Foreign shareholders,relative foreign policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings

Studies have shown that foreign investors hedge risks stemming from economic and political uncertainty in the home country through outward investment. This paper studies how foreign investors' home country risk affects their overseas investment and the host country firms' corporate cash holdings. We find that relative foreign EPU, defined as the difference between foreign investors' home country EPU and the host country of investment EPU, negatively impacts the host country firms' cash holdings through their influences on managerial decision-making. This negative relationship arises from firms' precautionary and transaction motives as foreign investors perceive lower corporate risk and better investment opportunities in the host country firms. Good corporate governance is also instrumental in yielding this negative relationship. The reduction in cash holdings due to high relative foreign EPU is more pronounced if foreign investors' home country legal environment is weaker, the two countries are further apart, and there is little trade partnership between them.     

IRS Private Letter Rulings: Initial Evidence on Determinants and Consequences

This study examines the determinants of firms' requests for Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and their impact on firms' cash holdings. Our results show that PLR requests tend to be made by firms with more active tax planning, more acquisitions, higher analyst following, higher leverage, and less in-house tax expertise. We also show that firms with IRS audit red flags are less likely to request a PLR. We use a difference-in-difference approach to assess changes in cash holdings following PLR requests and report a decrease in cash holdings for PLR firms, consistent with the notion that PLRs act to reduce tax uncertainty. Our study provides the first empirical evidence about the determinants of PLR requests and complements prior work on tax uncertainty and cash holdings (Hanlon, Maydew and Saavedra, 2017).     

How common are credit-less recoveries? Firm-level evidence on the role of financial markets in crisis recovery

We study firm recoveries from systemic sudden stops in developing countries, where firms' cash flows suffer exogenous shocks. Contrary to macro studies suggesting that output recovery precedes that of the financial sector, firm-level data shows that only in less than a third of firms, operating cash flows recover without a recovery in external credit, and even these firms have access to other sources of cash. Specifically, firms with high prior short-term debt exposure do experience a sharp reduction in short-term credit but increase operating cash flows during a crisis. Firms with high prior cash holdings experience negative cash flows and deplete their cash holdings. Thus, firms' financial prepositioning predicts recovery in cash flows and is consistent with trade-off theories of capital structure and with precautionary motives for cash holdings. We find no support for the maturity mismatch hypothesis, which predicts that firms with high short-term debt should have harder recoveries post crisis.     

Green credit policy and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

In 2012, China implemented a green credit policy (GCP) that restricts bank credits to heavily polluting firms. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that polluting firms increased their cash reserves by 9.5% after the GCP's issuance relative to non-polluting firms. We also document that the GCP significantly reduces firms' access to bank finance but increases the value of cash. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the increase in cash holdings is more significant for firms with greater financial constraints, firms with more investment opportunities, and high-tech companies. Overall, our findings are consistent with a constraint explanation: when external financing is restricted, firms retain more cash to meet future investment needs.     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

Signaling effect of cash holdings adjustment before bond issuance

Using Fixed Income Securities Database bond issuance data, we examine how firms' cash holding adjustment exhibits a signaling effect prior to corporate bond issuance; we also examine the meaning of this effect on firms' capital policy. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bonds from 1981 to 2018, the results found that bond issuers adjust their cash holdings higher prior to bond issuance compared to non-issuer firms. After controlling for various firm and bond characteristics, we found that firms that adjust their cash holdings higher attract investors' attention, thus resulting in lower bond spreads. Our results also perform different patterns in subsamples when adopting accrued and real earnings management, financial constraints, and corporate opacity.     

The impact of competition and time-to-finance on corporate cash holdings

This paper empirically documents how the interaction between competition and time frictions in capital markets impacts firms' cash management decisions. Using the introduction of the U.S. Securities Offering Reform in 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment, we show that a shorter time-to-finance leads to a reduction in corporate cash holdings. This effect is significantly stronger for firms that are exposed to preemption risk. Furthermore, patents mitigate the risk of preemption and the effect of a reduction in time-to-finance on cash holdings is strongest for unconstrained firms.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world

We examine the determinants of corporate cash management policies across a broad sample of international firms. We document that firms in countries with strong legal protection of minority investors are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flow than are firms in countries with weak legal protection. This relationship is most pronounced for firms that are financially constrained and those with high hedging needs. More importantly, we do not find evidence that financial development plays an incremental impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash, after controlling for the effect of legal protection. Therefore, we argue that the legal protection of investors (rather than financial development) represents the first-order effect in influencing international firms' cash management policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of country-level legal protection of investors in mitigating the effects of firm-level financial constraints and hedging needs on corporate cash management policies.     

