Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

Video-sharing platform's optimal monetary incentive decisions considering motivation crowding-out effect

Considering the motivation crowding-out effect of monetary incentives, a game-theoretic model is built to examine a video-sharing platform's optimal incentive decisions. Results show that offering monetary incentives to contributors does not ensure an improvement in video quality nor an increase in the platform's profit. We identify four ideal market conditions for the platform to offer monetary incentives. We find that though the motivation crowding-out effect seems to undermine the effectiveness of monetary incentives, the ideal market conditions for offering monetary incentives do not always require this effect to be very weak; sometimes it even has to be medium.     

高管股权激励能推动企业承担社会责任吗？

如何激励高管主动承担企业社会责任一直是学术研究的热点话题。利用中国A股上市公司数据对高管股权激励与企业社会责任间的关系进行实证检验,研究结果表明,高管股权激励能够推动企业承担社会责任,表现为实施股权激励的样本有更高的企业社会责任得分。在年度政策不确定程度更高的样本中,高管股权激励对企业社会责任有更明显的推动作用;在地区市场化程度更高的样本中,高管股权激励对企业社会责任有更明显的抑制作用。作用机制检验表明,高管股权激励主要通过激励风险承担和缓和融资约束两条路径对企业承担社会责任产生积极的影响,表现为在风险回避倾向更高的样本以及融资约束更严重的样本中,股权激励与企业社会责任得分的正相关关系更显著。经济后果检验表明,实施股权激励企业的社会责任得分越高,企业的财务业绩和市场业绩也越好。     

Innovation and corporate sustainability: An investigation into the process of change in the pharmaceuticals industry

Although there has been considerable research effort directed at refining the content of corporate environmental performance, e.g. corporate environmental reporting and accounting, there has been relatively little empirical investigation to date on the process of corporate eco‐change. This research reports on the quantitative and qualitative results of a survey of German and UK pharmaceuticals firms, which evaluated the significance of the various incentives, both intra‐firm and external to the organization, that have stimulated eco‐change. We find that, although the industry is one that has been characterized by voluntary agreements and proactive behaviour in the past, regulation still remains the main driver for sustainability improvements. New technology is the second most important driver. Stakeholder dialogue and inter‐firm cooperation were both revealed to be relatively weak forces for eco‐change. The study also tested the validity of the conventional neo‐classical economic world‐view of innovation in firms versus a more radical co‐evolutionary one. The former assumes that firms respond only to profit signals and do so efficiently, whereas the latter assumes that change is path dependent; i.e., the firms’ norms and routines and past experiences are influential. We find that, although the neo‐classical perspective stands up to our empirical investigation of eco‐innovation to some degree, the co‐evolutionary approach better captures the complexity of the corporate eco‐change process. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Reporting on sustainability and HRM: a comparative study of sustainability reporting practices by the world's largest companies

As a response to the growing public awareness on the importance of organisational contributions to sustainable development, there is an increased incentive for corporations to report on their sustainability activities. In parallel with this has been the development of ‘Sustainable HRM’ which embraces a growing body of practitioner and academic literature connecting the notions of corporate sustainability to HRM. The aim of this article is to analyse corporate sustainability reporting amongst the world's largest companies and to assess the HRM aspects of sustainability within these reports in comparison to environmental aspects of sustainable management and whether organisational attributes – principally country-of-origin – influences the reporting of such practices. A focus in this article is the extent to which the reporting of various aspects of sustainability may reflect dominant models of corporate governance in the country in which a company is headquartered. The findings suggest, first and against expectations, that the overall disclosure on HRM-related performance is not lower than that on environmental performance. Second, companies report more on their internal workforce compared to their external workforce. Finally, international differences, in particular those between companies headquartered in liberal market economies and coordinated market economies, are not as apparent as expected.     

Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives

Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match the agents' true contribution to the principals' objectives. Such misalignment may pose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze the extent to which implicit dynamic incentives, such as career concerns and ratchet effects, alleviate or aggfravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives implies that career and ratchet effects have real effects in that stronger ratchet effects or greater distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives, and that distortion affects the optimality of different promotion rules.     

