Forecast Summary

The economy is in the throes of its biggest downturn in ten years. Output has been falling and unemployment rising for nearly a year and business confidence indicators suggest no early letup. In the last 12 months total output has fallen 2 per cent with manufacturing 5 per cent lower. This, we believe, is the trough of the recession and we expect signs of recovery to be evident in the late spring. Even so, output is likely to fall by nearly 1 per cent this year and unemployment should rise well above 2 million. The benefits of recession have been slow to appear, though the trade gap is narrowing sharply. The downward pressure on prices from falling demand is balanced by rising costs as industry struggles to pass on high unit labour and interest costs. Helped by some reduction in mortgage rates and a severe squeeze on profits, we expect retail price inflation to fall to Sper cent by the end of the year and to 3–4 per cent over the medium term.     

Forecast Summary

The sluggish response of the current account to severe monetary tightening has put pressure on the exchange rate, which was instrumental in the decision to raise base rates to an eight-year high of 15 per cent. In so doing, the government has declared itself ready to risk recession to hold the pound - its main bulwark against rising inflation. Our forecast illustrates the risk. Compared with June, when we saw the economy avoiding a hard landing in the short term (at the cost of a protracted battle to reduce inflation over the medium term), the present forecast projects a sharp deceleration in output next year. Over the medium term output grows a disappointing 2 per centp.a., unemployment starts to rise and it is not until 1992 that retail price inflation is back below 5 per cent.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

Forecast Summary

Led by private sector demand, the economy has grown very rapidly in the last 12 months, Output has risen nearly 6 per cent and unemployment has fallen by over ½ million but the current account deficit has widened dramatically and wage and price inflation is increasing. Monetary policy has been tightened sufficiently, we believe, to produce a gradual reduction in the current deficit over the medium term and to prevent inflation from breaking the 7 per cent level which a higher mortgage rate will ensure early next year. But, as demand is reined back, there is a cost to output which rises 3 per cent next year, 2–2½ per cent thereafter. Unemployment continues to fall, dropping below 2 million at the end of next year and reaching 1.8 million by 1992.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.     

Forecast Summary

The forecast illustrates the costs and benefits of joining the ERM at the relatively high central parity of DM2.95. It shows that, providing the government does keep the pound within its wide 6 per cent EMS band, retail price inflation can be brought down to the average European level of 3 per cent by the mid 1990s. But there is a cost in terms of lower output and rising unemployment. GDP growth is expected to slow to about 1 1/2per cent this year and next and to average 2 per cent or slightly more from 1992 onwards. This is less than the rate of growth of productive potential and implies a weak labour market with unemployment rising steadily bock above 2 million. The forecast assumes a $25 oil price; in an alternative we sketch out the implications of a rise in the price to $45 for a limited period.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

After six years of steadily rising OECD output, fears of a significant rise in world inflation are now increasing. In the last year there has been a slight pick-up in inflation with producer prices up nearly d per cent. But prompt action by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates before the presidential election appears to have damped inflationary expectations in the US and has given Japan and Germany an opportunity to tighten monetary policy without causing major currency fluctuations. It is also apparent that the other possible source of world inflation, commodity prices, is not a problem. OPEC over-production has ensured that the oil price remains weak and other commodity prices appear to have stopped rising after a brief acceleration at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless the major imbalances in world trade are declining only slowly and without a change in fiscal policy in the major economies it is difficult to believe that minor changes in monetary policy will be sufficient if the process of adjustment begins to falter. Despite these risks, we take a sanguine view of world prospects. Tighter monetary policy should effect a slowdown in world growth next year (already indicated by recent developments, particularly in the US) and this should be sufficient to control inflation which we expect to peak at just under 5 per cent at the beginning of next year. From 1990 onwards we see steady growth accompanied by low inflation.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The recent weakness of the world economy does not undermine the relatively optimistic forecast for 1987 which we presented in May. At that time we suggested that activity would be sluggish for most of this year as a result of the impact effect of the OPEC III oil price collapse. But we also argued that by the end of the year there would be clear signs of a consumer-led recovery as the personal sector adjusted to the real income gains and lower inflation benefits of the lower oil price and the reduction in nominal interest rates which followed. There is mounting evidence of rising consumer spending, particularly in Europe and it is something of a puzzle that output has not risen to meet this demand. The explanation is partly that producer confidence has lagged behind that of consumers, so that demand has been met from stock, and partly that spending has been supplied from countries outside the OECD, especially the NICs in the Far East. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our earlier view of OECD output prospects next year remains the most likely though, in recognition of the growing importance of non-OECD competition, we have adjusted the output forecast down slightly. OECD GNP is expected to rise 2.6 per cent this year, with an acceleration to over 4 per cent in 1987 arid 1988. Moreover, we believe this can be achieved without a rebound in inflation, which is forecast to be stable at about its present level of 2 1/2 per cent.     

