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1.
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.  相似文献   

2.
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues. Hence, we establish subjective foundations for the Anscombe-Aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities. We define second-order risk as risk that resolves in the first stage of the compound lottery and show that uncertainty aversion implies aversion to second-order risk which implies issue preference and behavior consistent with the Ellsberg paradox.  相似文献   

3.
In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. We offer an alternative notion of Bayesian c-rationalizability suitable for such complex social interactions. We show that Bayesian c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability.  相似文献   

4.
We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense.  相似文献   

5.
Act similarity in case-based decision theory   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary Case-Based Decision Theory (CBDT) postulates that decision making under uncertainty is based on analogies to past cases. In its original version, it suggests that each of the available acts is ranked according to its own performance in similar decision problems encountered in the past.The purpose of this paper is to extend CBDT to deal with cases in which the evaluation of an act may also depend on past performance of different, but similar acts. To this end we provide a behavioral axiomatic definition of the similarity function over problem-act pairs (and not over problem pairs alone, as in the original model).We propose a model in which preferences are context-dependent. For each conceivable history of outcomes (to be thought of as the context of decision) there is a preference order over acts. If these context-dependent preference relations satisfy our consistency-across-contexts axioms, there is an essentially unique similarity function that represents these preferences via the (generalized) CBDT functional.We are grateful to Akihiko Matsui for the discussions that motivated this work. We also thank Enriqueta Aragones, Roger Myerson, Zvika Neeman, Ariel Rubinstein, Peyton Young, and an anonymous referee for their comments. Partial financial support from the Alfred Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

6.
Most empirical studies of rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory have assumed power utility functions, both for gains and for losses. As it turns out, a remarkably simple preference foundation is possible for such models: Tail independence (a weakening of comonotonic independence which underlies all rank-dependent models) together with constant proportional risk aversion suffice, in the presence of common assumptions (weak ordering, continuity, and first stochastic dominance), to imply these models. Thus, sign dependence, the different treatment of gains and losses, and the separation of decision weights and utility are obtained free of charge.  相似文献   

7.
This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do not learn the correct forecasts too quickly, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on some data-generating processes; however, the set of such processes is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative results in the literature.  相似文献   

8.
We solve a liquidation problem for an agent with preferences consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263-291]. We find that the agent is willing to hold a risky project with a relatively inferior Sharpe ratio if the project is currently making losses, and intends to liquidate it when it breaks even. On the other hand, the agent may liquidate a project with a relatively superior Sharpe ratio if its current profits rise or drop to the break-even point. Our results capture the spirit of the disposition effect and the break-even effect documented in empirical and experimental studies.  相似文献   

9.
Yaw Nyarko 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):643-655
Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria. Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993) model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs, and not actual play, are subjective equilibria. Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997  相似文献   

10.
Summary A decision maker faces a known prior distribution over payoff relevant states. We compare the expected utility of this individual under two scenarios. In the first, the decision maker makes a choice without further information. In the second, the decision maker has access to an experiment before choosing an action. However, the decision maker does not know the true joint distribution over states and messages. The value of the experiment as measured by the difference in the two utility levels can be negative as well as positive. We give a condition which is necessary and sufficient for the experiment to be valuable in our sense, for any decision problem.An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Noisy Bayes Updating and the Value of Information. We have gained from the comments of Stephen Coate, John Geanakoplos, Larry Samuelson, Timothy Van Zandt and seminar participants at Harvard Business School, Princeton, Boston University, the international conference on game theory at Stony Brook 1992 and the Winter meeting of the Econometric Society at Anaheim 1993. The first author received support for this project from NSF grant #SES-9308515 and a University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation Grant.  相似文献   

11.
Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable dominates via ith-order stochastic dominance for i=M,N. We show that the 50-50 lottery dominates the lottery via (N+M)th-order stochastic dominance. The basic idea is that a decision maker exhibiting (N+M)th-order stochastic dominance preference will allocate the state-contingent lotteries in such a way as not to group the two “bad” lotteries in the same state, where “bad” is defined via ith-order stochastic dominance. In this way, we can extend and generalize existing results about risk attitudes. This lottery preference includes behavior exhibiting higher-order risk effects, such as precautionary effects and tempering effects.  相似文献   

12.
Recent decision theories represent ambiguity via multiple priors, interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the relevant uncertainty. This paper provides a robust behavioral foundation for this interpretation. A prior P is “plausible” if preferences over some subset of acts admit an expected utility representation with prior P, but not with any other prior QP. Under suitable axioms, plausible priors can be elicited from preferences, and fully characterize them; also, probabilistic sophistication implies that there exists only one plausible prior; finally, “plausible posteriors” can be derived via Bayesian updating. Several familiar decision models are consistent with the proposed axioms.  相似文献   

13.
This note provides a behavioral characterization of mutually absolutely continuous multiple priors.  相似文献   

14.
The demand for a risky asset in the presence of a background risk   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We examine the demand for a risky asset in the presence of two risks: a financial risk and a background risk which need not be financial. First, we compute the necessary and sufficient condition for a positive demand for a risky asset, showing that it depends on two terms capturing respectively the direct effect of risk premium and the dependence between the two risks. Second, we develop higher order expectation dependence concept and show that the more information about the sign of higher cross derivatives of the utility function we have, the weaker dependence conditions on distribution we achieve.  相似文献   

15.
This paper aims to extend the results by Ross (1981) [15] and by Modica and Scarsini (2005) [13] to stochastic dominance of degree 4 and over. Specifically, it is shown that Ross' approach can be extended to any order of risk attitude beyond the generalization proposed by Modica and Scarsini by means of sth degree increase in risk defined by Ekern (1980) [8].  相似文献   

16.
Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's α condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms.  相似文献   

17.
We provide comparative global conditions for downside risk aversion, which are similar to the ones studied by Ross for risk aversion. We define a coefficient of downside risk aversion, and study its local properties.  相似文献   

18.
In the framework of dynamic choice under uncertainty, we define dynamic stability as a combination of two assumptions prevalent in the literature: dynamic consistency and the requirement that updated preferences have the same “structure” as ex ante ones. Dynamic stability also turns out to be a defining characteristic of the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) [24] within the scope of variational preferences. Generally, for any class of invariant preferences, dynamic stability is shown to be connected to another independent property — consequentialism.  相似文献   

19.
We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity [L.G. Epstein, J. Zhang, Subjective probabilities on subjectively unambiguous events, Econometrica 69 (2001) 265-306; P. Ghirardato et al., Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, J. Econ. Theory 118 (2004) 133-173; K. Nehring, Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Math. Soc. Sci. 38 (1999) 197-213; J. Zhang, Subjective, ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility, Econ. Theory 20 (2002) 159-181] in the context of Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). We show that each definition of unambiguous events produces certain restrictions on the set of priors, and completely characterize each definition in terms of the properties it imposes on the MEU functional. We apply our results to two open problems. First, in the context of MEU, we show the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between the axiom of “Small unambiguous event continuity” (Epstein and Zhang, 2001) and the notions of unambiguous event due to Zhang (2002) and Epstein and Zhang (2001). Second, we show that, in the context of MEU, the classes of unambiguous events according to either Zhang (2002) or Epstein and Zhang (2001) are always λ-systems. Finally, we reconsider the various definitions in light of our findings, and identify some new objects (Z-filters and EZ-filters) corresponding to properties which, while neglected in the current literature, seem relevant to us.  相似文献   

20.
We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at the same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this representation.  相似文献   

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