Local Government Debt and Firm Leverage: Evidence from China

China's local government debt financing has been expanded aggressively to support infrastructure investment, especially since the enactment of four‐trillion‐yuan stimulus plan to stimulate the economy post global financial crisis. At the same time, the rapid increase of firm‐level leverage ratio of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and the decline of leverage ratio of non‐SOEs jointly deteriorated China's credit misallocation problem. In this study, we empirically test the effect of local government debton firm leverage in China. We find that an expansion of local government debt significantly crowded out the leverage of non‐SOEs, while crowded in that of SOEs. Moreover, the effect differed across industries and sectors.     

Highway Spending and Induced Vehicle Emissions: Evidence from the US states

This paper investigates the impact of state and local government highway spending on vehicle emissions. A theoretical framework is constructed to show the effect of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions and decompose the effect into a rebound effect, an induced demand effect and an interaction effect. We then develop an empirical strategy and combine state-level data in the US to test the induced CO2 emissions by government highway spending. We find that there are positive and significant total effects of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions. The magnitude of these effects, however, significantly differs from one another as the elasticity of freight vehicle emissions with respect to government highway spending is four times larger than that in the passenger sector. The difference can be plausibly explained by the rebound effect and the interaction effect. We argue that policies regarding government spending on highway projects, especially those relying on cost-benefit analysis, should account for the potential difference in induced environmental impacts between passenger and freight vehicles.     

制度变迁、地方政府行为与城乡收入差距 ——来自中国省级面板数据的经验证据

本文采用1997-2009年面板数据的变截距及变系数模型,利用控制地区经济开放程度、产业结构变迁、城市化率等因素,对中国30个省市的制度变迁、地方政府支出决策与城乡收入差距之间的关系进行实证分析。结果显示：就全国而言,制度变迁、地方政府对经济活动的干预和地方政府投资性支出均与城乡收入差距呈正相关,而地方政府保障性支出则与城乡收入差距呈负相关;就地区而言,大部分地区在市场化过程中的制度变迁、地方政府投资性支出扩大了城乡收入差距,而半数以上的地区其政府支出规模及其内部保障性支出对城乡收入差距的缩小则有一定促进作用,但不同地区其影响呈现一定的差异性。其政策含义在于,我国在推进市场化进程的同时还要兼顾公平与效率,加强地方政府对收入不平等的调节作用,完善地方财政支出结构特别是社会保障体系,以此来缩小城乡收入差距。     

Does high‐speed rail connection really promote local economy? Evidence from China’s Yangtze River Delta

High‐speed rail (HSR) has led to a transportation revolution in China. This paper uses the county‐level panel data of China’s Yangtze River Delta to investigate the effect of HSR connection on local economy. To address the issue of endogenous HSR route placement, we use a straight‐line strategy to construct potential HSR connection variables as instrumental variables of the actual HSR connection. Both the difference‐in‐differences and instrumental variable methods show that HSR connection impedes local economy, especially in peripheral regions. The impediment effect is channeled through population reallocation from peripheral to core areas and the restructuring of industries.     

Endogenous Growth,Taxes and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence*

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the simultaneous effects of taxes and government spending on long‐run economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. A two‐sector model is considered: one sector produces physical output and the other produces human capital. Government expenditure is divided into several categories, and several types of taxes are included. The property tax is especially interesting because it is a major source of revenue for local government. The theoretical model is estimated using annual panel data from North Carolina counties. This study finds that state‐level fiscal policies affect economic growth but county‐level fiscal policies do not.     

Political influence,central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis

This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.     

宏观调控的定位、依据、主客体关系及法理基础

中国实行宏观调控的基本依据是社会化大生产、国有经济的主导地位、共产党的执政地位,以及市场经济失灵等。宏观调控主体是政府,公民、法人或者其他组织都是宏观调控的客体。中央政府是宏观调控的终极主体,地方政府是宏观调控的客体。中国需要制定专门规范宏观调控行为的法规,这种法规应当属于程序性法规。     

Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Spanish Manufacturing Firms

This paper examines the effect of participation by foreign capital and the spillovers from a foreign presence on the technical progress of Spanish manufacturing firms. The results show that foreign direct investment (FDI) creates positive spillover effects for local firms, and when the presence of foreign capital and the absorptive capacity of spillovers from FDI are large, more technical progress ensues. Also, local companies in capital‐ and research and development (R&D)‐intensive industries experience larger positive FDI spillovers. For these reasons, government policies should aim to attract FDI, especially in the aforementioned industries.     

An Anatomy of the Chinese selectocracy

ABSTRACT

The Chinese regime is a self-contained polity that is best described by selectocracy, i.e. a polity that selects officials by a centralized mechanism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the selectorate. Throughout the process of reform, the party has been de-politicized, so the central government has become disinterested with regard to the conflicts in society, which enables it to adopt identity-blind and growth-enhancing policies. The selectoracy’s selection process is open, competitive and meritocratic. It puts more emphasis on responsibility, not accountability, as incentive to illicit performance from local officials. This ensures that the central government’s policies are carried out in the country.     

An Empirical Analysis of Post‐Merger Organizational Integration

We study post‐merger organizational integration using linked employer–employee data. Integration is implemented by reassigning a small number of high‐skilled workers, especially in R&D and management. Workforce mixing is concentrated to establishments set up after merger, rather than to previously existing establishments. Worker turnover is high after merger, but new hiring yields stable total employment. Target employees have higher turnover and reassignment, particularly if the target firm is small relative to the acquiring firm. These findings might suggest that integration is costly, but can be achieved by focusing on key employees. Alternatively, the reassignment of a few key employees is sufficient for achieving integration.     

