Price staggering in cartels

In this paper we investigate the optimal organization of staggered price increases in cartels. Staggered price increases impose a cost during cartel formation as the price leader initially loses sales. We show that for intermediate discount factors, staggered price increases can only be sustained when the increase is neither too small nor too large. When a cartel executes two consecutive price increases, the choice between using the same leader or alternating leadership depends on the initial price level in the industry. We also discuss the choice between simultaneous and staggered price increases with an exogenous antitrust detection function, the allocation of price leadership with cost asymmetry, and the effect of product differentiation on price staggering.     

Life expectancy of international cartels: An empirical analysis

This paper quantifies the importance of the various determinants of life expectancy for international cartels active throughout this century. I explain cartels' optimal duration as a function of market structure and demand growth and estimate the associated parameters recognizing that durability cannot be negative. According to the results, increases in either market shares or cartel concentration prolong life expectancy. Faster demand growth shortens cartel durability but this effect is not reliable. I also find that growth effects are sensitive to both the period of activity and the country coverage.The calculations in this paper use LIMDEP version 5.0. I am grateful to participants in seminars at the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. International Trade Commission; to Alexander David, Jon Faust, Michael Gibson, William Greene, James Griffin, William Helkie, Dale Henderson, John Irons, Doug Irwin, Michael Leahy, Matthew Pritsker, Stephen Salant, and Janice Shack-Marquez for several suggestions. I also received very useful comments from two anonymous referees. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or other members of its staff.     

Machine learning with screens for detecting bid-rigging cartels

We combine machine learning techniques with statistical screens computed from the distribution of bids in tenders within the Swiss construction sector to predict collusion through bid-rigging cartels. We assess the out of sample performance of this approach and find it to correctly classify more than 84% of the total of bidding processes as collusive or non-collusive. We also discuss tradeoffs in reducing false positive vs. false negative predictions and find that false negative predictions increase much faster in reducing false positive predictions. Finally, we discuss policy implications of our method for competition agencies aiming at detecting bid-rigging cartels.     

The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way.We discuss possible adverse effects of whistle-blowing programs on firms' behavior, and particularly on turnover, incentives to innovate and cooperation. We also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.     

Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication

This paper examines the feasibility of collusive mechanisms in single-unit auctions. A model is constructed with private and common value information asymmetry and continuous type space. We show that an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism (BCM) does not exist if common value uncertainty is present. This result contradicts actual antitrust cases, where common effects or resale opportunities created uncertainty about valuations, but a price-fixing cartel was formed. We solve the puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all bidder types truthfully reveal their private information. The introduced Bayesian bid coordination mechanism (BBCM) exists if the main source of information asymmetry is private value. In that case, a designated ring member can signal high valuation and suppress competition. Our results demonstrate the rationale behind cartel mechanisms with pre-auction knockouts.     

Fines and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels

In this article, we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature: the relative role of public and reputational sanctions in deterring misconduct. We propose an empirical framework, which accounts for public sanctions (in our case cartel fines) and a more direct measure of reputational sanctions, harnessing recent developments in opinion mining. We use the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of misconduct as a measure of reputational effect and thus approximation of the reputational sanction. As a demonstration, we combine an event study approach, sentiment analysis, and econometric techniques on a sample of 339 listed cartel member firms, prosecuted by the European Commission between 1992 and 2015. Our results offer evidence that in the context of cartels, public and reputational sanctions act as substitutes: where there is a reputational penalty, increasing this penalty reduces the effect of the public sanction. One the other hand, in the absence of a reputational punishment, the effect of the cartel fine steps in.     

Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties, penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge, (b) average consumer surplus, and (c) average total welfare.     

Dark network tensions and illicit forbearance: Exploring paradox and instability in illegal cartels

In this case study investigating illegal cartels, we contribute to our understanding of the dark side of business relationships in three different areas. First, we expand upon the dark side of business relationships theme, by investigating the nature of opportunism in price-fixing cartels and the role of illicit forbearance. Due to their illicit nature, cartels are forced to operate outside legally binding contractual frameworks requiring other ways to facilitate agreements to avoid opportunistic behaviour. Second, our investigation contributes to our understanding of tensions in business relationship settings. Our findings indicate that network tensions are made significantly worse by the illicit nature of cartels, resulting in inherently unstable relationships. Third, in addition to cartels, we argue for a broadening of the scope of the ‘dark side of business relationships towards one that recognises the importance of illicit practices undertaken by marketing managers. This is significant because illicit relationships are often archetypal examples of opportunistic behaviour, which are likely to result in different types of conflict in a business relationship/network context. In the case of cartels, this opportunistic behaviour influences cartel participants, customers, suppliers (not privy to the cartel agreement) and the wider public. Theoretical and practical implications are provided.     

