Creating Value Through Best‐In‐Class Capital Allocation1

With the economy showing signs of recovery, companies are shifting their focus from liquidity and balance sheet concerns back towards capital allocation and value creation. This article provides a comprehensive framework to examine shareholder value creation through capital allocation, and discusses important capital allocation lessons that have re‐emerged over the last few years. Notable among the key lessons are the following:

• ? Growth alone does not guarantee value creation, which suggests that companies should allocate capital based on the economic value of each investment opportunity.
• ? The limits of diversification in a financial crisis should be considered when allocating capital and managing liquidity.
• ? Companies should be conservative with base‐case cash flow projections and incorporate the possibility of downside scenarios into their projections.
• ? It is important to incorporate all forms of capital when managing liquidity.
• ? Whether using a long‐term or current‐market approach, companies should be consistent throughout the cycle in their cost of capital methodology.
• ? Companies should continually rethink investments and allocate capital in an attempt to maintain a competitive advantage.
• ? Evaluate returns relative to risk and cost of capital, and not against the company's average ROIC.
• ? Comparing the IRR of share repurchases to new investments is not an apples‐to‐apples comparison.

Finally, companies should concentrate on the strategic uses and value of particular assets and not allow their decisions to be driven by the value they might receive relative to their initial cost.     

Attracting Long‐Term Shareholders

Corporate CEOs often say they don't hear enough from shareholders about strategic issues related to long‐term value creation. At the same time, they claim to hear with predictable regularity from short‐term investors about their success (or failure) in hitting consensus earnings targets. But as the authors of this article begin by noting, there is mounting evidence that companies get the shareholders they deserve—that companies that provide quarterly earnings guidance and otherwise focus investor attention on near‐term earnings targets tend to attract more transient investors. The authors go on to argue that companies with a compelling long‐term vision can expect to benefit not only from more farsighted managerial decision‐making, but also from building a base of longer‐term investors who share management's view of success, and how it can and ought to be achieved. Such a shift in strategic focus and disclosure toward longer‐run performance creates a virtuous cycle—one in which companies that gain the interest and backing of investors with longer horizons end up reinforcing management's confidence to undertake value‐adding investments in their company's future. Even if most companies can't pick their shareholders, they can develop an investor engagement strategy designed to attract long‐term investors. In this article, the chairman and president of FCLTGlobal outline the underlying strategy behind long‐term investor relations and the four key components of such an approach.     

A Fireside Chat with Raj Gupta: What It Takes to Create Long‐Term Value

The chairman of two public companies (and former chair and CEO of Rohm and Haas) draws on his experience as a director of five private and 15 public companies in discussing the challenges and opportunities facing today's corporate boards. Perhaps the most formidable challenge is the pace of technological change, which is making business models ‘in all industries and countries’ obsolete and forcing companies to adapt much more quickly than in the past. Along with the risk of obsolescence is the increase in ‘reputational risk’ associated with an ‘information age’ in which companies are forced to monitor the nearly continuous flow of fact, hearsay, and outright fabrication. The author recommends that public company boards adopt a new ‘partnership’ model. Besides ensuring an ‘ethical tone at the top,’ corporate directors should aim to become partners with the senior management team by playing more active roles in strategic planning, risk management, and the design of performance evaluation and incentive pay systems. In the most striking departure from current practice, the author urges directors to seize the opportunity created by the ‘reconcentration’ of ownership of U.S. public companies by actively engaging large institutional investors in a strategic dialogue about the companies' strengths and vulnerabilities. In so doing, proactive directors can help their management teams preempt shareholder activists and create long‐run value by creating a more effective two‐way channel of communication, one with the potential to give management more confidence when undertaking large strategic investments with longer‐run payoffs.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

Commitment and Lapse Behavior in Long‐Term Insurance: A Case Study

This article presents a case study of a portfolio of individual long‐term insurance contracts sold by a Spanish mutual company. We describe the risk levels, the rating structure, and the implied cross‐subsidies on a portfolio of policies providing health, life, and long‐term care insurance. We show evidence of reclassification risk through the history of disability spells. We also analyze the lapse behavior and seek to provide a rationale for the portfolio’s dynamics. We discuss the lack of commitment from the policyholders (lapses) and from the mutual company (which took a run‐off decision). Finally, we draw conclusions regarding the design of such contracts.     

