Stock market speculation and managerial myopia

This paper extends the analysis of managerial share price concerns by allowing informed trading in the stock market. It is shown that because they decrease the manager's information advantage vis-à-vis the stock market, individual investors who trade on private information improve the efficiency of corporate investment. This improvement does, however, fall short of first-best efficiency. Moreover, a stronger managerial share-price concern increases the expected profit from informed trading. Hence, by encouraging individual investors to collect information about corporate decisions and trade on it, managerial myopia tends to automatically bring forth a partial solution to the problems that it causes.     

Stock-based managerial compensation,price informativeness,and the incentive to overinvest

This paper investigates the relationship among a firm's managerial incentive scheme, the informativeness of its stock price, and its investment policy. It shows that the shareholders' concerns about the effectiveness of stock-based compensation can lead to overinvestment. However, unlike other explanations in the literature, our results are neither caused by suboptimal incentive contracts nor do they rely on the assumption that managers are “empire builders.” Rather, overinvestment serves to induce information production by outside investors. By accepting positive and negative NPV projects, a firm effectively increases the market's uncertainty about its cash flow, thereby giving traders more incentives to become informed.     

Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership

High‐powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firm‐specific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well‐diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm. This negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than with shares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.     

Earnings management around employee stock option reissues

We investigate market behavior in a setting where managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and market price should be apparent ex ante to market participants. We find evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of executive stock options up to the time the options are reissued. Nevertheless, analysts and investors are not misled. Discretionary accruals have little power in explaining stock price performance during this period. Moreover, discretionary accruals do not explain subsequent analyst forecast errors. Thus, our findings suggest that, in this transparent setting, analysts and investors do not respond to earnings management.     

Share Repurchases,Dividends and Executive Options: the Effect of Dividend Protection

We study the determinants of share repurchases and dividends in Finland. We find that higher foreign ownership serves as a determinant of share repurchases and suggest that this is explained by the different tax treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Further, we also find support for the signalling and agency cost hypotheses for cash distributions. The fact that 41% of the option programmes in our sample are dividend protected allows us to test more directly the ‘substitution/managerial wealth’ hypothesis for the choice of distribution method. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options programme turns to a significantly positive one instead of the negative one documented in US data.     

Which Traders Contribute Most to Price Discovery? Evidence from the KOSPI 200 Options Market

We examine which group of investors—individuals, institutions, or foreigners—has more information about the true price process in the Korea Stock Price Index 200 (KOSPI 200) options market. Using the Hasbrouck (1995) information share and the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight approach, we show that foreigners are the most informative about the efficient price process, and domestic institutional investors as well as individual investors have small contribution to price discovery. This result holds firmly, even after controlling for the effects of trading volume and the number of trades. Our empirical results suggest that foreigners are informed traders in the KOSPI 200 options market, consistent with the findings of Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008).     

Intraweek and intraday trade patterns and dynamics

This paper investigates informed traders' order-splitting strategies on different days of the week and times of the day for a sample of stocks traded on the Australian Stock Exchange. Based on cumulative price changes, we document that informed traders tend to use medium size trades. We find that informed investors concentrate their strategic trading on Mondays and particularly during the first trading hour. In addition, informed investors also use large size trades around market opening and closing, as well as on days other than Mondays and Fridays. These results are more pronounced for the large market capitalization stocks.     

Differences in CEO compensation under large and small institutional ownership

I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay), whereas small institutional investors lower long‐term incentive pay (i.e., pension, deferred pay, stock incentive pay). These findings are consistent with managerial agency theory and the substitution of incentive pay by institutional monitoring. The effects are stronger for higher ownership levels and firms with weak governance, less financial distress, long‐tenured CEOs, multiple segments, and more free cash flow.     

Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

Tipping and Option Trading

This study examines options’ market behavior before analysts’ initiations. We find abnormal trading activity in the options market several days prior to the release of analysts’ initiations. Informed traders recognize the content and timing of the initial recommendations. We determine that informed trading is attributed to information leakage rather than savvy investors’ stock‐picking ability. We also find a significant information transmission from the options market to the underlying equity market around the event. Our results are consistent with the tipping hypothesis and confirm the informational role of equity options.     

