State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Issuance Decisions and Strategic Focus: The Case of Long-Term Care Insurance

Increasing costs of long-term care are placing ever greater burdens on state and federal budgets, yet private long-term care insurance remains a relatively minor financing vehicle. Although many researchers provide rationales for the limited private market, some life–health insurers have forged ahead into this relatively new and risky line of business. We investigate what makes these insurers different and whether managers are following a diversification or strategic focus strategy. We find that strategic focus is a consistently important factor and that managers' participation and volume decisions are made independently.     

Incentive Effects of Community Rating in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance

Rate regulations in insurance markets often impose cross-subsidies in insurance premiums from low-risk consumers to high-risk consumers. This paper develops the hypothesis that premium cross-subsidies affect risk taking by insurance consumers, and tests this hypothesis by examining the marginal impact of premium subsidies and overcharges on future insurance costs. The empirical analysis uses 1990–2003 rating cell-level data from the Massachusetts automobile insurance market, in which regulation produced large cross-subsidies across cells. Consistent with the hypothesized effects, premium subsidies are found to be significantly related to higher future insurance costs, and the opposite effects are found for premium overcharges.     

The Risk Balls Game: Transforming Risk and Insurance Into Tangible Concepts

The Risk Balls game is used as a game in an introductory insurance course to demonstrate in a tangible way the notion of risk and its relationship to insurance. Through playing with the ``risk balls,' each one representing a different type of risk, the students experience feelings of anxiety about risk, and later, the sense of anxiety reduction when they transfer the risk balls to insurers. The game incorporates complex concepts of risk transfer and risk reduction via pooling and sharing of risk. The mathematical implications of the law of large numbers are physically felt in the classroom when the students experience the relief associated with transferring the risk balls to insurers. The discussion that ensues during the game includes aspects of the underwriting process; moral hazard; adverse selection; the role of agents, insurers, and regulators; and the nature of the insurance contract. The game of risk balls stimulates lively group discussions and provides hands-on experience with risks such as premature death risk or fire risk and the fears associated with them.     

中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

An analysis of the carrying capacity and life process risks of UK and Turkish insurance intermediaries

The primary aim of this paper is to examine the strategic risks associated with environmental selection and how this affects the life process risks of insurance intermediaries. To achieve this aim; firstly the carrying capacity of UK and Turkish insurance intermediaries is calculated and, secondly, the demographic, ecological and environmental variables that affect that carrying capacity are examined. Our study provides two contributions to the literature. For the first time, carrying capacity analysis is applied for an organisational community. As much as previous studies assume the existence of carrying capacity as theoretical, it has not been previously calculated on a quantitative basis. The second contribution is related to risk and insurance literature, specifically the life process risks of insurance intermediaries. The main rationale behind that analysis is the construction of a map that will simplify the strategic risk and reward decisions of insurers as to which areas are potentially profitable, or are indicative of fruitful relationships with intermediaries. Additionally, this research enables us to identify the areas that have potential for development in terms of insurance. For this reason, uncertainties relating to the selection of authorised brokers/agents as a strategic risk is, perhaps, minimised. Moreover, we have examined whether probable variables that can affect carrying capacity have contextual differences or not. The findings exhibit that there is contextual differentiations concerning the variables that affect the carrying capacity of both countries.     

Die Risikoübernahme von Versicherungsunternehmen: Eine empirische Analyse für Deutschland und Großbritannien

In this paper we analyze the risk resulting from an insurer’s investment policy. For this a hypothetical asset return rate is defined, based on which the German and British insurance market is analyzed. The study design allows an investigation of the investment risk in different countries or for different lines of business. The aim of the analysis is to detect general market trends in the investment policy and an analysis of effects of important changes over time on the investment risk of insurers. The questions analyzed in this paper are also of particular relevance beyond the background of current reform proposal for insurance regulation in Europe in the field of risk management and capital adequacy (Solvency II).     

Economies of scope in financial services: A DEA efficiency analysis of the US insurance industry

This paper investigates economies of scope in the US insurance industry over the period 1993–2006. We test the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that firms can optimize by diversifying across businesses, versus the strategic focus hypothesis, which holds that firms optimize by focusing on core businesses. We analyze whether it is advantageous for insurers to offer both life-health and property-liability insurance or to specialize in one major industry segment. We estimate cost, revenue, and profit efficiency utilizing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and test for scope economies by regressing efficiency scores on control variables and an indicator for strategic focus. Property-liability insurers realize cost scope economies, but they are more than offset by revenue scope diseconomies. Life-health insurers realize both cost and revenue scope diseconomies. Hence, strategic focus is superior to conglomeration in the insurance industry.     

Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.     

Deregulation,Pricing Strategies,and Claim Behavior in the Taiwan Automobile Insurance Market

Stringent pricing regulations have long been in effect in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. In April 2009, a pricing deregulation was adopted, enabling insurers to establish their own auto insurance premium rates. This study examines the effects of deregulation in terms of three hypotheses that we propose pertaining to market shares, loading factors, and last policy month claims. The quantitative analysis results show that pricing deregulation prompts insurers to lower their rates. The effects of deregulation for insurers are determined by not only the decision to deduct premiums and the deduction percentages, but also by policy type.     

