Board connections and M&A transactions

We examine M&A transactions between firms with current board connections and find that acquirers obtain higher announcement returns in transactions with a first-degree connection where the acquirer and the target share a common director. Acquirer returns are also higher in transactions with a second-degree connection where one acquirer director and one target director serve on the same third board. Our results suggest that first-degree connections benefit acquirers with lower takeover premiums while second-degree connections benefit acquirers with greater value creation. Overall, we provide new evidence that board connectedness plays important roles in corporate investments and leads to greater value creation.     

Corporate life cycle and M&A activity

We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle.     

M&A Operations and Performance in Banking

This paper investigates whether M&A operations influence the performance of banks. Using a sample of 714 deals involving EU acquirers and targets located throughout the world over the period 1991–2005, we investigate whether M&A operations are associated with improved performance (using both standard accounting ratios and cost and alternative profit X-efficiency measures). Despite the extensive and ongoing consolidation process in the banking industry, we find that M&A operations are associated with a slight deterioration in return on equity, cash flow return and profit efficiency and with a marked improvement in cost efficiency. Hence, the improvements in cost efficiency appear to be transferred to bank clients. These changes in performance are directly attributable to the M&A operations, and would not have occurred in their absence. Moreover, these changes exhibit a particularly negative trend for cross-border deals to testify the importance of geographical relatedness in order to achieve better post-M&A performance. The environmental and bank-characteristics that make a deal successful or unsuccessful are finally identified.     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

Pathways to Success in M&A

For many if not most publicly traded companies, acquisition capabilities remain a critical component of sustainable longterm growth and profitability. And even as investors press companies to return excess capital through dividends and stock buybacks, the market continues to assign premium valuations to companies that earn above-average returns through a combination of internal investment and judicious acquisition spending.
This article begins by describing major challenges facing acquirers in the current business and regulatory environment. Then, after showing how M&A can be used to address strategic goals, the authors identify key elements in the M&A strategies of three highly successful companies: General Electric, Danaher, and Illinois Tool Works.     

Customer concentration and digital transformation

Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms during 2009–2020, we examine how customer concentration would influence firms' digital transformation. In this study, we construct a proxy for digital transformation based on a text analysis approach. Our baseline results show that customer concentration hinders digital transformation at the firm level. Moreover, we design a series of tests including instrumental variables and 2SLS regression to mitigate the endogeneity concern. Still, we find results consistent with the baseline regression. The results hold after multiple robustness tests. Furthermore, this negative effect of customer concentration on digital transformation is more pronounced when firms are subject to 1) more market competition, 2) more financing constraints, 3) higher transaction costs, and 4) less efficient use of resources. Overall, our results demonstrate the role of customer concentration in inhibiting firms' digital transformation from the perspective of supply chain management.     

Cross-Listings and M&A Activity: Transatlantic Evidence

We analyze whether European firms choose to list shares in the US to facilitate acquisitions. Evidence from a sample of 547 European companies shows that cross-listed firms are significantly more active in acquiring US companies than are their domestically listed peers. This pattern holds even after we account for self-selection in the cross-listing decision. Cross-listed firms are also more likely to use equity payment in large transactions, but after taking self-selection into account, transaction size becomes the key determinant of the use of equity. After cross-listing, the proportion of aggregate M&A volume financed with equity increases.     

并购中的价格锚定:金融创新还是价值掠夺--基于上市公司并购重组的案例分析

高并购溢价一直是理论界和监管层关注的重点问题。本文以上市公司高并购溢价为例,深入分析了并购交易中锚定价格的动机及其经济后果。研究发现,上市公司的支付对价与并购标的业绩承诺现值之间的差额是融资购买股权的费用,并不是并购标的未来现金流的折现。这主要是上市公司利用信息不对称将融资购买股权的费用直接锚定在股价中,引导外部投资者看好此次并购,最终上市公司大股东通过减持掠夺了中小股东的利益。本文给监管层的政策建议是要规范并购重组中的定价问题,并详细披露相关的信息,以降低与外部投资者之间的信息不对称。     

Shareholder wealth effects of M&A withdrawals

This paper provides evidence on the wealth effect in the event of the withdrawal of a merger or acquisition, and the impact of termination fee provisions on acquirer withdrawal returns. I report a significant negative correlation between acquirer withdrawal returns and announcement returns, consistent with the theory of managerial learning in M&As. Target firms reap net gains in deal withdrawals, showing evidence of a permanent revaluation of targets even if the deals fail. I also find that acquirer termination fee provisions are positively associated with acquirer withdrawal returns, suggesting that such provisions may play a disciplinary role in the withdrawal decision-making and protect acquirer shareholders’ interests in deal withdrawals. Furthermore, my results also show that target termination fee provisions are negatively associated with acquirer withdrawal returns, which supports the efficiency hypothesis.

     

Explaining M&A Success in European Banks

We study 98 large M&As of European bidding banks from 1985 to 2000 in order to investigate drivers of excess returns to the shareholders of the targets, the bidders, and to the combined entity of the bidder and the target. Our findings show that many of 13 drivers identified mostly from prior, US‐focused research have significant explanatory power, indicating that the stock market reaction to M&A announcements of European bidding banks can be at least partly forecast. Our results are largely consistent with the US‐experience and confirm the preference of stock markets for focused transactions and against diversification. Moreover, we find that less active bidders create more value than more active/experienced bidders. This stands in contrast to some US research and may indicate that managers of frequent European bidding banks may be motivated by other objectives than creating shareholder value.     

