NONSUBSTITUTION THEOREMS FOR A SMALL TRADING COUNTRY

This paper proves a nonsubstitution theorem for small trading economies, under quite plausible conditions. Conditions are established under which the consumption possibility set for an economy that has nontradeable factors of production and nontradeable consumption goods is bounded by a hyperplane, rather than by a curved surface. The theorem allows the possibility that the prices of nontradeable factors, and hence the incomes of their owners, may depend on domestic supplies of nontradeable factors. It is concluded that the equilibrium wage and the equilibrium prices of all consumption goods are independent of domestic endowments or the shape of demand functions. The theorem tends to strengthen the view that, in the absence of trade barriers, differences in real wages across countries cannot be explained by differences in resource endowments.     

Existence and Welfare Properties of Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Multiple Divisible and Indivisible Commodities and Linear Production Technologies

In this paper we consider a class of economies with a finite number of divisible commodities, linear production technologies, and indivisible goods and a finite number of agents. This class contains several well-known economies with indivisible goods and money as special cases. It is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indivisible commodities, if each agent initially owns a sufficient amount of one of the divisible commodities, and if a “no production without input”-like assumption on the production sector holds, then there exists a competitive equilibrium for any economy in this class. The usual convexity assumption is not needed here. Furthermore, by imposing strong monotonicity on one of the divisible commodities we show that any competitive equilibrium is in the core of the economy and therefore the first theorem of welfare also holds. We further obtain a second welfare theorem stating that under some conditions a Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium allocation for some well-chosen redistribution of the total initial endowments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, D46, D5, D51, D6, D61.     

Linear and non-linear price decentralization

Compendious and thorough solutions to the existence of a linear price equilibrium problem, the second welfare theorem, and the limit theorem on the core are provided for exchange economies whose consumption sets are the positive cone of arbitrary ordered Fréchet spaces—dispensing entirely with the assumption that the vector ordering of the commodity space is a lattice. The motivation comes from economic applications showing the need to bring within the scope of equilibrium theory vector orderings that are not lattices, which arise in the typical model of portfolio trading with missing options. The assumptions are on the primitives of the model. They are bounds on the marginals of non-linear prices and for ω-proper economies they are both sufficient and necessary.     

Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects,nonessential private goods and convex costs

Summary In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.hank Dolf Talman and an anonymous referee for many useful remarks and annotations of a previous draft of this paper.     

The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non‐Walrasian Markets

The standard version of the second welfare theorem assumes that market operations produce Walrasian outcomes. Therefore, if there are individuals who can manipulate prices, the conclusion of the second welfare theorem is questionable. In this paper, we address the decentralization of a Pareto‐optimal allocation, when markets are non‐Walrasian. Our objective in this paper is to develop a game which can implement Pareto‐optimal allocations as Nash equilibria of strategic exchange in markets. In this way, we develop a version of the second welfare theorem for economies where markets are strategic.     

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE*

For timeless economies where technology provides economies of scale, it is shown that, under a variety of circumstances, an allocation is optimal if and only if it is a free-entry monopsonistic equilibrium, in which producers take account of labour costs rising with the level of employment. The results refine Fujita's one-commodity theory, and extend it to many commodities and a heterogeneous population. Production takes place in towns. When transport costs for commodities are zero, one good is produced in each town. Land use and worker travel costs are allowed. For the equivalence theorem to hold, all production and property in a town should have a single owner. Models with transport costs are also discussed. For them, it is shown that in general there is no equilibrium.     

Some theorems on the existence of competitive equilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to point out a relationship between theorems on the existence of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities, and recent results (pioneered by A. Mas-Colell) on the existence of equilibrium for economies in which consumer preferences are neither complete nor transitive. This observation leads both to a substantial strengthening of the theorem on the existence of equilibrium with externalities, and at the same time to a revealing perspective on the Mas-Colell theorem.     