Short‐ and Long‐Term Effects of Multimarket Trading

We analyze short‐ and long‐term effects of multimarket trading by examining the entries of multiple markets into transacting three ETFs, DIA, QQQ, and SPY. We find that large‐scale entries improve overall market quality, while small‐scale entries have ambiguous effects. Our results show that the competition effect dominates the fragmentation effect over a long horizon and that market fragmentation leads to a decline in trading costs. Further, we find that the order handling rules help mitigate the fragmentation effect and facilitate the competition effect. We do not find that multimarket trading harms price efficiency or increases price volatility.     

The Economic Significance of Long‐Term Plans

The authors summarize the findings of their event study of the capital market reactions to an inaugural set of 17 CEO presentations of their ‘long‐term plans’ to institutional investors. The findings show that, although sell‐side analysts appear unresponsive to such plans, both trading volumes and stock prices exhibit significant abnormal reactions to the presentations, providing suggestive evidence that the communication of such plans conveys ‘value‐relevant’ information to investors with longer time horizons. Although based on an admittedly small sample, these findings shed light on the promise of long‐term plans and have been corroborated by analysis of the market response to the presentations of 10 more companies since the study was conducted. The authors also provide the outlines of a ‘content framework’ designed to help companies put together effective corporate plans and other long‐term disclosures. The framework is organized around nine main ‘themes,’ including policies governing capital allocation, corporate governance, and human capital development, as well as the statement of corporate purpose. After applying this framework to the 17 CEO presentations, the authors find that the more specific and forward‐looking the information disclosed in these long‐term plans, the more positive the capital market reaction.     

The Determinants of Long‐Term Corporate Debt Issuances

A significant proportion of the debt issued by investment‐grade firms has maturities greater than 20 years. In this paper we provide evidence that gap‐filling behavior is an important determinant of these very long‐term issues. Using data on individual corporate debt issues between 1987 and 2009, we find that gap‐filling behavior is more prominent in the very long end of the maturity spectrum where the required risk capital makes arbitrage costly. In addition, changes in the supply of long‐term government bonds affect not just the choice of maturity but also the overall level of corporate borrowing.     

R&D Increases and Long‐Term Performance of Rivals

We examine how a firm's research and development (R&D) increases affect its intra‐industry competitors in the long run. Consistent with the R&D spillover hypothesis, when a firm unexpectedly increases its R&D spending, its intra‐industry competitors experience improvements in operating performance and analyst forecast revisions and earn positive abnormal stock returns in the long run. The industry concentration, which is related to the firm's strategic reaction, is crucial in determining the magnitude of the R&D spillover effect.     

Predicting Long‐Term Financial Returns: VAR versus DSGE Model—A Horse Race

This paper considers a U.S. institutional investor who is implementing a long‐term portfolio allocation using forecasts of financial returns. We compare the predictive performance of two competing macrofinance models—an unrestricted vector autoRegression (VAR) and a fully‐structural dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—for horizons up to 15 years. Although the performances are similar for short horizons, the DSGE model outperforms the VAR at forecasting financial returns in the long term. This model also generates substantially higher Sharpe ratios. Although it contains fewer unknown parameters, it benefits from economically grounded restrictions that help anchor financial returns in the long term.     

Institutional Trade Persistence and Long‐Term Equity Returns

Recent studies show that single‐quarter institutional herding positively predicts short‐term returns. Motivated by the theoretical herding literature, which emphasizes endogenous persistence in decisions over time, we estimate the effect of multiquarter institutional buying and selling on stock returns. Using both regression and portfolio tests, we find that persistent institutional trading negatively predicts long‐term returns: persistently sold stocks outperform persistently bought stocks at long horizons. The negative association between returns and institutional trade persistence is not subsumed by past returns or other stock characteristics, is concentrated among smaller stocks, and is stronger for stocks with higher institutional ownership.     

