Government debt and optimal monetary and fiscal policy

How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policies? And what do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabilization response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements are largely unpredictable in nature.     

Are short‐term effects of pollution important for growth and optimal fiscal policy?

We study optimal fiscal policy in a stock‐flow model of the environment within an endogenous growth framework, where some pollutants have a lasting impact on environmental quality which is restored through abatement expenditure, while others dissipate and hence, have a short‐term effect on the environment. All pollutants, however, affect the productivity of a public good negatively. Given that short‐term pollution, although it dissipates, is irreversible in this sense, a government cannot ignore its negative effects since this type of pollution lowers the productivity of all inputs. We find that a larger negative effect of short‐term pollutants as well as a higher congestion effect of private capital leads to corrective fiscal policies with higher optimal income tax and abatement expenditure rates, which have favorable growth consequences. Interestingly, we find that the rate of short‐term pollution does not affect optimal fiscal policy while that of the long‐term pollution does.     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

THE PRICE LEVEL, THE QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY, AND THE FISCAL THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL

This paper examines price‐level determination from the perspective of portfolio choice. Arbitrages among money balances, bonds, and investment goods determine their relative demands. Returns to real balance holdings and after‐tax returns to investment goods determine the relative values of nominal and real assets. Because expectations of government policies ultimately determine the expected returns to both nominal and real assets, the price level depends on interactions among current and expected future monetary and fiscal policies. The quantity theory and the fiscal theory emerge as special cases produced by restricting both the margins and the policies considered.     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICIES USING QUANTILE REGRESSIONS

The objective of this paper is to propose and apply a new method to evaluate the distributional impact of fiscal policies and potential marginal reforms. The econometric tool adopted is structural quantile treatment effects regression, which allows a complete picture of the effects of the fiscal policy of interest on households with different incomes, abilities, and needs. We apply this method to personal income taxation and non‐cash transfers in Italy for the year 2004. Our estimates suggest that, although heterogeneous, the redistributive effects of the potential fiscal reforms are almost zero.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

General Equilibrium Impacts of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Welfare of Households in South Asia

Impacts of fiscal and monetary policies are assessed in an open economy two sector multi‐household general equilibrium tax model with money for South Asia. Despite impressive growth rates there is evidence for alarming gaps in the distribution of income among households that require very careful design of economic policies. Generally the impacts of fiscal expansions are positive for all categories of households under the flexible price system but the gains are much higher for households in the upper income group than for those in the bottom. In theory the equilibrium relative prices guarantee the optimal allocation of resources in such economy. Simulation results show that demand, output and employment are sensitive to the preferences of consumers, confidence of producers and sector specific production technologies. Monetary policy is super‐neutral under flexible price regime but can complement fiscal policy well when aggregate prices are made sticky. Combination of monetary and fiscal policies in this manner can have extensive impacts in efficiency and redistribution. Higher taxes distort incentives to work and investment from richer households slowing down the economy. This reduces the welfare level of both rich and poor. Flexibility in prices enhances the market mechanism and makes the fiscal policy more effective and efficient.     

Simulation Analysis of Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit in Austria – Optimal Economic Policies for the Past and the Future

The macroeconometric simulation model AMOD1 and the optimization algorithm OPTCON are used to evaluate fiscal policies for Austria since the late seventies. In particular, the question of optimal (debt stabilizing) fiscal policies for the past and for the future is analyzed within the framework of a medium-scaled simulation model. The first set of optimization experiments aims to assess optimal fiscal policies for debt stabilization for the historical period 1978–2000 while trying to maintain reasonable growth rates of approximately 2 percent of real GDP. Optimal values of the instruments and the targets are compared to empirical data for Austria. A second set of simulations calculates optimal paths for the fiscal instruments for the period 2001-2010, particularly with respect to the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is mandatory for member states of the Euro zone.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

Optimal grouping of commodities for indirect taxation

Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom.     

Public budget composition,fiscal (de)centralization,and welfare

Abstract We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a dynamic federal economy where governments decide on budget size and its allocation between public education and infrastructure spending. We find that full centralization of tax and expenditure policies is optimal when infrastructure productivity is similar across regions. When differences are not too large, partial centralization is optimal. With strong differences, full decentralization becomes optimal. National steady‐state output tends to be highest under full decentralization. We provide a justification for the mixed evidence regarding the Oates conjecture by showing that full dominates partial decentralization, despite being inferior to complete decentralization.     

Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibrium

This paper develops a framework for determining optimal monetary and fiscal policies in perfect foresight equilibrium. Such equilibria have the property that all underlying demand and supply functions are derived from optimizing behavior, expectations are realized, and all markets clear. The time consistency of optimal policies derived under such circumstances is analyzed for a variety of alternative optimal policy problems. The general conclusion is that time consistency will prevail with respect to the optimization of any single policy instrument which does not appear explicitly in the indirect utility functions; otherwise time inconsistency will result. Monetary instruments are generally examples of the former, and fiscal instruments examples of the latter.     

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

The government's time discount rate: Choices and consequences in a dynamic framework

This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequence of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to multiple equilibria with differing stability properties. Employing a calibrated model and simulations derived using the Mathematica package, the stability properties of the economy and the likely choice of equilibrium are examined. Within this framework, the dynamic consequences of different time discount rates for the fiscal authority are investigated, both in a world of certainty and also in a world of uncertainty. It is shown that, in a world of certainty, it will be optimal to choose the fiscal authority's time discount rate equal to the market rate of interest. However, depending on the degree of uncertainty in evaluating the time discount rates of consumers and of the fiscal authority, it may be appropriate to bias the fiscal authority's discount rate above or below the expected interest rate.     

Jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules under liquidity constraints

We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policies follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is liquidity constrained. The welfare benefits of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than those of optimizing the monetary rule. The optimized fiscal rule implements strong automatic stabilizers that primarily stabilize the income of liquidity-constrained agents, rather than output. Transfers targeted to liquidity-constrained agents are the preferred fiscal instrument. The optimized monetary rule exhibits super-inertia and a weak inflation response. Optimized simple rules perform as well as the optimal policy under the timeless perspective.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Inflation bias and markup shocks in a LAMP model with strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper investigates the effects generated by limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where monetary and fiscal authorities are independent and play strategically. It shows that: (i) both the long run and the short run equilibrium require a departure from zero inflation rate; (ii) in response to a markup shock, fiscal policy becomes more aggressive as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents increases and price stability is no longer optimal even under Ramsey; (iii) overall, optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardians, while liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.     

Factor mobility and fiscal policy in the EU: policy issues and analytical approaches

Increased integration of labour and capital markets creates significant challenges for the welfare states of modern Europe. Taxation of capital and labour that finances extensive programmes of cash and in-kind redistribution creates incentives for capital owners and workers to locate in regions where they obtain favourable fiscal treatment. Competition among countries for mobile resources constrains their ability to alter the distribution of income and may lead to reductions in the size and scope of redistributive policies. Mobility of labour and capital is imperfect, however. Recent trends indicate that labour and capital are neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile, but rather adjust gradually to market conditions and economic policies. This paper presents an explicitly dynamic analysis showing that governments can achieve some redistribution when it is costly for factors of production to relocate. As the costs of factor mobility fall, however, the effectiveness of redistributive policies is more limited, and governments have weaker incentives to pursue them. Liberalized immigration policies, EU enlargement, and other steps that promote integration of the factors markets of Western Europe with those of surrounding regions thus present a challenge to policy-makers if they also wish to maintain fiscal systems with extensive redistribution.     

Are there bubbles in Chinese RMB–dollar exchange rate? Evidence from generalized sup ADF tests

This article uses recently developed generalized sup ADF (GSADF) unit root tests into the analysis of nominal RMB–dollar exchange rates bubbles. Based on the results from the GSADF tests, we find strong evidence of explosive behaviour in the nominal exchange rate and investigate two bubbles there. The first bubble is during 2005–2006 which is determined neither by the relative prices of traded goods nor the relative price of nontraded goods. The second bubble busts in 2008 during subprime crisis period, and which is determined by the relative prices of traded goods but not the relative price of nontraded goods. There is no bubble before 2005 as the exchange rate is under fixed regime. As for this result, some expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are required in China since these are the most efficient and effective under a bubble burst scenario.