INCENTIVE AND INSURANCE EFFECTS OF INCOME TAXATION

Tax distortions cause a trade‐off between efficiency and equity. However, taxes not only affect incentives; they also provide implicit insurance, and this may critically affect the efficiency–equity relationship. For a standard labour supply problem it is shown that the insurance effect mutes the sensitivity of labour supply to taxes, which tends to reduce tax distortions and lower the marginal costs of public funds. The relation between incentives and insurance and thus efficiency and equity is flattened by the insurance effect and it may even be non‐monotone. However, the optimal utilitarian policy implies that there is always a trade‐off between efficiency and equity on the margin.     

A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform

To understand reasons for possible failures of ‘good’ economic reforms, we consider an institution which is always successful in making the best public decision from the utilitarian perspective. We show it is bound to introduce inequality if costs of a reform are privately known: the losers can not be always compensated. Thus, if equity is a primary concern, then some reforms with positive aggregate net gain might not be undertaken. If the utilitarian welfare is the only guide for making public decisions, implementing a reform might require the ability to ignore the associated social costs of inequality.     

The economic content of G.D.H. Cole’s guild socialism: behavioral assumptions,institutional structure,and analytical arguments

Despite a utopian tendency, G.D.H. Cole’s Guild Socialist writings exhibit considerable economic content. After sketching the historical context of Cole’s Guild Socialism and its broad ideology, we address its economic content by: 1. Cataloging Cole’s assumptions concerning worker motivation and utilitarian norms; 2. Clarifying the economic problems Cole sets out to address; 3. Describing the institutional structures of Cole’s Guild Socialism; 4. Exploring Cole’s theoretical contributions and their relation to modern constructs such as the economics of the employment relationship; and 5. Evaluating the extent to which the resulting body of theory is coherent, non-trivial, and normatively attractive.     

The veil of public ignorance

A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian “standard of evaluation” governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information. Our first main result generalizes Harsanyi's (J. Polit. Econ. 63 (1955) 309) classical result to situations of incomplete information, assuming that group preferences satisfy Bayesian Coherence and Interim Pareto Dominance. These axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists. We argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of Bayesian preference aggregation under complete information.     

A General Approach to Welfare Measurement through National Income Accounting*

A framework is developed for analyzing national income accounting using a revealed welfare approach that is sufficiently general to cover, both the standard discounted utilitarian and maximin criteria as special cases. We show that the basic welfare properties of comprehensive national income accounting, previously ascribed only to the discounted utilitarian case, extend to this more general framework. In particular, under a wider range of circumstances, it holds that real NNP growth (or, equivalently, a positive value of net investments) indicates welfare improvement. We illustrate the applicability of our approach in the Dasgupta–Heal–Solow model of capital accumulation and resource depletion.     

Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest “approval”. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral.We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least , where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement.     

The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Under approval voting utilitarian efficiency is relatively high irrespective of the behavioural assumption, and under the plurality rule strategic voting significantly increases utilitarian efficiency.     

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom

We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

Reconciling the Rawlsian and the utilitarian approaches to the maximization of social welfare

Under a deadweight loss of tax and transfer, there is tension between the optimal policy choices of a Rawlsian social planner and a utilitarian social planner. However, when with a weight greater than a certain critical value the individuals’ utility functions incorporate distaste for low relative income, a utilitarian will select exactly the same income distribution as a Rawlsian.     

Intergenerational consumption rules: An axiomatization of utilitarianism and egalitarianism

This paper considers choice rules that prescribe intergenerational consumption programs in an infinite horizon setting. An axiomatization is provided for utilitarian and egalitarian rules on a specific and concrete class of choice sets. The axiomatization provides new perpective on the relationship between the utilitarian and egalitarian rules and points out some trade-offs between norms that are inherent in the choice of a consumption rule. Finally, the analysis is extended to provide an axiomatization of the egalitarian rule for a broad class of choice sets.     

