The Role of Internal Capital Markets in Financial Intermediaries: Evidence From Insurer Groups

We exploit the transparency of internal capital markets (ICMs) within insurance groups to investigate the activity and efficiency of ICMs within insurance groups. Specifically, we compare the relationship between internal capital transfers and investment to that between capital from other sources and investment. The ability to track the actual ICM transactions allows for more direct analysis of ICM activity than most previous studies. Consistent with theory, we find evidence that ICMs play a significant role in the investment behavior of affiliated insurers. We then use these detailed data to execute a more direct test of ICM efficiency than currently exists in the literature. Consistent with ICM efficiency, results suggest that capital is allocated to subsidiaries with the best expected performance.     

Executive compensation and internal capital market efficiency

We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions. We find that while stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions, there is surprisingly no discernible influence of stock options. Our analysis supports the view that private benefits derived by managers are increasing in internal capital misallocation. We also document a strong positive link between CEO incentive compensation and excess value of diversified firms suggesting that the diversification discount can be ameliorated with CEO incentive compensation. The study contributes to the ICM literature and the literature on conglomerate diversification discount.     

产融结合资本配置效应的理论分析

本研究以内部资本市场理论为基础,对产融结合的资本配置效应进行了分析,得出结论:产融结合能为企业构造包含金融机构的内部资本市场,一方面可以缓解企业的融资约束,但另一方面也会使企业的组织结构复杂化,公司治理难度加大,进而对资本的配置产生负面影响。     

Allocative efficiency of internal capital markets: Evidence from equity carve-outs by diversified firms

We examine whether equity carve-outs (ECOs) lead to improvements in the functioning of the internal capital markets (ICM) of diversified firms. Divestitures, including spin-offs, sell-offs, and equity carve-outs, can be employed by firms to improve allocative efficiency. Equity carve-outs, unlike other forms of divestiture, leave the parent's ICM largely intact but provide the opportunity to enhance internal and external corporate governance mechanisms that can improve the parent's ICM. Using a US sample of 354 equity carve-outs completed between 1980 and 2013, we find that the allocative efficiency of parents is augmented significantly following transaction completion. This increase in allocative efficiency is driven by improvements in both the external and internal governance characteristics of parent companies, consistent with the expectation that motivates equity carve-outs.     

Internal capital markets and the partial adjustment of leverage

Prior literature provides support both for the existence of target capital structures and internal capital markets (ICM). The issue of whether firms use internal capital markets to reduce deviations from target capital structures, however, has yet to be examined. We provide the first empirical evidence of a link between deviations from target leverage and ICM activity. Based on data that allow us to trace intra-group capital market transactions for property–casualty insurers, our findings provide the first joint evidence that affiliated insurance companies have target leverage ratios and that ICM activity is used to manage deviations from target leverage.     

Firm vertical boundaries,internal capital markets,and firm performance

We investigate how vertical relatedness between business segments of firms affects capital allocation within internal capital markets. Using a battery of tests including exogenous import tariff reductions, we show that investments flow toward segments with better investment opportunities in firms with significant vertical relatedness between segments. This benefit of vertical relatedness is more pronounced in economic environments prone to information problems and in imperfectly competitive industries. Firms with significant inter-segment vertical relatedness also exhibit superior productivity and operating profitability. Overall, we show that superior capital allocation is a channel through which vertical integration impacts real outcomes of firms.     

企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性

国内外的研究表明企业集团普遍存在,尤其是在新兴市场经济国家。企业集团以集团总部为核心,通过内部资本市场在分部(成员企业)之间进行资源配置。目前国内关于内部资本市场的研究集中关注内部资本市场对于缓解企业融资约束方面的功能,尚缺乏企业集团内部资本市场资源配置功能的经验证据。本文以2006-2007年沪深两市的系族企业为研究对象,探讨我国企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性。本文的研究结论表明:一方面,无论是国有还是民营企业集团,普遍存在着活跃的内部资本市场;另一方面,企业集团内部资本市场的配置效率普遍不高,并且民营企业集团的内部资本市场的配置效率要显著低于国有企业集团。     

Market Structure,Internal Capital Markets,and the Boundaries of the Firm

We study how the creation of an internal capital market (ICM) can invite strategic responses in product markets that, in turn, shape firm boundaries. ICMs provide ex post resource flexibility, but come with ex ante commitment costs. Alternatively, stand‐alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility. By creating flexibility, integration can sometimes deter a rival's entry, but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising. These forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrator's relation to the product market. Hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs.     

内部资本市场:治理结构、机制与有效性

本文根据控制权的配置方式、终极股东的性质和实际控制人类型的不同,将内部资本市场的治理结构模式分为业务纽带型ICM、股权纽带型ICM和混合纽带型ICM三个大类和六个子类,并对结构演进的内在机制特征进行了探析,最后在治理结构模式的基础上分析了内部资本市场有效性。     

Exploitation of the internal capital market and the avoidance of outside monitoring

Internal capital markets (ICMs) provide firms an alternative to costly external financing; however, they also provide an avenue to avoid the monitoring associated with issuing external capital. We argue that firms operating inefficient internal capital markets will avoid outside financing. Consistent with this view, conglomerates that cross-subsidize divisions or engage in value-destroying investment avoid external capital market oversight by refraining from issuing both debt and equity. We further show that firms issuing bonds while engaging in value-destroying investment experience yield spreads that are, on average, 46 basis points higher than those of other diversified firms. They similarly experience yield spreads that are 18 basis points higher when they issue syndicated loans. Value-destroying conglomerates also witness SEO announcement returns that are, on average, 1% more negative than firms operating more efficient internal capital markets.     

