研发投入、冗余资源与企业绩效的关系研究

采用创业板企业2010～2014年数据为研究对象,实证分析研发投入与企业绩效的关系,探讨冗余资源对于二者关系的调节效应.结果表明,我国创业板企业研发投入强度与当期绩效显著负相关,而与滞后一至三期企业绩效显著正相关.考虑企业冗余资源的影响,进一步研究发现,沉淀性冗余资源和非沉淀性冗余资源对研发投入强度与企业绩效的关系分别具有负向和正向的调节效应,说明沉淀性冗余资源不利于企业研发绩效的提升,而非沉淀性冗余资源则可以有效促进企业进行创新研发,提高研发效率,最终提升企业绩效.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

Equity compensation and the sensitivity of research and development to financial market frictions

When financial market frictions exist, executives may have to decide which investment activities to reduce when internal funds decrease. Expenditures on research and development (R&D) may be particularly vulnerable because of the long-term nature of innovative activity. We find that equity compensation is associated with lower levels of firm R&D expenditures. Rewarding executives to incur more risk has little effect on R&D expenditures, but rewarding executives for higher returns reduces R&D expenditures and makes R&D expenditures more sensitive to financial market frictions. In contrast, cash compensation reduces the sensitivity of R&D expenditures to financial market frictions.     

Do Firms Use Time‐Vested Stock‐Based Pay to Keep Research and Development Investments Secret?

I find that executives’ unvested equity holdings are larger when executives are employed by R&D‐intensive firms in industries that rely more on secrecy to profit from R&D. Moreover, I find that this relation is more pronounced for executives with a greater ability to exploit R&D‐related information and also holds for nonexecutive employees. In addition, I find that these firms use option grants with longer vesting periods and that unvested equity holdings reduce the likelihood that their executives leave to find employment elsewhere. Overall, my findings are consistent with firms using time‐vested stock‐based pay to reduce the leakage of R&D‐related information to competitors through employee mobility.     

More Evidence That Corporate R&D Investment (and Effective Boards) Can Increase Firm Value

The authors find that higher R&D expenditures generally lead to both higher expected future cash flow and a lower cost of equity. In addition, they find that the positive connections between R&D spending and higher expected future cash flow and lower cost of equity are stronger in companies with more effective boards (as indicated by measures of director independence and experience). Such findings should help senior executives overcome any concern that investors may not give full credit to R&D investments because they are fully expensed and lead to lower reported earnings in the short term.     

Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process

This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Drawing on models of two-stage R&D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&D success, depending on peer firms’ R&D strength in the race. Using granular, project-level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early-phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross-sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.     

R&D productivity following first-time CIO appointments

Prior studies find that firms announcing the appointment of a new chief information officer (CIO) are rewarded by stock price increases, suggesting that the market expects new CIOs to add longterm value to the firm. In this paper, we examine whether first-time CIO appointments result in improved R&D productivity. We focus on R&D investments because one role of IT management is to aid in discovery and management of growth opportunities. Successful R&D activities are designed to create the type of knowledge-based, growth-critical assets (new or improved products, better distribution methods, etc.) that effective IT management would be expected to assist. After controlling for industry performance, we find that the productivity of R&D improves significantly after the appointment of a new CIO for appointments before 1999 (1997–1998) but not for appointments in later years (1999–2007), and that productivity improvements over the entire sample period occur for CIO appointments by firms with superior IT capabilities. Our results for R&D investments suggest that new CIOs improve the way IT is managed and improve their firms' approach to knowledge management.     

Investment policy in family controlled firms

We explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy. Our analysis centers on two incentives, risk aversion and extended investment horizons, which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake. We find that family firms devote less capital to long-term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures. When dividing long-term investment into its two components of R&D and capital expenditures, we note that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects. Additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to nonfamily firms. Overall, all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk, across all family sub-types, affects corporate R&D spending and capital expenditures.     

