财政分权下地方政府卫生支出的竞争行为研究

分权体制框架下地级市政府在制定医疗卫生支出决策时往往会受到相邻城市相关策略的影响,从而引发城市间政府卫生支出的策略互动行为.文章选取了2007?2013年中国283个城市面板数据,运用动态空间面板模型检验了分权体制下地市级政府卫生支出的策略互动行为,并揭示出财政分权及其城市间空间策略互动对政府卫生支出的影响.研究发现,地市级政府在政府卫生支出上存在显著的互补型策略互动,这种效应在地理距离相近的同省区城市间更为显著.进一步分析发现,财政分权促进了政府卫生服务供给;而无论是短期还是长期,地市级政府间财政分权的策略互动对政府卫生支出产生明显的抑制作用,从而较好地解释了政府卫生支出比重徘徊不前的原因.由此,积极利用竞争、激励机制以及实现财政体制安排的优化变革来引导政府的卫生服务供给将是重要的政策选择.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

Does fiscal decentralization affect local governments' strategic behaviours? Evidence from South Korea

Local governments tend to show strategic behaviours when making their spending decisions. However, few studies have examined strategic behaviours when promoting fiscal decentralization. Thus, this study empirically examines the presence of strategic interactions in expenditure decisions in South Korea as well as how fiscal decentralization affects those interactions, using a panel data set from 2010 to 2017. The results demonstrate that a local government mimics other governments' spending when those governments' residents share similar age demographics. Moreover, local governments in South Korea engage in strategic interactions as their expenditure side becomes more decentralized. However, local governments tend to demonstrate less isomorphic behaviour in welfare spending decisions when they have higher revenue decentralization. This is because local governments have no motive to emulate other welfare policies, as the central government delegates the provision of social services to local governments by providing grants with strings attached.     

财政支出分权如何影响政府支出预算偏离*

政府支出决算与预算的差异可称之为支出预算偏离，其大小直接关系到现代预算制度的建设和积极财政政策提质增效的效果。预算最大化理论指出地方政府追求自由裁量预算的最大化，这会导致预算支出大于决算支出，而财政支出分权则便利了地方政府追求自由裁量预算最大化的条件，因此，财政支出分权是导致支出预算偏离的一个重要因素。利用1994—2017年全省层面和市县加总层面的财政预决算数据，本文发现，财政支出分权程度越高，政府支出预算偏离的程度也越大。不同形式的稳健性检验较好地支持了上述结论。此外，经济发展水平和财政透明度能够降低财政支出分权对预算偏离影响的程度。合理调整不同层级政府之间的事权，建立事权与支出责任相匹配的财政体制，适度加强中央事权和支出责任，将有效降低政府支出预算偏离的程度。     

财政支出分权如何影响政府支出预算偏离*

政府支出决算与预算的差异可称之为支出预算偏离，其大小直接关系到现代预算制度的建设和积极财政政策提质增效的效果。预算最大化理论指出地方政府追求自由裁量预算的最大化，这会导致预算支出大于决算支出，而财政支出分权则便利了地方政府追求自由裁量预算最大化的条件，因此，财政支出分权是导致支出预算偏离的一个重要因素。利用1994—2017年全省层面和市县加总层面的财政预决算数据，本文发现，财政支出分权程度越高，政府支出预算偏离的程度也越大。不同形式的稳健性检验较好地支持了上述结论。此外，经济发展水平和财政透明度能够降低财政支出分权对预算偏离影响的程度。合理调整不同层级政府之间的事权，建立事权与支出责任相匹配的财政体制，适度加强中央事权和支出责任，将有效降低政府支出预算偏离的程度。     

财政分权与经济增长

对H.Davoodi,D.Xie,and H.Zou的两篇文章中的内生增长模型进行了改进;把地方财政决算支出占国家决算支出的比重看作衡量财政分权的指标,并利用1986-2004年间的数据对财政分权对我国经济增长的作用进行了两组回归分析。发现在1986-1990年间我国的财政分权的比重过高阻碍了我国的经济增长;在1991-2004年间我国的财政分权程度与我国的最大化经济增长相符。最后,对得出的统计结论进行了充分的解释。     

Highway Spending and Induced Vehicle Emissions: Evidence from the US states

This paper investigates the impact of state and local government highway spending on vehicle emissions. A theoretical framework is constructed to show the effect of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions and decompose the effect into a rebound effect, an induced demand effect and an interaction effect. We then develop an empirical strategy and combine state-level data in the US to test the induced CO2 emissions by government highway spending. We find that there are positive and significant total effects of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions. The magnitude of these effects, however, significantly differs from one another as the elasticity of freight vehicle emissions with respect to government highway spending is four times larger than that in the passenger sector. The difference can be plausibly explained by the rebound effect and the interaction effect. We argue that policies regarding government spending on highway projects, especially those relying on cost-benefit analysis, should account for the potential difference in induced environmental impacts between passenger and freight vehicles.     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

Corruption and military spending

Anecdotal evidence relates corruption with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985–1998. The association between military spending and corruption is investigated by using cross-section and panel regression techniques. The results suggest that corruption is associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government spending. The results can be interpreted as evidence that defense spending may be used as a component of an indicator of the quality of governance.     

