Theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings and political connections: firms level evidence from a developing economy

In this paper, we revisit the theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings while concentrating on the effect of political connections. In particular, we postulate two competing hypotheses for the effects that political connections can have on cash holdings: ‘substitution effect hypothesis’ and ‘complementary effect hypothesis’. Using the data on Pakistani firms over the period 2002–2010, we find that connected firms hold significantly larger cash reserves than their non-connected counterparts, thus confirming the ‘complementary hypothesis’, which suggests that agency problems lead connected firms to accumulate large amount of cash. Further, this effect is found to be more pronounced in dictatorial as opposed to democratic regimes indicating the presence of higher degrees of political patronage in that period. Finally, we also find differences in the complementary effect based on firm characteristics. Our results suggest that the firm size and leverage have increasing effects on the cash holdings of connected firms, contrary to the mainstream literature standpoint.     

State ownership,political connections and entry barriers: evidence from China

Private enterprises may encounter high industrial barriers in China because of government administrative restrictions. We analyse the effect of partial state ownership on a privately controlled company’s participation in industries with state-imposed barriers. The results indicate that state ownership in privately controlled enterprises has a significantly positive effect on participation in high barrier industries. After controlling for partial state ownership, we find that personal political identity of entrepreneurs, a previously investigated dimension of political connections, becomes less important in explaining private enterprises’ participation in barrier industries. We also find the effect of state ownership on access to barrier industries will become weaker when local economy is more developed.     

Effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints: new evidence from privatization in China

Taking advantage of the SOEs privatization events in China, our research looks to identify the causal effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints. In a difference-in-differences framework, we demonstrate that after the transfer of control from state to private owners, privatized SOEs hoard more cash, save more cash from incremental cash flow, and exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of investment.     

Political connections and corporate performance: Evidence from Pakistan

This study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a hand‐collected dataset of Pakistani firms from 2008–2014, our firm fixed effects and Heckman two‐stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without political ties. Moreover, we show channels through which political benefits are realized in terms of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries.     

Political connections,ownership structure and private-equity placement decision: evidence from Chinese listed firms

In contrast with many other countries, Chinese listed firms must obtain approval to make private-equity placements (PEPs) from the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a state bureau that regulates capital market financing. We analyse the role of political connection (PC) and ownership structures when accessing private equity (PE) market, while investigating the mechanisms through which political ties operate within the regulatory process of PEPs. The findings suggest that PCs do not contribute to the firm’s decision to apply for PEPs, but firms with state-ownership demonstrate a higher propensity to apply for PEPs. PC and state-ownership appear to help firms to obtain approval from the CSRC, and these firms are treated more favourably than their rivals without such connections. Politically connected firms spend less time in managing bureaucracy, but PC and state-ownership negatively affect proceeds from the PE market in China. Firms with politically connected directors with professional business backgrounds tend to spend less time managing the CSRC, and these professionals positively affect proceeds from the PE market in China. This study provides important insights for policy-makers, investors, PE issuing firms and security market regulators.     

Operational risk,the legal system and governance indicators: a country-level analysis

A total of 4388 operational loss events recorded over three decades in 53 countries are analysed on a country level in terms of the size of the economy, the standard of living, the legal system, the regional factor and six governance indicators. The results show that the average severity of the operational losses incurred by firms located in a particular country is positively related to the size of the economy and the standard of living. The results also show that loss of severity is negatively related to governance indicators, particularly regulatory quality. The frequency of operational loss events is also positively related to the size of the economy.     

Effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility reports: evidence from China

This article investigates effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. By using a unique longitude data set of Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2016, this study finds that ownership structure and board characteristics are significantly associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. In particular, our study finds that state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board size are positively and significantly associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. However, board independence is not related to the decision. We also find CEO duality is negatively and significantly related to the decision. Our findings highlight the role of corporate governance in firms’ transparency by influencing the voluntary disclosure of additional information on firms’ CSR activities.     

Political connections and labor investment efficiency: Evidence from China's private firms

This study investigates whether political connections affect labor investment efficiency. We test this question in the context of China's private firms, where we find that political connections are negatively associated with labor investment efficiency. We also explore the channels through which political connections reduce labor investment efficiency and provide evidence that political connections aggravate both agency problems and information asymmetry. Further tests show that the influence of political connections is more pronounced for firms with overinvestment problems or high-level political connections, and for firms from regions facing severe unemployment or loose anticorruption. Overall, our results are consistent with the “grabbing hand” argument that politicians destroy firm operational efficiency.     

Corporate governance,human capital,and productivity: evidence from Chinese non-listed firms

This article analyses the effects of corporate governance (CG) and human capital on productivity by using the 1999–2006 data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The findings of this study are twofold. First, CG and human capital generate significant positive effects on the productivity of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Second, CG has significantly different moderate and mediate effects on the relationship between human capital and productivity. Our results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. This study provides clear policy implications by suggesting that the firms in emerging markets, especially SOEs, must improve their CG and their allocation of human capital for them to enhance their productivity.     

Corporate governance and efficiency in banking: evidence from emerging economies

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the impact of corporate governance on bank efficiency across a sample of 139 commercial banks from 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the period 2005–2012. Data on governance characteristics are hand-collected from banks’ reports. The empirical findings indicate that implementing rigorous corporate governance structures is associated with higher costs for banks and a lower level of efficiency. However, during the crisis, a tight governance mechanism significantly increases banks’ cost and technical efficiencies. We also show that prudent risk management is associated with both higher cost and technical efficiency for more capitalized banks, while rigid supervisory boards are linked with greater technical efficiency for more capitalized banks.     

Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms

This paper examines the role of affiliation with the ruling Communist Party in the operation of private enterprises in China. Using a nationwide survey of private firms, we find that the Party membership of private entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the performance of their firms when human capital and other relevant variables are controlled. We further find that Party membership helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions, and affords them more confidence in the legal system. Finally, we find Party membership to be more important to firm performance in regions with weaker market institutions and weaker legal protection.     

Firm value in commonly uncertain times: the divergent effects of corporate governance and CSR

Economic uncertainty disrupts firms’ ability to create value. Most related literature examines how various organizational characteristics affect value under extreme conditions – the global financial crisis. However, recent work in quantifying economic uncertainty now makes it possible to take a more nuanced approach in investigating the conditions under which this value reduction can be mitigated during more ‘commonly uncertain’ periods. In this paper we analyze the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and social responsibility investments on Tobin’s q across 13 years and 40 countries. Evidence suggests that shareholder-centric corporate governance policies restrict board and executive flexibility during uncertain times, and therefore stifle their ability to react effectively to adverse macroeconomic changes. We also find that CSR initiatives serve as insurance in that they preserve value under uncertainty by acting as a reservoir of social capital.     

Impact of macroeconomic factors and country risk ratings on GCC stock markets: evidence from a dynamic panel threshold model with regime switching

This study examines the non-linear relationship between stock markets in GCC countries and their country risk ratings as well as with major macroeconomic factors. Based on a dynamic panel threshold model with two and four regimes, the results provide evidence of short-term asymmetry between first-lagged GCC stock returns and the performance of GCC stock markets. In addition, only the financial risk (FR) rating has a significant positive effect on the performance of GCC stock markets according to the prevailing regimes for the GCC lagged returns and the Brent oil market. Among the macroeconomic factors, improvements in the global stock markets, the MSCI Global Islamic Index, and the oil price increased the performance of GCC stock markets, whereas increases in the gold price, the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, and the U.S. Treasury bond rate reduced the performance of the GCC stock markets. These results have important implications for investors, policymakers, and portfolio managers.     

The governance of privatized firms: authority,reposnisbility and disclosure1

In any market economy, a fundamental question is how to make management accountable to shareholders and also to the requirements of law. This paper raises selective, critical issues of corporate governance that are particularly relevant to problems of the accountability of boards of directors to their shareholders in transition economies. These issues include the separation of ownership and control and the duties of directors; the need for disclosure given that separation; and the corporate charter as a vehicle for the direct participation of shareholders in governance. The paper suggests that one of the best models of corporate governance that transition economies can use is that employed by the leveraged-buyout (LBO) and venture capital funds operating in the West. It argues that weaknesses in corporate governance may undermine the entire privatization process. Economics and law are too often seen as separate disciplines. In reality, they come together in transition economies perhaps with greater impact than elsewhere.     

Debt and corporate governance in emerging economiesEvidence from India1

We analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large emerging economy, India, where debt has been an important source of external finance. Using cross‐sectional data on listed manufacturing firms we estimate, simultaneously, the relation between Tobin's Q and leverage for three years, 1996, 2000 and 2003. Our analysis indicates that while in the early years of institutional change, debt did not have any disciplinary effect on either standalone or group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appeared in the later years as institutions became more market oriented. We also find limited evidence of debt being used as an expropriation mechanism in group firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. In general, our results highlight the role of ownership structures and institutions in debt governance.     

Fiscal decentralization and corporate investment: empirical evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on levels and efficiency of corporate investment. The results indicate that as the extent of local government fiscal decentralization increases, the level of new investment by firms under their jurisdiction rises. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization has an impact on corporate investment by aggravating over-investment rather than alleviating under-investment, leading to a situation whereby fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with investment efficiency at the level of the firm. Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralization on over-investment, under-investment and investment efficiency is not different between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, suggesting that economic leverages are the dominant government intervention measures. The findings imply that fiscal decentralization is another determinant of firm-level investment and corporate investment efficiency, which broadens the existing literature on the economic consequence of fiscal decentralization, resulting in important implications for policy-making.     

市场风险与信用风险:风险管理中存在的悖论

利率、汇率波动的加剧,使金融衍生市场的风险成为影响金融体系稳定运行的最重要因素之一。在金融风险定价理论和资产组合技术的支持下,金融衍生工具已成为防范基础性金融风险的有效工具。但金融衍生工具在用于金融风险管理中也存在市场风险、信用风险、流动性风险等基本金融风险。不仅存在着市场风险与信用风险的替代性,还存在着加大金融风险总量的可能。金融风险管理的实质是寻求风险损失与风险收益的平衡。     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Working capital management and corporate governance: a new pathway for assessing firm performance

This study reports the relationship of working capital management (WCM) and corporate governance (CG) on firm performance (FP) using system generalized method of moments (SGMM). SGMM controls potential sources of endogeneity. This study uses US listed firms and includes two stages. In the first stage, the individual impact of WCM and CG on FP is examined. In the second stage, the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP is examined. The study finds that efficient WCM and good CG practices do affect FP on both an individual basis and on a collective basis. Therefore, this study recommends that the impact of WCM, being a short-term performance indicator, and CG, being a long-term indicator should be considered collectively in the future while investigating financial FP.     

Foreign investors and corporate social responsibility: evidence from the career advancement of women in Japan

I examine whether foreign investors invest in firms that encourage the career advancement of women by using data from a sample of Japanese firms during the period 2008–2011. First, I find that corporate governance reform and work-life balance practices facilitate the promotion of women to higher positions in firms. Furthermore, I find that foreign investors hold more shares of firms that encourage the career advancement of women. Overall, these results indicate that the career advancement of women, as a part of corporate social responsible activities, benefits foreign investors.