The PIN anomaly around M&A announcements

The probability of information-based trading (PIN) introduced by Easley and O’Hara (1987) has been increasingly used in empirical research in finance. We investigate its behavior around a sample of merger and acquisition announcements that took place on Euronext Paris between 1995 and 2000. The behavior of the PIN seems to be in contradiction with clear evidence of information leakages in our sample during the pre-event period. We investigate the reasons for its unusual behavior and raise some concerns about its use as an information-based trading indicator, at least around major corporate events.     

Wealth transfer,signaling and leverage in M&A

Merger activity amplifies the conflict of interest between a bidder's different classes of security holders. This study examines how equity returns and credit default swap spreads are affected by acquisition-driven changes in firm leverage. We develop an improved proxy for predicted leverage changes which includes transaction financing and find it has a positive relationship with both equity returns and credit spreads. Using data for North American firms that made acquisition announcements between 2008 and 2014, we find that in leverage increasing mergers, bidding firm shareholders gain while bondholders lose. While these results are consistent with the wealth transfer literature we show that the gains to bidders' shareholders and losses to bidders' bondholders are caused by the change in leverage, not the form of payment or its signaling effect as is commonly documented.     

Customer concentration and loan contract terms

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.     

Board involvement in the M&A negotiation process

This paper examines whether the active engagement of target firm directors in the sale process affects merger outcomes. Using data manually extracted from merger-related SEC filings, I create two measures of target board involvement in merger negotiations: the number of days it takes for the board to meet after the beginning of the sale process and the number of board meetings held throughout the entire process. I find that early board involvement in merger talks increases target shareholder returns and premiums, especially when shareholders have weak control over their firms and are thus in greater need of board protection. Although the two measures of target board activity do not affect acquirer cumulative abnormal returns or the likelihood of competition, such activity does reduce the likelihood of an excessive target termination fee. Robustness analyses dismiss an alternative explanation whereby attractive initial bids lead to both early board involvement and attractive final bids.     

专家谈跨境并购应注意什么

香港富华国际集团董事长赵勇:海外投资一定要规划好资金 很多民营企业"走出去"会经历四个过程,一是"走出去"之后找项目会经历一段时间.刚开始找项目会去美国、欧洲找,也不知道哪个项目适合,看了很多.开始时没有方向性,但这是必须经历的过程,了解哪个地区适合自己,经过磨合以后才能确定,最终找到朋友、找对感觉.二是找了很多项目,但下不了决心,看不准,觉得哪个项目都合适又都不合适.这个问题要根据自己公司的情况来定,最好做自己在国内已经做得比较熟悉的行业.比如你在中国经营了四五家酒店,再去海外看酒店项目就可以直接拿回来给国内的管理团队分析、考察、算账、与标的公司做对接,很容易判断项目的价值.三是看好了项目但下不了决心,犹犹豫豫.海外很多好项目也需要竞争,如果不迅速决策,项目就会被卖掉.因此,在海外投资要特别专心和专注,看好了马上决策.四是买了项目以后管不了.很多项目拿来以后,人家自己有团队,接手以后全靠国内的人员出去管也不行,最好还是利用海外或已经成熟的团队,要支持他们或相信他们,不能收购完了以后原团队大换血,这也很麻烦.     

并购大潮即将落幕

在过去的一个半世纪中,西方经历了七轮巨大的并购浪潮(见表1).19世纪末的第一轮企业并购浪潮,西起红树林(美国西海岸),东至墨西哥湾(美国东海岸),造就了一批金属、石油、铁路以及消费品领域的全国性巨头.到20世纪80年代,西装笔挺的企业狙击手使用垃圾债券进行融资,对大企业进行恶意收购——他们往往忙得都没时间吃午饭.2017年则是最近一轮并购潮即将退潮的时刻.银行家和企业老板中的平庸之辈将会无所事事,为失去佣金与奖金感到懊恼.     

CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses

We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses.     

CEO power,M&A decisions,and market reactions

In this study we examine the relationship between CEO power, corresponding acquisition activities and market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements with a Canadian M&A dataset (1997–2005). We use CEO excess pay as a proxy for CEO power. Our empirical results show that the market reactions to M&A announcements are not related to CEO power. It implies that powerful CEOs do not necessarily make value destroying acquisitions. Our results further show that CEO power levels are significantly higher for acquiring firms compared to the CEOs of non-acquiring firms. In other words, CEOs with more relative power make more acquisitions. Such acquisitions will increase the size of the firm and will allow CEOs to demand a higher compensation level for managing larger asset pools and to derive higher performance incentives that are also generally tied to firm size.     

内部控制缺陷披露与并购绩效

内部控制缺陷披露不仅向外部传递了负向信号,而且不利于并购过程中的价值预测、有效监督和并购整合,这是否会对收购方的并购绩效产生负向影响值得探究。本文基于我国沪深A股上市公司并购数据,采用综合财务指标分析法衡量并购绩效,建立多元回归模型,检验并购方内部控制缺陷披露对并购绩效的潜在影响。实证结果表明,上市公司并购当年披露内部控制缺陷将会降低并购绩效,而且披露的内部控制缺陷越严重,并购绩效越差。     

高管团队内部网络与并购绩效

近年来,高管外部社会网络特征对企业决策的影响受到学术界的广泛关注。与以往研究侧重点不同,本文探究高管团队内部网络结构对企业决策是否产生重大影响,并构建了上市公司高管团队内部网络结构指标。基于社会网络和信息不对称等相关理论,本文实证检验了高管团队内部网络对企业并购决策绩效的影响。结果显示,高管团队内部网络结构密度越高,高管成员之间的沟通越有效,公司并购绩效越好。进一步地分析发现,当并购的复杂度和风险较高、企业所在地区制度环境较差以及高管任职时间较短时,高管团队网络密度对于并购绩效的影响更为明显。最后,本文还发现高管团队内部网络密度高的企业并购后,公司的会计业绩和市场业绩也优于其他公司。