国有股权能够为民营企业带来好处吗?——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

民营企业家参政所产生的政治关联效应已受到广泛关注,但民营企业中的国有股权是否也具有政治关联效应还有待进一步证实.文章以中国民营控股上市公司为样本,研究了国有股权在民营企业中的政治关联效应和作用机制.研究发现:民营企业中的部分国有股权能够为其发展获取更多的经济资源与发展机会,因为国有股权可以依靠其与政府的体制关联为民营企业的发展提供声誉担保;与此同时,这些融资便利与经济资源能够进一步提升民营企业的经营业绩.文章拓展了公司政治关联领域的研究文献,为进一步全面理解中国经济转型时期政治关联对企业的影响提供了一个新的视角.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism; Social Standing in America: New Dimensions of Class; Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland

A very well-established economic literature maintains that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient as compared to privately owned ones (POEs). In this paper, I argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to state ownership per se, but is rather caused conditions other than ownership, to which SOEs often — though not necessarily always — relate. In particular, I focus on dynamic efficiency — specifically, the production of technological innovation — of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. I suggest that targeted measures, which are aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference — albeit complex and difficult to implement — can be much more (positively) impactful on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile state ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.     

创新、市场结构与行政进入壁垒-基于中国工业企业数据的熊彼特假说实证检验

本文基于"中国工业企业数据库"的企业层面数据,整理出中国524个四位数代码产业的2005--2006年产业层面数据.我们假设政府对国有经济比重较大的产业设置了较强的行政进入壁垒,并以国有经济比重大小为标准对样本进行分组回归.结果表明,国有经济比重大的行政进入壁垒产业的创新与市场结构呈显著"U形"曲线关系,熊彼特假说成立;国有经济比重小的自由市场产业的创新与市场结构呈显著"倒U形"曲线关系,熊彼特假说不成立.本文认为,忽略行政垄断和自由市场的制度因素,把国有经济比重大小不一的样本混合起来进行回归估计,可能是以往国内外实证研究出现结果不显著、不稳健,甚至互相矛盾的主要原因.     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

融资约束限制中国企业出口参与吗?

中国贸易增长模式的转变有赖于企业出口的扩展边际,而企业的出口参与行为取决于异质性。本文基于新新贸易理论,运用世界银行投资环境调查数据,使用probit模型重点考察了企业融资约束异质性对中国企业出口可能性的影响。研究结果表明,外源融资约束是限制企业出口参与的重要因素。进一步,本文发现企业出口参与对外源融资约束的依赖程度因所有制不同存在差异。国有企业和外资企业外源融资约束对出口参与的影响不显著;而民营企业外源融资约束对其出口参与起到显著的作用。另外,区分出口企业类型的检验结果显示,外源融资约束限制了企业的初始出口,而对于保持出口商地位的作用并不明显。     

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods. The partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer–retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration. This ‘information vertical effect’ translates into a ‘competition horizontal effect’: the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions.     

Status Incentives and Corporate Giving: Evidence From China's Political Reform On Private Enterprises

In this paper, we estimate the effect of status incentives on charitable giving by exploiting a natural experiment during China's political reform in 2002 that significantly improved the status of private entrepreneurs and their enterprises. We find that exogenous changes in social, political and economic status of private entrepreneurs led to a significant increase in the corporate giving of their privately owned firms. The findings are robust when we use different samples of the data and when we control for a large set of entrepreneurs and firm characteristics in the regression analysis.     

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ASSET RULES ON AUTO OWNERSHIP,EMPLOYMENT, AND WELFARE PARTICIPATION: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

This paper investigates how asset tests for welfare eligibility affect auto ownership, employment, and welfare participation for single mothers without a college degree. We combine longitudinal data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation with data on state‐level welfare program rules from the Urban Institute and data on state‐level controls to test whether these single mothers were more likely to (1) own a car, (2) be employed, and (3) be off of welfare, depending on the welfare asset rules instituted in their state. We find evidence that, taken as a group, the asset rules have a statistically significant effect on the probability of car ownership. Ordinary least squares results and cross‐sectional two‐stage least squares (2SLS) results using the asset rules to instrument for car ownership show a large, positive, statistically significant effect of car ownership on employment. However, in 2SLS models controlling for prior car ownership and prior employment, the asset instruments are weaker and we do not find an effect of car ownership on employment. Of significance for policy makers, we find that the asset rules do not have a statistically significant joint effect on welfare participation, even after addressing possible endogeneity. (JEL I38, J68, J08)     

