Price recall: Brand and store type differences

Price is among the most important choice criteria for customers, whose price knowledge is often surprisingly inaccurate. This study aims at providing new insights into differences in price recall across brands and store types, and their potential effect on marketing efficiency and customers’ store choice. Towards this aim, we analyze the price recall of consumers for 51 food items by a random-effects panel estimation employing a survey with 715 participants. Our results show that customers recall national brand prices better than private labels, almost irrespectively of the store type; consumers overestimate store brand prices in both store types; the effect, however, is much higher for the convenience store. These outcomes have consequences for the marketing strategy: despite a price-matching guarantee for the store brands in the convenience store, the price image is still in favor of the discounter. This result raises doubts on the effectiveness of the price-matching guarantee, at least in this context. The everyday low price strategy of the discounter seems to pay off in terms of the price image. Though both stores charge the exact same prices for their store brands, prices at the discounter are on average perceived to be significantly lower.     

Vulnerability to Low-Price Signals: An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Genuine and Deceptive Signals

Low-price guarantees help buyers make inferences about retailers’ prices. However, researchers are concerned that consumers might be vulnerable to relying on guarantees associated with high market prices. Furthermore, truly low-priced retailers that issue low-price guarantees might be vulnerable to consumers’ discounting of such guarantees. This article experimentally assesses these concerns and finds that the effects of adding a low-price guarantee to a low or high offer price on consumers’ pre-purchase perceptions depend on consumers’ confidence in their product category price knowledge and their decision involvement. The article explores the implications of the findings and provides directions for further research.     

The Impact of Store-Price Signals on Consumer Search and Store Evaluation

Always low price (ALP) and low price guarantee (LPG) are store-price signals that retailers frequently use to induce favorable store-price image and discourage consumers from comparing prices across stores. Although both policies signal low prices, only LPG is an obligatory promise to beat rival stores’ prices. Results of two shopping simulations show that when consumer search costs are relatively low, ALP may effectively discourage consumer search whereas LPG may trigger more search. Paradoxically, consumers tend to evaluate ALP stores less favorably (as having lower integrity and higher self-serving intention) than LPG stores even when both signals appear to be credible. These findings suggest that LPG is a superior tactic for creating a favorable store image while ALP is more effective for discouraging consumer search. The results also indicate that consumers visit fewer stores when the LPG is not a credible signal of lowest market price than when it is credible. This is because consumers are inclined to either claim discounts or refunds at the non-credible LPG store or to purchase at the competing store with a lower price rather than continue searching.     

Consumer responses to characteristics of price-matching guarantees: The moderating role of price consciousness

The present study develops and tests a conceptual model of consumer response to different types of price-matching characteristics (i.e., refund depth, length, and scope) across consumer segments with varying levels of price consciousness. A computer shopping simulation results show that a deep refund is interpreted as a signal of low prices by nonprice conscious consumers. However, price conscious consumers are found to associate deep refunds with increased prices, an unintended outcome for the retailer. The effects of price-matching characteristics on search and purchase behavior were also found to vary across more and less price conscious consumer segments.     

Online Price Search: Impact of Price Comparison Sites on Offline Price Evaluations

Consumers increasingly rely on Internet price comparison sites (PCS) to gain knowledge about the market. The prices generated by a PCS search can act as contextual reference prices and influence the attractiveness of prices encountered later as consumers shop offline at local stores. This paper demonstrates that both PCS retailer ratings and the shape of the PCS price distribution influence the impact of PCS search results on later price evaluations. A favorable PCS retailer rating increases the perceived validity of the price associated with that retailer, enhancing the impact of that PCS price on offline price evaluations (Study 1). The shape of the PCS price distribution can also influence later price evaluations, however this effect depends on the information provided by the PCS retailer ratings. When PCS retailer ratings are similar, implying similar validity for the associated prices, low PCS prices and those appearing more frequently in the PCS price distribution have more impact (Studies 2 and 3). When PCS retailer ratings are variable (some high and some low), the PCS price distribution effect occurs only when the PCS retailer ratings provide congruent information about price validity — that is, the most frequent price is offered by retailers with more favorable ratings. Study 3 shows that price validity inferences do mediate this result. Finally, we depart from the offline shopping context to show that when consumers choose a retailer directly from the PCS search results, the effect of PCS retailer ratings is stronger for high-priced retailers and for consumers who rely less on the retailer price as a heuristic to infer retailer service level. Based on our findings we offer insights for online and offline retailers when considering strategic responses, such as price matching guarantees.     