Private and Givernment Investment: A Study of Three OECD Countries

This paper examines the relationship between private investment and government spending in Australia, Britain and the United States. Since all time series data are stationary in first difference and cointegrated, these series are represented by an error correction model. Variance decomposition and impulse response functions are employed to investigate the effects of government spending on private investment. Generally the empirical results provide limited support for "crowding out" effects of government investment on private investment. The rate of interest and the corporate profit ability showed significant effects on private investment in two out of three cases. [E62, E63]     

Public sector decentralization and school performance: International evidence

Using a panel of international student test scores 1980-2000 (PISA and TIMSS), panel fixed effects estimates suggest that government spending decentralization is conducive to student performance. The effect does not appear to be mediated through levels of educational spending.     

中国政府公共服务职能的地方化及其后果

在当前中国的财政分权背景下,中国政府的公共服务职能划分呈现出地方化的特点,支出责任自上而下地下沉到地方政府。县级政府承担了大量的基本公共服务职能,包括教育、医疗等外溢性较大的职能,但是其政府自身却没有相应的财政收入能力保障这些职能的实现。中国政府公共服务职能地方化、收不抵支的直接后果就是,地方政府基本职能实现必将对财政转移支付、预算外收入等外部资金的依赖。     

Measuring the Human Capital Intensity of Government Spending and its Impact on Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries

This paper contradicts previous findings of a lack of relationship between government spending and long run economic growth. The paper argues that government spending has several opposing effects on growth. I focus on one of these, 'relative wage effects,' involving the human capital intensity of government spending. The paper constructs two rough measures of this variable for a diverse cross-section of countries, and uses them to disentangle relative wage effects from other effects of government spending. The paper finds that, after netting out relative wage effects, government spending is positively correlated with growth across countries. Furthermore, as the theory predicts, relative wage effects appear to be empirically important in countries where (a) government spending comprises a sufficiently large share of aggregate spending, and (b) government spending is particularly human capital-intensive.     

财政分权是否影响了公共教育供给——基于理论模型与地级面板数据的研究

1994年分税制改革在提升了中央财权的同时,却使地方政府事权负担加重。这种支出的财政分权可能使地方政府减少公共服务的供给,比如公共教育供给。文章首先分析了产生该现象的主要原因,然后构建理论模型,基于1996-2007年全国地级面板数据进行实证研究,结果证明财政分权确实减少了公共教育供给。文章进一步做了不同教育阶段和不同地区的对比。依据分析结果,文章对改进公共教育供给提出了财政体制方面的政策建议。     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

Fiscal crises,decentralization, and indiscipline

How does fiscal decentralization influence fiscal discipline and the probability of a fiscal crisis? Discrete choice analysis used with panel data reveals that crisis probability is associated positively with spending decentralization and negatively with vertical fiscal imbalance. These effects are prevalent in countries with a higher degree of tax revenue decentralization, while a stronger rule of law mitigates such adverse decentralization effects. The findings imply that reduced risk sharing against local shocks under tax revenue decentralization destabilizes the sustainability of a nation's fiscal system. Therefore, policymakers should be cognizant of the undesirable impacts of decentralization on fiscal crisis and indiscipline.     

Political incentives and local government spending multiplier: Evidence for Chinese provinces (1978–2016)

This paper uses data from Chinese provinces to examine the effects of political incentives of provincial leaders on local government spending multipliers over the post-economic-reform period. The estimation based on the local projection method provides three novel findings. Firstly, the estimated cumulative relative government spending multiplier is well above unity, and it is greater in the period after 1994 compared with before 1994. Secondly, the political incentives of provincial leaders augment the local government spending multipliers, and the effects are highly significant after 1994. Thirdly, the economic boom strengthens the augmenting effects of political incentives after 1994.     

分权体制下的民主参与、政府响应程度和公共品供需偏差

文章考察了当前背景下政府对地方民众公共品需求偏好的响应能力,利用1998～2008年期间的公共支出样本值测算了中国地方公共支出偏差指数,并引入不同选区人大代表指标作为民主参与的工具变量,以此体现政府响应能力。实证结果发现,财政分权、民主参与和公共品供需偏差三个变量之间存在着显著的内生关联;分权体制导致了政府公共品供给扭曲,而民主参与则部分抵消了公共品供需偏差。     

The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens' preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a 'natural laboratory' for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens.