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1.
Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jack Mintz 《Journal of public economics》2004,88(6):1149-1168
We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for “income shifting” firms is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms. 相似文献
2.
Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of their residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive taxes to one country and whose utility is larger than the average utility in the other country or in which the lowest skilled are subsidized. We also show that it is possible for the most highly skilled to receive a net transfer funded by taxes on lower skilled individuals in equilibrium. These findings confirm the race-to-the-bottom thesis in this setting. 相似文献
3.
This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens select a policy‐maker to set a tax rate for the country. In particular, under certain conditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country's capital is higher than the decisive voter's own share. 相似文献
4.
There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible. 相似文献
5.
In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity. 相似文献
6.
Sajid Anwar 《Journal of Economics》2001,74(3):259-281
This paper utilizes a well-known specification of returns to specialization (a variation of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model) to explore the implications of local agglomeration effects for commercial policy and restricted factor mobility. The paper initially considers a small open economy where it is shown that a tariff reduces the degree of specialization and hence the size of the external economies to the producers. An inflow of labor increases the degree of specialization while a capital inflow decreases it. The paper then considers a two-country world where both countries are large and deals with the pattern of trade and factor mobility. 相似文献
7.
Despite the fact that Ricardo experienced Pitt's income taxpolicies, and that he regarded taxation as the most importantissue to which the principles of political economy should beapplied, he rarely referred to actual tax reforms. This paperindicates that Ricardo's system of economics cannot bring aboutany tax that is completely compatible with his main criteriafor taxation (distribution neutrality, price neutrality andminimum taxation) as well as certainty, convenience and thesecurity of property. This result may explain why Ricardo didnot say which type of taxation system the British governmentshould establish. 相似文献
8.
We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms. 相似文献
9.
This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition. In contrast to standard tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare. 相似文献
10.
Petr Janský 《Post - Communist Economies》2018,30(5):617-635
International corporate tax avoidance by multinational enterprises likely lowers the Czech Republic’s corporate income tax revenue, but it is not clear by how much. To clarify this I first review existing estimates of the revenue losses of international corporate tax avoidance to government revenue worldwide. I then discuss revenue estimates relevant for the Czech Republic and develop a few new, albeit only illustrative, ones. None of the existing research focused on the Czech Republic nor did the six recent international studies I examine provide reliable estimates for the Czech Republic. The extrapolations from these studies result in a revenue loss of a quite wide range with a median of 10% of current corporate income tax revenues. The other newly prepared estimates, based on firm-level and aggregate data, are of similar magnitude. I conclude with a discussion of these rough estimates as well as questions for further research and policy recommendations. 相似文献
11.
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of the party increases with the distance between the lobby's preferred policy and the median voter's ideal policy. Finally, we show that the equilibrium policy is between the median voter's ideal point and the lobby's preferred policy. Such an equilibrium policy does not maximise the aggregate social welfare due to the distortionary nature of lobbying. However, when an appropriate contribution tax is introduced to limit this distortion, social welfare will be maximised. 相似文献
12.
Richard J. Cebula 《Applied economics letters》2019,26(5):429-432
This exploratory study seeks to add to the income tax evasion literature by investigating a heretofore ignored potential determinant of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S., namely, the labour force participation rate. It is hypothesized that the higher (lower) the labour force participation rate, the lower (greater) the degree of tax evasion. The empirical estimation supports this hypothesis, finding that a one unit (one percentage point) increase (decrease) in the labour force participation rate leads to a 9.1% decrease (increase) in income tax evasion. Thus, the declining labour force participation in recent years implies increased tax evasion problems for the U.S. 相似文献
13.
Accounting for the family in European income tax systems 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Tax systems are expected to achieve many things at once andthis paper discusses the trade-offs involved in attempting toreconcile conflicting aims. It surveys the various instrumentsthat are used to take account of marriage and the presence ofchildren and describes the current systems in the 15 EuropeanUnion countries. The impact of alternative tax treatments ofthe family 'borrowed' from other countries is examined for theUK, using the tax-benefit microsimulation model, POLIMOD. Thepaper explores the implications of the alternatives for thetax paid by families of different types and for the work incentivesof individuals in different family situations. 相似文献
14.
The effects of progressive income taxation on job turnover 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine whether the level of the income tax rate and the convexity of the income tax schedule affect job mobility, as measured by moving to a better job. While the predicted effect of the level of the tax rate is ambiguous, we predict that an increase in the convexity of the tax schedule decreases job search activity by taxing away some of the benefits of a successful job search. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate that both higher tax rates and increased tax rate progressivity decrease the probability that a head of household will move to a better job during the coming year. Our estimates imply that a five-percentage-point reduction in the marginal tax rate increases the average probability of moving to a better job by 0.79 percentage points (a 8.0% increase in the turnover propensity) and that a one-standard-deviation decrease in our measure of tax progressivity would increase this probability by 0.86 percentage points (a 8.7% increase in the turnover propensity). This estimate is robust to sensitivity analysis examining the importance of different sources of identification and variation in estimated effects across subgroups in the population. Our estimated importance of tax policy for job turnover suggests a potential role in explaining the responsiveness of taxable income to marginal tax rates. 相似文献
15.