Price Knowledge During Grocery Shopping: What We Learn and What We Forget

Past research on consumer price knowledge has varied considerably partly due to differences in how and when price knowledge is measured. This paper applies a multi-point, multi-measure approach to reconcile differences in past price knowledge research by examining systematic relationships between time of measurement and type of measures applied. Examination of consumer price knowledge before, during, and after store visit sheds light on what is measured at the individual points in time: episodic price knowledge and/or reference prices? With a between-subjects design interviewing 1,204 respondents, the authors investigate three price knowledge measures (price recall, price recognition, and deal spotting) demonstrating that these are hierarchically related. Results suggest that reference prices dominate before store visit, but also that episodic price knowledge, surprisingly, is still accessible at the store exit. These findings enable the authors to reconcile diverging results from past research, showing how consumer price knowledge evolves and suggesting that the vast majority of consumers learn about prices, whether consciously or unconsciously, during grocery shopping. Thus, when applying a multi-point, multi-measure approach, consumers appear to know more about prices than suggested by past research. Determinants of price knowledge are also examined and the results indicate that price knowledge builds up not only because of active search but also due to accidental exposure to prices and with low degrees of conscious processing. Implications for managers are discussed.     

Erratum to: Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability

This paper analyzes the role of verification of product availability in the context of competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs). PMGs involve a retailer matching any lower price offered by competition for an identical item. Until now, researchers focused on the scenario where customers can receive the lower price with a simple proof (e.g., weekly flyers). However, in reality, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability at the competitor location; if the product is not available there, then the price-match request might be declined. We develop a price competition model to investigate the effects of verification of availability on price decisions and profit levels of competing retailers. In our model, demand is driven by the availability levels of retailers as well as the price-search cost and store-switching cost incurred by customers. Price-search cost leads to two customer segments: uninformed ones who have no knowledge about prices, and informed ones who are knowledgeable about prices. On the other hand, store-switching cost determines how many customers search for the product at an alternative location because of high price or unavailability at their preferred retailers. Our analysis reveals, among others, that the outcome of availability verification is linked to three factors: price-search cost, store-switching cost, and the reservation prices of customer segments. Verification of availability allows retailers to price discriminate customers who could not be discriminated otherwise, specifically those belonging to the informed customer segment. Furthermore, it is a significant profit-enhancing mechanism only if there are switching customers in the market. Interestingly, even though customers view the verification of availability as a hassle, it can actually result in them paying lower retail prices by increasing the level of retail price competition.     

Effects of low price guarantees on consumer post-purchase search intention: The moderating roles of value consciousness and penalty level

While past research has focused on pre-purchase effects of low price guarantee (LPG), the present paper examines probable post-purchase consequences of such signals. Results of an experiment indicate that in an effort to enhance value from a purchase, consumers are more likely to engage in post-purchase search for lower prices when a purchase is made under an LPG. The experiment also indicates that presence of an LPG encourages post-purchase search intention only for consumers who are highly motivated to enhance value. Furthermore, it is seen that an LPG that offers higher refund leads to higher post-purchase search intention and this effect is also stronger for consumers with high concerns for enhancing value. The paper discusses several important implications of these findings for signaling theory and LPG-related retailing strategy.     

Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability

This paper analyzes the role of verification of product availability in the context of competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs). PMGs involve a retailer matching any lower price offered by competition for an identical item. Until now, researchers focused on the scenario where customers can receive the lower price with a simple proof (e.g., weekly flyers). However, in reality, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability at the competitor location; if the product is not available there, then the price-match request might be declined. We develop a price competition model to investigate the effects of verification of availability on price decisions and profit levels of competing retailers. In our model, demand is driven by the availability levels of retailers as well as the price-search cost and store-switching cost incurred by customers. Price-search cost leads to two customer segments: uninformed ones who have no knowledge about prices, and informed ones who are knowledgeable about prices. On the other hand, store-switching cost determines how many customers search for the product at an alternative location because of high price or unavailability at their preferred retailers. Our analysis reveals, among others, that the outcome of availability verification is linked to three factors: price-search cost, store-switching cost, and the reservation prices of customer segments. Verification of availability allows retailers to price discriminate customers who could not be discriminated otherwise, specifically those belonging to the informed customer segment. Furthermore, it is a significant profit-enhancing mechanism only if there are switching customers in the market. Interestingly, even though customers view the verification of availability as a hassle, it can actually result in them paying lower retail prices by increasing the level of retail price competition.     

Revisiting low price guarantees: Does consumer versus retailer governance matter?