Sustainability‐oriented capabilities for eco‐innovation: Meeting the regulatory,technology, and market demands

Despite consensus in the literature that regulation, technology push, and market pull drive eco‐innovation (EI), evidence remains limited on the diverse firm capabilities needed to boost EI. Building on the natural‐resource‐based view of the firm and the EI literature, this paper posits that firms need to renew and realign their capabilities, and ultimately develop distinctive sustainability‐oriented capabilities, in order to meet the rapidly changing regulatory, technology, and market demands. Results of the analysis, based on a survey of U.K. firms, reveal that EIs are more likely to arise when firms (a) build capabilities on voluntary self‐regulation (i.e., executive driven environmental management system and corporate social responsibility) because such organizational capabilities allow them to address increasing regulatory pressures; (b) invest in environmental research and development (i.e., eco‐R&D)—instead of generic research and development—because it provides them with the relevant and specific technological capabilities to tackle technology shifts towards sustainability; and (c) develop capabilities in green market sensing as such capabilities allow them to address green consumption needs.     

Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis

How has the impact of ‘good corporate governance’ principles on firm performance changed over time in China? Amassing a database of 84 studies, 684 effect sizes, and 547,622 firm observations, we explore this important question by conducting a meta‐analysis on the corporate governance literature on China. The weight of evidence demonstrates that two major ‘good corporate governance’ principles advocating board independence and managerial incentives are indeed associated with better firm performance. However, we cannot find strong support for the criticisms against CEO duality. In addition, we go beyond a static perspective (such as certain governance mechanisms are effective or ineffective) by investigating the temporal hypotheses. We reveal that over time, with the improvement in the quality of market institutions and development of financial markets, the monitoring mechanisms of the board and state ownership become more strongly related to firm performance, whereas the incentive mechanisms lose their significance. Overall, our findings advance a dynamic institution‐based view by substantiating the case that institutional transitions matter for the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance in the second largest economy in the world.     

Through Thick and Thin? How Self‐determination Drives the Corporate Sustainability Initiatives of Multinational Subsidiaries

Multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries implement corporate sustainability initiatives (CSIs) if they are self‐determined to do so (based on intrinsic motivation) or when urged on by circumstances and pressures (based on extrinsic motivation). Such differences in self‐determination are derived from underlying corporate psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness, and are manifested in the governance choices of making, allying or buying CSIs. In this study of oil and gas MNC subsidiaries in the developing country context of Trinidad and Tobago, four distinct types of firm are identified based on their levels of self‐determination and corporate governance tendencies. These groups are identified as trail blazers, marching soldiers, sharp shooters and fire fighters, and their distinctive characteristics are described. These findings are useful to corporate sustainability strategists seeking to select, design and implement CSIs that satisfy MNC headquarter directives but balance subsidiary objectives of maintaining good relations and access to operate in developing countries. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two components—(i) loyalty, with which the manager values the organization's profit, and (ii) selfishness, with which the manager values the monetary transfer he receives from the entrepreneur. We find that if the manager's task is easy enough, it is optimal to use a purely loyal manager. Otherwise, it can be optimal to use a manager with mixture of loyalty and selfishness—the manager's mixed motivation alleviates the entrepreneur's misrepresenting incentive, and as a result, the output distortion in the optimal contract can be reduced. In addition, when it is optimal to use a manager with mixed motivations, the entrepreneur selects someone who is more selfish than loyal.     