Narcissism is a bad sign: CEO signature size,investment, and performance

Using the size of CEO signatures in SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that CEO narcissism is associated with several negative firm outcomes. We first validate signature size as a measure of narcissism but not overconfidence using two laboratory studies, and also find that our measure is correlated with employee perceptions of CEO narcissism used in prior research. We then use CEO signatures to study the relation between CEO narcissism and the firm’s investment policies and performance. CEO narcissism is associated with overinvestment, particularly in R&D and M&A expenditures (but not in capital expenditures). Firms led by narcissistic CEOs experience lower financial productivity in the form of profitability and operating cash flows. Despite this negative performance, narcissistic CEOs enjoy higher absolute and relative compensation. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications, including controlling for a popular options-based overconfidence measure used in prior research.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

R&D investments,capital expenditures,and earnings thresholds

Prior studies find that firms cut research and development (R&D) expense in response to earnings considerations. We extend this stream of research by documenting that firms narrowly achieving an earnings threshold also report unusually high capital expenditures. In addition, these firms’ total investments (R&D expense plus capital expenditures) do not vary in response to earnings thresholds, which suggests that, on average, reductions in R&D expense are offset by concurrent increases in capital expenditures. Lastly, our research design allows us to infer that the increased capital expenditures are largely R&D investments that are capitalized instead of non-R&D capital expenditures, suggesting that overall investments in R&D are relatively unchanged.     

R&D and performance persistence: Evidence from the United Kingdom

There is compelling evidence from both the United States and United Kingdom suggesting that R&D investment is positively related to operating and/or market performance. This study extends prior research on R&D and valuation by further examining the sustainability or persistence of operating growth and market performance as a result of R&D investments.We use a large dataset of U.K. companies during the period 1990–2003 and our findings confirm the relation between R&D intensity and consistent growth in Sales and Gross Income, but only in the cases when a firm needs to engage in R&D activity because of the industry in which it operates. Moreover, our evidence indicates not only a positive relation between R&D intensity and subsequent risk-adjusted excess returns among firms that engage in R&D as testified by prior literature, but we also show that R&D intensity improves persistence in excess stock returns: the highest R&D-intensity firms are found to earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns more consistently than the sample median return, compared to lower R&D-intensity firms, as well as firms with no R&D. We interpret this finding as consistent with at least some form of market mispricing.     

The valuation relevance of R&D expenditures: Time series evidence

The literature on the valuation relevance of R&D investments is based primarily on cross-sectional regressions or panel data regressions with time and firm (or industry) fixed effects such that the parameters relating R&D to market value are cross-sectionally constant. In an alternative approach, this paper investigates the value relevance of R&D investment using an earnings-based time series valuation model. Model parameters are estimated for each firm separately. In contradistinction to the results obtained from cross-sectional and fixed effects panel models, this study finds weak empirical support at best for the value relevance of R&D expenditures at the firm level.     

Advertising investments,information asymmetry,and insider gains

Extant research has documented various sources of informational advantages enjoyed by company insiders including firm size, analyst following, dividend payout policy, book-to-market ratio, and the presence or absence of R&D investments. Surprisingly, despite this large body of work, virtually no research has investigated the contribution of advertising investments to information asymmetry. This omission is particularly glaring since: (a) advertising investments constitute a significant fraction of many firms' ongoing expenditures, and (b) the received literature provides strong theoretical arguments relating advertising investments and information asymmetry. Accordingly, the primary objective in this study is to empirically address this gap. Using advertising and insider transaction data at over 12,000 firms from 1986 to 2011, we find that insider gains are significantly greater at firms characterized by advertising investments. Specifically, a zero cost portfolio that is long on firms with net insider purchases and advertising investments, and short on firms with net insider purchases and devoid of advertising investments, garners annual abnormal returns of 5.5%. In addition, we find that investors' reaction to news of insider purchasing is significantly more pronounced at firms characterized by advertising investments — investors rationally recognize the greater information content associated with insider purchases at these firms.     

CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking

This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We identify channels through which CEO ownership affects firm value by examining R&D, which is discretionary and risky. We find CEO ownership similarly exhibits a hump-shaped relation with R&D when EG is weak, but no relation when EG is strong. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues concerning CEO ownership and EG.     

Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers

We investigate the link between a firm's leverage and the characteristics of its suppliers and customers. Specifically, we examine whether firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism to induce suppliers/customers to undertake relationship-specific investments. We find that the firm's leverage is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. We also find lower debt levels for firms operating in industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and customer industries are more prevalent. Consistent with a bargaining role for debt, we find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in supplier/customer industries.