Liquidation equilibrium with seniority and hidden CDO

The aim of our paper is to price credit derivatives written on a single name when this name is a bank. Indeed, due to the special structure of the balance sheet of a bank and to the interconnections with other institutions of the financial system, the standard pricing formulas do not apply and their use can imply severe mispricing. The pricing of credit derivatives written on a single bank name requires a joint analysis of the risks of all banks directly or indirectly interconnected with the bank of interest. Each name cannot be priced in isolation, but the banking system must be treated as a whole. It is necessary to analyze the contagion of losses among banks, especially the equilibrium of joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation time. We show the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium. Then the standard pricing formulas are modified by adding a premium to capture the contagion effects.     

What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.     

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model,efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.     

Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?

The default risk sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) decreased after banks started issuing trust-preferred securities (TPS). The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) discount on yield spreads is absent prior to the LTCM bailout, but the size discount doubles after the LTCM bailout. Prior to TPS issuance and the LTCM bailout, SND yield spreads are sensitive to conventional firm-specific default risk measures, but not after the bailout. We find paradigm shift in determinants of yield spreads after the LTCM bailout. Yield spreads on TPS are sensitive to default risks and can provide an additional source of market discipline.     

Who Benefits from Deregulating the Separation of Banking Activities? Differential Effects on Commercial Bank,Investment Bank,and Thrift Stock Returns

We analyze the deregulation impact on commercial banks, investment banks, and thrifts associated with four major events progressively integrating commercial and investment banking activities in the United States during the 1990s. We find that commercial banks are the only group to react favorably to Federal Reserve announcements relaxing firewalls and easing restrictions on commercial bank revenues from investment banking activities. These regulations primarily benefit large banks. The Bankers Trust acquisition announcement of investment bank Alex Brown is associated with increased wealth for each of the three types of financial service institutions. At the eventual deregulation of the financial services industry, with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999, the values of commercial banks and investment banks increase significantly although thrifts are not affected.     

Analysis of Stigma and Bank Credit Provision

Bank rescue programs are designed to provide assistance to struggling financial intermediaries during financial crises. A complicating factor is that participating banks are often stigmatized by accepting assistance from the government. This paper investigates stigma in two ways: (i) it examines how stigma changes a bank's decision to seek assistance from the rescue program, and (ii) it analyzes how stigma affects a bank's ability to operate as a financial intermediary using a joint model for bank‐level application, approval, and lending decisions. The empirical results indicate that stigma hinders the objectives of the rescue program and slows the production of credit.     

Interenterprise Credit and Adjustment during Financial Crises: The Role of Firm Size

Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) suffered a sharp contraction in their borrowing from banks during the Great Recession. Analyzing a large firm‐level database for European countries, the paper shows that trade credit amplified the liquidity squeeze on SMEs, with adverse effects on their real activity. SMEs sharply increased their net trade credit and thus transferred financial resources to larger firms. Given the large weight of SMEs in the economy of European countries, the liquidity squeeze of SMEs likely contributed to the depth of the output fall and the slow recovery in Europe during the Great Recession.     

Bank ownership and lending patterns during the 2008–2009 financial crisis: Evidence from Latin America and Eastern Europe

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in developing countries before and during the 2008–2009 crisis. Using bank-level data for countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we analyze the growth of banks’ total gross loans as well as the growth of corporate, consumer, and residential mortgage loans. While domestic private banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America contracted their loan growth rates during the crisis, there are notable differences in foreign and government-owned bank credit growth across regions. In Eastern Europe, foreign bank total lending fell by more than domestic private bank credit. These results are primarily driven by reductions in corporate loans. Furthermore, government-owned banks in Eastern Europe did not act counter-cyclically. The opposite is true in Latin America, where the growth of government-owned banks’ corporate and consumer loans during the crisis exceeded that of domestic and foreign banks. Contrary to the case of foreign banks in Eastern Europe, those in Latin America did not fuel loan growth prior to the crisis. Also, there are less pronounced and robust differences in the behavior of foreign and domestic banks during the crisis in Latin America.     

Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession

This paper investigates the links between regulatory arbitrage, financial instability, and taxpayer loss exposures. We model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits from increased leverage and asset volatility at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003–2008. Hypothesis tests indicate that, in both crisis and precrisis years, difficult-to-fail-and-unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Compared to the US sample, safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions are less driven by asset size. Introducing a proxy for differences in government susceptibility to regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. Our findings suggest that authorities in both venues could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on monitoring volatility as well as capital.     

Have community banks reduced home foreclosure rates?

Compared with mortgage brokers and universal banks, community banks have stronger incentives to originate high-quality residential home loans. Using the RealtyTrac database on residential foreclosures between 2005 and 2008, we show that county-level foreclosure rates are lower in counties with greater community bank presence. This finding is robust to a host of county-level economic and demographic control variables and after controlling for possible endogeneity of community bank presence.     

Adverse selection in mortgage securitization

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.     

How Accurately Can Z‐score Predict Bank Failure?

Bank risk is not directly observable, so empirical research relies on indirect measures. We evaluate how well Z‐score, the widely used accounting‐based measure of bank distance to default, can predict bank failure. Using the U.S. commercial banks’ data from 2004 to 2012, we find that on average, Z‐score can predict 76% of bank failure, and additional set of other bank‐ and macro‐level variables do not increase this predictability level. We also find that the prediction power of Z‐score to predict bank default remains stable within the three‐year forward window.     

Credit Traps and Macroprudential Leverage

We construct a macroeconomic model with overlapping generations to study credit traps—prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalization, and credit misallocation. Shocks to bank capital tighten banks' borrowing constraints causing them to allocate credit to easily collateralizable but low productivity projects. Low productivity weakens bank capital generation, reinforcing tight borrowing constraints, sustaining the credit trap steady state. Macroprudential policy to limit bank leverage can be welfare enhancing. In the presence of a credit trap, optimal leverage policy is countercyclical.     

Banks' Funding Stress,Lending Supply,and Consumption Expenditure

We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low-income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.     

Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis

We use the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs. Our model features dilution risk: maturing short-term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders, making runs more likely. The model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs. Results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage, asset values, and asset liquidity, but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the strength of guarantees, and asset volatility.