cost-plus (markup) approaches. Further, our results suggest an interaction between a brand's own-price effect and its cross-price effect emerges. If the cross-price effect for a brand is low - that is, the brand takes away relatively few sales from the other brands - the retail pass-through should increase with that brand's own-price effect. On the other hand, when the cross-price effect is high, the retail pass-through decreases with the brand's own-price effect.     

Store Brand Quality and Retailer’s Product Line Design

This study analyzes a retailer’s store brand quality decision in vertically differentiated product categories. We analyze a game theoretic model composed of one or two national brand manufacturers and a retailer, who strategically chooses the quality level(s) of its store brand(s) relative to the well-established national brand position(s) to maximize its category profit. Our analysis reveals that the nature of a retailer’s store brand quality positioning is quite different from the manufacturer’s national brand positioning decision, and that the best position for a store brand is not “as close to a national brand as possible” as previous studies suggest. Instead, the optimal quality position of each store brand is remarkably sensitive to the distribution of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. In particular, the relative proportions of quality sensitive consumers and price sensitive consumers determine the balance of three key strategic forces — the market expansion force, the retail margin force, and the consumer profitability force, leading to different optimal product line designs for store brands across different category environments. Interestingly, against multiple incumbent national brands, the retailer’s optimal product line design includes a store brand positioned at the highest quality level in the category only if most consumers are moderately quality conscious. We also analyze the implications of national brands’ brand equity for retailers’ store brand strategy.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Bridge,Focus, Attack,or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. JEL Classification: M310     

Private label line proliferation and private label tier pricing: A new dimension of competition between private labels and national brands

In this study, we explore the impact of private label (PL) proliferation and pricing on consumer demand and derive profit implications for different scenarios: (i) dropping or adding a line (kids, health or muesli) within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier prices. We use a representative household panel dataset (2008–2009) for the ready to eat (RTE) cereal category of two leading U.K. grocery retailers. Our results indicate line extension/delisting within the standard and premium PL tiers cannibalize each other and also steal business from NBs for the kids, healthy and muesli lines. Overall, premium PLs seem a profit generator tier that allows some room for further brand variant introductions within this tier. However, the retailer is better off, in terms of profits, if the proliferation within the economy PL tier is downgraded. Furthermore, both the retailer and NB manufacturers gain from an economy, standard and premium PL price increase, as it leads to a demand shift to NBs accompanied by a profit lift for the retailer.     

How category characteristics affect the number of store brands offered by the retailer: a model and empirical analysis

Our research examines why retailers offer, not one, but multiple store brands in some product categories. More specifically, we are interested in how certain product category characteristics affect the number of store brands. We model a product category consisting of two incumbent national brands that may differ in strength. The retailer may introduce one or two store brands depending on which maximizes category profits. Our analysis suggests that the retailer is likely to carry two store brands in categories where (i) the national brands are similar in strength; and (ii) the price sensitivity between the national brands is low. Interestingly, the conditions that support the introduction of more than one store brand are quite different than the conditions that would facilitate the introduction of additional national brands. We provide empirical evidence that support our model-based predictions.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

The retailer's brand promotion strategy under competition: The impact of supply uncertainty

While retailers are committed to promoting product brands to increase sales quantity and brand visibility, retailers are exposed to supply uncertainty. Therefore, we explore the brand promotion strategies of retailers in a competitive model. We then investigate the decision model under three different brand strategies and explore the equilibrium outcomes of stakeholders under supply uncertainty. In addition, we analyze and discuss social welfare under different scenarios. The results show that when the promotion cost is high (i.e., the cost effect dominates the market expansion effect), neither retailer promotes the product brand. When the promotion cost is low (i.e., the market expansion effect dominates the cost effect), both retailers tend to promote the product brands. When the promotion cost and market expansion match each other, only one retailer promotes the product brand becomes the equilibrium strategy. It is worth noting that when both retailers promote the product brand, the retailer falls into a prisoner's dilemma. In addition, we find that the supply uncertainty level diminishes the cost affordability and the motivation of retailers to promote the product brands. Interestingly, the supply uncertainty level reduces the possibility of retailers being in a prisoner's dilemma. Besides, market expansion (supply uncertainty) contributes to improving (diminishing) social welfare.     