地方政府竞争、土地垄断供给与城市化发展失衡

文章基于地方政府竞争和土地垄断供给的双重视角,利用中国1999—2012年的省级面板数据,对人口城市化与空间城市化的发展失衡现象及其内在机理进行了系统研究。理论研究发现,地方政府间以经济增长和财政收入增加为导向的竞争机制,为地方政府偏重推进空间城市化、忽视推进人口城市化提供了内在激励,而土地的政府垄断供给则为地方政府通过经营土地来实施这种偏重空间城市化的行为提供了手段。这两个因素叠加在一起,导致了人口城市化与空间城市化的发展失衡。实证检验发现,地方政府间竞争越激烈,土地供给数量越多,人口城市化与空间城市化发展失衡的程度就越严重。这表明,地方政府竞争和土地垄断供给对城市化发展失衡确实存在显著正向影响。推进地方政府竞争模式和土地供给制度改革,是实现中国人口城市化与空间城市化均衡发展的有效途径。     

政府控制、制度环境与上市公司财务重述行为

在我国转轨经济背景下,政府干预对企业行为具有重要影响。本文以财务重述为研究对象,实证检验了不同层级的政府干预和地区制度环境与上市公司财务重述行为之间的关系。研究发现,与非政府控制的公司相比,政府控制的公司尤其是地方政府控制的公司发生财务重述的概率更高,而公司所处地区制度环境的改善能够显著降低上市公司发生财务重述的概率。具体来说,公司所处地区的市场化进程越快、政府干预越少、法治水平越高,上市公司发生财务重述的可能性越低。本文为理解转型经济中政府在公司信息披露行为中的作用提供了实证支持,拓展了财务重述影响因素的研究,同时提供了改善公司财务报告质量的有效路径。     

空间外部性视角下的地方政府支出策略互动模式

运用空间面板计量方法研究了分税制改革以来中国地方政府支出的策略互动模式。结果表明,基本建设、文教科卫和预算外支出具有显著的空间自相关性,表现出策略互补,行政管理支出则由于地方财力情况的差异形成策略替代,效益外溢性、财政竞争机制和标尺效应在其中交替发挥了主导作用。财政收支分权对支出策略互动模式的影响效果并不一致,扩张支出分权将加剧以基建支出为主的地方政府竞争。财政分权的改革方向是使地方政府在一定程度上拥有收入自主权,中央适当上收具有强烈区域外溢性的公共品供给责任,降低地方非正式收支自主权,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型,将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配,验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时,其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现,地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性;分位数回归发现,辖区企业处于不同税负强度时,地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下,本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

中央政府与地方政府的政策博弈及其治理

本文描述了中央政府和地方政府政策博弈的凸现与加剧,认为这种政策博弈的制度性根源是市场取向的分权制以及以GDP为核心的政绩指标考核体系,制度性根源对政策博弈具有传导机制.这种政府博弈的积极影响促进了中央政府政策的更加合理、完善,而消极影响则是中央政府调控能力大打折扣、中央政府遭遇信任危机和扰乱市场秩序.治理途径则在于建立新型中央政府和地方政府关系,采取消除政策博弈的措施,即真正做到财权与事权的统一、建立居民的退出与呼吁机制、构建更加合理的政绩观与指标考评体系.     

我国地方政府债务风险的 度量、评估与释放

本文度量和评估了我国地方政府的债务风险,结果显示,地方政府的债务余额虽在可控范围内,但新增债务比率已超过预警线,地方政府存在一定的潜在债务风险。本文从分权体制和道德风险两个层面剖析了引致地方政府债务风险的原因,梳理了应对地方政府债务风险的逻辑体系,从制度基础、事前审核把关、事中动态监控、事后反思改进等方面为解决地方政府债务风险提供了政策建议。     

INTER‐REGIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH A VERTICAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT *

This paper incorporates the vertical structure of governments into a mixed oligopoly model by considering the public firms owned by different government levels, namely, a state‐owned public firm and a local public firm. As in the existing literature, a state‐owned public firm is assumed to maximise the welfare of an entire country comprising two regions. On the other hand, a local public firm is assumed to maximise the welfare of only one region. In such a setting, we find that when the central and local governments independently consider whether to privatise their respective public firms, only the state‐owned public firm should be privatised. Furthermore, we show that for the welfare of a country, a mixed oligopoly with a vertical structure of government can be more desirable than a mixed oligopoly without it.     

Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation

This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision in an economic federation with two levels of government: a local government in each locality and a (first mover) central government. Each locality is characterized by two ability‐types, and the ability‐distribution differs across localities. The central government redistributes via a nonlinear income tax and a lump‐sum transfer to each local government, while the local governments use proportional income taxes and provide local public goods. We show how the redistributive role of taxation is combined with a corrective role, and how the central government can implement the second best resource allocation.     

Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation

Federal, state, and many local governments make decisions that involve taxation, redistribution, and provision of public goods. Positive models to study these issues encounter the well‐known problem that majority‐voting equilibrium (MVE) may fail to exist in such multidimensional models. In this paper, with reasonable restrictions on preferences, I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an MVE in a model with linear income tax and government expenditure policies that affect individual labor/leisure choices. My majority‐voting result takes account of the possibility that low‐skill individuals will drop out of the labor force under some tax and expenditure configurations.     

从地方政府经济行为角度谈绩效评价机制设计

相对于中央政府，地方政府的从属地位决定了其经济行为取向受制于中央的政策期望和评价激励机制。不同时期的中央政策期望和评价机制决定了地方政府经济行为的不同特征。当前中央政府对地方政府评价制度的不完善，导致了宏观经济政策微观力量的缺失和负面外部效应的不断累积，建设完善的绩效评价机制是当务之急。