Toshiyuki Hirai 《Economic Theory》2008,37(1):81-98
This paper studies the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in a public good economy, where any allocation is achieved through
a proportional income tax system. The outcome of the economy is defined to be a set of tax rates. We show that whenever the
core as the set of tax rates is nonempty, it is a unique stable set. When the core is empty, the set of tax rates is a stable
set if and only if the set is a singleton consisting of a tax rate satisfying a certain condition. We show the existence of
such stable sets.
The author is grateful to Mikio Nakayama, Jun Wako and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. He
is also grateful to Youngsub Chun, Takuya Masuzawa and Shigeo Muto for their helpful comments. 相似文献
16.
Joel Slemrod 《Journal of public economics》2004,88(6):1169-1186
The statutory rate and effective tax rate imposed on corporation income—as well as the dispersion of these rates—began to decline in the 1980s. Is this due to changes in the domestic determinants of corporate taxation or increases in international pressures for tax competition?This paper finds clear evidence that the corporate tax rate is insulated from a country's revenue needs: across countries, there is no association of the expenditure-GDP ratio with the corporate statutory rate and only weak evidence of a positive association with the average rate. There is suggestive, but not definitive, evidence that the domestic role of the corporate tax as a backstop to the individual income tax is important: across countries, there is indeed a strong association between the top individual rate and the top statutory corporate rate.There is intriguing evidence about the role of international competitive pressures on corporate taxation. Measures of openness are negatively associated with statutory corporate rates, although not with revenues collected as a fraction of GDP. Strikingly, larger, more trade-intensive countries do collect more corporate tax, but this may be because these countries are more attractive venues for investment. 相似文献
17.
This paper reviews potential advantages and disadvantages of capital tax competition. Tax competition may introduce, mitigate, or exacerbate inefficiencies in both the private sector and the public sector. In different models, tax competition may either limit or increase public expenditures and taxes on mobile factors, with differing welfare consequences. We also discuss the implications of tax competition for redistributive policies and for policies dealing with risk, and we identify some of the possible empirical implications of tax competition. 相似文献
18.
Do jurisdictions compete over corporate taxes? The extent of uncooperative strategic government interactions in corporate tax policy remains unclear, because the results reported in relevant econometric studies vary considerably. This paper applies meta-analysis and meta-regression methods to a novel dataset consisting of 604 observations on corporate tax competition reported in 33 primary studies. The results point to the presence of corporate tax competition effects, and there is no consistent evidence for publication selection bias. The analysis, however, reveals that several data and specification choices systematically affect the results reported in the literature: the choice of the weighting scheme applied in estimating the corporate tax function and details of the econometric estimation strategy are significant when it comes to explaining variation in reported results. Furthermore, we find that accounting for partisan politics and country size matters. 相似文献
19.
Michael Hoel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1993,3(3):221-231
The use of some kind of carbon tax is often proposed as part of an international climate policy. One possibility could be an international climate agreement requiring a harmonization of domestic carbon taxes. It is shown that there are several practical difficulties with such an agreement, and that it therefore is unlikely that CO2 emissions will be allocated efficiently between countries with this type of agreement. Alternative types of agreements include an international carbon tax, in which the governments of the participating countries pay a tax, in proportion to their CO2 emissions, to an international agency. A very similar arrangement would be to introduce a system of emission permits which are internationally tradeable between governments. Under quite general conditions, agreements of these two types can be designed so that they are both efficient and satisfy whatever distributional objectives one might have. Under both of these systems, the choice of domestic policies could be left to the individual countries. A domestic carbon tax is an obvious policy response from a country participating in an agreement of this type.Significant parts of the paper are based on research at CICERO (Center for International Climate and Energy Research, Oslo) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. The paper draws heavily on a related paper (Hoel, 1992a) which was prepared for Workshop on Fee and Charge Systems for Reducing Greenhouse Gases, OECD, Paris, November 5–6, 1991. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
20.
The present paper deals with the question of whether tax harmonization and federal taxation increase welfare in a symmetric tax competition framework with heterogeneous individuals and lobbying. A model closely related to the approach of Lai (2010) is linked to externalities that are familiar from conventional public finance. The observed deviations from efficient taxation are derived from the interplay of four externalities, which can be divided into two groups: externalities occurring due to tax competition and externalities which are caused by lobbying. Whether or not the centralization of tax competences is useful depends mainly on the relative sizes of the competition-induced and lobbying-induced externalities. 相似文献