Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?

Despite the apparent importance of “street earnings” to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts’ abilities and incentives influence which line items forecast-tracking services exclude from GAAP earnings to arrive at street earnings. We propose an alternative explanation: managers actively influence analysts’ forecast exclusion decisions via earnings guidance. We test this explanation by examining how earnings guidance influences two aspects of analysts’ exclusions: (1) special item exclusions (i.e., nonrecurring items) and (2) incremental exclusions (i.e., recurring items). We find that for firms with no special items in the previous year, when managers guide, analysts exclude almost all current-year special items, whereas when managers do not guide, the proportion that analysts exclude is significantly lower. More importantly, we that analysts’ incremental exclusions are significantly higher when managers guide than when they do not guide. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers play an active role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

Do analysts and investors fully understand the persistence of the items excluded from Street earnings?

Previous research has found that the items that are included in GAAP earnings but excluded from Street earnings to allow the firm to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts (“MBF exclusions”) are more persistent than the other excluded items. In this study, I find that the difference in the levels of persistence between MBF and non-MBF exclusions declined after the introduction of Regulation G, which requires public companies that disclose non-GAAP earnings to also present GAAP earnings and a reconciliation of the two. Analysts underestimate the persistence of non-MBF exclusions, but the degree of this underestimation is lower in the post-regulation period. In contrast, there is little evidence to indicate that analysts underestimate the persistence of MBF exclusions in either time period. I also find strong (weak) evidence that investors underestimate the persistence of Street exclusions in the pre- (post-) regulation period. These results suggest that Regulation G constrains the practice of excluding recurring expenses from Street earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts and helps analysts and investors to understand the persistence of Street exclusions.     

The Value Relevance of Mandatory Non‐GAAP Earnings

This paper examines the value relevance of earnings components where there is a mandatory requirement to report generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings and non‐GAAP earnings, and where the items to be eliminated from GAAP earnings are defined in detail. The setting is different from non‐GAAP earnings disclosures presented in the United States and elsewhere, where managers have discretion over whether to report a non‐GAAP earnings number, and what to exclude from GAAP earnings. Our mandatory setting enables us to report value relevance results that are not confounded by managers' discretionary choices regarding non‐GAAP earnings exclusions. We use price‐level regressions, based on the Ohlson (1995) model, to test for incremental and relative value relevance. The results show that non‐GAAP earnings reported under a mandatory regime have higher value relevance than GAAP earnings. The disaggregation of these items is useful to investors in a setting where managerial motivations are minimized.     

Transitory earnings components and the two faces of non‐generally accepted accounting principles earnings

Non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) earnings reporting has been linked with both informative and strategic incentives. We seek to disentangle these conflicting effects by examining the association between non‐GAAP earnings disclosure and transitory items in GAAP earnings, conditional on managers' reporting incentives. We report evidence of a statistically and economically significant asymmetric relation between disclosure propensity and transitory items in GAAP earnings conditional on both the sign and magnitude of the GAAP earnings surprise. Our findings suggest that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures tend to be driven by a desire for informative (strategic) reporting when GAAP earnings beat (undershoot) market expectations.     

Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.     

Non-GAAP earnings and board independence

We examine the association between board independence and the characteristics of non-GAAP earnings. Our results suggest that companies with less independent boards are more likely to opportunistically exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings. Specifically, we find that exclusions from non-GAAP earnings have a greater association with future GAAP earnings and operating earnings when boards contain proportionally fewer independent directors. Consistent with the association between board independence and the permanence of non-GAAP exclusions reflecting opportunism rather than the economics of the firm, we find that the association declines following Regulation G and that managers appear to use exclusions to meet earnings targets prior to selling their shares more often in firms with fewer independent board members. Overall, our results suggest that board independence is positively associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings.     

The quality of street cash flow from operations

We provide empirical evidence on the quality of street cash flow from operations (CFO) as an alternative financial performance summary measure. We focus our investigation on the quality of the items analysts exclude in their determination of street CFO. Based on a sample of 8,518 firm-year observations over the 1993–2008 period, we find that the street CFO number is generally higher than the GAAP CFO number, indicating that analysts typically make CFO-increasing exclusions. Our inspection of hand-collected analyst reports reveals that, while some analysts make sophisticated exclusions of transitory cash items, many others ignore working capital and other accruals when adjusting forecasted earnings to arrive at their street CFO forecasts. We find that street CFO exclusions are negatively associated with future operating earnings, suggesting that these exclusions are not fully transitory or unimportant in forecasting future performance. Our results also indicate that street CFO exclusions are less transitory than the implicit accrual component of analysts’ street earnings exclusions. These results suggest that the average quality of analysts’ street CFO exclusions is quite low and that it is even lower than the quality of their implied accrual exclusions. Moreover, we find that investors perceive analysts’ CFO exclusions to be of such low quality to render street CFO measures less informative than GAAP CFO figures. Finally, we find that analyst conflicts of interest and (to some extent) the greater inherent volatility of firms’ CFO series contribute to the low-quality nature of analysts’ street CFO exclusions.     

