Bounded governance within extended order: The Confucian advantage of synergy under generalized constitutional rules

A constitutional explanation of the economic dynamism of the East Asian Confucian economies is proposed. The main hypothesis is that the synergy between the extended order of generalized rules, first introduced by Western civilization, and the bounded governance of Confucian societies has produced a comparative cultural and institutional advantage for the five tigers in East Asia. As a pure form, the extended order, represented in Western society by a system of private property rights, a system of impersonal and generalized markets and a formal-rational system of law and administration, is far more efficient than the bounded governance of Confucian societies in the East Asia, which is characterized by the particularistic human relations and familistic, clannish, and other forms of personal ties and connections. Nevertheless, once a linkage to the extended order is established—overcoming the limits of personal exchange—Confucian ethics can support the bounded governance structures of clans, networks, communities, and familistic corporations that are effective in governing those complex tasks in which property rights are difficult to divide and allocate, individual performance is difficult to measure, and complete contract is either difficult to make or hard to enforce.     

Market thickness,sunk costs,productivity, and the outsourcing decision: an empirical analysis of manufacturing firms in France

Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of outsourcing behaviour by French manufacturing industries. It focuses on the effects of market thickness, sunk costs, and the productivity of firms on the outsourcing decision. I estimate a dynamic probit model where outsourcing decision is linked to past outsourcing behaviour. The results show that outsourcing is a persistent strategy adopted by large firms and suggest the presence of significant sunk costs associated with outsourcing. The results also show that market thickness reduces search costs and enhances the establishment of outsourcing relationships.     

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

A general equilibrium analysis of software development: Implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement

We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.     

Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania

This paper points out, in the changing institutional setting of transition in Romania, Some relevant factors influencing economic actors to behave in a way that pushes them to devote resources to unproductive goals, rather than to embark on activities that add economic and social value. The theoretical insights offered in the literature of rent seeking are applied to the issues of transition. A mathematical model of a rent seeking economy is presented, analyzing the influence of interest groups activity on the overall income of the economy. Some examples of rent seeking behavior that severely hamper the economic efficiency are illustrated for the case of Romania. The conclusion is that, in appreciating the progress in transition, the reduction in rent seeking is an important factor to be taken into consideration.     

How does employment protection legislation influence hiring and firing decisions by the smallest firms?

This paper examines the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on hiring decisions by own-account workers and firing decisions by very small firms (one to four employees). Using data from the EU-15 countries, our results show that the strictness of employment protection legislation is negatively related to both these types of decisions, and hence, to labour mobility among the smallest firms. This new evidence may be useful for governments aiming to create a more enabling macro-environment for employment and productivity growth.     

The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation

We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents' actions. We characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. If the private learning channel is present, convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect-information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents. If, however, there is no private information sharing, then convergence is exponential at a rate strictly lower than the mean arrival rate of public information.     

On estimation of the CES production function—Revisited

Estimation of the non-linear Constant Elasticity of Scale (CES) function is generally considered problematic due to convergence problems and unstable and/or meaningless results. These problems often arise from a non-smooth objective function with large flat areas, the discontinuity of the CES function where the elasticity of substitution is one, and possibly significant rounding errors where the elasticity of substitution is close to one. We suggest three (combinable) solutions that alleviate these problems and improve the reliability and stability of the results.     

Environmental regulation of technically inefficient firms

This paper presents a model in which a technically inefficient firm is responsible for the emissions of pollutants. We derive second-best regulatory schemes (tax and quota) assuming that the firm’s technical efficiency is unknown to the regulator.     

Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem

In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a ‘simple’ contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties’ valuations are private information.     

In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

Multiplant firms pit their facilities against each other for production assignments. The present paper studies the consequences of this practice in a model where production is limited by capacity constraints and asymmetric information allows facilities to accumulate slack. It shows the amount of slack per unit of output to be pro-cyclical. Indeed, as capacity constraints become more acute in economic booms, the power of in-house competition for quota assignments is reduced and slack per unit of output increases, while the opposite is true in downturns. Moreover, in downturns firms may use higher cost facilities even when lower cost plants are not running at capacity since this boosts X-efficiency in low-cost plants.     

Does quality influence choice of general practitioner? An analysis of matched doctor–patient panel data

The impact of quality on the demand facing health care providers has important implications for the industrial organization of health care markets. In this paper we study the consumers' choice of general practitioner (GP), assuming they are unable to observe the true quality of GP services. A panel data set for 484 Norwegian GPs, with summary information on their patient stocks, renders the opportunity to identify and measure the impact of GP quality on the demand, accounting for patient health heterogeneity. We apply a multi-equation model in the LISREL format, with GP quality and patient health as latent determinants of demand for GP services. Patient excess mortality rate at the GP level is one indicator of quality. Our results indicate that GP quality has a clear positive effect on demand, even when patient heterogeneity is accounted for.     

Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence

This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand preemption.     

Inflation, price dispersion, and market structure

In this paper, we use a novel data set containing prices from bazaars, convenience stores, and supermarkets in Istanbul to re-examine the relationship between price dispersion and inflation. Although existing evidence is mixed, we find positive and significant relationships between dispersion, on the one hand, and lagged dispersion and unexpected product-specific inflation on the other. We also find evidence that dispersion is initially decreasing in anticipated aggregate inflation but is eventually increasing. Finally, average price duration and dispersion are lowest in the bazaar. This is intuitive, since menu and search costs should be minimal in that market structure.     

Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study

We study markets with costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. Buyers costlessly observe one or (with probability 1−q) two of the posted prices, and can accept one or pay to search again. The experiment varies q, the search cost, and the number of buyers. Equilibrium theory predicts a unified very low (high) price for q=0 (q=1) and predicts specific distributions of dispersed prices for q=1/3 and 2/3. Actual prices conform closely to the predictions in some treatments. Buyers’ reservation prices are biased away from the extremes, however, and sellers’ prices have positive autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation.     

A critical review of multi-criteria decision making methods with special reference to forest management and planning

This paper provides a review of research contributions on forest management and planning using multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) based on an exhaustive literature survey. The review primarily focuses on the application aspects highlighting theoretical underpinnings and controversies. It also examines the nature of the problems addressed and incorporation of risk into forest management and planning decision making. The MCDM techniques covered in this review belong to several schools of thought. For each technique, a variety of empirical applications including recent studies has been reviewed. More than 60 individual studies were reviewed and classified by the method used, country of origin, number and type of criteria and options evaluated. The review serves as a guide to those interested in how to use a particular MCDM approach. Based on the review, some recent trends and future research directions are also highlighted.     

Working under pressure: Evidence from the impacts of soccer fans on players’ performance

In this paper we study how pressure affects individual’s behavior. For this purpose we use sports data, where the attendance is a proxy for pressure, to investigate if the number of fans in the stadium affects the performance of the players. We overcome the reverse causality problem by proposing an instrument variable: a promotion in Brazil during which low cost tickets were assigned to random soccer matches. In contrast to previous literature, our results suggest that pressure does not significantly affect players’ behavior.     

Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent

This paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers. We show that there are cases in which privatization, even though it fosters investments in infrastructure, also opens the door to more corruption. The public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption. Our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in Latin America, where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency-enhancing and have fostered investments and, at the same time, popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high, especially among the middle class. We show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region.     

The determinants and impact of telecommunications reforms in developing countries

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.