Government Popularity and the Economic Cycle

In June 1987 the Conservatives under Mrs. Thatcher were re-elected with a majority of over 100 seats against Labour. They received 42.3 per cent of the total vote, the size of the majority owing much to the significant number of votes received by third parties. But it is also believed that the Conservatives' share of the vote, unchanged from 1983, reflected the performance of the macro economy. In the four years of Mrs. Thatcher's second term, output rose more than 3 per cent a year and by the time of the election inflation was below 1 per cent, interest rates were under 10 per cent, and unemployment had come back below 3 million. If Mrs. Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues had planned an economic strategy for the next four (or five) years in order to be in a strong position to win a fourth term of office, it might have included the following factors: output growth of 2–3 per cent a year; inflation staying around 1 per cent; interest rates of 10 per cent or thereabouts; unemployment down further from the near-3 million mark of June 1987. On our current forecast, that is, with the exception of output, the economic record of the Conservatives' third (Thatcher/Major) term. Yet the Conservatives have been running neck and neck with Labour in tile opinion polls and, barring unforeseen developments, the coming election will be extremely close, with the possibility still of either a small Conservative majority or a small Labour majority or even a hung Parliament. Why is it that, against the background of a similar economic performance in aggregate, the Conservatives have lost popularity? The arguments are complex and a full explanation would include the introduction of the community charge arid the fall of Mrs. Thatcher herself. But the economy is part of the explanation. The economic literature on Government popularity examines the state of a number of economic variables at the time of the election. At its most extreme, some believe that all a Government has to do to be re-elected is deliver a low mortgage rate in time for the election. Other analysts have explained Government popularity in a simple regression framework, with a lagged dependent variable to capture sluggish adjustment. A weakness of this research is that it implicitly believes all the Government has to do is to ‘get it right on the night’. As long as the economy falls into place by the time of the election, re-election is certain. This implies that the electorate both forgets and forgives, and is indifferent to the course of the economy in the previous three or four years. But it cannot be the case that the electorate evaluates only the average performance of the economy over the lifetime of a Parliament or even the most recent developments. As in any simple utility maximisation problem, it is not just the mean of the distribution that counts but also its variance. In other words the combination of late 1980s' boom and early 1990s' recession counts against the Government in a way that four or five years of steady progress would not have done. If this is correct, it may not be sufficient for the Government to deliver low inflation and interest rates and some recovery in output in time for the election; it may simply be that the electorate remains unforgiving of a five-year track record of boom and bust.     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

Executive Summary

Our assessment of the outlook for the UK economy over the next two years has become slightly more cautious in the wake of the additional fiscal tightening announced in the November Budget. Although we had anticipated tax and public spending measures of the right magnitude in 1994/95, the Budget was more severe in 1995/96 and beyond than we had expected. We have scaled back our estimates of growth for 1995 and 1996 accordingly. On a more positive note, we expect the outlook for inflation to be better than we indicated last October. The mid-1990s are' likely to see a period of sustained low inflation which has not been seen since the 1960s. The government's target measure - RPI excluding mortgage interest - is not expected to test the 4 per cent target ceiling though it is stuck in the 3-3.5 per cent range for most of the forecast period. Despite expecting slower growth, we are now more optimistic about unemployment, which we expect to fall below 2.4 million in 1997. We now believe that increased labour market flexibility should allow the economy to grow on a lower real wage and productivity growth path, at least while unemployment remains so high. However, whether this improved performance would allow the UK to sustain an unemployment of below 2 million without a serious resurgence of inflation is still open to question.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE TIMING OF RECOVERY

In his Budget speech the Chancellor argued that "there are good reasons to expect that the recovery will begin around the middle of this year, although initially it may be slow. As we found ten years ago, confidence revives as inflation comes down… Just as falling consumer spending contributed to the onset of recession, so returning consumer confidence is likely to lead the recovery." Since then Mr. Lamont has detected 'faint stirrings' of a recovery in activity, while the Prime Minister is confident of a return to growth, arguing this month that "there are far too many indications for anyone to doubt that in the second half of this year there will be a great improvement and we will be coining out of recession." For all the official confidence that their relatively modest prognosis, which we shared in our June forecast, is proving correct, there are many who remain doubtful. The survey data, while improving, do not yet convincingly point to an upturn and there is a fear that while lower inflation and easier monetary policy would on their own produce higher spending, this effect could be outweighed by consumer caution in the face of rising unemployment. This Forecast Release examines these issues. It focuses particularly on the link between lower interest rates, falling inflation, rising unemployment and the savings ratio and finds that, on the basis of the experience in the recessions of 1975 and 1980 and the boom of 1988, it would be surprising if the savings ratio were not to head lower in the second half of the year. The latest figures on retail sales, which rose more than 1 per cent in June, suggest that this may already be happening, though this will only be confirmed by data showing a greater willingness on the part of consumers to step up their borrowing once again.     

