金融危机背景下企业现金流运行中的政策影响研究

目前鲜有学者将企业现金流的研究视角放在宏观政策层面上,本文抓住了金融危机这一契机,以财政政策为研究对象,将其对企业现金流的影响分为财政政策在宏观层面的传导、财政政策在宏观微观间的传导、财政政策在微观层面的传导三大过程进行尝试性分析,得出传导链条,并提出了危机中企业现金流管理的两大关注点,以期对危机中企业现金流断流风险的防范以及相关宏观经济政策的制定有所帮助。     

Corporate Financial Policy and the Theory of Financial Intermediation

This paper examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy subject to two forms of moral hazard. Multiple information problems are shown to generate a role for multiple classes of financial claimants. We then show that economic efficiency is enhanced if the financial structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets. Consequently, our results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository financial institutions.     

机构投资者持股、现金股利政策与公司价值——来自2005-2010年中国上市公司的经验证据

现金股利政策,决定了机构投资者的收益模式选择——长期持有的价值投资抑或短期频繁买卖的投机炒作,进而影响机构投资者能否帮助上市公司提升公司价值。论文基于2005-2010年中国A股上市公司7159个年度观察数据,实证研究发现,当且仅当上市公司(连续)发放(较高)现金股利时,机构投资者持股才能显著提升公司的市场价值,而且此时机构投资者持股比例还必须达到较高的水平。该结论在控制内生性、计量模型选择、变量度量等问题后仍然稳健成立。     

Product Market Threats and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings

We construct a model to show that predatory strategies by a financially strong rival can cause a financially weak firm to underinvest. This threat intensifies when the two firms produce similar products and share similar future investment opportunities. We show that cash holdings become more valuable by providing liquidity to fund investment opportunities as they emerge, thereby mitigating the underinvestment problem. Empirical evidence supports these model predictions. The value of cash is significantly higher for firms facing higher predatory threats. The results are robust to various controls for financial constraints, corporate governance, risk factors, and industry‐level measures of product market competition. An identification strategy that exploits exogenous variation in financial constraints further corroborates the causal effect of predatory threats on the value of cash.     

公司治理和融资政策的关系研究综述

公司治理在融资政策选择中起着重要作用。公司治理作为减少代理成本的激励机制，能抑制内部人机会主义行为，使其不能按自身利益调整公司融资政策。同时，公司治理通过减低信息不对称水平、减少小股东受掠夺的风险进而降低资本成本。本文对国内外公司治理与融资政策之间关系的研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司治理结构和公司融资问题的研究提供了依据。具体而言，本文回顾了公司治理和资本结构、公司治理和债务期限结构、公司治理和资本成本之间的关系。     

信息不对称、公司治理与现金持有价值——基于知情交易概率的非平稳面板数据

本文为了研究中国上市公司信息不对称、公司治理和现金持有价值之间的关系,以沪深上市公司2004-2009年数据为基础,利用知情交易概率作为管理者和投资者之间的信息不对称代理变量,以高管持股比例作为公司治理代理变量,利用公司各种财务指标作为控制变量,发现信息不对称与中国上市公司现金持有价值呈显著负相关,高管持股比例和现金持有价值显著正相关,支持自由现金流理论和委托代理理论,信息不对称程度越高,管理者越可能滥用现金,导致现金持有价值下降,而提高公司治理,加强投资者保护可以提高现金持有价值。     

金融中介、非正规金融与现金价值

金融体制改革相对滞后,影响了商业银行利用金融资源的效率,致使投放到企业中的资金使用效率低下。除正式的金融制度安排外,非正规金融形式也是重要的融资形式。以我国上市公司1999-2005年的数据为样本,本文研究了以银行贷款为主的金融资源和以商业信用为主的非正规金融资源之间的资金效率问题。结果发现,对于难以获得银行贷款的企业,的确通过商业信用来缓解融资约束,两种融资渠道存在替代性关系;以商业银行为主的金融中介的资金效率低于以商业信用为代表的非正规金融的资金效率。     

Taxes,Inflation and Corporate Financial Policy

This paper examines inflation-induced distortions in personal and corporate income taxes and discusses the implications for corporate dividend and financial structure policies and for shareholder unanimity. The tax effects relating to capital gains and debt interest cause changes in aggregate corporate borrowing and lead to equilibrium tax relationships which differ from the zero-inflation tax relationships.     

