Political influence in hedge fund activism: Causal evidence from U.S. gubernatorial election

This study examines the causal impacts of political influence on hedge fund activism in an exogenous setting of U.S. gubernatorial election. Local incumbent politicians have incentives to protect local inefficient firms from being targeted by activists because activism could lead to divestment and local worker layoffs. And such incentives can become weaker in election years because political competition increases the incumbent politician’s accountability to broader groups of stakeholders. Consistent with this prediction, the likelihood of local firms being targeted by activists is shown to be significantly higher during election years. Moreover, the firm’s political connections mitigate the effects of election, suggesting that politicians still maintain protection to connected firms. Further cross-sectional tests show that the effects of election are stronger (1) for firms with lower labor intensity, severer problem of free cash flow and lower efficiency, and (2) when the political competition is fiercer. Additional tests reveal that hedge fund activism enhances the target firm’s operating performance and creates larger value for investors when it faces weaker political influence. To sum up, our findings suggest that political influence affects hedge fund activism and the activists strategically adjust the timing of initiating campaigns according to the changes of such influence.     

Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance

We model corporate voting outcomes when an informed trader, such as a hedge fund, can establish separate positions in a firm's shares and votes (empty voting). The positions are separated by borrowing shares on the record date, hedging economic exposure, or trading between record and voting dates. We find that the trader's presence can improve efficiency overall despite the fact that it sometimes ends up selling to a net short position and then voting to decrease firm value. An efficiency improvement is likely if other shareholders’ votes are not highly correlated with the correct decision or if it is relatively expensive to separate votes from shares on the record date. On the other hand, empty voting will tend to decrease efficiency if it is relatively inexpensive to separate votes from shares and other shareholders are likely to vote the right way.     

Determinants of hedge fund performance during ‘good’ and ‘bad’ economic periods

We analyse the drivers of hedge fund performance, focusing simultaneously on fund size, age, lockup period, fund strategies, business cycles and different market conditions, dealing with the omitted variable bias. We use exogenous break points and a switching Markov model to endogenously determine different market conditions. We find that HFs deliver positive alpha only during “good” times, irrespective of their fundamentals. During “bad” times, they minimise their systematic risk. Small and young funds, and those with redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha compared to their peers during “good” times. Finally, specific strategies deliver significantly negative alpha during “bad” times.     

Shareholder activism and firms’ performance

Increasing attention to activist campaigns raises the question of whether they lead to better performance. The impact of different motives, demands, and proposals is still unclear and, sometimes, contradictory. We used a unique dataset of activist campaigns targeting firms in the US from 2002 to 2017 and analysed the impact of activism on firm performance, considering their specific demands. Our results show that firms experience a decline in profitability almost immediately after campaigns, although the effect is unclear in the years subsequent to the intervention. Results also suggest that campaigns primarily focused on demanding a change in strategic direction or obtaining board control intensify the decline in profitability. Seeking board representation is the type of demand that effectively increases target firms’ profitability. Our analysis adds to research on shareholder governance and competitive dynamics by highlighting that the type of demand adopted in campaigns impacts differently on firms’ performance.     

Does “Vote No” Change Corporate Governance and Firm Value? Evidence from the Shareholder Activism of the Korean National Pension Service

In this paper, we analyze the effect of shareholder activism on firm value through internal corporate governance in an emerging market. We investigate the shareholder activism by the National Pension Service (NPS) of Korea, the fourth-largest pension fund in the world in 2010. We investigate stock price reaction to a “vote no” press announcement and find that the market does not react in the short run, which reaction is inconsistent with the results from developed countries. We also find that firms experiencing “vote no” and improved internal corporate governance have higher firm valuation. Shareholder activism by the NPS is effective in increasing target firm value through improving internal corporate governance.     

市场竞争的基金治理效应:理论假说与实证检验

论文首先提出了"市场竞争的基金治理效应假说",在此基础上论文以开放式基金为例对我国基金层面的市场竞争结构进行了考察,发现我国基金业存在大基金垄断和一定程度的过度竞争并存的问题;进一步,论文首次给出了衡量基金治理效率的指标体系,并通过实证检验证实了治理效应假说存在,即市场竞争结构对基金治理具有显著影响。     

Does institutional activism increase shareholder wealth? Evidence from spillovers on non-target companies

This paper presents evidence of the shareholder wealth effect of institutional activism using its spillovers on non-target companies. The spillovers are instructive because they are a response to an exogenous shock and thus create an environment to conduct a clean event study. In particular, we examine the spillover effects of the first target announcement of the Korea Corporate Governance Fund. As the very first sign of institutional activism in the country, this announcement creates an expectation of similar governance efforts even in non-target companies, especially in those companies whose governance is currently poorer and thus the scope for future activism is greater. Consistent with institutional activism contributing to shareholder wealth, we find that, among non-targets, those firms granting fewer rights to outside shareholders experience a more positive stock price reaction. Further analysis lends additional support to the positive wealth effect of institutional activism.     

借鉴国外经验构建我国完善的公司治理模式

公司治理是现代金融重要的理论和实践问题.从典型国家的发展历程看,并不存在一成不变的治理模式.虽然不同的治理模式各有优势,但也都有逐步向市场主导型靠拢的倾向.在清晰了解发达国家公司治理模式形成过程的基础上,构建适合我国公司实际情况的公司治理模式具有重要意义.     

Lemmings in the bond market? An empirical analysis of the term structure of credit spreads

The paper examines the credit spread between government and corporate bonds at different maturities. Theoretical models assume that credit risk premiums for high quality firms monotonously increase with maturity. We find evidence suggesting that bonds issued at maturities attracting the highest issuance volumes tend to have credit risk premiums that are on average 10 to 15 basis points higher than issues at nonconventional maturities. These results point out a shortcoming of existing theoretical models and show that the credit yield curve is not smooth, but affected by the local supply of issues at various parts of the yield curve. In addition, the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that firms utilizing the bond markets for funding could lower their funding costs by shifting the term of their debt away from the most commonly targeted maturities.

Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers

We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and​ board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm’s future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures.     

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?

By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws’ passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a “quiet-life” hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws’ passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact.     

对股票期权的思考--股票期权在我国企业的适用性研究

起源于美国的股票期权制度在其本土已经得到了较为广泛的应用，我国在这方面也进行了积极的探索，一些企业也进行了实践。但股票期权究竟是否适合我国的情况呢?本将以主板市场为基础，通过对股票期权的实施条件的分析来对其在我国企业的适用性进行研究。     

Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards

We examine cases where managers announce an intention to de-stagger their boards via proxy proposals or board action. The literature has established the staggered board as the most consequential of all takeover defenses and one that destroys wealth. Thus, dismantling staggered boards benefits shareholders. We study the wealth effects and motives behind this change in governance within a conditional event study. We find that de-staggering the board creates wealth and that shareholder activism is an important catalyst for pushing through this change. Moreover, in the period preceding Sarbanes–Oxley, investor reaction indicates a perception that de-staggering firms are more likely to be takeover targets.