Household income mobility in rural China: 1989–2006

This article analyzes household income mobility in rural China between 1989 and 2006. The results indicate that incomes in rural China are highly mobile. The high degree of rank and quantity mobility implies re-ranking and mean convergence in income distribution, but the disparity between them also enlarged with leveling-up and Gini divergence brought about by economic growth. In addition, there exists considerable transitorily poor and rich in positional mobility. Though, transitory movement provides an opportunity for both poor and rich and decreases long-term inequality, it also causes considerable income fluctuations and economic insecurity. Moreover, the equalizing effect of income mobility on income inequality is weakening.     

Women as agents of change: Female income and mobility in India

Economic globalization will give many women in developing countries access to steady and relatively remunerative employment for the first time, potentially shifting bargaining power within their households and changing the choices that are made for their children. This paper exploits a unique setting — a group of tea plantations in South India where women are employed in permanent wage labor and where incomes do not vary by caste — to anticipate the impact of globalization on mobility across social groups in the future. The main result of the paper is that a relative increase in female income weakens the family's ties to the ancestral community and the traditional economy, but these mobility enhancing effects are obtained for certain historically disadvantaged castes alone. Although the paper provides a context-specific explanation for why the women from these castes emerge as agents of change, the first general implication of the analysis is that the incentive and the ability of women to use their earnings to influence household decisions depends importantly on their social background. The second implication is that historically disadvantaged groups may, in fact, be especially responsive to new opportunities precisely because they have fewer ties to the traditional economy to hold them back.     

Mobility of Top Incomes in Germany

I analyze German top income mobility using micro‐level panel data of personal income tax returns which are highly representative for top income taxpayers for the years 2001–06. Top income mobility is assessed in three dimensions: (i) persistence in top income fractiles and its stability over time, (ii) measures of individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size: the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, and (iii) mobility's impact on top income shares. Persistence in top income fractiles is comparatively high and fairly stable across the analyzed period. Top income recipients are less prone to downward mobility and see less variation in annual ranks than less rich tax units. Mobility's impact on income concentration is moderate. The top percentile's share is reduced by roughly 5 percent over six years.     

The measurement of rank mobility

In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring social mobility when the social status of individuals is given by their rank. In order to sensibly represent the rank mobility of subgroups within a given society, we address the problem in terms of partial permutation matrices which include standard (“global”) matrices as a special case. We first provide a characterization of a partial ordering on partial matrices which, in the standard case of global matrices, coincides with the well-known “concordance” ordering. We then provide a characterization of an index of rank mobility based on partial matrices and show that, in the standard case of comparing global matrices, it is equivalent to Spearman's ρ index.     

The measurement of income mobility: A partial ordering approach

Summary. Given a set of longitudinal data pertaining to two populations, a question of interest is the following: Which population has experienced a greater extent of income mobility? The aim of the present paper is to develop a systematic way of answering this question. We first put forth four axioms for income movement-mobility indices, and show that a familiar class of measures is characterized by these axioms. An unambiguous (partial) ordering is then defined as the intersection of the (complete) orderings induced by the mobility measures which belong to the characterized class; a transformation of income distributions is “more mobile” than another if, and only if, the former is ranked higher than the latter for all mobility measures which satisfy our axioms. Unfortunately, our mobility ordering depends on a parameter, and therefore, it is not readily apparent how one can apply it to panel data directly. In the second part of the paper, therefore, we derive several sets of parameter-free necessary and sufficient conditions which allow one to use the proposed mobility ordering in making unambiguous income mobility comparisons in practice. Received: July 12, 1995; revised version: May 13, 1997     

USING PSEUDO‐PANELS TO MEASURE INCOME MOBILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

This paper presents a comparative overview of mobility patterns in 14 Latin American countries between 1992 and 2003. Using three alternative econometric techniques on constructed pseudo‐panels, the paper provides a set of estimators for the traditional notion of income mobility as well as for mobility around extreme and moderate poverty lines. The estimates suggest very high levels of time‐dependent unconditional immobility for the Region. However, the introduction of socioeconomic and personal factors reduces the estimate of income immobility by around 30 percent. There are also large variations in country‐specific income mobility (estimated to explain some additional 10 percent of inter‐temporal income variation). Analyzing the determinants of changes in poverty incidence within cohorts revealed statistically significant roles for age, gender, and education of the household head, the latter subject to distinctive effects across levels of attainment and transition in and out of poverty.     

On Ramseyʼs conjecture

Studying a one-sector economy populated by finitely many heterogeneous households that are subject to no-borrowing constraints, we confirm a conjecture by Frank P. Ramsey according to which, in the long run, society would be divided into the set of patient households who own the entire capital stock and impatient ones without any physical wealth. More specifically, we prove (i) that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable and (ii) that along every equilibrium the most patient household owns the entire capital of the economy after some finite time. Furthermore, we prove that despite the presence of the no-borrowing constraints all equilibria are efficient. Our results are derived for the continuous-time formulation of the model that was originally used by Ramsey, and they stand in stark contrast to results that – over the last three decades – have been found in the discrete-time version of the model.     

Coordination of mobile labor

We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these “general equilibrium’’ findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [Increasing returns, industrialization and indeterminacy of equilibrium, Quart. J. Econ. 106 (1991) 617-650].     

Distributional effects of public policy choices

This paper examines the effects of a budget-neutral public spending allocation between public investment and private investment subsidy on inequality dynamics and intergenerational mobility in an environment with heterogeneous households and incomplete capital market.     