Analyzing the effects of private-label supplier disclosure on retailer image

Private-label retailers' disclosures of dual manufacturing agreements—that is, agreements with manufacturers that produce both their own national brands and private labels—can affect the images associated with the retailers. In this study, an experiment reveals moderating effects on retailer images, according to the images of both the national brand manufacturers and the retailers; and also depending on the brand equity of the private label. A low-image retailer's disclosure that a national brand manufacturer supplies its private label causes consumers to perceive that the retailer has a higher image. However, the positive effects of private label supplier disclosure on the retailer's image are weaker when the private label enjoys high equity.     

Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power?

Like any new product, private label entry increases competition within a category leading to downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices. But, given the higher margins for private labels and potential bargaining benefits for retailers, they have incentives to help private labels gain market share. The paper addresses two questions: First, do private labels enhance a retailer’s bargaining power with respect to manufacturers? Second, given the higher profitability and potential increase in bargaining power, does the retailer strategically set retail prices to favor and strengthen the private label? We find support for the “bargaining power” hypothesis, but qualified support for the “strategic retailer pricing” hypothesis. Retailers gain bargaining power through lower wholesale prices on imitated national brands. But the gain is greater in niche categories than in mass categories, suggesting that niche national brands with limited “pull” power lose greater bargaining power. In terms of strategic pricing, the retailer, on initially introducing the private label, strategically sets prices to help private labels gain market share in high volume mass market categories. But retail prices revert to the category profit maximizing price after a year when the private label gains a stable market share.     

A Positive Theory of Private Label: A Strategic Role of Private Label in a Duopoly National-Brand Market

This article offers an economic rationale for national brands to provide private labels to their retailers. We build a game-theoretic model that analyzes the interactions among two national brand manufacturers and one common retailer. In an interesting strategic role, the private label mitigates the promotion competition between the two national brands and provides benefits for all three members in the channel. Our analysis shows that offering a private label can be a credible commitment from a national brand manufacturer that it will not engage in promotions and decrease the incentive of the national brand rival to engage in promotions. In this way, we attempt to provide a reason for why national brand manufacturers provide retailers with private labels in practice. In addition, we discuss the optimal quality level of private labels.     

Managing advertising investments in marketing channels

This paper investigates how should manufacturers optimally allocate resources to retailer-initiated (retailer) advertising through cooperative advertising programs and own (manufacturer) advertising in a bilateral monopoly. Retailer advertising stimulates immediate sales but may also harm long-term (post-advertising) demand, whereas manufacturer advertising aims at building brand equity and stimulates both immediate and long-term sales. A game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer and a retailer set pricing and advertising decisions over a two-period planning horizon is developed to account for the differences between manufacturer and retailer advertising. We characterize equilibrium solutions for four advertising scenarios for the manufacturer, ranging from no investment in any advertising activity to undertaking own advertising and supporting retailer advertising simultaneously. Comparing the two players’ equilibrium strategies and profits across these scenarios, we find that manufacturers should avoid offering exclusively cooperative advertising programs to retailers. When retailer advertising positively influences long-term sales, manufacturers should offer cooperative advertising supports to retailers in addition to undertaking their own advertising. When retailer advertising negatively affects long-term sales, manufacturers can still undertake own advertising and offer cooperative advertising under certain conditions. However, if these conditions are not met, focusing exclusively on own advertising is their best advertising strategy. Retailers also prefer scenarios in which manufacturers advertise, but may choose not to participate in manufacturers’ cooperative advertising programs. This leads to suboptimal outcomes if cooperative advertising programs are not enhanced by additional incentives (e.g., side payments or other services).     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

Effect of Store Brand Introduction on Channel Price Leadership: An Empirical Investigation

In this study, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of store brand introductions on the price leadership relations in a distribution channel between a retailer and national brand manufacturers. We analyze a multi-product category retail database from a major grocery chain, which captures both a period before and a period after the introduction of a store brand in each product category. By applying the time series approach to this data set, we show that store brand introductions frequently lead to price leadership changes, generally in a more favorable direction for the retailer than for the national brand manufacturer, evidenced by either the decay of the manufacturers’ price leadership or the rise of the retailer’s price leadership. However, such a change is not universal but tends to be concentrated among a certain quality tier of national brands, which is not always the low-tier, but sometimes the top-tier despite the low-price low-quality position of the store brand. The patterns detected in the data suggest that these changes are likely to reflect the retailer’s strategic effort to reshape the price leadership environment in a product category aided by the enhanced bargaining power and managerial sophistication that accompanied the store brand introductions.     

