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1.
byAxel Gautier 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2004,75(4):645-656
Abstract This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole,1993) where the regulator faces a cash‐in‐advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two‐part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost . 相似文献
2.
Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively. 相似文献
3.
KOJI ISHIBASHI 《The Japanese Economic Review》2010,61(4):488-506
I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity. 相似文献
4.
Chifeng Dai 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2008,34(1):75-85
We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency
parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price
contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and
Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further,
the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires
information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.
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5.
《Journal of public economics》2007,91(5-6):1177-1196
In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of fiscal federalism. A non-trivial Principal–Multi-Agent model is used to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local governments, and under citizen free mobility. We show how informational rents, landlords' interests, and citizen mobility interact to produce distortions at both ends of the type space: in particular the most efficient jurisdictions should overproduce and overtax in second-best optimum. Informational asymmetries decrease the average production of public goods and increase the inter-jurisdictional variance of taxes and public-good production. 相似文献
6.
Chifeng Dai 《The Canadian journal of economics》2021,54(1):92-125
We study optimal contracts in environments where a risk‐averse supplier discovers cost information privately and gradually over time: the supplier is privately informed about its cost uncertainty at the time of contracting and discovers the realization of cost condition privately after contracting and before production. We show that both the buyer and the supplier prefer more cost uncertainty when the supplier is not very risk‐averse but less cost uncertainty when the supplier is sufficiently risk‐averse. However, the buyer always prefers to contract before the cost uncertainty resolves regardless of the supplier's degree of risk aversion. The nature of the optimal contract also depends on the supplier's risk preference. A separating contract is optimal when the supplier is not very risk‐averse; however, a pooling contract, which offers the same contract terms regardless of the cost uncertainty, can be optimal when the supplier becomes sufficiently risk‐averse. Moreover, the optimal production schedule is often characterized by “inflexible rules.” 相似文献
7.
分别运用混合战略模型和重复博弈模型分析了生猪产业链中市场契约和生产契约的履行情况。分析结果表明:市场契约的履行与关系租金正相关,与抽检成本、遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关;生产契约的履行与关系租金、专用性资产投资和贴现率正相关,与遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关。提出建议:政府应扶持猪肉产品品牌建设,促使优质猪肉产品在市场上实现优质优价;政府应增加对屠宰加工企业的抽检补贴;屠宰加工企业在进行专用性资产投资的同时也应要求养殖场户进行专用性资产投资。 相似文献
8.
Fernando Branco 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1995,7(3):277-292
Laffont and Tirole (1987) analyzed the problem of a regulator that wants to select one ofn firms to carry out a single indivisible project when the firms have private and independent costs and have the possibility of an ex-post investment in (non-observable) effort to reduce the (observable) cost.This paper generalizes the analysis to a model of common costs, unknown at the bidding stage, while keeping the assumption of independent types. I show that the main characteristics of the private costs model are kept in a common cost framework. I provide two mechanisms that may be used to implement the optimal contract.This is a much revised version of a part of chapter one of my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank Drew Fudenberg, Oliver Hart, and two anonymous referees for their comments. I am especially indebted to Jean Tirole, who suggested this problem to me. I have also benefited from presentations at MIT and the EARIE 93 Meeting. Financial support from INVOTAN (grant 3/88/PO) is gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are my own. 相似文献
9.
This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs. 相似文献
10.
This article extends the existing theory and empirical investigationof unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibilityand self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achievingviable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the partiesto a unitization contract have unit production shares that arethe same as their cost shares will the contract be incentivecompatible. Using a database of 60 unit operating agreements,we measure the industry's actual behavior against the principlesof production from a common pool. Our survey of units that haveonly one production phase and that are relatively homogeneousreveals that such equal sharing rules are always found and theyappear to encourage the parties to behave optimally. In morecomplex units with multiple production phases and/or separateconcentrations of oil and gas (gas caps) we find deviationsfrom the theoretical ideal. In the case of multiphase units,we find equal cost and production shares within phases, butnot across phases. A preset trigger for shifting from one productionphase to the next helps to maintain optimal behavior. For gascap units, however, we generally do not find the equal sharingrule. Conflicts and rent dissipation follow as illustrated bythe case of the Prudhoe Bay Unit. The article describes thedesirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It alsoshows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficultsituations. 相似文献
11.
