Inflation targeting credibility and sovereign risk: evidence from Colombia

This article relates to the literature on sovereign risk in developing countries. In particular, we present empirical evidence to address the effect of inflation targeting credibility on sovereign risk based on the Colombian experience. The findings denote that credibility is an important improvement in the institutional framework to reduce the sovereign risk premium.     

The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt: empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy

This study relates to the literature regarding credibility effect on public debt for developing economies under inflation targeting. The novelty is the investigation of effects of both monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt and its management. The main idea is that high credibility might improve public debt management. With this purpose, this paper addresses empirical evidence based on the Brazilian experience. The findings denote that credibility is an important instrument to improve the public debt management under inflation targeting.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

Central Bank Independence,Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia

Colombia undertook reform of its central bank in 1991, pushing it in the direction of greater independence. We find that this reform led to a significant decrease in the level of inflation, as well as inflation uncertainty, suggesting an increase in credibility. However, there has also been an increase in inflation persistence since reform. The lower mean but greater persistence of inflation indicates that central bank independence has shifted the Phillips curve inward but also flattened it, a result consistent with recent research for the Euro-zone and the United States. Finally, further analysis reveals that, in accordance with the Friedman-Ball hypothesis, higher inflation raises uncertainty in Colombia, but that uncertainty does not increase inflation.     

Young democracies and government debt: evidence from South America

I test the hypothesis that when democracies are young, or still fragile and unconsolidated, government debt tends to increase, presumably because of increased demand for redistribution, or to buy out the electorate, so that democracy becomes acceptable and “the only game in town”. I use a sample of all South American young democracies during the 1970–2007 period and the results, based on dynamic panel time-series analysis, suggest that those young democracies are indeed associated with larger government debt. Furthermore, I test the hypothesis that the outgoing dictatorships of the day bequeathed the young democracies with large government debt. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the analysis. Lastly, there is no evidence that, as those democracies mature over time, government debt tends to decrease. Given how I conduct the exercise, that is, the nature of the sample, the methodology I use and the counterfactuals I run, and also that there are always new episodes of democratisation being experienced by different countries around the world, with some being economically successful and others less so, the results I report are informative of what to expect in terms of government debt during political transitions into democracy when particular institutions are still not in place.     

A Keynesian explanation of Indian government bond yields

Abstract

John Maynard Keynes held that the central bank’s actions mainly determine long-term interest rates through short-term interest rates and various monetary policy measures. His conjectures about the determinants of long-term interest rates were made in the context of advanced capitalist economies and were based on his views on liquidity preference, ontological uncertainty, and the formation of investors’ expectations. Is Keynes’s conjecture that the central bank’s action is the main driver of long-term interest rates valid in emerging markets, such as India? This paper empirically investigates the determinants of changes in Indian government bonds’ nominal yields. Changes in short-term interest rates, after controlling for other crucial variables, such as changes in the rate of inflation and the rate of economic activity, take a lead role in driving the changes of the nominal yields of Indian government bonds. This suggests that Keynes’s views on long-term interest rates can also be applicable to emerging markets. The empirical findings reveal that higher fiscal deficits do not appear to exert upward pressures on government bond yields in India.     

中央银行票据:终将消逝的政策工具

本文对我国2002年以来发行中央银行票据的背景和调控原理进行了分析.从我国货币政策和汇率政策协调的角度看,中央银行票据的发行是这两大政策冲突的表现,是货币当局试图同时实现人民币内外币值稳定的无奈之举.作者解释了中央银行票据无力承担主流政策工具的理由,并认为国债在未来将最终代替中央银行票据成为货币当局操作的主要政策工具.     