我国大型零售业发展自有品牌营销策略研究

面对商业流通领域的市场变化,我国大型零售业借鉴＂自有品牌＂的经营理念,培育自身的知名品牌,逐渐将实施自有品牌战略作为新的利润增长点和提升企业核心竞争力的重要手段。通过对我国大型零售业开发自有品牌的发展现状分析,借鉴国外成功的商业自有品牌开发经验,制定适宜我国大型零售业的自有品牌营销策略。     

Why Do Local South Korean Market Leaders Supply Retailer Grocery Brands?

This article examines why many of the leading South Korean brand manufacturers produce retailer brand products within their major product categories. The reasons identified include pressure from retailers, protection of other national brand product ranges, maintenance or improvements in working relationships, protection of other distribution channels, savings in marketing budgets, diversification of product lines, and changing competitive structures. Evidence is also provided of the dynamic nature of decision making relating to retail brand supply across the whole portfolio of brands which the manufacturer offers, rather than in respect of individual product brands or markets, the focus of much existing work.     

THE IMPACT OF ORDER FULFILLMENT SERVICE ON RETAILER MERCHANDISING DECISIONS IN THE CONSUMER DURABLES INDUSTRY

Historically, manufacturers held the upper hand in consumer goods supply chain relationships. There has been a pervasive shift of power to retailers over the past 20 years, however, ushering in an era of waning consumer loyalty to manufacturers' brands and increasing loyalty to retailers. While there is extensive research focusing on the manufacturer‐consumer relationship, retailers' increased ability to influence consumer purchases suggests that manufacturers should understand not only consumer perceptions of delivery service, but also retailer perceptions. We incorporate social network theory to examine the manufacturer‐retailer‐consumer linkages in the consumer durables industry, with the emphasis on the retailer in the role of the “broker” (Burt 1992). Specifically, we examine whether retailer perceptions of a manufacturer's order fulfillment service (OFS) positively impacts retailer perceptions of the manufacturer's brand, the importance of the product, and the likelihood of the retailers' salespeople to recommend the product to consumers. The research bridges OFS and retailer purchase behavior in a consumer durables industry characterized by high levels of consumer involvement, brand presence, and personal selling.     

A longitudinal examination of the effects of retailer–manufacturer brand alliances: The role of perceived fit

Abstract

One resource that has been identified as a valuable source of competitive advantage is the equity associated with an organisation's brands. Organisations devote considerable resources to developing strategies that allow them to build and/or maintain strong brand names. This study investigates brand alliances between retailers and manufacturers. The role of perceived fit between the partnering brands is explored. In addition, the study examines the influence that retailer–manufacturer brand alliances have on: retailer equity; manufacturer brand equity; the intention of consumers to frequent the stores of the retailer involved in the brand alliance (shopping intention); and the intention of consumers to purchase products from the manufacturer involved in the brand alliance (purchase intention).     

Private Label Vendor Selection in a Supply Chain: Quality and Clientele Effects

We model a supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer and an independent manufacturer, both of whom are potential suppliers of store brand to a single retailer. The retailer serves two customer segments—a quality sensitive segment (high type) and a price sensitive (low type) segment. The retailer serves these two segments by targeting the national and store brands to the quality and price sensitive segments, respectively. When the national brand manufacturer supplies the store brand he internalizes the effect of store brand quality on the national brand's retail prices. This leads the national brand manufacturer to choose a lower store brand quality than the independent manufacturer. This decrease in store brand quality has the benefit of increased revenues from the high type customers along with an associated cost of decreased revenues from the low type customers. Thus, when the benefit outweighs the cost the retailer chooses the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand. We show that the retailer will choose the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand when (a) the size of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, (b) the valuations of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, and (c) the retailer's margin requirement on the store brand is not very high. Overall, these results suggest that retailers who serve a bigger sized quality (price) sensitive clientele would have the national brand (independent) manufacturer supply the store brand.