Retailers often use low price guarantees (LPG) as a signal to attract consumers and increase sales. Consumers interpret LPGs as a signal that a particular retailer is committed to low prices. However, if more and more retailers employ LPGs, their effectiveness as a price signal wears off. As a result, retailers adapt increasingly extreme guarantees to get an advantage over the competition. Retailers, for instance, are experimenting with taking on the responsibility of looking for lower prices and automatically refunding consumers when a competitor offers a lower price for the same product. This research shows that automatic price protection of this sort might backfire under certain conditions. Three studies show that LPGs alone are not enough to signal low prices and that retailers combining large refunds with a retailer-enforced LPG obtain less favorable reactions than those implementing other types of LPGs.     

How retailer money-back guarantees influence consumer preferences for retailer versus national brands

Retailers often use money-back guarantees to reduce consumer perceived risk about brand quality and to increase their market share. The effect of such guarantees on perceived product quality and ultimately preference and product choice depends on their perceived value and credibility, related to other extrinsic clues, such as price and brand. An analysis of an experimental design with a national sample of consumers shows that compared with a simple money-back guarantee, a double money-back guarantee does not further increase the relative preference for a retailer brand over a national brand. Furthermore, the size of the effect of a money-back guarantee is small, moderated by the effects of other information on product quality, such as the size of the price differential between retailer and national brands. Finally, the effect of a money-back guarantee differs, depending on the customer–retailer relationship: A retailer with high credibility can influence regular customers less by guarantees.     

Internal reference price response across store formats

Reference price models have a long tradition in marketing and consumer research. Pricing strategies can utilize consumer response to gains and losses relative to internal reference prices, which are price expectations developed from past-observed prices. Consequently, many previous studies have been devoted to analyzing differences in internal reference price response across product categories and consumer characteristics. However, knowledge about internal reference price response across different store formats is missing. Our study aims to fill this research gap. To do so, we estimate a reference price model for the same set of brands and the same sample of consumers across two store formats (discount chain vs. supermarket chain). The prices for the brands in our model are similar across store formats. Results from our proposed model show that the same consumers are loss-averse at the discount chain while gain-seeking at the supermarket chain. Predicted by previous literature, we attribute the difference in internal reference price response to the different price image of the store formats. Overall, our research contributes to the reference price literature and provides important implications for pricing strategies at stores with different price image.     

Implementing price increases in turbulent economies: Pricing approaches for reducing perceptions of price unfairness

Consumer frustration over having less money in their pockets and, at the same time facing higher prices for products and services in the marketplace, arises during turbulent economic times (e.g., post-2007). Sellers suffer increased costs and pass along increases by raising prices to consumers. The current article discusses trends in the pricing literature and in practice that sellers utilize in limiting perceptions of price unfairness, particularly when increasing price in turbulent economic times. Specifically, engaging in transparency in pricing by revealing information about price changes to the consumer during poor economic times potentially reduces perceptions of price unfairness. Using industry-common price-setting practices, shrinking product volume, providing automatic rebates promotions, or offering price-matching promotions also likely reduces perceptions of price unfairness.     

Consumer perceptions of refund depth and competitive scope in price-matching guarantees: effects on store patronage

The study investigates the effect of two characteristics of price-matching guarantees—the depth of refund offer and the scope of competitors eligible for price matching—on consumer perceptions of price-matching guarantee believability and value and consumer intentions to patronize the retailer. The results show that large refund offers built consumer patronage intentions by enhancing perceptions of the value of the price-matching guarantee, while simultaneously exerting a negative impact on patronage by reducing believability of the price-matching promise. The competitive scope also affected the patronage intentions by influencing the perceived value of the price-matching policy.     

A nearly perfect market?

Internet shopbots allow consumers to almost instantly compare prices and other characteristics from dozens of sellers via a single website. We estimate the magnitude of consumer search costs and benefits using data from a major shopbot for books. For the median consumer, the estimated benefit from simply scrolling down to search lower screens is $6.55. This amounts to about 60% of the observed price dispersion and suggests that consumers face significant search costs, even in this “nearly-perfect” market. Price elasticities are relatively high compared to offline markets (−7 to −10 in our base model). Furthermore, contrary to the common assumption, search intensity is not correlated with greater price sensitivity. Instead, consumers who search multiple screens put relatively more weight on non-price factors like brand.     