Credibility Attributes and Investor Perceptions of Non‐GAAP Earnings Exclusions

Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors focus more on non‐GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) than on traditional GAAP earnings because non‐GAAP earnings are believed to proxy for a firm's ongoing profitability, a measure useful for valuation. Managers determine these non‐GAAP earnings by excluding certain items from their GAAP income. However, because these non‐GAAP earnings are both unaudited and may be disclosed by a firm to manage investors’ perceptions as opposed to inform, investors must infer the credibility of the disclosure through observable firm attributes. In this study we examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (corporate governance, higher‐quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) will be perceived as providing more credible non‐GAAP exclusions than those with weaker attributes. Our expectation is that the market reaction to non‐GAAP earnings exclusions of firms with stronger credibility attributes will be greater than for those with weaker attributes. Our results support our expectation.     

Non-GAAP Earnings and the Earnings Quality Trade-off

Using a large sample of earnings press releases by Australian firms, we compare multiple attributes of non-GAAP earnings measures with their closest GAAP equivalent. We find that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, smoother, more value relevant, and have higher predictive power than their closest GAAP equivalent. However, the same set of non-GAAP earnings disclosures are also less conservative and less timely than their closest GAAP equivalent. The results are consistent with non-GAAP earnings measures reflecting a reversal of the trade-off between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting inherent in accounting standards and the way they are applied. We also find that differences in several of these attributes between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are more evident in larger firms, firms with lower market-to-book ratios, firms with a higher proportion of independent directors, and firms that report profits rather than losses. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that accounting standards impose significant amounts of conditional conservatism at some cost to the valuation role of accounting information. Non-GAAP earnings measures can therefore be seen as a response to the challenges faced by a single GAAP performance measure in satisfying the competing demands of value relevance and stewardship.     

US Managers' Use of 'Pro Forma' Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings Targets

Abstract:  The practice of reporting manager-adjusted 'pro forma' earnings numbers in quarterly earnings press releases has attracted considerable attention in recent years in the United States. Prior research suggests that while some managers report these adjusted numbers to better reflect core earnings, others may use these earnings adjustments to meet strategic earnings targets on a pro forma basis when they fall short based on GAAP reporting standards. Assuming the latter motivation could potentially mislead investors, the difficulty lies in distinguishing the 'good guys' from the 'bad guys.' Using hand-collected pro forma earnings data, we investigate the extent to which different types of earnings adjustments affect the spread between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings from continuing operations. Moreover, we investigate which types of adjustments managers use to meet strategic earnings targets. In addition to the exclusion of one-time items like restructuring charges, the results indicate that managers often exclude recurring expenses such as depreciation, research and development, and stock-based compensation to meet these strategic targets. The exclusion of recurring items is especially indicative of aggressive pro forma reporting. Finally, we find that firms that report adjusted earnings numbers only sporadically are more likely than firms that adjust earnings figures on a regular basis to use pro forma reporting to achieve strategic earnings targets by excluding recurring items.     

Disclosure of GAAP line items in earnings announcements

We provide new evidence on the disclosure in earnings announcements of financial statement line items prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). First, we investigate the circumstances that might provide disincentives generally for GAAP line item disclosures. We find that managers who regularly intervene in the earnings reporting process limit disclosures at the aggregate level and in each of the financial statements so as to more effectively guide investor attention to summary financial information. Specifically, this disclosure behavior obtains when managers habitually cater to market expectations, engage in income smoothing, or use discretionary accruals to improve earnings informativeness. Second, we predict and find that the specific GAAP line items that firms choose to disclose are determined by the differential informational demands of their economic environment, consistent with incentives to facilitate investor valuation. However, these valuation-related disclosure incentives are muted when managers habitually intervene in the earnings reporting process.     

Pro forma disclosures,audit fees,and auditor resignations

The disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.     

IFRS and U.S. GAAP: Assessing the impact of reporting incentives on firm restatements in foreign and U.S. markets

This study examines the impact of reporting incentives on firm restatements in foreign and U.S. markets. We investigate whether financial reporting, using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) results in quality disclosures, given differences in institutional and market forces. This study examines the quality of financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS and U.S. GAAP by concentrating on firm restatements as a measure of earnings management. Our results indicate that there is no significant difference in the value of restatements due to differences in accounting standards when the rule of law is high in the international market. Furthermore, firms with better law enforcement and higher traditions of law and order, tend to have smaller restatement amounts or less earnings manipulation. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the quality of financial information prepared under IFRS and its dependency on the institutional factors and market forces of a country.     