Do informed option investors predict stock returns? Evidence from the Taiwan stock exchange

In this paper, we set out to investigate the information content of options trading using a unique dataset to examine the predictive power of the put and call positions of different types of traders in the TAIEX option market. We find that options volume, as a whole, carries no information on TAIEX spot index changes. On the other hand, however, although foreign institutional investors do not engage in much trading, there is strong evidence to show that the trading in which they do engage has significant predictive power on the underlying asset returns. We also find that foreign institutional investors have greater predictive power with regard to in near-the-money and middle-horizon options.     

How does ownership concentration exacerbate information asymmetry among equity investors?

This study investigates the association between ownership concentration and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, and explores several mechanisms that mitigate such a relation. Using a large sample of Korean firms whose ownership structure is highly concentrated, we find that the degree of information asymmetry increases with ownership concentration. We also find that ownership concentration is positively associated with information asymmetry via an increase in the relative amount of informed trading. This effect more than overcomes the unexpected decrease in the frequency of private information events. Furthermore, while neither institutional investors nor internal corporate governance systems help alleviate the negative effects of ownership concentration, analyst following reduces the information asymmetry associated with ownership concentration. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, additional control variables, and an alternative use of empirical proxies.     

Options,option repricing in managerial compensation: Their effects on corporate investment risk

While stock options are commonly used in managerial compensation to provide desirable incentives, they can create adverse incentives to distort the choice of investment risk. Relative to the risk level that maximizes firm value, call options in a compensation contract can induce too much or too little corporate risk-taking, depending on managerial risk aversion and the underlying investment technology. We show that inclusion of lookback call options in compensation packages has desirable countervailing effects on managerial choice of corporate risk policies and can induce risk policies that increase shareholder wealth. We argue that lookback call options are analogous to the observed practice of option repricing.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

General managerial skills and corporate social responsibility

We show that a CEO’s general managerial skills are negatively related to the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) undertaken by the firm. This finding is robust to alternative measures of CSR and alternative econometric specifications. The negative effect of general managerial skills on CSR persists when we attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns by employing propensity score matching and an instrumental variables approach. Further, supplementary analysis reveals that this negative effect is stronger in tight labor markets and in firms where shareholders are more short term oriented, consistent with the notion that the broader set of outside options available to generalist chief executive officers acts as a labor market mechanism that makes them less concerned about the firm’s long-term prosperity and thus more reluctant to commit to CSR.     

Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock options in optimal contracts

We study the problem of compensating a manager whose career concerns affect his investment strategy. We consider contracts that include cash, shares, and call options, focusing on the role of options in aligning incentives. We find that managers are optimally paid in cash, supplemented by a small amount of call options; shares are excluded. The options are struck at-the-money, consistent with the near-uniform practice of compensation committees. The convexity of option payoffs helps to overcome managerial conservatism, although a nontrivial underinvestment problem persists. Our model yields several testable implications regarding cross-sectional variation in the size of option grants and pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

Disclosing to Informed Traders

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

Bookbuilding vs. fixed price revisited: The effect of aftermarket trading

Investors who possess information about the value of an IPO can participate in the offering as well as trade strategically in the aftermarket. Both the bookbuilding and the fixed price IPO selling methods require more underpricing when aftermarket trading by informed investors is considered. Bookbuilding becomes especially costly, since the potential for profit in the aftermarket adversely affects investors' bidding behavior in the premarket. Unless the underwriter can restrict its bookbuilding effort to a small enough subset of the informed investors, a fixed price strategy that allocates the issue to retail investors produces higher proceeds on average, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature. We therefore find a benefit to limiting access to the premarket and, hence, provide an efficiency rationale for the practice by American bankers of marketing IPOs to a select group of investors. We also provide unique policy and empirical implications.     

What do dividend reductions signal?

Dividend reductions have long been considered a “last resort” action for firm managers. Managerial reluctance to reduce dividends emanates from the view that dividend drops signal managerial pessimism regarding future earnings. Contrary to expectations, studies show that earnings rebound significantly following a dividend reduction; yet investors react negatively to the dividend-drop announcement. We present an explanation for the anomalous behavior of earnings and returns around the time of a dividend drop. Our evidence suggests that a reduction in a firm's established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm's real options. Earnings rebound following the dividend reduction due to the savings that result as the firm allows growth options to expire; however, announcement period returns suggest that investors recognize the lost value associated with the forthcoming expiration of growth options.