Global welfare comparisons

Abstract To provide a normative foundation for transfers between different economies, one needs information on their ‘per capita welfare.’ This paper considers various methods for doing this and reaches the following conclusions: (i) Such global welfare comparisons are more demanding than usually thought. (ii) The ranking of methods differs from that of local (over‐time) comparisons, with real comprehensive per capita NNP being the least impractical method. The lesson is that global welfare comparisons should be performed with great care. The comparisons must be made in local real prices calculated according to ‘purchasing‐power‐parity,’ where non‐traded environmental amenities play an important role.     

Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Investment‐specific Technological Change

This paper examines a dynamically optimal subsidy policy in a continuous‐time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Krusell (Krusell, P. (1998) “Investment‐Specific R&D and the Decline in the Relative Price of Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141), in which investment‐specific technological progress occurs endogenously because of R&D performed by monopolistic firms. It is demonstrated that a combination of the time‐invariant subsidy for investment and the time‐variant subsidy for R&D enables the market equilibrium to replicate the socially optimal allocation.     

Information technology and economic performance in U.S industries

Abstract .  We study the relationship between information technology (IT) and economic performance, to explore whether IT-capital promotes productivity growth. We use a data set similar to that of previous researchers, but employ non-parametric estimation techniques in order to directly estimate the output elasticities of IT for each industry and time period. We find that IT has a positive effect on productivity, which varies among industries and time. Moreover, adjustment costs are important when identifying this effect. Finally, IT-capital growth appears to be raising income in all industries used in our sample, even those that experienced output reduction.     

Product customization

The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the way companies advertise, develop and distribute products. Firms can now customize their advertising messages and products to the particular characteristics and needs of customers. Customers themselves can create their own products. We investigate investments by firms in product-customization capabilities within a duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation. We find that (i) if brand name effects are not too strong, one firm emerges as a leader in product customization—firms make asymmetric investments in product-customization technologies in order to reduce price competition, (ii) if brand name effects are strong, both firms make extensive investments in product customization, and (iii) the possibility of product customization can raise industry profits if brand names are weak, but not when they are strong.     

Can micro-credit bring development?

We examine the long-run effects of micro-credit on development in an occupational choice model similar to Banerjee and Newman (JPE, 1993). Micro-credit is modeled as a pure improvement in the credit market that opens up self-employment options to some agents who otherwise could only work for wages or subsist. Micro-credit can either raise or lower long-run GDP, since it can lower use of both subsistence and full-scale industrial technologies. It typically lowers long-run inequality and poverty, by making subsistence payoffs less widespread. Thus, an equity-efficiency tradeoff may be involved in the promotion of micro-credit. However, in a worst case scenario, micro-credit has purely negative long-run effects. The key to micro-credit's long-run effects is found to be the “graduation rate”, defined as the rate at which the self-employed build up enough wealth to start full-scale firms. We distinguish between two avenues for graduation: “winner” graduation (of those who earn above-average returns in self-employment) and “saver” graduation (due to gradual accumulation of average returns in self-employment). Long-run development is not attainable via micro-credit if “winner” graduation is the sole avenue for graduation. In contrast, if the saving rate and self-employment returns of the average micro-borrower are jointly high enough, then micro-credit can bring an economy from stagnation to full development through “saver” graduation. Thus the lasting effects of micro-credit may partially depend on simultaneous facilitation of micro-saving. Eventual graduation of the average borrower, rather than indefinite retention, should be the goal of micro-banks if micro-credit is to be a stepping stone to broad-based development rather than at best an anti-poverty tool.     

The Sins of the Fathers: Intergenerational Income Mobility in China

This paper aims to obtain an accurate estimate of China's intergenerational income mobility and to present evidence on its distributional pattern. Using panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1989–2009, I find that China is less mobile than most developed countries. Then, I employ five different approaches to investigate the distributional pattern of China's intergenerational mobility across income levels. The results suggest that poor families have relatively high mobility, indicating opportunities for the poor children to escape poverty. Finally, I show that while wealthy fathers are likely to pass on their favorable economic status to their sons, rich sons come from a very wide range of family economic backgrounds.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

Inequality convergence revisited: Evidence from stationarity panel tests with breaks and cross correlation

This paper empirically examines whether there exists stochastic convergence of income inequality among 48 contiguous states within the US over the 1916–2005 period. For that purpose, we employ the recently developed panel stationarity test of Carrion-i-Silvestre, Del Barrio-Castro and López-Bazo (2005), which assumes a highly flexible trend function by incorporating an unknown number of structural breaks. In addition, the issues of cross-sectional dependence as well as control for finite-sample bias are accommodated through bootstrap methods. Overall, for the US case, our analysis provides strong evidence in support of the hypothesis of inter-state inequality convergence. Moreover, the results are robust to alternative inequality measures applied, different notions of stochastic convergence defined, and alternative panel stationary test employed.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

China's regional income disparityAn alternative way to think of the sources and causes1

Using data on China's provincial economies for the period 1978–2005, we decomposed the causes and factors that have contributed to inter‐regional per capita income disparity. Variance in capital per employee and variance in capital elasticity are found to be the two main sources of income disparity while the employment–labour force ratio is shown to be an important factor in containing the rise of income disparity. An analysis on inter‐regional factor reallocation effects reveals their relatively small and insignificant contributions to overall growth performance. It is also discovered that capital has in most years flowed in the right direction to pursue higher marginal productivity across provincial economies. Inter‐provincial labour movement, on the other hand, had not displayed significant equilibrating effects until institutional reforms started to allow freer inter‐regional labour mobility in later years. Generally, we conclude that market‐oriented factor mobility has played a crucial role in equalizing factor returns as well as enhancing growth efficiency across regions.