现实信贷市场中抵质押品的功能探析——基于信息经济学商业银行的研究视角

文章从信息经济学、信贷配给理论、风险管理理论和巴塞尔新资本协议等视角出发,论述了有关押品的性质、功能和角色,分析了押品发挥作用的基本原理和传导机制,形成了有关现实信贷市场中抵质押品功能的9条结论。最后,结合我国信贷市场发展实际,对商业银行加强押品管理提出了初步建议。     

涉农经济组织的融资及信贷配给

本文将利率、贷款抵押成本作为信用成本变量纳入一个分析框架,建立了一个竞争市场条件下综合信贷配给模型,重点研究涉农经济组织在不同信贷市场下的信贷配给.研究表明,涉农经济组织由于信用风险高而被排除在配给范围之外.这个结论可以很好地解释涉农经济组织融资困难这一经济现象.     

流动性过剩、法定存款准备与信用配给

本文旨在研究调整存款准备带来的信用配给问题,考虑银行对企业的监督机制,分析借贷市场均衡时调节法定存款准备率对利率、投资和经济增长等宏观变量以及经济主体的影响,利用模型检讨我国货币政策的实施,并进而提出完善我国货币政策实施的相关建议。     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

论我国中小企业融资的信用制度建设

现代经济是信用经济，信用是一切投融资活动的基础。众多学者的研究表明，中小企业信用缺失是造成企业融资困难的主要原因之一。基于此，首先从信息经济学理论角度对信用制度在中小企业融资中的作用作了具体分析；其次说明了中小企业融资难的现实状况，并从博弈理论和现实制度两个层面剖析了信用缺失是中小企业融资难的根源；最后探讨了加强中小企业融资信用制度建设的对策。     

信息不对称与政府规制经济

在经济生活领域,信息不对称是普遍存在的现象。信息不对称对市场运行效率有着深刻的影响,会降低市场运行的效率。因此,应弥补信息不对称缺陷,加强政府的经济规制。     

A Game‐Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model

Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two‐sided competition. Despite the well‐known problems of achieving competitive solutions under two‐sided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game‐theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz–Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.     

信息不对称条件下我国商业银行信贷资产安全分析

本文从信息经济学和行为金融学的特殊视角探讨了信息不对称条件下我国商业银行信贷资产不安全的形成机理,并创造性地对银行信贷资产安全内涵进行了界定,总结和提出了信贷交易中存在的5种主要信息不对称形式,特别是创新地提出了商业银行与商业银行之间、与信用中介评级机构之间存在的信息不对称问题,对于当前形势下加强和防范信贷经营中的超额授信、过度授信、关联企业等风险具有较强的实践意义.     

Credit market imperfection,lack of entrepreneurship and capital outflow from a developing economy

This paper explores the impact of credit market imperfection on lack of demand for capital, trade, and capital flows in an economy with wealth heterogeneity. In particular, we look at the implications of wealth heterogeneity. We show that the low return of capital and lower output of credit-intensive output in autarky may reflect lack of entrepreneurship and demand for credit due to wealth heterogeneity and eventually may lead to capital outflow from a capital-scarce country. This is a different way of echoing the sentiment of the well–known Lucas paradox, which suggests that capital might flow from the poor to the rich countries. We also show the possibility of trade and capital flow being complements and not substitutes, as is usual in standard trade models driven by factor abundance.     

网购市场鱼龙混杂现象的经济学解释：基于二维不对称信息的视角

网络购物市场存在商品鱼龙混杂的典型现象：高价格的商品不一定高质量,低价格的商品也不一定低质量,表现出明显的信息不对称特征。文章基于网络购物市场所存在的两个维度不对称信息的特征事实,即厂商在产品质量与产品生产成本两个方面拥有私有信息,通过构建二维不对称信息的分析框架,从市场均衡的视角首次解释了上述现象的经济机理。分析表明,由于二维不对称信息的存在,消费者和厂商决策的互动过程使得市场上产品价格与质量不再具有单调递增关系,从而网络购物市场可能出现鱼龙混杂的市场均衡,文章证明了这一均衡在合理的条件下是存在的。文章通过比较静态分析考察了市场环境的变化如何影响商品质量的价格信号显示效率以及消费者购买行为,并考察了网络购物行业商家披露信息、消费者对于商家的反馈评分机制和保证退货等手段对于消除商品鱼龙混杂现象的有效性,为进一步规范发展我国网络购物行业提供了参考。     

非对称信息条件下最优承包合同的研究

承发包双方在合同变更中的机会主义和信息的非对称性,产生了“敲竹杠”和投资过小现象以及隐藏信息的道德风险问题。运用委托-代理理论建立了非对称信息条件下的最优承包合同模型,对上述问题进行了研究。证明在承包商隐藏信息务件下,最优承包合同将使承包商的专用投资水平下降、工程项目工期延长、业主效用降低。     

信誉、财富与农村信贷配给——欠发达地区不同农村金融机构的供给行为研究

文章使用2006年云南、宁夏近800个农户家庭的调查数据,实证分析了欠发达地区不同农村金融机构的信贷供给行为.在区分农户的名义需求和有效需求的基础上,研究发现信用社和银行在发放贷款时偏向富有农户,民间借贷者没有这种偏向,因而其服务的覆盖面远远超过正式机构.两者都重视农户的信誉状况,但信用记录没有实现共享.这些行为的差异主要来源于各类金融机构之间信息成本和交易成本的差别.     

