Evaluating how predictable errors in expected income affect consumption

This article studies whether anomalies in consumption can be explained by a behavioural model in which agents make predictable errors in forecasting income. We use a micro-data set containing subjective expectations about future income. This article shows that the null hypothesis of rational expectations is rejected in favour of the behavioural model, since consumption responds to predictable forecast errors. On average, agents who we predict are too pessimistic increase consumption after the predictable positive income shock. On average, agents who are too optimistic reduce the consumption.     

Rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria in an overlapping-generations economy

There are two theories for the treatment of market uncertainty: rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria. This paper shows how the game-theoretic solution concept of rationalizable expectations can be applied to an overlapping-generations exchange economy. Some general properties of these equilibria are discussed. It is shown that rationalizable-expectations equilibria are the predictions yielded by considering sunspot equilibria in which probability beliefs may differ across individuals. This result allows for a new interpretation of sunspot equilibria and helps to understand their relevance.     

Are Rational Expectations Equilibria with Private Information Eductively Stable?

The paper derives conditions for eductive stability of rational expectations equilibria in simple linear economic models with private information. Following Guesnerie (1992; 2002), the concept of eductive stability is used. It is shown that even in a private information setting, rational expectations equilibria might be justified as a result of mental process of reasoning of the agents. The paper considers an equilibrium concept, where the agents are unable to condition their forecasts on the actual market price. It is shown that eductive stability in this case requires that a condition is satisfied that is also relevant in the symmetric information case. This condition is compared to the respective stability condition that must hold if agents are able to use the current market price as an additional source of information. It turns out that the conditions for eductive stability that emerge under both equilibrium concepts differ.revised version received September 11, 2003     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

宏观经济政策是否有效——基于理性预期模型的分析

自《通论》发表以来,关于宏观经济政策是否有效的争论一直贯穿于整个宏观经济学界。因此,从理性预期模型出发,对于宏观经济政策是否有效进行了再分析,通过博弈论思想的引入探究了宏观经济政策能否达到理想效果。在对扩张性宏观经济政策实际效果进行分析时指出了为何会出现“滞涨”,为何近年中国经济能够实现高增长低通胀的问题。     

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods

This paper extends the research on incentive compatible institutions for the provision of public goods by imposing a minimum contribution that must be met in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of the public good. Excluding individuals who do not contribute at least the minimum transforms the linear n-player pure public goods game to an n-player coordination game with multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The experimental results show that exclusion increases contributions to the public good in most cases. However, an increase in contributions may not be sufficient to increase social welfare because there is a welfare cost to excluding individuals when the good is non-rival. Furthermore, exclusion can decrease both contributions and welfare in environments in which individuals fail to coordinate their contributions. The results are sensitive to the minimum contribution requirement and to the relative returns from the public and private alternatives.     

How do advertised brands benefit from private labels? An application of rational expectations models

Private labels have traditionally been viewed as a threat to advertised brands. Contrary to traditional wisdom, this study uses a two-asset rational expectations model to show that advertised brands could benefit from private labels. While the manufacturer’s advertising creates product differentiation, the retailer’s synchronous pricing strategy further enhances the product differentiation and raises profits as well as the efficiency of price discounts for the advertised brand. In addition, the existence of private labels improves the advertising efficiency, especially for newly introduced brands. The economic role of private labels is not limited to taking a free ride on the manufacturer’s advertising efforts, and this role cannot be replaced by another advertised brand.     

Learning to believe in nonrational expectations that support pareto-superior outcomes

I consider the prototype New Keynesian macroeconomic model with subjective demand expectations of firms. In this model the firms' objective demand is log-linear in their relative price. Firms believe that their demand curve is linear or log-linear in their absolute price. They estimate the parameters of this curve by least squares from past observations on prices and quantities. The wage rate either clears the labor market given firms' demand perceptions or is given in the short run and changes according to a linear Phillips curve. In either setup of the model the interplay between learning and price setting confirms the subjective model. Among the long-run equilibria are solutions at which the representative household attains a higher level of utility as compared to the rational-expectations outcome. If the supply of labor depends upon the real wage, money is not neutral.     

Money demand, the Cagan model, testing rational expectations vs adaptive expectations: The case of Turkey

This paper estimates the Cagan type demand for money function for Turkish economy during the period 1986:1–1995:3 and tests whether Cagan's specification fits the Turkish data using an econometric technique assuming that forecasting errors are stationary. This paper also tests the hypothesis that monetary policy was implemented in aiming to maximize the inflation tax revenue. Finally, the Cagan model is estimated with the additional assumption of rational expectations for Turkey for the considered period. First version received: March 1998/final version received: October 1998     

The random walk versus unbiased efficiency: can we separate the wheat from the chaff?

Abstract:

In the issue under investigation the wheat cannot be separated from the chaff because all we have is chaff. The random walk and unbiased efficiency are equally bad forecasters that should not be used as benchmarks for measuring forecasting accuracy. The simulation and econometric results show that when two forecasters are not independent they produce forecasts of similar quality, in which case it is erroneous to use the forward rate as a forecaster and the spot rate as a benchmark. Theoretical and intuitive explanations are presented for why the random walk and unbiased efficiency produce poor-quality forecasts that are almost identical. The failure of unbiased efficiency is explained primarily in terms of the post Keynesian view of the forward exchange rate.     

How does the diversity of investors’ beliefs affect stock price informativeness?

A growing number of studies have investigated the role of stock prices in aggregating private information and guiding resource reallocation. However, this article may be the first attempt to study how the diversity of beliefs affects stock price informativeness. The framework of the noisy rational expectations model shows that stock informativeness is determined by both the precision and use of private information in trading. If private beliefs about the value are highly diverse, the aggregate average opinion revealed in a stock’s price will be more accurate and, thus, more informative. As the price becomes more informative, however, individual investors will rely less on their private information. When this occurs, less private information will be absorbed in price, which, in turn, reduces price informativeness. Our model shows that the relationship between belief diversity and price informativeness is U-shaped in equilibrium.     

理性预期学派货币中性理论在中国的实证检验

利用中国1994年以来的经济数据,通过建立ARIMA模型和二阶段OLS模型对理性预期学派货币中性理论进行了检验。实证结果显示,短期内中国预期的货币供给冲击与非预期的货币供给冲击对产出都有显著影响,且非预期的货币供给冲击对产出影响更明显;但从长期看,预期货币与非预期货币对产出的正负效应相互抵消,中国货币政策表现为长期渐近中性。     

Valuation in the Lab

Experimental methods have proven useful to explore the power and limits to nonmarket valuation through stated preference methods. We now understand better how people learn about and react to the incentives, institutions, and information created by surveys. This paper briefly reviews topics in experimental valuation, including ex ante bias corrections, ex post bias calibration, and examining the circumstances that strengthen or weaken the economist’s presumption of rational valuation.