消费者谈判能力与厂商标价策略——模型及基于实验经济学的检验

本文建立的理论模型研究了消费者谈判能力、谈判成本和对商品的偏好程度等几方面对厂商最优标价决策的影响。当消费者谈判能力较弱时,厂商可能策略性地不对商品标价,以获取更大利润,利润大小与消费者的谈判能力呈倒U形关系;而当消费者谈判能力较强时,厂商会选择对商品进行标价以最大化利润;但若消费者谈判能力很弱,消费者很可能因无利可图而放弃购买,这时厂商就会选择标价销售。通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证。本文同时证明,在一定条件下,厂商选择策略性不标价可能不是社会最优的,因此需要通过政府强制标价来实现市场有效性。     

谈判能力与标价策略

厂商能够通过策略性地选择不标价销售,利用其较强的谈判能力获取更多的利益。当厂商谈判能力较弱时,厂商将选择标价以最大化其利润。考虑消费者的谈判成本,厂商选择不标价时,其利润和谈判能力呈倒U型关系。当厂商谈判能力过高时,由于消费者将无利可图而放弃购买,因而厂商将选择标价的策略。在一定条件下,厂商实施策略性不标价不是市场有效的,可以通过强制标价实现市场的有效性。     

下游竞争、买方谈判能力与上游产品差异化

基于零售商谈判能力的差异,构建完全信息动态博弈模型,考察下游竞争程度、买方谈判能力对上游产品差异化策略激励的影响.结果表明,下游市场竞争与买方谈判能力对产品差异化的激励不存在替代效应;当零售商不具有买方谈判能力时,市场竞争程度通过影响上游利润激励供应商的产品差异化策略,竞争程度不影响批发价格;当主导零售商具有买方谈判能力时,谈判能力通过影响批发价格激励供应商的产品差异化策略;市场竞争削弱了消费者效用水平,而买方谈判能力改善了消费者效用水平.     

大型家电B2C零售商谈判行为与谈判势力的博弈分析

本文以博弈论为基础,建立起大型家电B2C零售商与供应商的谈判行为与谈判势力模型,在分析大型家电B2C零售商市场势力影响因素的基础上,通过对本文所建立模型的求解,分析了它们的竞争行为对市场势力的影响。笔者认为,在大型家电B2C零售商市场运作过程中,它们把增加市场占有率作为最优的市场竞争策略,同时为了获得最优策略,它们会尽量压低上游供应商的价格,且获取商品的价格越低,其出售商品的价格也越低,但它们自身的利润未必增加。     

寡头市场具有混合捆绑销售契约的竞争分析

在寡头竞争市场环境下,生产完全互补产品的厂商可以通过谈判签约并使用"混合捆绑"策略进行竞争,如电信运营商与手机厂商共同推出的签约套餐和预付费套餐。针对这种行为,文章构建了一个包含两组互补品厂商的寡头博弈模型,研究混合捆绑销售契约对市场价格、厂商利润和社会福利的影响。研究表明:当只有一组厂商签订混合捆绑销售契约时,签约厂商能够从捆绑折扣中获得竞争优势,而竞争对手则被迫降低自己产品价格并在竞争中处于劣势;当两组厂商均签订混合捆绑销售契约时,围绕捆绑产品的竞争将使得捆绑折扣进一步提高,但各自的利润却下降了。然而当这种签约策略内生时,所有厂商将选择签订契约并进行捆绑销售,从而陷入"囚徒困境"。最终,在互补产品"纵向外部性"和系统产品"横向外部性"的共同作用下,混合捆绑销售契约提高了消费者剩余而降低了社会福利。基于本文分析,应该反对竞争政策对厂商谈判签订契约使用混合捆绑策略进行竞争的行为。文章的贡献在于从契约的角度研究厂商之间的捆绑销售策略,并运用统一的分析框架考察了不同契约结构下厂商实施捆绑销售的动机,对于深化捆绑销售的理论研究和完善竞争政策具有重要的借鉴意义。     

策略型消费者的动态定价机制与返还合同设计

当面临需求、市场环境、宏观政策等诸多因素的不确定性时,越来越多的厂商采用动态价格策略来增加利润。随着这种策略的广泛应用,消费者选择持币观望而导致市场低迷。本文应用Stackelberg博弈模型和合同设计理论,考虑厂商在面对这些可能延迟购买的消费者时,如何决定价格策略。研究结果表明,厂商通过动态定价无法对高保留价格的消费者实现完全的价格歧视,但可以通过一个返还的合同设计最大限度地获得这些高保留价格消费者的消费者剩余。最后,通过比较价格歧视与返还合同下的利润,指出差别定价和返还合同的适用条件。     

垄断条件下企业研发的最优决策研究

研发决策是企业战略发展和组织管理中必不可少的重要内容,对于垄断企业更是如此。分别从企业层面和产业层面对垄断条件下垄断企业的最优研发决策进行了分析。研究表明,由于信息不完全和研发成本的存在,垄断厂商可能会选择低效技术;当研发投入成本较低、风险较小时,厂商进行技术转换、增加研发投入的激励更大。而在进行技术投入时,非合作竞争中的研发投入水平和厂商利润均小于合作研发时的水平,从而导致研发不足。而通过合作研发将技术的外部扩散效应内部化,对企业的研发具有正向激励作用。     