Temporary work and neoliberal government policy: evidence from British Columbia,Canada

We examine the impact of government policy on the incidence of temporary work by analysing the case of British Columbia (BC), Canada. The analysis is based upon the Canadian Labour Force Survey 1997–2004; temporary work is defined as work that is not expected to last for more than 6 months and includes seasonal, fixed‐term, casual, and temporary help agency work. A case study of BC provides a valuable opportunity to assess the impacts of neoliberal government policy, designed to increase labour market flexibility, on the extent of temporary work because we are able to compare labour market trends in BC both before and after the reforms introduced in 2001 and to compare BC with other provinces in Canada that were not subject to such large changes in their policy environments. We find that the shift to neoliberal policies in BC led to significant increases in the likelihood of workers finding themselves in temporary employment. We also find that the likelihood of being a temporary worker in BC in the post‐policy change period increases relative to all other provinces over the same period. Taken together, these results indicate that government policy is a key determinant of the level of temporary work. As such, the level of temporary work should be seen as a policy‐sensitive variable, rather than as a phenomenon determined solely by the exogenous forces of globalization and technological change.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

The effects of local government investment on economic growth and employment: evidence from transitional China

Based on the panel data of 28 provinces in the year of 1987-2001,this paper examines the effects of the local government investment on economic growth and employment.The empirical result shows that the local government investment plays a significant positive role in economic growth and emplovment.However,while the proportion of local government investment to GDP had a remarkable rise after 1998.the elasticity of local government investment on economic growth declined,which shows that there is a hig room for raising the efficiency of local government mvestment.Moreover,the empirical examination shows that although local government investment had positive effect on employment,the elasticity had a decrease after 1994 when the tax-sharing system reform was put into practice.This shows that the positive role of local government investment on emplovment is also limited.This paper argues that the role of local governments as investors must be weakened,and local governments of different levels should lessen direct economic intervention and concentrate on public regulation.     

Monetary policy credibility and macrodynamics: evidence from Ghana

We compute a time-varying metric of monetary policy credibility based on Ghana’s experience, using both symmetric and asymmetric approaches. We then follow-up with some empirical evidence to address the linkages between macroeconomic developments and central bank credibility. The empirical results reveal high and low credibility cycles with an average duration of 2 years over the study period. Particularly, higher levels of credibility were associated with stable domestic currency and lower nominal interest rates. This reinforces the notion that efficient monetary policy delivers higher central bank credibility with better outcomes for macroeconomic variables. In contrast, the level of credibility tends to worsen in the wake of weakening macro fundamentals which are not adequately countered by monetary policy decisions. There is therefore the need for efficient monetary policy formulation to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment in Ghana. This will in the long-run build policy credibility towards attaining the central bank’s medium-term inflation target.     

Politically connected managers,government ownership and corporate socially responsible investments: evidence from China

We investigated the effects of politically connected managers on the corporate socially responsible investments of firms with different types of ownership. The results show that SOEs with politically connected managers are more likely to invest in corporate socially responsible investments compared to SOEs without such managers. However, private firms with politically connected managers are less likely to invest in corporate socially responsible investments than private firms without such managers.     

Abnormal returns before acquisition announcements: evidence from Europe

Acquisition announcements influence the stock price of target firms, providing an opportunity for insiders to obtain significant abnormal returns. We study the presence of positive abnormal returns before the announcement date, in target firms, quoted in Euronext markets (Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Portugal) from 2001 to 2007. We investigate whether the pre-announcement run-up of prices can be explained by rumours in the media and the percentage of capital previously owned by the bidding firm, among other factors. We examine cumulative abnormal returns in an event window of 60 days prior the acquisition announcement, with the event date adjusted for the previous disclosure of news about the acquisition, in the media. We compute a run-up index, and find that there are abnormal positive returns before the announcement date, confirming previous studies. We find that a significant part of the run-up is explained by: (i) market anticipation triggered by legitimate sources of information, namely, rumours in the media about the possibility of an acquisition bid and (ii) the percentage of capital previously owned in the target firm, by the bidding firm.     