Insurance Redlining and Disparate Impact: The Application of a Federal Civil Rights Doctrine to Homeowners Insurance

ABSTRACT: Allegations of inner-city insurance redlining are increasingly facilitated through the jurisprudence of "disparate impact," a legal doctrine holding that a policy or practice based on race-neutral criteria may nevertheless constitute illegal discrimination if it has a disproportionate adverse impact on racial minorities or women. Disparate impact analysis would require insurers to document a precise cause-and-effect relationship between a challenged underwriting variable and its associated risk. Moreover, they would be required to show that no "less discriminatory" risk-assessment technique is available. If it is not possible—or too costly—to meet this burden, insurers will have no choice but to abandon the use of those risk-selection practices and cost-based pricing mechanisms that yield a disparate racial impact. This will result in higher premiums and less insurance availability for consumers. Furthermore, dubious charges of unfair discrimination will exacerbate racial tensions and divert attention from the social and economic pathologies of which insurance costs are merely symptomatic.     

The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry

Corporate cash holdings play a significant role in the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry yet the topic of insurer cash holdings policy has largely been overlooked by prior empirical research. While a number of studies have investigated firm‐specific factors related to cash holdings in the insurance industry, prior research has not examined how market concentration and potential predation risk impact cash holdings. We propose a new measure of market concentration and provide evidence in support of the predation risk theory. Specifically, we show that insurers exposed to more concentrated markets tend to hold more cash. Furthermore, the relation between market concentration and cash holdings is influenced by access to internal capital. While unaffiliated insurers without access to internal capital hold greater levels of cash in more concentrated markets, group insurers with access to internal capital do not hold greater levels of cash to mitigate predation risk.     

Auditor quality,audit fees,organizational structure,and risk taking in the US life insurance industry

Using a system of simultaneous equations, this study examines the relation among external audit monitoring, in the US life insurance industry. We find insurers with higher leverage risk and surplus risk are more likely to use Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher fees. In return, insurers hiring Big‐4 auditors and paying higher audit fees have lower leverage risk and surplus risk. Second, the results suggest that mutual life insurers have a higher leverage risk and surplus risk than stock life insurers. This evidence is in contrast to that for property–liability insurance companies. Third, we find insurers are less likely to hire Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher audit fees after implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Finally, life insurers with Big‐4 auditors or paying higher audit fees are more likely to take lower risks after the implementation of SOX.     

Regulator's Determination of Return on Equity in the Absence of Public Firms: The Case of Automobile Insurance in Ontario

In a regulated market, such as automobile insurance (AI), regulators set the return on equity that insurers are allowed to achieve. Most insurers are engaged in a variety of insurance lines of business, and thus the full information beta methodology (FIB) is commonly employed to estimate the AI beta. The FIB uses two steps: first, the beta of each insurer is estimated, and then the beta of each line of business is estimated, as the beta of an insurer is a weighted average of the betas of the lines of business. When there are a sufficient number of public companies, company and market returns are used. Otherwise, researchers have resorted to using accounting data in the FIB. Theoretically, the two steps are not separable and the estimation should be done with one step. We introduce the one‐step methodology in our article. The one‐step and two‐step methodologies are compared empirically for the Ontario market of AI. Insurers in Ontario are predominantly private companies; thus, accounting data are used to estimate the AI beta. We show that a significant bias is introduced by the traditional, two‐step FIB methodology in estimating the betas for different lines of business, while insurers’ betas are very similar under both methods. This has a significant application to the estimation of betas of “pure players” in classic corporate finance. It implies that their betas and hence the resulting, required rates of return used in the net present value calculations should be estimated based on the one‐step method that we develop in this article.     

The Effective Duration and Convexity of Liabilities for Property-Liability Insurers Under Stochastic Interest Rates

Managing interest rate risk for property-liability insurers requires appropriate measurement of the sensitivity of liabilities to movements in interest rates. Most prior studies have assumed that interest rates shift in a parallel fashion and that the cash flows from liabilities are unaffected by interest rate changes. This article recognizes that unpaid property-liability (P-L) insurance losses are inflation-sensitive, that movements in interest rates will affect future claim payouts due to the correlation between interest rates and inflation and that interest rates are stochastic. The effective duration and convexity of P-L insurance liabilities calculated based on this approach are substantially lower than those measured using traditional approaches, which has important implications for asset-liability management by P-L insurers.     

The drivers and value of enterprise risk management: evidence from ERM ratings

In the course of recent regulatory developments, holistic enterprise-wide risk management (ERM) frameworks have become increasingly relevant for insurance companies. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature by analyzing determinants (firm characteristics) as well as the impact of ERM on the shareholder value of European insurers using the Standard & Poor’s ERM rating to identify ERM activities. This has not been done so far, even though it is of high relevance against the background of the introduction of Solvency II, which requires a holistic approach to risk management. Results show a significant positive impact of ERM on firm value for the case of European insurers. In particular, we find that insurers with a high quality risk management (RM) system exhibit a Tobin’s Q that on average is about 6.5% higher than for insurers with less high quality RM after controlling for covariates and endogeneity bias.     

Effects of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

Using a sample of property–liability insurers over the period 1995–2004, we develop and test a model that explains performance as a function of line‐of‐business diversification and other correlates. Our results indicate that undiversified insurers consistently outperform diversified insurers. In terms of accounting performance, we find a diversification penalty of at least 1 percent of return on assets or 2 percent of return on equity. These findings are robust to corrections for potential endogeneity bias, alternative risk measures, alternative diversification measures, and an alternative estimation technique. Using a market‐based performance measure (Tobin's Q) we find that the market applies a significant discount to diversified insurers. The existence of a diversification penalty (and diversification discount) provides strong support for the strategic focus hypothesis. We also find that insurance groups underperform unaffiliated insurers and that stock insurers outperform mutuals.