Corporate Cash Policy and How to Manage it with Stock Repurchases

At the end of 2004 total U.S. corporate cash holdings reached an all‐time high of just under $2 trillion—an amount equal to roughly 15% of the total U.S. GDP. And during the past 25 years, average cash holdings have jumped from 10% to 23% of total corporate assets. But at the same time their levels of cash have risen, U.S. companies have paid out dramatically increasing amounts of cash to buy back shares. This article addresses the following questions: What accounts for the dramatic increase in the average level of corporate cash holdings since 1980? And why do some companies keep so much cash (with one fourth of U.S. firms holding cash amounting to at least 36% of total assets) while others have so little (with another quarter having less than 3%)? Why do companies pay out excess cash in the form of stock repurchases (rather than, say, dividends), and what explains the significant increase in repurchases (both in absolute terms and relative to dividends) over time? The author begins by arguing that cash reserves provide companies with a buffer against possible shortfalls in operating profits—one that, especially during periods of financial trouble, can be used to avoid financial distress or provide funding for promising projects that might otherwise have to be put off. Such buffers are particularly valuable in the case of smaller, riskier companies with lots of growth opportunities and limited access to capital markets. And the dramatic increase in corporate cash holdings between 1980 and the present can be attributed mainly to an increase in the risk of publicly traded companies—an increase in risk that reflects in part a general increase in competition, but also a notable change over time in the kinds of companies (smaller, newer, less profitable, non‐dividend paying firms) that have chosen to go public. At the other end of the corporate spectrum are large, relatively mature companies with limited growth opportunities. Although such companies tend to produce considerable free cash flow, they also tend to retain relatively small amounts of cash (as a percentage of total assets), in part because of shareholder concern about the corporate “free cash flow problem”—the well‐documented tendency of such companies to destroy value through overpriced (often diversifying) acquisitions and other misguided attempts to pursue growth at the expense of profitability. For companies with highly predictable earnings and investment plans, dividends provide one means of addressing the free cash flow problem. But for companies with more variable earnings and less predictable reinvestment, open‐market stock repurchases provide a more flexible means of distributing cash to shareholders. Unlike the corporate “commitment” implied by dividend payments, an open market stock repurchase program creates what amounts to an option but not an obligation to distribute funds. The value of such flexibility, which increases during periods of increased risk and uncertainty, explains much of the apparent substitution of repurchases for dividends in recent years.     

Labor Union Effect on Corporate Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

By using panel data from Korean listed firms, we find that unionized firms strategically hold less cash to enhance their bargaining power against labor unions. We also find that unionized firms are likely to reduce the marginal value of their cash holdings, thereby decreasing shareholder value from the agency theory perspective. This finding complements the agency theory argument that managers tend to waste corporate resources by hoarding cash, particularly when faced with increased information asymmetry and financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that information-related financial constraints and agency problems are likely to co-exist in unionized firms.     

Cash and Corporate Control

The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.     

家族控制、金融发展与上市公司现金股利政策

本文以中国A股上市公司为样本,考察家族控制、金融发展对于上市公司现金股利政策的影响。实证发现,家族上市公司的派现意愿和派现水平显著低于非家族上市公司,一个重要原因在于家族上市公司面临着比非家族上市公司更高的融资约束。进一步地,在良好的外部金融环境中,上市公司的派现意愿和派现水平显著更高,而且金融发展有助于缓解家族上市公司的融资约束问题并推动其现金股利的发放。     

大股东控制、财务杠杆与公司价值——国有及民营上市公司治理的比较研究

本文以2002～2004年的上市公司为样本,研究了第一大股东持股比例、财务杠杆与公司价值之间的关系.研究发现,国有控制上市公司与民营控制上市公司公司价值并无显著差异;国有控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值呈U形关系,民营控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值则呈倒U形关系;国有控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值负相关,民营控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值则正相关.其政策含义是,政府应该继续贯彻"抓大放小"的战略方针;监管部门应该关注持股比例较高的民营上市公司第一大股东的资金来源及其行为特征,防止其对公司其他利益相关者的侵害行为;银行贷款应对国有及民营企业一视同仁,银行需要加强对国有控制上市公司贷款的监督.     

Toward a Positive Theory of Corporate Financial Policy

This paper offers an alternative theoretical structure to the neoclassical valuation model that has been the cornerstone of theories of finance for a quarter of a century. It begins by outlining the neoclassical model in simple but surprisingly robust terms. More recent extensions and refinements are then discussed. The alternative model, which does not rely on modern financial economic theory but which is consistent with real world empirical behaviour, is developed next. Finally, a new research agenda for finance is proposed.     

财务特征、公司治理与现金股利分配倾向

以2001～2008年间772家沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析财务特征和公司治理对现金股利分配倾向的影响得出,在财务特征方面,规模大和盈利能力强的公司倾向于分配现金股利,而成长性高和资产负债率高的公司则相反;在公司治理方面,国有控股、董事会规模大、高管薪酬高和由四大会计师事务所签证的公司倾向于分配现金股利,流通股比例高和独立董事规模大的公司却相反,而公司领导权结构的影响则不显著。概言之,财务特征显示上市公司有能力发放现金股利,但治理因素却表明上市公司并不希望发放现金股利。     

商业信用、融资约束与公司价值

以我国 A 股非金融类上市公司为样本,就商业信用变动对公司价值的影响进行分析,并以投资效率损失作为融资约束程度分类标准,对融资约束程度不同公司的商业信用变动的边际价值进行对比分析。研究发现：商业信用有利于提高公司价值;融资约束公司的商业信用变动的边际价值小于非融资约束公司;对于融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而增加;而对于非融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而减小。     

Earnings Quality Effect on Corporate Excess Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

By using panel data from Korea’s listed firms, we find that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to accumulate excess cash holdings, perhaps in an attempt to buffer themselves from information asymmetry problems. We also find that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to discount the marginal value of their excess cash holdings because their shareholders appear to question the reason for such cash policy changes from the agency theory perspective. Overall, our results suggest that information asymmetry and agency problems are likely to co-exist in firms with poor earnings quality.