Property Rights,Public Enforcement,and Growth

We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government can assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or if public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare, an equilibrium path without property‐rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case, the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.     

Property rights revisited

Over the last 20 years, a large number of papers have tried to quantify the effect of property rights on a wide range of variables like growth, trade and to a lesser extent, inequality. However, these studies have been inherently limited by measures of the security of property rights that are currently available. These suffer from any of a number of shortcomings, ranging from a lack of availability, objectivity, or the fact that they measure a broader concept like the rule of law. This paper tries to address this gap by proposing a new index of property rights. Specifically, we use a state-space model to combine all available indicators tracking the security of property rights into an index that covers 191 countries over the period 1994–2014. We compare it to the existing indicators by revisiting the link between inequality, democracy and property rights, using a panel threshold regression model with fixed-effects. Depending on the measure of property rights that is used, there can be considerable differences in the size, significance and even the sign of the estimated parameters. Specifically, in contrast with existing measures, we find that a strengthening of the security of property rights reduces inequality in highly democratic countries only via the government's redistribution channel.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

On the transaction values of land use rights in rural China

Land Use Rights (LURs) in China affect farmers’ productivity through investment incentives and the way land is allocated across households. LURs have implication and trade-offs between equity and growth. This paper examines how Chinese farmers might respond if the Chinese government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell LURs. Livelihood choices, labor substitution, market infrastructure, a lack of property right protections, entrepreneurship, bureaucracy, and political will are all influential factors that will determine whether such a program would work. The purpose of this paper is to examine the economics of transaction in LURs, estimate the value at which LURs could transact in equilibrium, and to analyze factors that would affect these price changes. We evaluate farmer’s intention to buy and sell LURs and how much they are willing to pay and receive for LURs.     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。     

马克思财产理论与公民社会治理的形成

马克思财产理论认为,财产、效率与自由具有内在的逻辑一致性,推动社会的发展、经济的繁荣和人们实体自由的增加；人类社会的三种财产历史形式,是对马克思财产理论的实证,实现了逻辑和历史的统一；现代社会催生的财产形式,对于当下我国建构公民社会具有启示意义.随着市场经济和改革开放产生的公民社会,在财产、经济效率与公民权利的内在逻辑中,必然呼唤和催生成熟的公民社会,在公民社会治理理念中实现政治社会、经济社会和公民社会的良性互动,实现和谐社会的建构.     

基于产权分离的生态产权制度优化研究

文章在梳理产权与生态产权的主要文献以及分析归纳中国生态产权制度运行低效的深层次原因的基础上,提出以“非开发性所有权”为核心概念的生态产权制度优化的理论依据和可能的实践路径,并基于博弈理论采用嵌入激励机制的多阶段双边拍卖模型论证了“非开发性所有权”贝叶斯均衡价格的存在性。研究表明：(1)生态领域的根本利益冲突,既是生态产品极强的正外部性且无法内部化或市场化所引致的,也是产权制度失效的根本成因;(2)基于产权的可分离性原理,可以构建涵盖“非开发性所有权”和“开发性所有权”等权利相兼容的生态产权制度;(3)建立以“非开发性所有权”为交易品的市场,可以作为生态产权制度的优化路径,同时也是生态产品正外部性得以内部化的有效路径;(4)政府生态购买,是生态产权制度优化路径的有效实现形式。当引入激励机制时,基于不完全信息的多阶段双边拍卖机制能够实现贝叶斯均衡的理论购买价格。上述分析内容可以作为生态产权制度改革的政策工具。     

Privatization, Land Reform, and Property Rights: the Mexican Experience

This paper is concernedwith rural property rights in Mexico. Consideration of this issuewas occasioned by the liberal program of reform adopted in 1992by the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, which providesfor a gradual privatization of the Mexican ejidos, a form ofcommunally administered property. The present contribution examinesto what extent this reform project is theoretically founded andwhich practical problems it encounters in implementation. Thegenesis and structure of rural property rights in Mexico is outlined.The problems associated with implementing the reform projectare discussed for an empirical case example in the Soconuscoregion (Chiapas) in Mexico. Finally, a number of consequencesare drawn.     