Forecast Summary

The outlook is conditioned by our assumption that sterling enters the ERM, probably in the autumn, at a central DM parity not very different from the current rate and that this exchange rate is held over the medium term. Fiscal and monetary policy have to be made consistent with a stable pound, which rules out tax cuts and restricts the fall in base rates to 12 per cent. The benefits of the ERM are to be seen in a reduction in the underlying rate of inflation to below 5 per cent by 1992. But ERM participation is not costless. The downside is four years of output growth averaging below 2 per cent and higher unemployment. The ERM offers the possibility of low inflation and steady growth in the second half of the 1990s: it is not a 'quick fix' for the current problems facing the UK economy.     

Forecast Summary

The January crisis, which occurred despite (or perhaps because of) signs of accelerating recovery, will not, we believe, prevent output from rising by over 3 1/2 per cent this year and by over 2 per cent p.a. over the medium term. Although the recent fall in sterling will put up prices - especially of traded manufactures - we expect retail price inflation to fall below 5 per cent after reaching almost 6 per cent this spring.     

The London Business School with Gover Publishing

The world economy is in poor shape. OECD industrial production fell 0.5per cent in both 1991 and 1992 arid though it may now have stopped falling it is still, on our estimates, below year-earlier levels. The US recovery continues to disappoint; recession persists in Japan and Europe; inflationary pressures, already weak, are waning. Next month's UK forecast would normally be based on the world forecast published in June's International Economic Outlook, when we were looking for G7 output to rise 1.2 per cent this year, 2.5 per cent next. But this now looks on the high side and although a detailed revision to the world forecast mist wait until the December IEO, as at1 input to the UK forecast we are shading our G7 growth forecasts - to I per cent this year and 2.25 per cent in 1994. Similar downward revisions are also in train at the OECD arid IMF, according to recent press reports. The more sluggish output performance is already having mi impact on the oil price, which has fallen below £16 a barrel. Together, these developments imply lower world inflation and, particularly in post-ERM Europe, a faster easing of monetary policy than we had allowed for in June.     

The London Business School Gower Publishing

The 1989/90 payround is under way against the background of the highest rate of inflation in nearly seven years, the lowest rate of unemployment since December 1980 and a spate of industrial disputes which feature pay as a central theme. Reflecting this, pay settlements are moving higher and whole economy earnings are rising at an underlying rate of 9.25per cent, compared with only 7.5 per cent in early 1987. The obvious danger, with the labour market remaining tight, is that earnings will accelerate further, possibly into double figures. If this were to coincide with slower output growth, unit labour cost inflation would increase sharply, either threatening the government's inflation objectives or, as in 1980–81, resulting in a squeeze on profits - a hard landing. In our June forecast, we ruled out this possibility - at least as the central case - but at the same time we warned that "the main economic danger lies in this area: if wage bargainers are successful in bidding up wages to compensate for higher retail price inflation, the battle to reduce inflation could be even more protracted than our forecast suggests and output prospects too would be that much weaker". In this Forecast Release we return to this theme.     

Forecast Summary

Although hard evidence of recovery is still elusive, our forecast indicates that the trough of the recession occurred in the second quarter and that output fell 4 per cent peak-to-trough. We estimate that GDP rose 112 per cent in the third quarter - though only because of a rebound in North Sea oil production - and that for 1991 CIS a whole it will be 2 per cent down on 1990 levels. Next year GDP is forecast to rise 2 per cent but it is not until 1993 that the 1990 output peak is passed. Unemployment therefore still has a considerable way to rise - to a peak of 2.8 million in 1993. In the first year of full EMS membership, the economy has made an accelerated transition to European levels of inflation. Against a background of modest growth, it should be possible to consolidate this progress and we expect retail price inflation to average little more than 3 per cent over the next four years. Similar rapid progress has been achieved on the balance of payments where there is a trade surplus on manufactured goods for the first time since 1982. Here, however, we are less confident that the reduction in the trade gap can be sustained. In the recovery phase we expect imports to rise more rapidly than exports with the result that the current account deficit rises from £6bn this year to £8bn in 1992 and £10bn-£12bn in 1993-5.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

The Australian Economy - Thatcherism after 7 Years?

In March 1983 Mr Malcolm Fraser's Liberal Coalition was defeated in the Australian general election. He had held office for over 7years. His Government's record on economic management can be briefly summarised as follows. At the end of 1975 when the Liberal Coalition took office the inflation rate was 14 per cent and the rate of unemployment was 5.4 per cent; in March 1983 the inflation rate was 11.5 per cent and the rate of unemployment was 10.4 per cent. It is generally thought that Mr Fraser's policies were not unlike those of Mrs Thatcher. Since he had been operating them for over seven years it is reasonable to ask why the outcome appears to have been so disappointing. In this Briefing Paper we examine recent developments in the Australian economy and make some comparisons of policies and outcomes in Australia and Britain, particularly during the past four years, when there were conservative Governments in both countries.