Volatility spillovers and macroeconomic announcements: evidence from crude oil markets

The paper applies an event study methodologyaims to investigate the macroeconomic announcements effects on Standard&Poor’s500 and oil prices. Our results provide evidence for a significant impact of the US macroeconomic news on oil prices. This impact is split into two components, namely the direct effect (common response) and indirect effect (volatility transmission). Altogether our results show that the volatility transmission is bidirectional. Not only a significant volatility transmission from the oil market to the US stock market is revealed, but also a high volatility transmission is recorded from the oil market to the stock market especially after the release of consumption indicators.     

Socioeconomic stratification and stereotyping: lab-in-the-field evidence from Colombia

In this study, we test the hypothesis that the Colombian system of socioeconomic stratification (SES), which ranks dwellings from one to six to calculate utility (public services) rates, may induce discrimination. To this end, a field experiment with around 1000 participants from Bogotá is carried out. The design includes a combination of a trust game and a dictator game and SES-contingent decisions. Results exclude the presence of pure preferences for discrimination, yet they confirm that low strata are associated with stereotypes of low trustworthiness. We also observe significant prosocial behavior in the low-income population, and most strikingly, we do not observe any difference in trustworthiness across different income levels.     

Imperfect credibility,sticky wages,and welfare

This paper studies optimal monetary policy under imperfect credibility in a New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting. In our imperfect credibility framework, the central bank commits to a policy plan but occasionally reneges on past promises with a given common knowledge probability. We find that the welfare gains from increasing credibility are approximately linear on the initial credibility level. We also find that the output-inflation stabilisation trade-off is nonmonotonic as higher credibility does not always reduce output volatility. The variance decomposition shows that wage markup shocks are the main driver of economic fluctuations and that these shocks are better contained, even in relative terms, when credibility is high. We then show that the degree of credibility impacts the effect of wage flexibility on welfare. When credibility is low, monetary policy is less potent and the economy can experience a feedback loop between wage volatility and price volatility. We show, though, that once wage markup shocks are taken into account, wage flexibility is usually welfare improving.     

The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

The effects of learning and signaling on money demand: With an application to heterodox inflation stabilization programs

This paper develops a nonlinear vector autoregression of inflation and money growth subject to changes in regime. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are conjectured to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to observe directly whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program. However, as part of their money demand decision, agents construct probability inferences regarding the regime. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime.  This specification is estimated using data from the Israeli and Argentine high-inflation periods. Results indicate that the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government's signaling might simplify the agents' inference problem and increase the speed of their learning but, under certain conditions, it might also increase inflation volatility. Welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their money demand in the short-term even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level. First version received: August 1998/Final version received: January 1999     

The effectiveness of capital controls: evidence from Colombia and Thailand

In the run up to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 many developing nations were subject to massive inflows of capital, capital that their financial systems found difficult to absorb. One of a number of policy options to respond to such inflows is unremunerated reserve requirements (URR). Two countries, Colombia and Thailand, deployed URR in the second half of the decade. This paper analyses the effectiveness of the URR in those two instances. We find that URRs were modestly successful in Colombia and Thailand. In Colombia, the controls were able stem an asset bubble in the stock market. In Thailand, the URR reduced the overall volume of flows, and the announcement of the URR caused a sharp drop in asset prices. However, some of the other goals of capital controls were not fulfilled. The results in this paper demonstrate that there is still a role for capital controls in the twenty-first century, but such controls should be more sophisticated than in years past.     

General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard

Summary. This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions. They then act in a Radner-type economy with the previously designed securities. Consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., taking prices as given). An equilibrium concept is adapted for these moral hazard economies and its existence is proven. It is shown through an example how incentive motives might lead to the endogenous emergence of financial incompleteness.Received: 18 March 2002, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D82, G10, G22.This paper is based on an essay from my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago. I am thankful for comments from Fernando Alvarez, Rodrigo Cerda, Pierre-André Chiappori, Rubens P. Cysne, Carlos E. da Costa, Milton Harris, Lars Stole, Juan P. Torres-Martínez, Paulo K. Monteiro, Philip Reny, Iván Werning, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the 6th SAET Conference and the 22th SBE Meeting. Financial support from CNPq is gratefully acknowledged.