The Implications of Rybczynski’s Theorem for Government Spending,Learning by Doing,and Labor Mobility

The evolution of a small open economy or region with labor mobility and dynamic scale economies in the high-tech sector is analyzed using the neoclassical 2×2-model. Government services are inputs to private production and influence specialization according to Rybczynskis theorem. This effect is reinforced by dynamic scale economies. Empirically observed differences in regional development and specialization are explained by diverging government policies and/or history-dependent factors. Despite of diverging wage rates, diversified regions and regions specialized in low-tech production may coexist with a common level of per capita incomes.     

The public reallocation of resources across age: a comparison of Austria and Sweden

There is a strong interdependency between public transfers and the shape of the economic lifecycle because these transfers facilitate and enable the decoupling of production and consumption over long time periods, most notably in childhood and retirement. The design of public transfers obviously influences the production and consumption and consequently also the degree of economic dependency of children and the elderly. We propose economic dependency ratios which are based on age-specific consumption and labour income or age-specific public contributions/benefits, respectively, illustrating them in a comparison of Austria and Sweden. Although these two countries are very similar economies in terms of production, income and the size of the public sector, there are remarkable differences in the design of public transfers, in their distribution over age-groups and consequently in the shape of the average economic lifecycle. Using the economic dependency ratios we show that the financial sustainability of the public transfer system depends beside the demographic developments strongly on its design: the Swedish system collects the contributions from a wider range of age groups, transfers a smaller share to the elderly and provides more support to younger generations, supporting them to invest in children of their own. These characteristics have a positive effect on the sustainability of the Swedish system: although in Sweden there is a larger share of the population in the age group 60+, the total economic dependency of elderly persons is lower.     

The Mises-Hayek business cycle theory,fiat currencies and open economies

This paper extends the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory to open economies with fiat currencies. I explore: (1) the problem of domestic versus international monetary policy with fiat currencies in an international setting. (2) How the feedback effects between central banks in the context of an expansionary monetary contributes to extend and transmit a Mises-Hayek business cycle from big economies to small financially integrated economies. I find that a lengthening of the period of production is not the only effect produced on the capital structure, but also a misallocation of capital goods between the production of tradable and non-tradable goods and services and that business cycles can become more severe when there are open economies with fiat currencies.     

The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies

We provide an evaluation of the measure of privately blocking coalitions in differential information economies. In the case of atomless economies, it is proved that for a Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Walrasian expectations equilibrium, to any symmetric profile there corresponds a ball such that "almost half” of the profiles it contains are privately blocking. Analogous results are proved in the case of finite differential information economies for generalized coalitions and social coalition structures. From a different point of view, the paper can be considered as a contribution showing private core equivalence theorems under restrictions on coalition formation. We thank an anonymous referee for observations and comments improving an earlier version of the present paper.     

Edgeworth's conjecture with infinitely many commodities: commodity differentiation

Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence. In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L ¹, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition, we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that, for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997     

Offshoring and employment structure in the EU periphery: the case of Spain

The effects of offshoring of production have received a great deal of interest due to their implications on labour markets. However, the main theoretical predictions related to this issue are not always fulfilled in the empirical analysis; according to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, there seems to be unanimous support for its effects in advanced countries whose production is relocated but not at all for recipient economies of the same. Additionally, there is a lack of empirical evidence in countries specialized in unskilled-labour tasks which are, at the same time, economies with higher relative wages in a global framework such as the Spanish economy. In this sense, the aim of this article is to analyse the effects of material offshoring in the relative composition of employment in the Spanish manufacturing industry during the period 1990–2007. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of immigrant labour and the temporary employment rate due to its increasing relevance in the Spanish economy during the period analysed. Using a generalized methods of moments (GMM) approach, our results suggest that, as opposed to most developed countries, offshoring in Spain has favoured the demand for blue-collar workers. In addition, we confirm that the increase in immigration and the increasing use of temporary contracts have enlarged the share of low-skilled workers.     