INTERNET RETAILING INTERMEDIATION: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF INVENTORY LIQUIDITY AND FULFILLMENT GUARANTEES

Internet retailers intermediate online markets by setting prices, matching wholesalers' supply with consumers' demand, affording inventory liquidity, and meeting fulfillment guarantees to consumers. Little attention has been given to studying the two latter intermediation functions. To fill this research gap, this study examined a sample of 25 mainstream online retailers in some 704 transactions with consumers. The study evaluates the inventory liquidity and the fulfillment guarantees these Internet retailers provide to consumers. Furthermore, it presents a path‐analysis model, which suggests that retailers coordinate their actual and promised inventory‐liquidity and delivery performance to satisfy the fulfillment guarantees made to consumers. Moreover, the results show that key transactional attributes (i.e., the net price and the number of items fulfilled) commonly present in Internet markets and visible to all market participants impact both the levels of inventory liquidity and the delivery performance of the transactions between consumers and Internet retailers.     

Price-matching guarantees in dual channels

Many retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their customers that any lower price offered by competition for an identical product will be matched. Suppliers sometimes also offer PMGs to consumers in their direct channels. However, the extant literature on PMGs focuses on retailers and is silent on the role of upper stream chain members. We contribute to the literature by identifying the implications of PMGs in a dual distribution channel in which a supplier reaches consumers via a direct channel in addition to the retail channel. We show that the presence of PMGs in a dual channel hinges on supplier’s strategic ability, or lack thereof, to adjust its wholesale price in relation to the guarantee. Specifically, a PMG fails to prevail at equilibrium when the supplier is capable of strategically adjusting its wholesale price - but may prevail at equilibrium otherwise. The main reason is that the supplier can manage the competition between the retail channel and the direct channel through its wholesale price decision, and offering a PMG limits this ability. On the other hand, offering a PMG can be a beneficial strategy for the supplier when the supplier cannot adjust its wholesale price; for instance in a retail dominant chain where the retailer dictates the transfer price. In a retail dominant chain, if the direct and retail channels are perceived to be similar in quality and service offerings, then both channel members benefit from offering a PMG because it softens the intensity of price competition. On the other hand, when the two channels are sufficiently differentiated in quality and service offerings, then retail managers should be cautious and avoid offering the guarantee if their channel is in a superior position in terms of perceived quality.     

Are Low Price and Price Matching Guarantees Equivalent? The Effects of Different Price Guarantees on Consumers’ Evaluations

Some retailers offer price match guarantees, whereas others offer guarantees making the same promise but labeling these low-price guarantees. Do consumers respond differently to these different price guarantee labels? To address this research question, this paper leverages insights from pricing, signaling, and regulatory focus theories to demonstrate – across multiple studies – that consumers perceive price match versus low price guarantees differently. In turn, contingent on consumers’ regulatory focus, this difference in perceptions feeds forward and influences consumers’ purchase intentions and post purchase (e.g., repurchase) intentions. This paper contributes to theory, not only by showing differences across price match versus low price guarantees, but also by being the first to jointly examine purchase and post purchase intentions relating to price guarantees. This paper also speaks to practice, noting contingencies that determine whether the price match or the low-price guarantee label should be used.     

Red price? Red flag! Eye-tracking reveals how one red price can hurt a retailer

Retailers present prices in red color to signal savings. Past research has shown that presenting all prices in red increases perceived savings from the store. However, in practice, retailers often present just one price in red in promotion materials with multiple prices. Will consumers perceive higher savings from the store even if only one price is presented in red? This research examines this prevalent retail practice using a theoretical lens. The theoretical framework predicts that two unique learned associations with red color (red: Savings and red: Stop) play a key role in shaping consumers' perception of savings from stores that highlight only one price in red. This research proposes and empirically demonstrates that consumers perceive lower savings from stores that present only one price in red. The theoretical framework is validated using a multi-method approach that combines the strengths of behavioral and physiological (eye-tracking) methods. Findings from this research suggest that presenting only one price in red lowers perceived savings from the store, which may hurt sales.     

Price Discrimination and the Cruise Line Industry: Implications for Market Definition,Competition, and Consumer Welfare

This article extends the price discrimination literature and applies it to market definition and competitive effects analysis in recent mergers in the cruise line industry. In that industry, short run output is fixed. If firms want to increase price and restrict output to price‐insensitive customers, they have to increase the output and lower price to the price‐sensitive customers. We show that with fixed output (1) it is in firms’ interest to engage in price discrimination, (2) firms have increased ability to engage profitably in price discrimination as the intensity of competition decreases, and (3) the average price of price‐sensitive and ‐insensitive consumers increase with reduced competition. Unlike the economists at the Federal Trade Commission, our analysis suggests that cruise lines engage in third‐degree price discrimination. Moreover, the cruise industry could be a separate market and a reduction in the number of competitors might raise average prices.