Firm-level political risk and debt choice

We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders' expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank's support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.     

Mitigating political uncertainty

This study examines whether firms that establish political connections gain differential access to relevant information over legislative developments, thereby mitigating the negative consequences of uncertainty. I find that political connections (partially) offset the negative relation between investment and political uncertainty documented in prior research. My results do not appear to be driven by connected firms pursuing investments that are insensitive to uncertainty. I perform additional tests to address concerns over correlated omitted variables. First, I identify a setting around a tax policy development designed to provide new investment incentives to firms. In this setting, I predict and find that reduced information asymmetry for connected firms results in delaying investment in anticipation of future lucrative tax incentives. Second, I perform a falsification test and document that political connections do not mitigate the effects of general economic uncertainty. Finally, I continue to find support for my hypothesis within a propensity matched sample.     

政治关系、制度环境与股票价格的信息含量——来自我国民营上市公司股价同步性的经验证据

以2004～2007年间所有的民营A股上市公司为样本,本文对政治关系与股票价格的信息含量(以公司的股价同步性衡量)之间的关系进行了实证检验。检验结果发现,与没有政治关系的公司相比,有政治关系的公司的股票价格同步性显著较高。并且,政治关系与股票价格同步性之间的正相关关系只在市场化程度较低、政府干预较多以及法制水平较差的地区存在。进一步区分政治关系的类型发现,代表委员类政治关系显著提高了公司的股价同步性,而政府官员类政治关系对股价同步性的影响则不显著。     

政治关联的不确定性与企业经营风险——基于上市公司的案例分析

中国企业的政治关联,特别是企业与政治人物的关系长久以来都对企业的财务情况、企业业绩和股票价格有着深刻的影响。采用案例分析方法,对金螳螂、惠生工程和佳兆业三个具有政治关联的上市企业,在相关政治人物在任和“落马”前后的业绩和市值表现进行分析发现：上市企业与政治人物,特别是地方官员的紧密关系,能够帮助企业通过关联官员取得政策、信贷、信息资源,提升企业竞争能力和企业业绩,在企业初创和发展阶段能够为企业发展带来重大机遇,提升企业的市场价值。但这种政治关联,也会使企业面临成为政府官员权力寻租工具的风险,最终由于政治人物政治前途的不确定性造成风险,即使在企业业绩并未出现大幅下降的情况下,受到市场恐慌情绪影响,企业市场价值面临巨大下跌风险,并影响到企业的长远发展。     

地方官员更替、企业辖区知名度与股价同步性

以2009～2013年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析地方官员更替、辖区企业知名度与股价同步性的关系,结果表明:地市级政府官员变更所带来的政治不确定性会显著降低辖区企业的股价同步性,并且相对于新任官员来源于本地而言,新任官员来源于异地更能够显著地降低辖区内企业的股价同步性.进一步研究还发现,当地市级政府官员发生变更时,相对于辖区知名度较高的企业而言,辖区知名度较低的企业会披露更多的企业私有信息以应对政治不确定性风险,从而其股价同步性有了更大程度的降低.研究的结论证实了政治不确定风险的增加能够显著降低辖区内企业的股价同步性,客观上有助于提高股价的信息含量.     

政治联系与公司价值——基于对万向集团的研究(英文)

通过对很多公司调查研究,我们发现私企的政治联系可以增加公司价值。本文通过对万向集团的研究,讨论公司高管的政治联系与公司价值的关系。     

Political connections,auditor choice and corporate accounting transparency: evidence from private sector firms in China

This article investigates the way in which political connections impact auditor choice. Using a political connection index constructed based on the bureaucratic ranks of executive managers and board members in Chinese private sector firms, we find that for firms with weak political connections, the likelihood of hiring high‐quality auditors increases with the degree of political connectedness, while it decreases with political connectedness for firms with strong political connections. This inverse U‐shaped relationship is particularly pronounced for firms with ownership structures that intensify agency problems. Finally, we find that political connections and accounting transparency also have an inverse U‐shaped relationship.     

Analysts’ earnings forecasting behavior surrounding uncertain regulatory events: evidence from the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This study examines analysts’ forecasting behaviour in the presence of significant tax policy uncertainty. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) was preceded by a lengthy debate, allowing us to investigate how tax policy uncertainty evolves over time. Our results are generally consistent with the intuition that uncertainty precedes the enactment of a proposed tax law while complexity manifests afterwards. Using the repeal of the investment tax credit to identify highly impacted firms, we find that the onset of disagreement among analysts during the debate occurred sooner for highly impacted firms than other firms. We also find that disagreement among analysts was concentrated among highly impacted firms before and after enactment. Given that our sample period precedes Regulation Fair Disclosure, our evidence suggests that analysts relied on private information from management to resolve the uncertainty associated with TRA86 but only for highly impacted firms.     

Board connections and crisis performance: Family,state, and political networks

We introduce a novel concept of network interactions in which board connections provide access to external spheres of political influence, state ownership, and family control. We posit this form of indirect access via board association enables connected firms to benefit from information privy to external networks while avoiding their resource-based costs of membership. Board network data are assembled for 1290 East Asian firms and linked to hand-collected data on political connections and corporate ownership around the 2008–09 crisis. Companies with board connections to state-owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance and stock returns. In countries with weak institutional development, board connections to politically connected firms were also beneficial.     