Segmenting university alumni using a person‐centered methodology

Higher education leaders in the United States increasingly rely on relationships with alumni to advance multiple institutional goals. Scholars have traditionally relied on variable‐centered approaches to understand associations among alumni experiences, personal attributes, and support behaviors. Departing from this tradition, this study draws on a person‐centered approach, latent class analysis, to segment groups of alumni by their non‐monetary support behaviors. We define non‐monetary support as engaging in actions outside of charitable giving that advance institutional objectives. Drawing on past literature, we conceptualize alumni non‐monetary support behaviors as falling into 4 categories: (a) volunteerism: charitable preferences, (b) political advocacy: social change preferences, (c) multimode engagement: charity and social change, and (d) disengagement: nonsupport. Relying on an alumni survey from a research‐intensive university in the United States, our analysis found support for a 4‐class model of alumni supporters and nonsupporters. These groupings include the classes of Political Advocates, Apolitical Recruiters, Super Engaged Alumni, and Disengaged Alumni. Using cross‐tabulation analysis, we explore attributes of each class by age, gender, and involvement in religious, political, and volunteer organizations in college. We find that groups of alumni exhibit the same patterns of engagement while they were students. For example, students who were engaged in political action in college are those who are likely to become Political Engagers as alumni. Students who volunteered in college and stayed clear of politics emerge as Apolitical Recruiters after college. Super Engaged Alumni are those who were engaged in multiple domains in college. Implications for advancement practice are discussed.     

To pay or not to pay — the role of monetary incentives in an optimal blood donation service bundle

• This study derives four attributes that make up the typical blood donation service bundle. It focuses on the role of monetary incentives in such bundles, but also discusses three other attributes, namely the offering organization, the distance to donation location, and the donation time. Each attribute is discussed in the context of a blood donation marketing mix. In an empirical conjoint study, 529 potential blood donors evaluate different designs of blood donation service bundles. Monetary incentives are found to be the most important factor when donors compare different blood donation service bundles. It is found that the distance to the donation location is almost as important as monetary incentives. Blood donation organizations aiming to collect all blood donations from unremunerated blood donors should therefore shape their service bundles to be attractive for potential blood donors. It is concluded that nonpaying blood donation organizations have to offer superior convenience to their donors to be able to compensate for not offering monetary incentives. Operating with mobile donation teams is one of the concrete suggestions for blood donation marketing that are given in this study.

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monetary incentives and social ties in academic publications

Monetary incentives underlie academic publications, especially in countries where many researchers' incomes are performance-based. Evidence has documented that social ties improve the chances of publication in journals, whereas building and maintaining social ties require resources. We develop a simple model to investigate the consequences of monetary investment on the probability of publication through social ties. The results indicate that monetary incentive can stimulate researchers to make more efforts regarding publication. Through social ties, monetary investment in the process of academic publication distorts researchers' incentive. Monetary investment through social ties improves the probability of publication and then disables the signaling function of publication in terms of researchers’ abilities. Depending on the contribution of different types of researchers to society and the ability of the latter to differentiate the quality of publication in journals, the improvement in publication probability by monetary investment through social ties may improve or reduce the level of social welfare.     

企业知识型员工激励措施探讨

本文介绍了知识型员工的概念和特点,对我国企业知识型员工激励的现状做了分析,指出其存在的问题并进行了原因分析,提出了相应的激励对策:塑造良好的企业文化,创造学习型组织;构建合理的薪酬激励模式;建立合适的绩效考核制度;突出工作激励和个体需求差异激励。     

Incentives and disincentives for corporate environmental disclosure

The year 2000 saw the launch of AA1000, a standard designed to enable corporate ethical performance to be judged. If such ethical performance is interpreted as social and environmental behaviour our view is that it should lead to more social and environmental disclosure. Yet the willingness to communicate corporate social and environmental performance still seems to be limited. Of the social and environmental disclosures that exist many appear to be rather fragmented and disparate. In this paper we explore the apparent paradox between concern for the environment and the limited amount of corporate environmental disclosure (CED) that takes place. Through an empirical study, the incentives and disincentives for CED are identified. Findings from the study identify a difference between the information requirements of ‘users’ and the willingness of ‘preparers’ to provide. The paper makes some tentative policy suggestions with the intention of bringing the two parties closer together. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

The Rise of Individual Performance Pay

Existing empirical evidence suggests that individual performance pay is more prevalent in human‐capital‐intensive industries. We introduce a model that can contribute to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer‐dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the agents can hold up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer‐dependent incentives. In a setting with complementary tasks, we show that although team‐based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and, in fact, suboptimal, to provide team incentives when the agents become indispensable.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.