转型经济下企业家制度能力对民营企业成长的作用机理

以吉利集团和横店集团为案例,分析企业家制度能力对民营企业成长的作用机理。案例研究发现,企业家制度能力是民营企业家实施制度创新并作用于企业成长的能力依托。企业家外部制度能力通过突破规制性制度壁垒为民营企业获取规制合法性,企业家内部制度能力通过改革企业产权制度和职能管理制度为民营企业提高内部管理效率,两者共同促进民营企业成长。     

Reluctant regulation

We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership seems positively associated with firm value. This relation tends to appear in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. Our results suggest that, where political institutions are weak, politicians may influence regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.     

“逆向混改”如何影响战略性新兴产业民企绿色创新？ ——基于代表性产业比较分析的视角

以“逆向混改”现象普遍的高新技术、节能环保两类战略性新兴产业为研究对象,基于民营企业“逆向混改”的准自然实验,实证检验“逆向混改”对民企绿色创新的影响。结果显示,“逆向混改”可以有效驱动战略性新兴产业民企提高绿色创新绩效。机制检验发现,“逆向混改”具有促进专业化发展和融资约束缓解的“双重功效”,有利于促成民企绿色创新发展的“护城河”和“蓄水池”。基于代表性产业比较分析发现,环境规制的合理设计及强化,可以有效地促进高新技术产业民企“逆向混改”对绿色创新的协同效应;创新补贴政策的适度强化及激励,可以有效地促进节能环保产业民企“逆向混改”对绿色创新的互补效应。研究揭示了“逆向混改”推进民企绿色创新的影响规律,为促进战略性新兴产业高质量发展提供了理论和政策启发。     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究

公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。     

Formal and real ownership structure of the Polish economy: state-owned versus state-controlled enterprises

This article analyses the difference between the state’s formal and real shares in the Polish economy. We identify two basic types of corporate control exercised by the state over enterprises through ownership (in the case of majority ownership) and non-ownership tools (in the case of minority ownership). Consequently, we distinguish between two types of state enterprises: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-controlled enterprises (SCEs). In post-communist economies, SCEs mainly originate from so-called reluctant privatisation, in which the transfer of ownership rights takes place without the appropriate transfer of control rights. We discuss the tools of non-ownership control used by the state. Our estimates of the real share of state enterprises in the Polish economy (which include both SOEs and SCEs) show that it is almost two times higher than the formal share (only SOEs). The share of state enterprises is also highest in the group of Poland’s largest and most important firms. We conclude that the real importance of state enterprises in the Polish economy is much higher than might be expected if only the formal share of state ownership is taken into account.     

异质机构、企业性质与自主创新

本文通过放松经理人市场的完全竞争性假定,拓展了经典职业生涯模型,藉此研究了中国制度背景下的机构持股、企业性质与企业创新的关系,并基于2004—2009年923家上市公司的数据,从R&D投入和专利申请两个维度对本文拓展模型的命题进行了实证检验。结果表明:(1)异质机构对企业创新有不同的影响,证券投资基金对企业创新有显著的负效应,这种负效应在国有企业中表现得更为明显;(2)民营企业中机构投资者持股促进了企业的创新活动,国有企业中机构投资者持股与企业创新呈显著的负相关关系;(3)机构投资者整体持股对全样本企业的专利申请有不显著的正效应,而对R&D投入则有显著的负效应。     

The economic performance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe

This article explores the economic performance of state ownership in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2007–2013. The largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are selected based on the ‘Coface – 500 Top Companies in CEE’ list in 2013. Of these 500 enterprises, 69 were identified as state-owned. All originated in the socialist period. The majority of them are from Poland and Ukraine. SOEs hold a dominant position in energy supply, the oil and gas sector, and transport. We find that the persistence of state ownership in post-socialist countries is caused by incomplete privatisation and the presence of SOEs within strategic sectors. The economic performance of the largest state-owned companies is, on average, comparable to their private counterparts.     

THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.