提高商业银行竞争力:市场结构改革还是产权结构改革

近年来,在如何提升我国商业银行国际竞争能力这一问题上,逐渐形成两大主张:市场结构论和产权结构论.本文认为,这两种观点的前提、政策重点都存在一致性,因而完全可以双管齐下--在加快国有商业银行产权结构改革的同时,优化银行业市场结构,增强银行业市场的竞争性.市场结构改革和产权结构改革同等重要.在具体措施上,市场结构的改革重点应是在给予股份制商业银行"国民待遇"的同时,鼓励它们开展市场化的并购.     

构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础——基于成都市改革经验的理论分析

在现行的农村土地产权制度下,农民并没有真正意义或物权意义上的土地财产权利。从成都市改革的实践经验来看,在这场改革中,农民个体表达出对土地承包经营权和宅基地使用权权能的完整性及"私有化"的强烈追求,以"还权赋能"为指向的成都市的土地制度改革适应了农民的这一要求。农村土地产权制度改革是完善社会主义市场经济体制的一项重要内容,我们需要在中国特色社会主义理论创新的指导下进行新的实践探索,改革的方向是在不改变土地集体所有权的制度框架下使物权化的土地产权向农民回归,重新构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础。     

大股东侵占行为动因剖析及其对国有产权改革的借鉴意义

国有产权改革目前正进入攻坚阶段,各种利用控制权地位侵占国有资产的案例比比皆是。本文通过LLSV模型分析了大股东侵占发生的条件机理和动因,探究了如何防范和减缓侵占行为的均衡条件,提出了在国有产权改革实践中如何对待此种行为的政策建议。     

Women’s rights and development

Why has the expansion of women’s economic and political rights coincided with economic development? This paper investigates this question by focusing on a key economic right for women: property rights. The basic hypothesis is that the process of development (i.e., capital accumulation and declining fertility) exacerbated the tension in men’s conflicting interests as husbands versus fathers, ultimately resolving them in favor of the latter. As husbands, men stood to gain from their privileged position in a patriarchal world whereas, as fathers, they were hurt by a system that afforded few rights to their daughters. The model predicts that declining fertility would hasten reform of women’s property rights whereas legal systems that were initially more favorable to women would delay them. The theoretical relationship between capital and the relative attractiveness of reform is non-monotonic but growth inevitably leads to reform. I explore the empirical validity of the theoretical predictions by using cross-state variation in the US in the timing of married women obtaining property and earning rights between 1850 and 1920.     

Population dynamics and utilitarian criteria in the Lucas–Uzawa Model

This paper introduces population growth in the Uzawa–Lucas model, analyzing the implications of the choice of the welfare criterion on the model's outcome. Traditional growth theory assumes population growth to be exponential, but this is not a realistic assumption (see Brida and Accinelli, 2007). We model exogenous population change by a generic function of population size. We show that a unique non-trivial equilibrium exists and the economy converges towards it along a saddle path, independently of population dynamics. What is affected by the type of population dynamics is the dimension of the stable manifold, which can be one or two, and when the equilibrium is reached, which can happen in finite time or asymptotically. Moreover, we show that the choice of the utilitarian criterion will be irrelevant on the equilibrium of the model, if the steady state growth rate of population is null, as in the case of logistic population growth. Then, we show that a closed-form solution for the transitional dynamics of the economy (both in the case population dynamics is deterministic and stochastic) can be found for a certain parameter restriction.     