This paper examines one element of financial institutions doing business internationally: currency exchange risks. Such risks present significant barriers to profitably and competitively expand financial service markets. This paper compares the cost of alternative options hedging schemes in the presence of multi-currency uncertainties that affect the repayment of financial institutions' portfolios of loans (assets) and debt. Schemes that use separate contracts to hedge each uncertainty are compared to schemes with a single contract to capture all uncertainties simultaneously. The impact of correlation between the different currencies on such hedging policies is investigated. It is found that correlation matters and can significantly affect the cost and the contract choice.The authors greatly appreciate comments from participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference in Boston, MA, October 8–11, 1998 and the Office of Thrift Supervision research seminar. 相似文献
12.
现代主流企业理论认为企业是"契约"性质的,并建构交易费用范畴来分析企业内部的契约关系,但这种关系不同于马克思主义分析框架中的经济关系和生产关系,而被认为是一种法权关系和交易关系.事实上,企业契约背后隐含着经济关系和生产关系,表现为复杂的权力支配关系或层级关系,而不是平等的交易关系.因此,企业是"权力"性质的.深化认识企业的"权力"性质,可以从企业权力分析的历史向度问题以及企业权力的内生性质等方面来拓展.这是一种基于历史唯物主义来分析企业权力现象及其权力关系演变的视角或方法. 相似文献
13.
如何防范国企经营者和主管部门官员之间合谋侵占国有企业的生产剩余,一直是政府部门和学术界关注的焦点问题。本文根据Laffont和Martimort等在委托-代理框架下提出的分权制思想,构建了防范国企经营者合谋的"囚徒困境"博弈模型。但由于基于"囚徒困境"博弈所构建的双重审核机制可能产生过高的审查成本,且其实施受到主管官员有限责任的限制,因此通过引入不对称信息进一步改进了"囚徒困境"博弈,使不合谋的均衡结果能在更宽松的条件下实现。 相似文献
14.
Channel competition and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with demand and cost disruptions
The impacts of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer are examined. First, coordination of the dual-channel supply chain without disruption is proposed, by using a revenue sharing contract. Furthermore, the effects of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and profit are examined from the perspective of partners and the whole supply chain. Optimal prices and quantum of production in the event of disruptions occurring are derived. Suitable changes and improvements in revenue sharing contracts can help coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with disruptions. Finally, the proposed models are further analysed through numerical examples. 相似文献
15.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2006,9(1):93-115
We propose a model of schooling that can account for the observed heterogeneity in workers' productivity and educational attainment. Identical unskilled agents can get a degree at a cost, but becoming skilled entails an additional unobservable effort cost. Individual labor can then be used as an input in pairwise production matches. Two factors affect students' desire to build human capital: degrees imperfectly signal productivity, and contract imperfections generate holdup problems. Multiple stationary equilibria exist, some of which are market failures characterized by a largely educated workforce of low average skill. Policy implications are explored. 相似文献
16.
We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme—a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract—minimizes the maximum expected payment, where this maximum is taken over the set of possible agent preferences. For some parameters of the problem, a range of alternative incentive schemes also satisfy this criterion. We show that the simple incentive scheme is not weakly dominated by any of the alternatives: there does not exist an alternative mechanism for which the expected payment is no higher for all realizations of the agent's preferences and strictly lower for some realization. 相似文献
17.
Felix Höffler 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2009,35(3):246-274
The standard model by Laffont et al. (RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1): 1–37, 1998a; 38–56, 1998b) treats termination fees
as an instrument to increase market power in a one-shot game of horizontal product differentiation. A prediction (Gans and
King, Economics Letters, 71: 413–420, 2001) within this framework is that, with non-linear tariffs, firms should be interested
in low termination fees. This seems to be at odds with regulatory experience in many countries. We offer an alternative approach,
using an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition. We focus on symmetrical calling patterns and investigate simple two-part
tariffs for two customer types, as well as general non-linear tariffs for two types and for a continuum of types. In this
framework, when looking also at collusion in retail prices, termination fees make deviations from the collusive outcome less
attractive. The optimum deviation strategy is usually to try to attract the high valuation customers since they exhibit the
highest profits. Thus, a deviator will have a pool of heavy users which will have more outgoing than incoming calls, implying
net termination payments. A cooperatively chosen termination rate can increase the deviator’s cost and thereby always stabilizes
collusion.
相似文献
18.
We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs. 相似文献
19.
The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations. 相似文献
20.
论公司治理文化与治理制度不同偏好的互补与替代 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
从经济学视角看,公司治理文化具有节约交易费用、节约监督成本和加强对企业各相关方激励的作用。公司治理文化偏好不完备契约,而公司治理制度则偏好完备契约,这决定了两者在企业的不同发展阶段是互补与替代的关系。 相似文献