“信息制导”决定信贷风险

在中国银行业全面开放之际．针对信贷风险大案频发，巨额不良资产难以消除的现状．从现代经济社会发展趋势出发，本文运用信息经济学理论对银行授信审批全过程展开深入的研究分析，发现国内商业银行在授信审批过程中存在信息制导的恶性发挥，从信息源到信息传递再到信息处理都存在虚假、错误信息，并产生叠加、加剧叠加和错误放大，出现了“集体失信”，引发信贷风险产生。从银行实务操作可行性出发，提出了较为系统的解决方法和措施。为在当今经济发展世界一体化、金融全球化的新形势下，商业银行如何控制和防止信贷风险提出了新的信贷理论和实际操作办法。     

中国人才市场信用缺失与重构

人才市场诚信体系是社会主义市场信用体系的重要组成部分,当前人才市场中存在的用人单位与应聘人才之间的纠纷已严重影响了社会安定和市场秩序,降低了全社会的资源配置效率。因此,加快产权制度改革,强化诚信制度建设,重构有中国特色的人才市场诚信体系尤为重要。     

Access to credit and informality among micro and small enterprises in Ethiopia

This paper examines the determinants of Micro and Small and Enterprises (MSEs) access to credit in Ethiopia using detailed firm‐level data collected in 2003. Its basic purpose is to identify the various attributes of a firm that determine its access to credit with an emphasis on the role of firm formality. We find that informal firms are more credit constrained compared to formal firms. A firm’s location, membership of a business association and maintaining an accounting record are found to be important determinants of access to credit. Further, we find firms whose owners have vocational training are more credit constrained than those who are not, as are firms that are exclusively male owned. There is no systematic relation between access to credit and a firm’s age, size and the sector in which it operates. The paper concludes with possible policy interventions designed to improve access to credit for MSEs in Ethiopia.     

Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontieremissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter'sconcern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point forthe negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, itis shown that transfers from the victim induce the polluting country toexaggerate its concern for the environment. As a consequence, in thesecond best solution, abatement of all but the least caring type isdistorted downward and optimal bribes may be such that more caring typesturn them down. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier policyproposals derived for a non-equilibrium starting point. They indicatethat under asymmetric information the binding incentive problem is toprevent the polluting country from claiming not to care about theenvironment and that optimal bribes from the victim should be restrictedto sufficiently environmentally concerned polluters.     

Monetary Regime Choice and Optimal Credit Rationing at the Official Rate: The Case of Russia

ABSTRACT

Stabilizing monetary policy in a small open economy is constrained by the open economy trilemma. In this paper, we investigate whether foreign exchange market interventions and the Central Bank’s credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) may soften this constraint and improve the results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model appropriate for analyzing the forward-looking behavior of households facing non-zero probabilities of losing access to financial market and CROR. We have found significant credit rationing in the quarterly Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2. The probability of losing access to financial market and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Using Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2 we demonstrate that CROR provoked forward-looking activity in financial market, which led to more Ruble devaluation in the crises of 2008–2009. It improved poor countercyclical performance of two Russian monetary policy rules, whereas made small effect on welfare. Welfare maximization exercises reveal a tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare solutions and favor of a floating exchange rate regime. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both exchange rate-based and Taylor rule-based models but resulting improvement in welfare is very small.     

股票市场和银行信贷市场的风险转移与互动

股票市场与银行信贷市场的风险转移与互动机制是整个金融体系防范风险的关键。鉴于此,基于对两市场风险转移与互动机制包含的三个阶段及其各自的表现形式所进行的实证分析,得出结论:中国股票市场与银行信贷市场之间因长期的资金关联已经存在密切的相关性,两市场在价与量上存在因果关系,同时两市场的短期波动亦存在动态关系。种种事实表明,风险转移与互动机制的第一阶段已经启动。     

信用机制对于市场经济运行的意义

信用机制是人们在商品交换过程中形成的主观上诚实守信和客观上按约偿付相统一的经济运行方式,它创造了现代社会发达的信用工具与信用交易方式,是市场经济运行的前提与基础,是市场微观主体经济活动的启动器和润滑剂。因此,信用机制深深根植于现代市场经济发展规律之中。     

日本企业在中国市场的战略调整

近几年,在日系企业的全球化投资与扩张浪潮中,中国市场已成为其加速投资与扩张的重要区域市场.提升中国市场的战略地位、构筑和强化生产基地建设、投资向研发和销售环节延伸、与中国企业建立战略联盟、扩大向非制造业领域的投资,是日本企业在中国市场战略调整的五大动向,应引起高度关注.