The effect of voluntary clawback adoption on non-GAAP reporting

We examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Prior literature documents that voluntary clawback adoption improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perceptions of reduced discretion over GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Using a propensity score matched sample, we find that non-GAAP earnings disclosure frequency increases and non-GAAP exclusion quality decreases after clawback adoption, consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. Additional cross-sectional tests help support this interpretation.     

An investigation of SEC “Speech GAAP”

This study investigates the financial reporting regulation effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff comments made during the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Annual Current SEC & Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) Developments Conference in Washington, D.C. (SEC Conference). At this conference, the SEC staff communicates its preferences about areas where it believes companies are misapplying GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). We call this communication SEC Speech GAAP. One outcome of the SEC Conference may be that companies re-evaluate their previous financial reporting by restating their financial statements. We find, first, that firms with restatement issues similar to those covered at the SEC Conference experience a decrease in the association between earnings and future cash flows after the restatement. Second, we find little market reaction to the disclosure of restatements related to SEC Conference issues, but the disclosure of non-conference related restatement issues has a significantly negative affect on investors’ valuation decisions. Our findings suggest that SEC Speech GAAP is associated with financial statements that are less informative to investors and investors find the valuation consequences of restatements prompted by SEC Speech GAAP to be less important than the valuation consequences for restatements prompted for other reasons.     

Earnings changes associated with relaxing the reconciliation requirement in non-U.S. firms’ SEC filings

We investigate the changes in earnings information content and earnings attributes for non-U.S. firms listed in U.S. equity markets following the 2007 relaxation of the SEC requirement to reconcile IFRS earnings and stockholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in annual regulatory filings. We analyze a sample of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges from 2005 to 2008 that use IFRS, and compare them to non-U.S. firms that continue to use domestic GAAP or U.S. GAAP. Prior literature finds no changes in informativeness following the regulatory change for IFRS-using firms. However, when we partition the IFRS-using firms into two groups based on their history of providing reconciliation information, we find that firms which previously provided more information about the differences between their reporting GAAP and U.S. GAAP had significant increases in the information content of their earnings. In contrast, there is no change in earnings informativeness for firms that provided less informative reconciliations. We regard the reconciliation informativeness as a proxy for firms’ efforts to provide more informative disclosures, which is driven by their disclosure incentives. We also document that the change in the information content of earnings for more informative reconcilers was contemporaneous with a change in earnings attributes for these firms. Consistent with no change in earnings informativeness for less informative reconcilers, there is little change in their earnings attributes. Our results underscore the importance of incorporating disclosure incentives when examining the consequences of a regulatory change.     

Comparing the Value Relevance of Two Operating Income Measures

Prior research has shown that pro-forma (recurring operating) earnings reported by managers and analysts are more value relevant than GAAP net income. Since GAAP net income contains many non-operating items that reduce its value relevance compared to operating earnings, comparing the value relevance of GAAP net income with operating earnings unduly favors operating earnings. We show that operating earnings reported by managers and analysts are more value relevant than a measure of operating earnings derived from firms' financial statements, as reported by Standard and Poor's. Our evidence is important because it indicates that operating earnings reported by managers and analysts contain value relevant information beyond that provided by operating earnings obtained by sophisticated users from firms' financial statements.     

The Impact of the Disclosure of Non‐GAAP Earnings in Australian Annual Reports on Non‐Sophisticated Users

The disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings in Australian annual reports has risen steadily in recent years. These non‐statutory earnings measures are generally disclosed in the unaudited section of the annual report and are not consistent with statutory profit as defined under generally accepted Australian accounting standards (GAAP). Recent research conducted in the United States (US) has provided evidence that non‐sophisticated investor decisions are influenced by the presence and prominence of non‐GAAP earnings information. Further evidence suggests that investor perception changed after non‐GAAP earnings disclosures became subject to regulation in that jurisdiction. Australia has high investor participation rates by international standards, including investors operating self‐managed superannuation funds, resulting in a significant number of active individual investors. This study employs an experimental design to investigate the impact on non‐sophisticated investors of the reporting of non‐GAAP earnings information in addition to GAAP earnings information in Australian annual reports. The results of this study show a positive association between the prominent disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings information and non‐sophisticated investor reliance on this information. These results provide important evidence to Australian regulators as these narrative disclosures are not subject to regulation, in contrast to the US where mandatory regulation has been in place since 2003.