Null,nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value,the equal division value,and the equal surplus division value

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.     

A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents’ impatience, and an equal responsibility property.     

The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a “partition function” outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations (“generalization” and “extension”) obtains a unique Shapley-type value for games in partition function form. The key requirement is that the “Extended, Generalized Shapley Value” (EGSV) should be “recursive”: the EGSV of any game should be the EGSV of itself. This requirement forces us to ignore all but the payoffs to bilateral partitions. The EGSV can be conceptualized as the ex ante value of a process of successive bilateral amalgamations. Previous Shapley value extensions, if generalized, are not recursive; indeed, they iterate to the EGSV.     

Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game. Adding an additional axiom, we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties.     

The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism

In this paper, we show that there is a relationship between two important matching mechanisms: the Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism (TTCC mechanism proposed by Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004). Our main result is that when a specific chain selection rule proposed by Roth et al. is used, these two mechanisms are equivalent. While the equivalence is relevant for one specific case of the TTCC mechanism, it is a particularly interesting case since it is the only version identified by Roth et al. to be both Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof.     

A comparison between the core and the monopoly solutions in a mixed exchange economy

Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers. Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996     

The museum pass game and its value

We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.     

Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core

Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991.     

Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, which generalize the Top Trading Cycles to the general case in which individuals are allowed to report indifferences, while preserving a maximal possible set of its desirable properties.     

Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation

Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a more potentially interpretational one. We are focused on an interpretation based on the idea of marginal contribution, a concept already familiar in the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. A general null player axiom is introduced, and it turns out that any valued solution satisfying the three properties is characterized by a null player model.     

Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing

We study a positioning game prior to negotiations where each party invests into influential activities in order to raise voter support for their preferred bargaining outcome. The case chosen for our analysis is a bilateral monopoly where a purchaser meets a pharmaceutical firm and where the two negotiate on the price of a new and innovative medicine. We identify factors that influence on the negotiated price such as treatment effects of the new and the existing drug, production costs of the new drug, the price of the existing drug, the marginal cost of public funds and patient group size. Furthermore, it is shown that the negotiated price, depending on the characteristics of a political cost function with regard to the influential activities, is influenced by the order of moves taken by the parties. Regardless of the strategic interrelationships between the two parties, likely positioning games to be played are those where one of the two negotiating parties acts as a leader while the rival acts as a follower.     

股东与经理人风险态度偏差所引发代理成本的抵减--EVA调整事项必要性的一个定量化解释

EV A调整事项是EVA区别于R I(R esidualIncom e)的重要标志,也是EV A倡导者所宣传的EV A重要“卖点”。在理论界,调整事项必要性的争论一直存在;在实务界,推行EV A管理模式的企业对待调整事项也是千差万别。本文有别于一般的研究思路,在构筑股东和经理人投资决策模型的基础上、在股东与经理人风险态度不一的假设下,采用数理推导的办法来论证EV A调整事项存在的必要性。本文的研究表明,由于经理人相对股东更容易回避风险,在投资项目的选择上,往往会放弃收益率小于经理人最低要求报酬率、但是N PV却大于零的投资项目,这样就损害了股东的利益,加大了代理成本。EV A调整事项使得费用(成本)的确认时间向后推移,从而能够产生对股东和经理人因风险态度偏差而引发代理成本的一种递减作用,保护股东的利益。     

The Ethnic Employment and Income Gap in Sweden: Is Skill or Labor Market Discrimination the Explanation?*

This study uses a cognitive test score, the Swedish Military Enlistment test taken at age 18, to identify whether the ethnic employment and income gap in Sweden is caused by a pre‐market skill gap and/or ethnic discrimination. The employment gap and income gap are estimated for males born in Sweden with different ethnic backgrounds: their parents were born in Sweden or in southern Europe or outside Europe. Controlling for the cognitive test score does not affect the ethnic employment gap, and for incomes the ethnic income gap almost disappears.     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.     

The treatment effect, the cross difference, and the interaction term in nonlinear “difference-in-differences” models

In any nonlinear “difference-in-differences” model with strictly monotonic transformation function, the treatment effect is the cross difference of the observed outcome minus the cross difference of the potential non-treatment outcome, which equals the incremental effect of the interaction term coefficient.     

浅析传统成本法与作业成本法的区别与联系

由于企业的竞争日趋激烈,一种能够有效控制成本的作业成本法应运而生.在西方国家,作业成本法得到了良好的实施并取得了一定的成效.本文分析了作业成本法与传统成本法的区别和联系,作业成本法从根本上解决了传统成本法的缺陷.以作业为基础的成本计算是成本会计科学发展的大趋势,在我国研究与推广作业成本法有着重大的理论与现实意义.     

The dependence structure between the Canadian stock market and the USD/CAD exchange rate: a copula approach

Abstract This paper investigates the dependence structure between the real Canadian stock returns and the real USD/CAD exchange rate returns, using the Symmetrized Joe‐Clayton (SJC) copula function. We estimate the SJC copula with monthly data over the period 1995:1 to 2006:12. Our results show significant asymmetric static and dynamic tail dependence between the real stock returns and the real exchange rate returns, such that the two returns are more dependent in the left than in the right tail of their joint distribution. We explain this asymmetric dependence in terms of an asymmetric interest rate policy by Canadian monetary authorities in response to changes in the real exchange rate during sub‐periods of falling and rising commodity prices.     

Disaggregated data and trade policy analysis: The value of linking partial and general equilibrium models

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are now routinely utilized for the evaluation of trade policy reforms, yet they are typically quite highly aggregated, which limits their usefulness to trade negotiators who are often interested in impacts at the tariff line. On the other hand, Partial Equilibrium (PE) models, which are typically used for analysis at disaggregate levels, deprive the researcher of the benefits of an economy-wide analysis, which is required to examine the overall impact of broad-based trade policy reforms. Therefore, a PE–GE, nested modeling framework has the prospect of offering an ideal tool for trade policy analysis. In this paper, we develop a PE model that captures international trade, domestic consumption and output, using Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) structures, market clearing conditions and price linkages, nested within the standard GTAP model. In particular, we extend the welfare decomposition of Huff and Hertel (2001) to this PE–GE model in order to contrast the sources of welfare gain in PE and GE analyses. To illustrate the usefulness of this model, we examine the contentious issue of tariff liberalization in the Indian auto sector, using PE, GE and PE–GE models. Both the PE and PE–GE models show that the imports of motorcycles and automobiles change drastically with both unilateral and bilateral tariff liberalization by India, but the PE model does a poor job predicting the overall size and price level in the industry, post-liberalization. On the other hand, the GE model overestimates substitution between regional suppliers due to “false competition” and underestimates the welfare gain, due to the problem of tariff averaging in the aggregated model. These findings are shown to be robust to wide variation in model parameters. We conclude that the linked model is superior to both the GE and PE counterparts.     

The long-run causal relationship between transport energy consumption and GDP: Evidence from heterogeneous panel methods robust to cross-sectional dependence

This paper employs panel methods that address/mitigate heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence to determine the direction and sign of long-run causality between transport energy consumption per capita and real GDP per capita. Granger-causality was determined to run from GDP to energy.