The limit theorem on the core of a production economy in vector lattices with unordered preferences

Summary. We prove Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw's (1987) theorem on the equivalence of Edgeworth production equilibria and pseudo-equilibria in a more general setting. We consider production economies with unordered preferences and general consumption sets in a vector lattice commodity space. We adapt the approach of Mas-Colell and Richard (1991) and prove our theorem by applying a separating hyperplane argument in the space of all allocations. We also generalize Podczeck's (1996) important result on the relationship between continuous and discontinuous equilibrium prices to the case of production. Received: April 18, 1997; revised version: February 6, 1998     

A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies

Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting. Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996     

Testing for the Fisher hypothesis under regime shifts: an application to Asian countries

This article aims to provide new insights into trade effects of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), using an imperfect competition framework. The model combines the new gravity model approach with supply-demand export equations in imperfect competition. In this regard, the role of scale economies, product varieties and expectations is explored. Facing the lack of international data on scale economies, we also develop a translog production system which makes it possible to obtain reliable estimates of this factor. For a more rigorous treatment of the endogeneity problem in the model, we make use of an instrumental GMM panel estimator. Results show limited effects of GAFTA on regional trade in imperfect competition, due to market segmentation and the predominance of inter-industry trade. In addition, the fitted intra-GAFTA trade values are far beyond the actual ones. This suggests that GAFTA countries could benefit from deeper regional trade integration. In this regard, the Arab Spring creates new opportunities to reinforce trade integration as a means of grasping additional trade gains in this area.     

On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria

Summary. This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria (rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper (DeMarzo and Skiadas (1996)) we show that equilibrium prices for the larger class of quasi-complete economies can be characterized as rn-REE. Examples of quasi-complete economies include the type of economies for which demand aggregation in the sense of Gorman is possible (with or without asymmetric information), the setting of the Milgrom and Stokey no-trade theorem, an economy giving rise to the CAPM with asymmetric information but no normality assumptions, the simple exponential-normal model of Grossman (1976), and a case of no aggregate endowment risk. In the common-knowledge context, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a common knowledge posterior estimate, given common priors, to coincide with the full communication posterior estimate. Received: May 29, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997     

INCENTIVES FOR COMPETITIVE RESPONSES IN REPLICATED ECONOMIES: A GENERALIZATION

A simple proof is presented of a theorem of Roberts and Postlewaite on truthful revelation of preferences for replicated economies. The proof provides some generalizations of the earlier result using the strict definition of feasibility. First, to economies with an infinity of agents but with a finite number of types; secondly, to economies with a countable number of commodities.     

Entrepreneurship and productivity: The slow growth of the planned economies

Trends in gross domestic product (GDP) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the former socialist economies seem to indicate that these economies were converging to unusually low long-run growth rates in the late 1980s. In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model of entrepreneurship that is able to account for the difference in long-run performance between centrally planned economies and market-oriented ones. Long-run growth rates of output and productivity are determined by the growth of the stock of managerial knowledge, which in turn depends on the share of the population involved in entrepreneurial activities and on the time that spent on those activities. We analyze the effect of two characteristics of centrally planned economies on their growth performance. First, in centrally planned economies factors of production are distributed by the central planner to the firms' managers through a contest that uses up some of the managers' productive effort. Second, the leadership is “egalitarian,” in the sense that it treats individuals with different abilities equally. We show that these two features reduce the fraction of people becoming entrepreneurs/managers, as well as their managerial effort, which in turn reduces long-run output and TFP growth. Furthermore, we find that centrally planned economies have lower income inequality and slightly higher capital–output ratios, which is consistent with these countries' experiences.     

On the existence of lindahl equilibria in economies with a measure space of non-transitive consumers

We present a generalization of Roberts' theorem on the existence of Lindahl equilibria in economies with a measure space of agents. The principal contribution of this paper is methodological. We show that by formulating the problem in what we consider to be its natural infinite dimensional setting, the basic structure of Debreu's proof in the theory of value can be applied. Our proof makes use of functional analysis and relies, in particular, on Artstein's characterization of weak sequential convergence in L₁(μ).