Government ownership and exposure to political uncertainty: Evidence from China

The government of China started its anti-corruption campaign in December 2012. Since then, more than 600 government officials have been investigated. We regard the investigations involving senior officials as signals of increased political uncertainty. Focusing on these events, we study how firms’ exposure to political uncertainty varies with government ownership. It is found that the stock performance of private firms is worse on the event days than in normal times, whereas state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer less from the events. Moreover, the event-day effects are not quickly reversed in the post-event periods. Among SOEs, the negative impact of the events also decreases with government ownership. The evidence indicates that government ownership mitigates firms’ exposure to political uncertainty.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms¹ listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.     

政治关联、融资渠道与民营企业非效率投资研究

从自由现金流和银行贷款两方面考量2007~2010年沪深A股民营上市企业政治关联对企业非效率投资的影响。结果表明,存在政治关联民营企业容易利用自由现金流和银行长期贷款进行过度投资;存在地方政治关联的民营企业,其自由现金流的过度投资更严重,中央政治关联企业则存在更多利用长期贷款进行过度投资的行为。同时,投资不足的民营企业政治关联降低了企业投资对于自由现金流和银行短期贷款的依赖;中央政治关联的民营企业投资对于银行长期贷款的敏感度更高,地方政治关联企业未发现类似的显著影响。     

政治联系、预算软约束与政府补助的配置效率——基于中国民营上市公司的经验研究

本文以2004～2008年的民营上市公司为样本,实证研究了民营企业的政治联系对预算软约束及政府补助效率的影响。研究发现,政治联系是一把双刃剑:一方面,政治联系的民营企业容易受到政府干预,由此承担了较重的雇员负担,也因此获得了较多的政府补助,从而支持了林毅夫等对预算软约束的政策性负担层面的解释。另一方面,虽然政治联系未直接发挥关系作用,但会增加雇员负担一定时的政府补助。进一步地,在政治联系的民营企业中,政府补助对公司绩效的促进作用显著低于无政治联系的民营企业,揭示了政治联系改变了政府补助的流向,降低了政府补助资金的配置效率。     

Investment opportunity set,political connection and business policies of private enterprises in China

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that determine the business policies of private enterprises in the People’s Republic of China. Little is known about these private enterprises although these are surpassing the state-owned enterprises to become the most important corporate sector in China. The phenomenal growths of these enterprises provide an interesting setting to study the effect of the investment opportunity set (IOS) on business policies. We also examine how a firm’s political connection, generally believed to be instrumental to a firm’s success in transition economies, affects its business policies. We provide evidence on the importance of these factors in shaping the private firms’ business policies in China. More specifically, our results show that growth firms pay lower dividends, have lower overdue receivables relative to sales, have higher percentage of bonus shares, and are more likely to engage in joint ventures. In addition, firms with better political connection are able to borrow more, are more likely to establish a board of directors, and are more likely to acquire SOEs. These results have policy implications with regard to private enterprises in transitional economies in general and those in China in particular.     

Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms

Social network connections of corporations can significantly affect operating performance and firm valuation. Political connections are one form of social networking which often manifests into improved firm profitability as a result of political favors granted by politicians. However, analysts often have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms. This is because politicians often grant political favors to firms in an unpredictable manner making it difficult for market participants to time precisely when political benefits will translate into higher firm profitability. I examine how political connections affect analysts’ stock recommendations using a unique dataset of political contributions in the US over the period 1993–2012. I show that analysts’ recommendations are less profitable for firms with high connectedness than for firms with low (or no) connectedness. I also find that analysts are less effective in translating earnings forecasts into profitable recommendations for highly connected firms. Overall, the findings suggest that analysts do not impound all of the information concerning corporate political connections efficiently into their primary research outputs.     

Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms

We extend recent research on the links between political connections and financial reporting by examining the role of auditor choice. Our evidence that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor supports the intuition that insiders in these firms are eager to improve accounting transparency to convince outside investors that they refrain from exploiting their connections to divert corporate resources. In evidence consistent with another prediction, we find that this link is stronger for connected firms with ownership structures conducive to insiders seizing private benefits at the expense of minority investors. We also find that the relation between political connections and auditor choice is stronger for firms operating in countries with relatively poor institutional infrastructure, implying that tough external monitoring by Big 4 auditors becomes more valuable for preventing diversion in these situations. Finally, we report that connected firms with Big 4 auditors exhibit less earnings management and enjoy greater transparency, higher valuations, and cheaper equity financing.     

Political connections,tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.     

Hail to the chief: The effect of political alignment with the presidency on corporate investment

We examine the effect of political alignment between the CEO and the US president on corporate investment. We find that when the CEO is from the same party as the President that the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment are significantly reduced or eliminated. We arrive at this result after having controlled for investment opportunities, economic uncertainty, and political alignment with Congress. We also find that the political alignment between the CEO and the President has a greater effect on corporate investment for firms in industries with significant exposure to government spending. Our results go to confirm the effects of a country's politics and the occupier of the White House on CEOs’ business and economic outlooks. The results also point out that the effect of the behavioral traits of executives changes depending on the external environment.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.