Liquidity Trading in Market Microstructure Theory

Liquidity trading is an important component of market microstructure models. In most cases, its role is primarily to ensure existence of equilibrium and therefore that trading occurs among asymmetrically informed agents. While most market microstructure models allege that agents trade based upon rational expectations, the rationality of the type of liquidity trading assumed in these models remains to be verified. Specifically, liquidity traders are often assumed to submit price-inelastic orders for reasons exogenous to the model at hand. But whether price-inelastic trading is consistent with rational utility maximizing behavior remains to be shown.     

Liquidity Externalities and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Trading after Hours

This paper examines liquidity externalities by analyzing trading costs after hours. There is less than 1/20 as many trades per unit time after hours as during the trading day. The reduced trading activity results in substantially higher trading costs: quoted and effective spreads are three to four times larger than during the trading day. The higher spreads reflect greater adverse selection and order persistence, but not higher dealer profits. Because liquidity provision remains competitive after hours, the greater adverse selection and higher trading costs provide a direct measure of the magnitude of the liquidity externalities generated during the trading day.     

Liquidity Provision and Noise Trading: Evidence from the Investment Dartboard Column

How does increased noise trading affect market liquidity and trading costs? We use The Wall Street Journal's “Investment Dartboard” column, which stimulates noise trading, as a natural experiment to evaluate models of the bid-ask spread. We find that substantial increases in trading volume and significant but temporary abnormal returns occur when analysts recommend stocks in this column, especially when recommendations come from analysts with successful contest track records. We also find an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

Optimal Liquidity Trading

A liquidity trader wishes to trade a fixed number of shares within a certain time horizon and to minimize the mean and variance of the costs of trading. Explicit formulas for the optimal trading strategies show that risk-averse liquidity traders reduce their order sizes over time and execute a higher fraction of their total trading volume in early periods when price volatility or liquidity increases. In the presence of transaction fees, traders want to trade less often when either price volatility or liquidity goes up or when the speed of price reversion declines. In the multi-asset case, price effects across assets have a substantial impact on trading behavior.We are grateful to Prajit Dutta and Larry Glosten for numerous conversations and comments and to Marc Lipson for help with the Plexus data. Comments and suggestions of the referee and the editor, Josef Zechner, helped us improve the paper. We also thank the participants of the Chicago Board of Trade 13th Annual European Futures Research Symposium 2000 and the participants of the EFA Annual Meetings 2001.     

Insider Trading around Dividend Announcements: Theory and Evidence

The informational role of strategic insider trading around corporate dividend announcements is studied based on the efficient equilibrium in a signalling model with endogenous insider trading. Insider trading immediately prior to the announcement of dividend initiations has significant explanatory power. For firms with insider selling prior to the dividend initiation announcement, the excess returns are negative and significantly lower than for the remaining firms (with no insider trading or just insider buying) as implied by our model. Another implication is that dividend increases may elicit a positive or negative stock price response depending on the firm's investment opportunities.     

Asset Liquidity and Stock Liquidity: International Evidence

This study examines the relationship between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that firms with greater asset liquidity on average have higher stock liquidity. More importantly, our study shows that asset liquidity plays a more significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty in countries with poor information environment. For example, we find that the asset–stock liquidity relationship is stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. We further find evidence that after the adoption of IFRS, the improved accounting information environment results in a weaker asset–stock liquidity relation, but only in countries with a strong legal regime. Finally, our study shows that the positive asset–stock liquidity relationship may be attributed to transparency and/or liquidity reasons.     

Market Liquidity and Trading Activity

Previous studies of liquidity span short time periods and focus on the individual security. In contrast, we study aggregate market spreads, depths, and trading activity for U.S. equities over an extended time sample. Daily changes in market averages of liquidity and trading activity are highly volatile and negatively serially dependent. Liquidity plummets significantly in down markets. Recent market volatility induces a decrease in trading activity and spreads. There are strong day-of-the-week effects; Fridays accompany a significant decrease in trading activity and liquidity, while Tuesdays display the opposite pattern. Long- and short-term interest rates influence liquidity. Depth and trading activity increase just prior to major macroeconomic announcements.     

Episodic Liquidity Crises: Cooperative and Predatory Trading

We describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants. We first solve a one‐period trading game in continuous‐time, using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading. Then, in a multi‐period framework, we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction, providing apparent liquidity to one another. Cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high, leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity. Equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity, but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down.     

The Effects of Trading Methods on Volatility and Liquidity: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange

This study contrasts the call and continuous auction methods using Taiwan Stock Exchange data. Volatility under the call market method is approximately one-half of that under the continuous auction method. The call market method is more effective in reducing the volatility of high-volume stocks than low-volume stocks. This contradicts conventional wisdom which suggests that the call market method is superior for thinly traded stocks, while the continuous auction method is preferred for heavily traded stocks. The call market method does not impair liquidity and price discovery. The call market appears more efficient than in the continuous auction market.     

Multimarket Contact and Profitability in Banking: Evidence from Italy

In this paper we test the theory according to which multimarket contact is a crucial factor hampering competition among firms, because it lowers the incentive to behave aggressively in one market if there is fear that rivals retaliate in other common markets. We consider the Italian banking industry in the period 2002–2005, employing both market-level and firm-level data. The empirical evidence supports theory predictions, since profitability is positively related to the average number of contacts among banks, and appear to be higher for those credit institutions experiencing more links. This result has also policy implications, given the increasing consolidation (and hence the growing number of interactions in local markets) that has characterized this sector in the last years.

Short‐ and Long‐Term Effects of Multimarket Trading

We analyze short‐ and long‐term effects of multimarket trading by examining the entries of multiple markets into transacting three ETFs, DIA, QQQ, and SPY. We find that large‐scale entries improve overall market quality, while small‐scale entries have ambiguous effects. Our results show that the competition effect dominates the fragmentation effect over a long horizon and that market fragmentation leads to a decline in trading costs. Further, we find that the order handling rules help mitigate the fragmentation effect and facilitate the competition effect. We do not find that multimarket trading harms price efficiency or increases price volatility.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

Insider Trading, Investment, and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis

We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto efficient, because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff-relevant information via prices—arising from insider trading—benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving risk-sharing among them.     

Strategic Trading, Liquidity, and Information Acquisition

We study endogenous liquidity trading in a market with long-livedasymmetric information. We distinguish between public information,tractable information that can be acquired, and intractableinformation that cannot be acquired. Besides information asymmetryand noise, the adverse-selection spread depends on the diffusionof intractable information and on the interest rate. With endogenousliquidity trading, efficiency is lower than that implied bynoise-trading models. Liquidity traders benefit from the informationreleased through the insider's trades in spite of their monetarylosses. We study factors that affect the insider's informationacquisition decision, including the amount of intractable information,observability, and information acquisition costs.     

Order Flow and Liquidity around NYSE Trading Halts

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market-clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to 'spread the quote' prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.     

Derivative Pricing with Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market

We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivatives, and short‐selling due to hedging of nontraded risk. We show that illiquid assets can have lower expected returns if the short‐sellers have more wealth, lower risk aversion, or shorter horizon. The pricing of liquidity risk is different for derivatives than for positive‐net‐supply assets, and depends on investors' net nontraded risk exposure. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market. We find strong evidence for an expected liquidity premium earned by the credit protection seller. The effect of liquidity risk is significant but economically small.     

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Banks have a unique ability to hedge against market‐wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, banks can insure firms against systematic declines in liquidity at lower cost than other institutions. We provide evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from commercial paper backup lines without running down their holdings of liquid assets. We also provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains these funding flows.