内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金

本文首先对内部资本市场存在于多元化企业集团的观点提出了质疑,认为多元化可以扩大内部资本市场的运作空间,但不是判断企业集团是否存在内部资本市场的必要条件；其次对内部资本市场交易按其特征进行分类,并对其与关联交易的区别进行了辨析；最后从组织租金视角研究内部资本市场的本质,界定了内部资本市场租金的内涵,提出内部资本市场的本质是租金的创造与分配。     

纵向兼任高管能提升智力资本价值创造效率吗?——基于中国A股农业上市公司实证分析

基于智力资本理论,依据中国A股农业上市公司2008—2021年年度数据,考察纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的影响。结果显示：纵向兼任高管与智力资本价值创造效率呈负相关,增加机构投资者持股可以改善这种负向效应;纵向兼任高管职位越高,对智力资本价值创造的抑制效应越明显;纵向兼任高管与智力资本技术创新专利产出呈负相关。鉴于此,农业上市公司应重视纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的负面影响,可通过增加机构投资者持股来降低对它产生的不利影响,提升智力资本价值创造效率。     

中国上市公司内部资本市场有效吗?——来自H股多分部上市公司的证据

从理论上说,外部资本市场无效或低效的情况下,企业集团可以通过构建内部资本市场有效配置资源。本文采用基于资产回报的现金流敏感性法,对H股多分部上市公司内部资本市场效率进行了直接测度。针对2000～2011年532个样本的面板数据的研究显示,上市公司内部资本市场总体有效,大部分上市公司能够通过内部资本市场持续有效地配置资源,部分上市公司具有出色的"挑选胜者"的能力。本文的研究结论符合理论预期,不仅为我国发展企业集团的经济政策提供了经验证据,而且为进一步的研究奠定了理论和方法基础。     

Using Spinoffs to Reduce Capital Mis-Allocations

In this paper, we try to show that mis-allocation of capital in a conglomerate can lead to spinoffs. This mis-allocation arises when internal cash is not allocated efficiently between divisions with differences in growth opportunities. We show that differences in growth opportunities can predict subsequent spinoffs. We also show that differences in growth opportunities are better predictors of spinoffs than either the SIC codes that are used in the corporate focus explanation of spinoffs, or the usual estimates of free cash flow as applied to the conglomerate.     

Dismantling internal capital markets via spinoff: effects on capital allocation efficiency and firm valuation

We investigate the linkage between changes in firm value and changes in capital allocation efficiency resulting from dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. We find no evidence of wholesale misallocation of capital pre-spinoff. On the average, excess value increases following spinoffs. Furthermore, changes in excess value are positively linked to changes in capital allocational efficiency following spinoff. We find that spinoff announcement returns are greater (smaller) when the parent allocates capital to the unit to be spun off in a seemingly less (more) efficient manner. Divested division capital expenditures move toward industry levels after spinoff, regardless of their relative investment opportunities.     

Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. Journal of Finance 52, 111–133]) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher-productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated, for example, by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, could decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance.     

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.     

The internal workings of internal capital markets: Cross-country evidence

We derive empirical predictions from the standard investment-cash flow framework on the functioning of internal capital markets (ICM), but circumvent its criticism by focusing on parent cash flow and investment opportunities. We test these predictions using a unique dataset of parent firms and their listed and unlisted subsidiaries in 90 countries over the period 1995–2006. We find that company and country institutional structures matter. (1) Ownership participation of the parent firm in the subsidiary plays a crucial role for the proper functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership stake of the parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. (2) The best functioning cross-border ICMs can be found in the sub-sample of firms with parents from a country with “strong” institutions and subsidiaries from a country with “weak” institutions. (3) Unlisted subsidiaries are much more dependent on the ICMs their parents provide than listed subsidiaries. Thus, ICMs are not per se “bright” or “dark”, their proper functioning depends on how they are set up.     

Managerial Incentives and Internal Capital Markets

Capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm, as well as on headquarters' assessment of the divisions. While corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions, the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who, consequently, are tempted to free ride. As the number of divisions increases, the free‐rider problem is aggravated, and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives. The analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm, the industry, and the capital market.     

Efficiency and risk in European banking

We assess the inter-temporal relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European commercial banks employing several definitions of efficiency, risk and capital and using the Granger-causality methodology in a panel data framework. Our results suggest that lower bank efficiency with respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk and that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements. We also find that more efficient banks eventually become better capitalized and that higher capital levels tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels. These results are generally confirmed by a series of robustness tests. The results have potentially important implications for bank prudential supervision and underline the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains to support financial stability objectives.