On the Riskiness of Universal Banking: Evidence from Banks in the Investment Banking Business Pre- and Post-GLBA

We explore whether an economically significant differential exists in market-based risk measures between universal banks and traditional banks. Using a three-asset portfolio regression model, we find that between 1990 and 2007—a period of gradual deregulation culminating in passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999—an increased participation in investment banking was associated with higher total and unsystematic risks and no significant change in systematic risk. Small risk-reduction benefits emerged in the post-GLBA era, but such benefits were likely the result of the particular sample period rather than a fundamental change in bank structure following the GLBA. Our results cannot justify the GLBA on risk-reduction grounds, though the Act may be defensible for other reasons.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial Banks

Noninterest income now accounts for over 40% of operating income in the U.S. commercial banking industry. This paper demonstrates a number of empirical links between bank noninterest income, business strategies, market conditions, technological change, and financial performance between 1989 and 2001. The results indicate that well‐managed banks expand more slowly into noninterest activities, and that marginal increases in noninterest income are associated with poorer risk‐return tradeoffs on average. These findings suggest that noninterest income is coexisting with, rather than replacing, interest income from the intermediation activities that remain banks' core financial services function.     

Seasoned Offerings,Imitation Costs,and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings

This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regularities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.     

Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints that they impose on their own investors. Because the firm's manager prefers continuing the firm over liquidating it and aggressive (risky) continuation strategies over conservative (safe) continuation strategies, the institution must monitor the firm and exercise some control over its decisions. Bank finance takes the form of debt, whereas venture capital finance often resembles convertible debt. Venture capital finance is optimal only when the aggressive continuation strategy is not too profitable, ex ante; the uncertainty associated with the risky continuation strategy (strategic uncertainty) is high; and the firm's cash flow distribution is highly risky and positively skewed, with low probability of success, low liquidation value, and high returns if successful. A decrease in venture capitalists’ cost of capital encourages firms to switch from safe strategies and bank finance to riskier strategies and venture capital finance, increasing the average risk of firms in the economy.     

Great expectations: Banks as equity underwriters

We examine the in-roads commercial banks have made into equity underwriting over 1990–2002. While banks end the period handling upwards of 25% of equity underwriting, this increase results almost exclusively from acquisitions of investment banks with an already established market share of equity underwriting. We find a significant decline in the market share of equity underwriting that banks acquired in the post-merger period, a decline that is larger than that experienced by independent investment banks of comparable reputation. Banks lose market share because they originate fewer IPOs and their IPOs have a lower incidence of follow-on SEOs compared to independent investment banks. Following the merger, banks experience a large fall off in their ability to retain follow-on SEOs and are less successful in winning SEO mandates when an issuer switches from its IPO underwriter. Overall, the findings suggest it has been difficult for banks to achieve scope economies in equity underwriting.     

Wealth and Risk Effects of Adopting Deposit Insurance in Canada: Evidence of Risk Shifting by Banks and Trust Companies

This paper confirms that adopting explicit deposit insurance expanded risk-shifting incentives for Canadian Banks and Trust Companies. By transferring responsibility for monitoring non-systematic risk to the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), deposit insurance eliminated the compensation previously paid to large-block stockholder monitors. This transfer fueled a redistribution of insured-institution stock from poorly diversified large-block shareholders to diversified investors. Also, subsequent changes in market volatility support the hypothesis that CDIC insurance and the absorption of catastrophic risk it provided reduced systematic risk in the stock market as a whole even as it increased non-systematic risk in the banking and trust-company sector.     

Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.     

Financial Expert CEOs and Earnings Management Around Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the association between financial expert CEOs and earnings management (EM) around initial public offerings. We identify financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles. We find strong evidence that newly listed firms with financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in either accrual-based or real EM in the offering year than those with non-financial expert CEOs. In particular, our results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue that occurs due to non-random matching of CEOs to firms. In addition, we employ alternative measures of financial expertise, including past experience in a CFO position, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications. We document that CEOs who used to work as CFOs and those who gained varied financial experience are less likely to manage earnings through both accruals and real activities. Moreover, CEOs who have a professional qualification in finance and/or accounting are also associated with lower accrual-based EM.     

The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure,ownership and competition in Indian banking

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.     

Why do Underwriters Charge Low Underwriting Fees for Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan?

Abstract:  In Taiwan, underwriting fees for initial public offerings (IPOs) are extremely low compared to fees in other countries. From 1989 to 1999, the average underwriting fee for IPOs in Taiwan is 0.99%—far below the regulatory limit. Although the Taiwanese underwriting industry is highly concentrated, underwriting fees do not cluster at any particular level. We examine the underwriting fee and income structure in Taiwan and find support for an incentive hypothesis. Underwriters have an incentive to charge lower underwriting fees when market demand for IPO shares increases and capital gains account for a larger portion of their total income.     