The Case for Maximizing Long‐Run Shareholder Value

Criticism of the shareholder model of corporate governance stems in part from misunderstanding about what shareholder wealth maximization means for the other stakeholders of public companies. The corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization does not imply that such stakeholders “do not matter.” Managers maximize shareholder value by maximizing the total expected cash flows available to distribute to all of their stakeholders. To maximize such cash flows, managers must provide their customers with desirable goods and services at attractive prices—which in turn requires that managers attract the employees, suppliers, and financial capital needed to conduct their businesses by providing each of these groups with market‐determined returns on their contributions to firm value. In this way, successful corporations benefit all of their stakeholders, and what is good for the corporation is generally good for society. External forces such as the media and government exert considerable influence on corporate actions and, in so doing, they play a role in helping to limit negative corporate “externalities” such as pollution and climate change. But direct regulation of productive activities should be used sparingly, and subjected to ongoing cost‐benefit analysis. Government regulation replaces the collective decisions of a broad marketplace of stakeholders using their own resources to act in their own interests with decisions made by government officials with complicated incentives and using resources generated by others. More generally, government should seek to regulate corporate actions only in the limited situations in which there are no market solutions for reducing the effects of externalities. For example, government plays a critically important role in identifying and deterring corporate fraud, and in ensuring competition and a level playing field for companies and all their stakeholders.     

Labor‐Market Institutions and Long‐Term Effects of Youth Unemployment

Graduating from a school during a time of adverse economic conditions has a persistent, harmful effect on workers’ subsequent employment opportunities. An analysis of panel data from OECD countries during the 1960–2010 periods reveals that a worker who experiences a 1 percentage point higher unemployment rate while the worker is 16–24 years old has a 0.14 percentage point higher unemployment rate at ages 25–29 years and 0.03 percentage points higher at ages 30–34 years. The persistence of this negative effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. A composite index for labor‐market rigidity is constructed and the index is shown to have positive correlation with the persistence. Moderating macroeconomic fluctuations is more important in countries that have more persistent labor‐market entry effects on subsequent outcomes.     

A Long‐Term Perspective on the Determinants of Treasury Bond Stripping Levels

We examine the proportion of individual Treasury bonds held as strips over the entire history of the STRIPS program. First, we document a secular decline in the Treasury bond stripping levels from 1985 to 2010, coincidental with the long‐term decline in the interest rates. This pattern suggests that investors purchase strips to avoid reinvestment risk and to lock in the high interest rates in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, higher coupon and longer maturity bonds are shown to be more heavily stripped. Third, the suspension of new issues of 30‐year bonds from 2001 through 2006 created a gap in the maturity structure of Treasury bonds and induced heavy stripping of 30‐year bonds issued post 2006. Our findings suggest that stripping is motivated by several factors, including interest rate risk management, tax concerns and market completion.     

A Glimpse Behind a Closed Door: The Long‐Term Investment Value of Buy‐Side Research and Its Effect on Fund Trades and Performance

We examine proprietary research produced by buy‐side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy‐side research has investment value for a one‐year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy‐side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy‐side analysts with good track records, and when the underlying stocks have little sell‐side coverage. The influence of sell‐side research is concentrated primarily in stocks not followed by buy‐side analysts and in funds with low overall buy‐side coverage. The company's funds that rely more heavily on buy‐side research generate superior performance.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

Early Mover Advantages: Evidence From the Long‐Term Care Insurance Market

Researchers frequently question whether financial firms benefit by developing new products because barriers to entry common to other industries generally do not exist. Studies of early mover advantages for new financial products provide mixed evidence at best. We find evidence of early mover advantages in the relatively young market for long‐term care insurance (LTCI) using data that allow broad testing of financial performance. Product differentiation, individual lines exposure, firm size, and traditional health insurance experience also affect financial performance.     

Risk‐Adjusted Long‐Term Contrarian Profits: Evidence from Non‐S&P 500 High‐Volume Stocks

Can trading volume help unravel the long‐term overreaction puzzle? With portfolios of non‐S&P 500 NYSE stocks, we show that (1) both the high‐ and low‐volume (abnormal volume) contrarian portfolios earn a much higher market‐adjusted excess return than the normal‐volume contrarian portfolio, (2) however, when leverage‐induced risk is factored in, excess returns from contrarian portfolios with normal‐ and low‐volume stocks are insignificant, (3) only excess returns from high‐volume contrarian stocks are significant and cannot be explained by the time‐varying risk and return framework, and (4) such high‐volume, risk‐adjusted excess returns arise mainly from winner (glamour) stocks.