The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline

Summary. This note explores the consequences of a player's freedom of choice over his degree of commitment for the bargaining outcome. In particular, we modify the nonstationary structure of Fershtman and Seidmann (1993)'s bargaining by allowing one player to possess imperfect commitments where the degree of commitment is chosen prior to the negotiation stage. We show that a player optimally chooses an intermediate degree of irrevocability provided the costs of increasing the degree of commitment are small enough. In this case, not only an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment is effective.Received: 18 July 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78.Part of this work was written while I was visiting the IAE-CSIC and the University of Essex, whose hospitalities are gratefully acknowledged. This paper has benefited from comments of seminar participants at the University of Essex, 56th European Econometric Society Meeting, 16th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Lausanne and the XXVI Symposium of Economic Analysis in Barcelona. I thank Vicent Calabuig and Gonzalo Olcina for very helpful comments. I am especially indebted t o Clara Ponsatí and an anonymous referee for some very detailed comments which lead to substantial improvement of the paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Generalitat Valenciana under a postdoctoral grant.     

Adverse selection,commitment and exhaustible resource taxation

This paper studies the contractual relationship between a government and a firm in charge of the extraction of an exhaustible resource. Governments design taxation scheme to capture resource rent and they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on resources than the extractive firms do. This article investigates how information asymmetry on costs and an inability to commit to long-term contracts affect tax revenue and the extraction path. This study gives several unconventional results. First, when information asymmetry exists, the inability to commit does not necessarily lower tax revenues. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less than under symmetric information. Hence, the inability to commit has an ambiguous effect on the exhaustion date. Third, the modified Hotelling's rule is such that an increase in the discount factor does not necessarily reduce the first-period extraction.     

Strategic commitment and Cournot competition with labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms

This paper examines the behavior of a labor-managed income-per-member-maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm in a quantity-setting model with a strategic commitment. First, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be increased, but cannot be decreased. Hence, each firm’s investment choice changes its capital cost from a variable one into a fixed one. Second, each firm independently chooses its actual output. The paper examines the equilibrium of the quantity-setting mixed model and shows whether or not capacity investment is effective for the labor-managed firm and the profit-maximizing firm.     

Sentimental fools: a critique of Amartya Sen’s notion of commitment

Commitment is problematic because one sometimes pursues it against one’s interest. To solve it, the paper proposes a distinction between ‘non-binding’ and ‘binding’ commitments. Non-binding commitment is about ambition, such as becoming a great chef, which bolsters welfare in the pecuniary sense as well as self-respect. In contrast, ‘binding commitment’ is about honesty. While it diminishes welfare, it augments self-integrity. The neoclassical view reduces both commitments to interest, while the multiple-self approach separates both commitments from interest. The separation permits the confusion of sentimental fools, who enter commitments without regard to interest, with rational sentimentalists, who take interest into consideration.     

Turnover in top management and de-escalation of commitment

We explore how de-escalation of commitment is linked to top management turnover and economic changes at the firm. Escalation of commitment occurs when managers continue investment in a project after receiving negative information. A major determinant of escalation is the personal responsibility effect in that managers are more likely to escalate commitment to a failing project if they were responsible for the original investments. Prior studies suggest that a change in top management facilitates de-escalation of commitment as incoming managers who do not have such commitment are able to stop investments that are discovered to be failing. Our empirical analysis based on a sample of over 3,300 firms for the period from 1992 to 2016 demonstrates the link between specific top management turnover types and economic changes at the firm consistent with the de-escalation of commitment.     

在合资企业组织公正感与管理承诺

讨论在合资企业中管理的组织承诺的低效性,是否可以用分配、程序和互动公正来解释,特别指出公正感的各维度与组织承诺有紧密的联系。认为,上层主管应该及时投入额外的注意,通过对决策的周密合理的解释以及对管理者决策的尊重进行公正的、明确的内部交流。管理者对公平起着积极的作用,因为它传达了积极的相关信号。     

组织承诺理论的研究进展及对高校教师管理工作的启示

近年来,关于组织承诺的研究成为了组织行为学研究的一个热点,学者们从组织承诺的含义和结构等方面进行了深入研究。在高等教育领域,教师的组织承诺是联结教师与学校的心理纽带,是增强组织凝聚力的重要指标,影响着学校整体绩效水平。因此,高校管理者要善于激发教师的内在动机,提高其组织承诺程度;要善于协助教师制定科学合理的目标;要帮助教师完善职业生涯规划,提高其职业发展能力;要注意重点培养教师高水平的情感承诺。     

On discretion versus commitment and the role of the direct exchange rate channel in a forward-looking open economy model

Abstract

This paper compares optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment in an economy where the direct exchange rate channel is operative. The stabilization bias under discretion is shown to be weaker in an open economy relative to a closed economy. In an open economy, a ‘less conservative central banker’, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behaviour of real output that eventuates under commitment. Evaluating the social loss function under discretion and commitment, we find that the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve mitigates the pronounced differences between the two strategies in case of high persistence in the stochastic shocks.     

Knowledge resources and innovation performance: the mediation of innovation capability moderated by management commitment

This paper examines the process that links knowledge resources to innovation performance. We propose that this relationship is mediated by innovation capability and that management commitment moderates this mediation effect. To measure innovation performance, we create an indicator that summarises the impact of innovation activities on products, processes and sustainability. The sample comprises 9432 firms in different sectors included in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The results confirm that knowledge resources not only have a direct positive effect on innovation performance but also an indirect effect by improving the firm's innovation capability. We also confirm the moderating role of management commitment, but with limitations. This research, therefore, throws light on how firms can leverage their knowledge resources to gain a competitive advantage based on innovation.     

