Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.     

A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences

We examine the properties of a two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model that allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem will hold in the steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points. We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple autarkic steady states, violations of the static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy if discount factors differ.     

Increases in trust and altruism from partner selection: Experimental evidence

This paper examines how selection affects trust and altruism in a Trust and Modified Dictator Game. Past Trust and Dictator game experiments not allowing partner selection show substantially more trust and altruism than equilibrium predicts. We predict partner selection will cause sorting in which behavior across partner types without selection will be positively correlated with partner choice. This selection pattern will cause trust and altruism to be higher with selection and the increase will be proportional to a maximum possible gain. We find selection has all these effects. We also find greater gains in the Trust than Modified Dictator game consistent with larger possible gains in the Trust game. The results imply that theories ignoring selection will underestimate trust and altruism in markets with selection.     

A Dynamic Model of Network Formation

Network structure plays a significant role in determining the outcome of many important economic relationships; therefore it is crucial to know which network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation process will converge to an efficient network structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C7, D20.     

Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints

We consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses: (1) there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn a subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in subsequent play, and (2) agents choose their game partners through a costly search process. We show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium, agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails. Thus, all agents in a society will abide by the same ethical standard, although what standard this will be cannot be predicted. We also show that these are essentially the only SPE outcomes. We suggest that this provides at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs.     

人口老龄化对医疗资源配置的影响分析

运用用人口学方法分析人口老龄化等人口因素对医疗资源配置的影响。由人口特点变化将会带来医疗费用的增长,在人口老龄化的趋势下,未来医疗资源将有近50%的比例用于老年人口,这种变化是对有限医疗资源在配置选择上的一个大挑战。分析了人口特点的变化对医疗机构内不同科室的影响,为医疗机构的规划和发展以及人力资源培训等方面的调整提供参考。     

Rebranding ex‐convicts

We develop a theoretical model explaining how the problem of poor labor market outcomes for ex‐convicts might be alleviated by an external intervention. While employers wish to avoid associating with those who will end up returning to crime, they cannot be certain from the available information which convicts will reoffend and which will not. We illustrate that, notwithstanding this informational asymmetry, a government (or a civic society) can nevertheless design a costly, yet net socially beneficial program through which some ex‐convicts can credibly convey their good intentions to employers. Such a “rebranding” program can help more ex‐convicts find legitimate work, with fewer electing to return to crime than would otherwise have been the case.     

Controlling a dam to environmentally acceptable standards through the use of a Decision Support Tool

We aim to establish a simple mathematical tool that could be used to set an appropriate level for the environmental levy which would allow a dam operator to remain profitable, yet also to ensure that the operator's policy is environmentally acceptable. We shall use Bellman's principle of optimality to solve an optimal control problem which will simulate the Station Operator's behaviour. The problem of the Regulatory Authority is multi-criteria and will be solved through aDecision Support Tool. The degree of fulfilment of the criteria will be a function of the target lake level, target extraction rate, and the level of the environmental levy. We will investigate the extent to which the targets are satisfied when the levy is altered.Research supported by VUW Graduate School of Business and Management.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.     

Technology Transfer and the South's Participation in an International Environmental Agreement*

We develop a North–South model of international trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the relationship between environmental technology transfer and the South's incentive to join an international environmental agreement (IEA). We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which technology transfer will increase the South's incentive to join the IEA. We also find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the South's participation in the IEA will increase the market incentive for technology transfer. Results have clear policy implications for (i) the sequence of technology transfer and the South's IEA membership, and (ii) the legitimacy of the South's subsidies for technology transfer.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.     

On the private provision of public goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ private contributions.     

On Mergers and Agglomeration

We formulate a model of mergers and acquisitions assuming a monopolistic competitive industry that exhibits agglomeration economies. We provide the conditions for the existence of a non‐trivial Nash equilibrium in the acquisition market at which the most productive firm acquires a range of less‐productive firms. Most importantly, we show that domestic merger and acquisition activities are international trade promotionary. We also show that such types of mergers and acquisition will improve the competitive position of foreign firms leading to an increase in their market share. In addition, domestic mergers and acquisitions will increase the number of imported varieties.     

Political uncertainty and corporate debt financing: empirical evidence from China

We examine the influence of political uncertainty on corporate debt financing under the Chinese highly specialized political system. A new reasonable and effective alternative indicator, official turnover reason, is constructed to measure different political uncertainty level. Robust results suggest that listed companies will keep low debt financing level and smooth debt financing volatility under political uncertainty, which will be weakened during the global financial crisis. We also find that the listed company will raise equity financing level while overall financing is significantly reduced. In addition, SOEs are more sensitive to political uncertainty than non-SOEs, as they have stronger political connections with government officials.     

Stochastic Common Learning

We present a general model in which agents learn by observing a stochastic process. We show that agents not only learn in such a model but also learn commonly. By this we mean that in the long run agents will form common beliefs concerning important facts and in particular they will commonly believe that their views regarding the future are similar. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.     

Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality

We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out rates and there will be a persistent differences in wages between groups according to the starting states of their networks.     

Volume rendering visualization of 3D spherical mantle convection with an unstructured mesh

We propose a new approach to utilize the algorithm of hardware-assisted visibility sorting (HAVS) in the 3D volume rendering of spherical mantle convection simulation results over unstructured grid configurations. We will also share our experience in using three different spherical convection codes and then taking full advantages of the enhanced efficiency of visualization techniques, which are based on the HAVS techniques and related transfer functions. The transfer function is a powerful tool designed specifically for editing and exploring large-scale datasets coming from numerical computation for a given environmental setting, and generates hierarchical data structures, which will be used in the future for fast access of GPU visualization facilities. This method will meet the coming urgent needs of real-time visualization of 3D mantle convection, by avoiding the demands of huge amount of I/O space and intensive network traffic over distributed parallel terascale or petascale architecture.     

高管职位特征、机构投资者治理与企业研发投入

以沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本，检验高管职位特征（任期、薪酬）以及机构投资者治理对企业研发投入的影响。结果发现：高管职位特征对企业研发投入有显著正向影响，高管任期越长、货币薪酬越高，企业研发动力越强、研发投入越大。然而，在机构投资者有效监督的环境下，当高管任期越长、短期货币薪酬越高时，出于研发失败风险导致未来职业声誉受损和被替换风险的考虑，高管会倾向于规避风险，反而不利于企业研发。政策意义在于：董事会和股东应当将长短任期和薪酬机制有效结合，当研发失败导致业绩下滑时审慎地对高管作出处罚，解除高管层的后顾之忧，增强高管加大研发投入的动力。     

Clubs,local public goods and transportation models: A synthesis

Clubs, local public goods, and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model. The emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation, pricing and the size of the sharing group. We derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit, as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient. Given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed. We show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs' local public goods and the transportation problems.