策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

免费商业模式下厂商盈利机制的经济分析——基于对网络游戏产业的分析

本文在对免费商业模式的发展历程以及现状进行分析的基础上,选取我国免费商业模式较为集中的网络游戏产业作为对象,运用经济学工具研究发现免费商业模式对厂商盈利能力的影响机制为:第一,通过消费者相对可支配收入的提高以及选择成本的降低提高市场需求;第二,通过差异化消费菜单实现市场细分,更好地满足消费者需求,从而扩大厂商利润空间,因此在理论上这两者使得免费商业模式下的厂商相对于收费商业模式具有更强的盈利能力.     

失业利益与工资谈判:一个博弈模型

本文通过一个可以中途退出谈判的讨价还价模型 ,刻画了存在失业利益条件下的工人和企业之间的工资议价行为。结论是 :失业利益将加强工人的工资要价能力 ,降低工人求职的努力程度 ,过高的失业利益甚至导致工人提前结束谈判 ,而过低的失业利益导致工人在各阶段的工资要价都较低 ;由于信息不对称 ,企业可以凭借信息优势对工人的要价进行压价。理论上 ,存在最优的失业保障。     

Trade mechanism selection in markets with frictions

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogeneous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders' continuation values—which are endogenous—influence the sellers' choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the surplus expected from it, choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In equilibrium sellers may simply target one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price discriminate (haggling). We also study when haggling generates trading delays. A price setting externality arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers' pricing choices.     

The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers: Too many bargainers spoil the broth

In this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given. The list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers, so the higher the list price, the more the firms can extract from bargainers. We find that an increase in the proportion of consumers seeking to bargain can lower consumer surplus overall, even though new bargainers receive a lower price. The reason is that the list price for those who do not bargain and the bargained prices for those who were already bargaining rise: sellers have a greater incentive to make the bargainers’ outside option less attractive, reducing the incentive to compete for price takers. Competition Authority exhortations to bargain can therefore be misplaced. We also consider the implications for optimal seller bargaining.     

Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations

We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers' goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer can obtain higher pay-offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations. The degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay-offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers.     

INFLATION AND VARIETY*

Economies undergoing high inflation often experience a reduction of product variety in the marketplace. Existing models study how inflation affects quantity, but very few have studied how inflation affects variety. In a monetary model with explicit microfoundations, I analyze how inflation affects variety as well as quantity. I consider two pricing mechanisms—bargaining and price posting with directed search. I show that inflation reduces both quantity and variety under both pricing mechanisms. Quantitatively, the model implies that the total welfare cost of 10% inflation ranges from 4.77% to 8.4% under bargaining and is 1.52% under price posting.     

Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets

We study an MNE's choice of FDI mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing. We show how the market's vertical structure and trading features affect this choice. An MNE's incentives to expand through cross-border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power, upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms. The opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts, instead of two-part tariffs, are used. Our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome FDI and should discourage FDI through acquisition.     

Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks,Small Banks,and Secondary Market Prices

Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary-market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary-market prices.     

NASH BARGAINING AND CO-OPERATIVES

This paper develops the generalised Nash bargaining solution for a bargaining co-operative selling its output to a single buyer. Three assumptions for co-operative members' behaviour are examined: profit maximisation, co-operative surplus maximisation and maximising members' price. Solutions are compared and comparative statics presented for these alternative assumptions and the bargaining over price and quantity transacted. The most striking feature of the results is that pursuing the objective of maximising members' price does not necessarily lead to the highest members' price     

BARGAINING AMONG FARMERS,GOODWILL, AND THE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVES

A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term.     

An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida

The Florida dairy market has a few fluid milk processors and many dairy farmers. The dairy farmers are represented in negotiation with the processors by a cooperative. This research builds a theoretical model of bargaining between the processors and a cooperative. The model is applied to the Florida dairy market to examine price negotiations between Florida milk processors and a dairy cooperative. An expectation maximization (EM) algorithm along with maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the econometric disequilibrium model with time series data for the period of October 1998 to May 2009. The results show that the class I price set by the Federal Milk Marketing Order is the major factor influencing the cooperative’s supply reservation price. Negotiated quantity and production seasonality affect the processors’ demand reservation price. The processors appear to be more patient and have higher average bargaining power (0.8804) than the cooperative (0.1196). The highest (lowest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2008 and the lowest (highest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2001.     

THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON WAGES AND INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT PRICES UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY1

This paper seeks to determine whether, under bilateral monopoly, profit rate regulation induces an input price bias in addition to the well known Averch-Johnson capital intensity bias. Using a Nash-type employer-union, fixed bargaining power model, it is found that regulation may induce lower as well as higher wage rates. Similarly, when the two parties are respectively capital equipment supplier and user, regulation of the user's profit rate has an ambiguous effect on the equipment rental rate. In both cases the input price effect is shown to depend on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how demand elasticity varies with output.