软预算约束制度成因研究的现状与逻辑

本文试图总结关于软预算约束制度成因的既有研究,并就研究逻辑、基本思想提出建设性批评意见.指出,这些研究在如何理解软预算约束,什么是制度成因,以及研究的方法论这三个问题上有着较大的分歧,今后的研究既要充分发展软预算约束概念,又要充分探讨制度作用的因果逻辑.在此基础上作者给出了一个全面研究软预算约束的综合性研究框架.     

Vertical integration,escalating commitment and technological performance: evidence from firms in the US computer industry

We set out in this study to analyse the impact on the technological performance of firms arising from their vertical integration, along with their escalating commitment to capital investment. Our findings reveal a positive relationship between vertical integration and the technological performance of such firms. A positive correlation is also found to exist between vertical integration and escalating commitment to capital investment; in other words, a firm's rising commitment to its capital investment may well strengthen the positive effects of vertical integration on the technological performance of the firm. More importantly, the interactive effects on technological performance will tend to differ, largely dependent on the type of vertical integration. The findings of this study also indicate that vertical integration can effectively neutralise the threat to exit barriers resulting from a firm's escalating commitment to its prior investment.     

How to pay for the war in times of imperfect commitment: Adam Smith and David Ricardo on the sinking fund

The paper proposes a comparative analysis of Smith's and Ricardo's views on the sinking fund. It shows that Smith and Ricardo agreed in stressing the ineffectiveness of the sinking fund as a policy instrument targeted at public debt repayment and tax-burden relief, pointing out that its actual workings had paradoxically helped to increase rather than reduce British total debt-load. Moreover, their explanation of the sinking fund paradox integrates a defective fiscal commitment technology with powerful politicians’ incentives to siphon off the money stored in the sinking fund to meet sudden increases of public expenditure whenever the occasion arose.     

The empirical relationship between commitment enhancement devices and terrorism

An extant theoretical literature attributes the high lethality of violent extremist religious sects (VERSs) to their comparative advantage in assembling coalitions of highly committed operatives and identifies sacrifice and stigma (S&S) and social service provision (SSP) as the primary commitment enhancement devices VERSs employ. However, lack of direct measures of the VERSs’ deployment of these devices has impeded efforts to test the hypothesized effects of S&S and SSP on terrorism. This article exploits the relationship between exogenous variation in the marginal productivities of S&S and SSP as inputs in the production of commitment and variation in VERSs’ employment of these inputs to identify proxies for S&S and SSP. Using data from 158 countries, our cross-sectional estimates of the effects of S&S and SSP on the impact of terrorism are significant and larger than the effects of geographic and political variables that are consistently reported to be both significant and substantial.     

Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment

When a government is unable to commit to its future tax policies, information about taxpayers' characteristics revealed by their behavior may be used to extract more taxes from them in the future. We examine the implications of this ratchet effect for the design of redistributive income and savings tax policies in a two‐period model with two types of individuals who only differ in their skill levels. When commitment is not possible, it may be optimal to separate, pool, or partially pool different types in period one. The nature of the distortions to labor supplies and savings are investigated for each of these three regimes. The identification of the optimal regime is investigated numerically.     

Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.     

Managerial Expectations of Synergy and the Performance of Acquiring Firms: The Contribution of Soft Data

This study examines whether the “soft” information present in merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement press releases contains incrementally valuable news relative to traditional “hard” data. Using the methodology of Loughran and McDonald [2011], we construct measures of synergy expectations and managerial optimism for more than 1,200 M&A announcements over the period 1995–2007. We find that synergy expectations are positively related to announcement period returns, longer-run performance, and the market's reaction to quarterly earnings announcements. Managerial optimism is insignificant for explaining a merger's subsequent performance. We conclude that the soft information contained in M&A announcements concerning synergy expectations can provide useful information to investors.     

The demand for shopping travel: a theoretical and empirical study

The paper is concerned with the development of a basic methodology for the future study of shopping. It is demonstrated how existing methodology fails to allow for some of the most important dimensions of the shopping choice decision. A revised model is developed and tested against specially collected data from a cross-section of households in Sussex. This demonstrates the importance of attraction and accessibility in determining variations in levels of household shopping activity, but the apparent lack of severe time constraints on most households' shopping. It is also shown that the range of choices perceived available is strictly limited. Some suggestions for further revisions, particularly in the definition of the level of shopping activity using expenditure information, are made.     

Soft Strategic Information and IPO Underpricing

Using content analysis, we measure the impact of soft information, derived from words in initial public offering (IPO) registration documents, on IPO pricing efficiency. First, using 2,298 U.S. IPOs from 1996–2008, we find that an IPO document's strategic tone correlates positively with the stock's first-day return; more frequent usage of positive and/or less frequent usage of negative strategic words leads to more IPO underpricing. Second, we find that an IPO document's strategic tone is negatively correlated with the stock's long-run return. Together, these findings imply that investors initially misprice soft information in registration statements, which mispricing is eventually corrected. Additionally, we create new content-analysis libraries for strategic words and introduce a survey-based library creation method and word-weighting system.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

Soft budget constraints and the property rights theory of ownership

Modeling the government make-or-buy decision, Hart and colleagues [Hart, O., Shleifer, S. and Vishny, R.W., 1997, The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1127–1161] assume government providers are exogenously more replaceable than private providers. Instead, we posit government managers' soft incentives arise endogenously from their lack of control rights, because of rationally softer budget constraints.