Cross-border pollution,public pollution abatement and capital tax competition

We analyze the case where governments have to use income tax revenue to finance public pollution abatement and relate the results to the existing literature on capital tax competition. We show that the impact of public pollution abatement on Nash taxes on mobile factor income is non-trivial and the standard results from the tax competition literature can be reversed. When the two countries are identical, the Nash equilibrium capital income taxes converge to the tax on immobile factors income as the degree of cross-border pollution converges to one. When countries are asymmetric and pollution is local the presence of public pollution abatement lowers the capital tax for the capital exporting country, while the impact on the capital tax of the capital importing country is ambiguous.     

Optimal tax and debt policy with endogenously imperfect creditworthiness

This paper studies the patterns of optimal tax rates and borrowing in a developing country characterized by a costly tax collection. Its access to the international credit market is determined by the efficiency of the tax system, the relative bargaining power of creditors, and the outstanding debt. Country risk modifies considerably the pattern of taxes and borrowing in recessions. The tax rate exhibits strong counter-cyclical patterns in economies operating close to the credit ceiling, whereas the tax rate exhibits very few cyclical patterns in economies operating on the elastic portion of the supply of credit, where country risk factors are absent.     

确定最优资本结构:基于修正的节税收益与破产成本概念

For half a century, no consensus has been reached on optimal capital structure after numerous intensive studies. This paper develops three alternative simple models to derive optimal capital structure. Because the optimal leverage ratio determined by the models is close to most survey data, some relevant puzzles, such as “financial conservatism”, are easily explained. In addition, the new models can be extended to accommodate various decision situations, for instance, abnormal growth, bankrupt expectancy, debt guarantee, transaction cost, and personal income tax.      

资本弱化——国际避税的焦点

资本弱化已成为跨国公司国际避税的一种重要手段,也是国际税收领域的重要课题,许多发达国家都针对这种情况制定了相应的反避税措施。我国加入WTO以后,外商来华投资企业日益增多,资本弱化避税问题日加显现,我国应从选用固定比率法、制定适合的债务/股本比率及关联方认定标准等方面加以应对。     

The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements

Of a total of 2,976 double tax agreements (DTA s), some 60% are signed between a developing and a developed economy. As DTA s shift taxing rights from capital‐importing to capital‐exporting countries, the latter inherently benefit more from the agreements. In this paper, we argue that capital exporters use foreign aid to incite capital importers into signing DTA s. We demonstrate in a theoretical model that in a deal, one country does not trump the other, but that the deal must be mutually beneficial. In the case of an asymmetric DTA , this requires compensation from the capital‐exporting country to the capital‐importing country. Examining DTA s that are signed between donor and recipient countries between 1991 and 2012, and using a fixed effects Poisson model, we find that bilateral foreign aid commitments increase by 22% in the year of the signature of a DTA . Evaluated at the sample mean, this translates into around US$ six million additional aid commitments in a DTA signatory year.     

The economic consequences of corporate tax rates reductions in the EU: Evidence using a computable general equilibrium model

In a globalised world, governments are eager to attract foreign investors by lowering corporate tax rates. Recent trends point towards a revival of a race to the bottom in corporate income tax (CIT) rates in developed economies. EU countries have been active in this respect. A generalised fall in CIT rate could prove detrimental to tax revenues and trigger increase in other taxes to meet fiscal policy objectives. However, it could also spur investment and growth and prove to be a good fiscal policy strategy if, as a result, the corporate tax base increases. The final economic and fiscal impact of a reduction in CIT rates is therefore unclear. Using a CGE model, we find that uncoordinated tax reforms significantly impact national economies and third‐country effects can be significant when large countries implement CIT rate cuts. Small countries are better off unilaterally reducing their CIT rate at the expense of other EU countries. We find that negative spillovers are mitigated when the country reducing its CIT rate restores its budget balance by cutting either public expenditures or social transfers. A larger degree of non‐EU capital mobility also tends to reduce the negative spillover effects of unilateral CIT rate reductions.     

Nontraded goods and optimal foreign investments

The main purpose of the present paper is to discuss the optimal tax policy towards capital movements in the case where nontraded goods exist. We show that, in the case of generic capital, the instability of nontraded goods market in the passive country makes it optimal to subsidize the income from international investments. Furthermore, we show that complete specialization of the passive country invokes the orthodox tax policy of Kemp (1962, 1964, chs. 13 and 14), whether capital is generic or sector-specific.     