Prices Up and Volumes Stable

2011 First Half China Garment Industry Report Exports Grew at a Slower Pace China Customs reported the garment & accessories export value of $51.286 billion for the first five months of this year, up 23.12% y/y, accounting for 56.28 percent of the total, 5% lower than the previous year’s points.Despite sales prices increase, sales volume remain stable. From Jan. to May     

Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers

Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are “local” searchers who visit only one seller, whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price. Equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero-density gap. When the (exogenous) reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount, the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers. A reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices.     

Customer value analysis in a heterogeneous market

In recent years, customer value has become a major focus among strategy researchers and practitioners as an essential element of a firm's competitive strategy. Many firms have been interested in Customer Value Analysis (CVA) which involves a structural analysis of the antecedent factors of perceived value (i.e., perceived quality and perceived price) to assess their relative importance in the perceptions of their buyers. We develop a statistical approach for performing CVA utilizing a recursive simultaneous equation model that is formulated to accommodate buyer heterogeneity. In particular, the proposed finite‐mixture methodology allows one to estimate the relative effects and integration rules of perceived value drivers at the market segment level, as well as to simultaneously determine the (unknown) segments themselves. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology via an actual commercial application involving a large electric utility company. Finally, we discuss the contributions of our research from the perspective of firm strategy and how it may be extended in the future. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Stable at the Beginning of 2010

Performance Stable at the Beginning of 2010 2010 is a crucial year as China strives to maintain rapid economic growth while reforming its growth model. The global situation will improve this year     

Performance Stable at the Beginning of 2011

Textile industry this year will face more pressure Q1 Textile Industry’s Performance Conference was unveiled by China National Textile & Apparel Council on May 13.Since the beginning of 2011,the standard for defin ing large-scale enterprises was raised from the annual income of 5 million yuan of main business to the annual income of 20 million yuan of main business, according to the latest news.     

Managers' perception of relationship management in heterogeneous markets

Relationship management holds many promises of becoming a new paradigm in marketing and management. However, the development of relationship marketing is still difficult to accomplish in heterogeneous markets, since different management practices are needed in markets ranging from homogenous segments of customers with the same preferences to customers with individual demands for customized services. This paper investigates managers' perceptions of relationship development in heterogeneous markets. Results from a survey of 135 branch bank managers show that they perceive that the more heterogeneous the market, the more difficult to achieve relationship development. The study also finds that more difficult relationship development leads branch managers to perceive a more centralized locus of realized strategy. This suggests that firm relationship development needs to focus more on customer orientation and that realized strategies need to be at a local level to support this.     

Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?

Cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection whereconsumers are imperfectly informed about product quality. Producer collusionmay be necessary to signal quality via third-party certification. Whileexamining different cost structures for third-party certification, we showthat a stable cartel that provides information about product quality mayimprove overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce competition.     

Mobile-only consumers arise from heterogeneous valuation of fixed services

Mobile-only users are usually perceived as a consequence of fixed-mobile substitution. This study uses a unique dataset based on a survey in France, combined with interviewee's telecommunications billing data, to reveal heterogeneous consumer preferences for fixed services. With the same mixed logit model we estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for fixed communications services and fixed-mobile relationship. Results show a very large heterogeneity of WTP for fixed services among consumers. In addition, we show that fixed and mobile data are complement for all consumers. Mobile-only consumers have a much lower but non-zero WTP, and higher price sensitivity compared to fixed-mobile consumers. Consequently, an increase in the fixed offer price would reduce the demand for fixed service. Heterogeneous preferences for fixed services constitute an alternative explanation for the existence of mobile-only users, despite the complementary nature of fixed and mobile broadband. Counter-factual simulations show that the share of mobile-only could also be driven by the way to subsidize mobile handset. For instance, making the handset subsidy only available to fixed-mobile quadruple play subscribers could reduce the share of mobile-only by half.