In defense of health-based standards

This paper explores the utilitarian ethical foundations underlying two standards for pollution control: an efficiency standard and a health-based standard. The main point is that a health-based standard can be defended quite easily on utilitarian grounds; safety proponents need not be self-serving, irrational nor ignorant. Criticism of health-based standards as “too costly” is not always persuasive since material consumption is not the only component of social welfare, nor do consumption increases necessarily increase social welfare.     

Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model

A perfectly competitive vintage-knowledge model of Schumpeterian growth is introduced to study the relation between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and productivity-dispersion. The incentive to innovate is generated by the productivity-dispersion (latent in traditional vintage models) between new and old plants, rather than by monopoly rents. The model has a unique steady-state REE with endogenous growth. The endogenous extent of entry constitutes a buffer, dampening the effect of research-efficiency and completely neutralizing the effect of population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates. Variations of research-efficiency lead to a negative relation between growth and vintage-lifetime and a non-monotonic relation between growth and productivity-dispersion.     

Moral hazard,adverse selection,and the optimal provision of social insurance

The single-period social insurance model of Diamond and Mirrlees is extended to allow for a diversity of types (in the probability of becoming disabled). When individual type is observable, the utilitarian optimum has both consumption when working and disability benefits increasing with the probability of disability. When type is not observable (adverse selection is present), the optimum is a single ‘pooling’ policy over a wide range of welfare weights which includes the utilitarian case. These results also provide insights into the potential distributional effects of moral hazard and the ways moral hazard and adverse selection problems may interact.     

Justifying social discounting: The rank-discounted utilitarian approach

The discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized for treating generations unequally. We propose an extended rank-discounted utilitarian (ERDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non-decreasing streams, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion. We show that more inequality averse ERDU societies have higher social discount rates when future generations are better off. We apply the ERDU approach in two benchmark economic growth models and prove that it promotes sustainable policies that maximize discounted utilitarian welfare.     

Equally-distributed equivalent utility,ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi?s impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit aversion to ex post inequality. We also relate this axiomatization to our axiomatization in a companion paper of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions. Given certain richness assumptions, the only social welfare functions that belong to both families are the utilitarian.     

Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making

This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the Mth binary relation. We show several distinct sets of conditions for the choice functions representing these two procedures to satisfy non-emptiness and choice-consistency conditions such as contraction consistency and path independence. We also examine the relationships between the outcomes of the two procedures. Finally we investigate under what conditions the outcomes of each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the criteria.     

Utilitarianism and the role of utility in Adam Smith

Abstract

In this paper we confront attempts to bring Smith closer to utilitarianism. We show that Smith's conception of utility is not utilitarian. While the pursuit of ‘pleasure’ could lie behind human behaviour, it is not the pleasure referred to by utilitarianism. Instead, utility, in its colloquial sense, plays a greater role that suggests a type of consideration which is foreign to utilitarianism and which also introduces a rationalist element to Smith's moral analysis. Thus, utility, in the utilitarian sense, is neither a guide to action nor a means for moral evaluation.     

The transformations of utility theory: a behavioral perspective

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it reappraises the major transformations which the utilitarian approach to human behavior has undergone in economics in search for a representation by utility functions and later by preference orders. Second, in the light of today’s behavioral and human sciences, an attempt is made to restore some elements of early utilitarianism that were abandoned in these transformations. Third, in line with the interest of the early utilitarians in both explaining behavior and elaborating on its moral assessment, the present paper also discusses some normative implications of the suggested restoration of utilitarian theory.     

Sympathy and its discontents: ‘Greatest happiness’ versus the ‘general good’

The paper explicates the utilitarian principle of sympathy in terms of the shape of what has been called the ‘sympathetic gradient’, which determines the allocation of goods to those close by and afar. It examines challenges to the utilitarian impartial weighting scheme that emerged in the literary community, and from evolutionary biology. As sympathy came to be seen as an impediment to evolutionary perfection, voices urged that sympathy be suppressed. Darwin's Descent of Man explicitly countenanced the suppression of sympathy in a trade-off of happiness for the perfection of the race. A post-Darwinian argument concerning a different capacity for pleasure accompanied the demise of sympathy in utilitarian economic analysis. Utilitarians then moved from the early presumption of ‘everyone to count for one’ to counting ‘every equal increment of pleasure’ equally.