Property rights imperfections and asset allocation: Co-ownership in Bulgaria

This paper analyzes how imperfections of property rights affect households’ allocation of assets using micro-survey data from Bulgaria. Co-ownership of assets is widespread in many countries due to inheritance. Central and Eastern Europe offers an interesting natural experiment to assess the effects of this type of property rights imperfection because of the asset restitution process in the 1990s. In Bulgaria, where co-ownership is very prominent and land is strongly fragmented, the land reform and inheritance legislation allows identifying the impact of co-ownership by taking advantage of a discontinuity created by a minimum plot size law. We find that land in co-ownership is more likely to be used by less efficient farm organizations or to be left abandoned, and that it is related to significant welfare losses. The paper hence provides evidence of sub-optimal land allocation following a privatization that established formal but imperfect property rights.     

Property rights in land and output growth in Russia

This paper tests whether the implementation of a key market‐oriented reform in post‐Soviet Russia, property rights in land, proxied by the percent of privatized land by region, affected the pace of sub‐national economic growth during two unprecedented expansion periods: 2001–2008 and 2010–2014. Individuals gained the Constitutional right to own land in 1993, but implementation was stalled. The pace of land privatization can be explained by arguably exogenous factors such as distance to Moscow, as well as climate and also regional political culture, proxied by concentration of votes in the 2004 presidential election. We show that this rate of land privatization in Russia's regions was significantly associated with output growth in 2010–2014, confirming the policy importance of this measure for developing economies. Regions where private holdings expanded most rapidly with the enforcement of property rights in land, gained a competitive advantage in the growth process through increased investment in fixed assets and private consumption.     

中国银行业改革的侧重点:产权结构还是市场结构

本文对运用SCP(结构—行为—绩效 )框架及其从行业结构的角度揭示中国银行业主要问题的思路及提炼出的政策含义提出了批评 ,认为在现代技术不断改变着银行运作机制、主要发达国家的银行业的行业结构进一步向集中化发展、各个银行在努力追求规模经济和范围经济效应的背景下 ,中国银行业保持一定程度的集中率是符合国际银行业发展趋势的。中国银行业的主要问题是国有银行产权结构单一 ,而不是行业集中的问题。从行业结构的角度为突破口的改革将可能导致中国经济的振荡。正是中国银行业的资产与市场份额集中于带病的国有商业银行 ,改革的侧重点就不能从行业结构的调整为起点 ,而是相反 ,要充分利用进入WTO后的有限的过渡期 ,在国有银行的市场份额发生显著萎缩之前 ,坚决地进行国有商业银行的产权改革 ,努力避免潜在金融风险的总爆发。     

A great wall of patents: What is behind China's recent patent explosion?

China's patent surge, documented in this paper, is seemingly paradoxical given the country's weak record of protecting intellectual property rights. Using a firm-level data set that spans the population of China's large and medium-size industrial enterprises, this paper explores the factors that account for China's rising patent activity. While the intensification of research and development in the Chinese economy tracks with patenting activity, it explains only a fraction of the patent explosion. The growth of foreign direct investment in China is prompting Chinese firms to file for more patent applications. Amendments to the patent law that favor patent holders and ownership reform that has clarified the assignment of property rights also emerge as significant sources of China's patent boom. These results are robust to alternative estimation strategies that account for over-dispersion in the patent counts data and firm heterogeneity.     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

产权信念及其对公平偏好与自利偏好的挤出

传统经济理论将产权作为经济绩效的外生变量,但是人类社会的演化路径表明产权是内生于人类族群的共同信念,它与内置于人类心智的公平偏好交互作用影响个体的决策行为。文章运用比较制度实验方法针对不同来源的产权考察其认同信念及其对公平偏好的影响。实验发现,产权不仅导致提议者对回应者和接受者有产权认同信念,也导致提议者的自利偏好和回应者的公平偏好被挤出;通过对利他偏好、策略行为和第三方评价的分离,测度了产权信念;提议者没有强烈的公平偏好动机,而是通过策略行为来最大化自身利益。     

Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy

Abstract.  We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.