Efficiency and productivity growth in the banking industry of Central and Eastern Europe

We employ the directional technology distance function and provide estimates of bank efficiency and productivity change across Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and across banks with different ownership status for the period 1998–2003. Our results demonstrate the strong links of competition and concentration with bank efficiency. They also show that productivity for the whole region initially declined but has improved more recently with further progress on institutional and structural reforms. Input-biased technical change has been consistently positive throughout the entire period suggesting that the reforms have induced favorable changes in relative input prices and input mix. However we find evidence of diverging trends in productivity growth patterns across banking industries and that foreign banks outperform domestic private and state-owned banks both in terms of efficiency and productivity gains. Overall, we find that productivity change in CEE is driven by technological change rather than efficiency change.     

Public and private enforcement of securities laws: Resource-based evidence

Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators’ resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently available evidence.     

The impact of banking regulations on banks' cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence

This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis to provide international evidence on the impact of the regulatory and supervision framework on bank efficiency. Our dataset consists of 2853 observations from 615 publicly quoted commercial banks operating in 74 countries during the period 2000-2004. We investigate the impact of regulations related to the three pillars of Basel II (i.e. capital adequacy requirements, official supervisory power, and market discipline mechanisms), as well as restrictions on bank activities, on cost and profit efficiency of banks, while controlling for other country-specific characteristics. Our results suggest that banking regulations that enhance market discipline and empower the supervisory power of the authorities increase both cost and profit efficiency of banks. In contrast, stricter capital requirements improve cost efficiency but reduce profit efficiency, while restrictions on bank activities have the opposite effect, reducing cost efficiency but improving profit efficiency.     

A theory of the transition to secondary market trading of IPOs

We develop a model in which investment banks and institutional investors collaborate in smoothing an initial public offering's (IPOs) transition to secondary market trading. Their intervention promotes welfare under the assumption that significant new information arrives in the market in the immediate aftermath of the IPO. Under this assumption, it is optimal to stage the offering and suboptimal to commit to selling shares at a uniform price. The optimal strategy yields an economic rationale for secondary market price stabilization for IPOs carried out via a well-coordinated network of repeat institutional investors.     

A Comparison of Syndicated Loan Pricing at Investment and Commercial Banks

We reject the hypothesis that investment and commercial banks have identical loan-pricing policies. We find that compared to commercial banks, investment banks lend to less profitable, more lever aged firms, price riskier classes of term loans more generously, and offer relatively longer-term credits, usually with term, not commitment contracts. Investment banks typically establish higher credit spreads, although the premium declines when a commercial bank joins as syndicate co-arranger. Investment banks also price riskier classes of term loans more generously to borrowers than do commercial banks. Commercial-bank funding advantages do not appear to be a source of the pricing differences.     

Performance and Merton-type default risk of listed banks in the EU: A panel VAR approach

This paper provides empirical evidence that sheds new light into the dynamic interactions between risk and efficiency, a highly debated issue. First, we estimate three alternative measures of bank performance, by employing a directional distance function framework, along with a cost frontier and a profit function. As a second step, we calculate a Merton-type bank default risk. Then, we employ a panel VAR analysis, which allows the examination of the underlying relationships between efficiency and risk without applying any a priori restrictions. Most evidence shows that the effect of a one standard deviation shock of the distance to default on inefficiency is negative and substantial. There is some evidence of a reverse causation. As part of a sensitivity analysis, we extent our study to investigate the relationship between efficiency and default risk for banks with different types of ownership structures and across financial systems with different levels of development.     

Do interbank customer relationships exist? And how did they function in the crisis? Learning from Italy

Using 11 years of monthly Italian bank-by-bank data, this paper correlates the bilateral amounts and the identity of each interbank borrower and lender with a long list of explanatory variables. The results show that interbank customer relationships, i.e. stable and strong relationships between pairs of borrowing and lending banks, do exist in Italy, that they persist over time, and that they functioned well during the crisis, enabling the healthier banks to provide and the troubled ones to receive funds.     

Banks and innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms

In this paper we investigate the effect of local banking development on firms’ innovative activities, using a rich data set on innovation for a large number of Italian firms over the 1990s. There is evidence that banking development affects the probability of process innovation, particularly for firms in high-tech sectors, in sectors more dependent upon external finance, and for firms that are small. The evidence for product innovation is much weaker and not robust. There is also some evidence that banking development reduces the cash flow sensitivity of fixed investment spending, particularly for small firms, and that it increases the probability they will engage in R&D.