Investor protection and cash holdings: Evidence from US cross-listing

This paper examines (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-listed firms. We analyze 1405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross-listing to much higher standards after cross-listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings relative to other types of ADR firms.     

Government intervention and firm investment

This paper examines how government intervention affects firms' investment and investment efficiency, focusing on the world's largest economic stimulus package (ESP) during the 2008 global financial crisis period. The RMB four trillion ESP aimed to restore the economy by promoting investment in priority areas. Thus it provided an exogenous shock to firms' investment environment and exacerbated the impact of government intervention on firms' investment and investment efficiency. We use propensity score matching to match government-intervened firms with their controls to reduce the endogeneity issue of government intervention. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that government-intervened firms invested more than control firms. Further analysis shows that the source of funding for investment was mainly from bank loans rather than internal cash flows. However, the post-investment performance was poor. We find that the investment efficiency of government-intervened firms decreased and government-intervened firms overinvested after the ESP. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and placebo tests. The findings suggest that government intervention can play a negative role in government-intervened firms.     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings

We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz's (2005) model on the interaction between government and firm agency problems.     

Foreign institutional ownership and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from emerging economies

With the increased presence of foreign institutional investors in emerging stock markets, academic interest on the effects of foreign institutions on corporate managerial decisions has notably increased. This paper joins this debate by investigating the effects of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings, a strategic corporate financing choice. Analysing a sample of firms from 23 emerging economies, the paper shows that, while foreign institutional ownership has a negative effect on cash holdings, it also increases the contribution of cash to firm valuation. These effects are potentially transmitted to cash through mitigation of agency conflicts and alleviation of financing constraints. In all, our findings suggest beneficial effects of foreign institutions on firms' financing structure, as foreign investors contribute to a more efficient and value-enhancing cash policy.     

The causes and consequences of securities class action litigation

We examine the impact of securities class action lawsuits on firms' investment and financing choices. Firms which overinvest are more likely to be sued. After a lawsuit, firms on average decrease overinvestment activity, and they decrease payouts while increasing leverage, cash holdings, and firm-specific risk. Additionally, we find some evidence that firms decrease diversification post-suit. Overall, these changes are consistent with a post-suit decrease in agency problems which lead to significant changes in real investment policies. The evidence is consistent with the notion that security class action lawsuits draw attention to agency problems which are then at least partly resolved.     

Refinancing Risk and Cash Holdings

We find that firms mitigate refinancing risk by increasing their cash holdings and saving cash from cash flows. The maturity of firms’ long‐term debt has shortened markedly, and this shortening explains a large fraction of the increase in cash holdings over time. Consistent with the inference that cash reserves are particularly valuable for firms with refinancing risk, we document that the value of these reserves is higher for such firms and that they mitigate underinvestment problems. Our findings imply that refinancing risk is a key determinant of cash holdings and highlight the interdependence of a firm's financial policy decisions.     

The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms' access to business group deep pockets affects the entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper shows that entry into manufacturing industries is negatively related to the cash hoarded by incumbent affiliated groups and positively related to entrant groups' cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact of group cash holdingson entry is more important in environments where financial constraints are pronounced. The cash holdings of incumbent and entrant groups also affect the survival rate of entrants in the three- to five-year post-entry window. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and affect the product market behavior of affiliated firms by mitigating financial constraints.     

Economic policy uncertainty,institutional environments,and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on corporate cash holdings using a large sample of international firms. EPU intensifies concerns of investors on managerial self-dealing and political extraction. Consequently, the potential cost of cash holdings (i.e., expropriation) outweighs its benefit (i.e., precautionary motives), and the optimal amount of cash holdings decreases. We find supportive evidence that firms hold less cash when EPU is high. We further show that the market discounts excess cash holdings under high policy uncertainty, but this negative effect is mitigated by stronger investor protection, better freedom of press, and better government quality.