International externalities and optimal tax structures

This paper develops a model of two trading countries which are related by a bilateral production externality. Necessary conditions which must characterize an optimal tax structure from the point of view of one country are solved for and interpreted. Second, the model serves as a vehicle to extend the theory of corrective taxation in the case where only one policy instrument is available to deal with several distortions simultaneously. It is pointed out that the ranking of alternate second best tax structures typically depends upon which good is imported and which good is exported.     

Who benefits from partial tax coordination?

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high‐tax and low‐tax countries can be worse off. This conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high‐tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.     

The welfare effects of illegal immigration

"This paper extends the work of Ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor-importing country in a two-country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility. We derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers, and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax. With capital mobility, foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country."     

我国省际劳动、资本、消费有效税率的估算与比较

国际上衡量实际税收负担的一般方法为平均有效税率,采用这一国际通行方法,核算了1998－2012年我国各省级劳动、资本收入以及消费支出的平均有效税率,以反映这三种要素的真实负担情况,并将它与世界其它国家进行了比较研究。结果表明：各省劳动收入有效税率则呈上升态势,资本有效税率呈先下降再上升趋势,消费有效税率呈现不规则上升趋势;资本收入有效税率大大高于劳动收入和消费支出的有效税率;各省劳动和消费的有效税率还处于世界平均偏下水平,而资本有效税率处于世界平均偏上水平;地区比较来看,东部地区的劳动、资本、消费有效税率最大,西部次之,中部最低。表明西部地区的税负水平偏高,应该探索能够降低西部地区税负的有效途径,均衡地区之间的税收负担。     

Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens

We present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries. In the first part of the paper, we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does not necessarily attract all shifted profits. Under this assumption, tax competition between a large number of identical countries may lead to either a symmetric equilibrium with no profit shifting or an asymmetric equilibrium where firms shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. In the second part of the paper, we introduce tax havens. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, tax havens unambiguously reduce the tax revenue of countries due to a ‘leakage effect’ — tax havens attract tax base from countries — and a ’competition effect’ — the optimal response to the increased tax sensitivity of tax bases involves a reduction of tax rates. Starting from an asymmetric equilibrium, however, tax havens also raise the tax revenue of countries through a ’crowding effect’ — tax havens make it less attractive to compete for profits and thus induce low-tax countries to become high-tax countries. We demonstrate that the latter effect may dominate the former effects so that countries, on balance, benefit from the presence of tax havens.     

Commodity tax harmonization and the location of industry

We study the positive implications of commodity taxation and tax harmonization under the destination and origin principles when firms are monopolistic competitors facing variable demand elasticity and segmented markets. Our emphasis is on the international location of firms in the presence of market size asymmetries and trade costs. Under the destination principle, an increase in the tax rate of a country always causes some firms to relocate to the other. This effect may be reversed under the origin principle when economic integration is deep enough. Under tax harmonization the choice of a common tax principle is irrelevant for the market outcomes and for the global tax revenues. It affects, however, the distribution of revenues between small and large countries.     

The determinants of tax haven FDI

This paper examines the determinants of a multinational enterprise's (MNEs) decision to set up tax haven subsidiaries. We adapt the firm-specific advantage–country-specific advantage (FSA–CSA) framework and construct a number of empirically testable hypotheses. The analysis is based on a database covering 14,209 MNEs in twelve OECD countries. We find that the variety of capitalism of a MNEs home location and the level of technological intensity has a strong impact on this decision. We also find that the home country corporate tax rate has a minimal impact. This suggests that corporate tax liberalisation is unlikely to deter MNEs from undertaking this activity.     

On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size

In this paper, we analyze competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital through low taxes and public inputs that enhance firms' productivity. The competing jurisdictions are different in size and mobility of capital is costly. We find that for moderate mobility costs, small economies can attract foreign capital by supplying higher levels of public goods than larger jurisdictions, without practicing tax undercutting. The classical result that small jurisdictions are attractive because they engage in tax dumping is recovered only for high mobility costs of capital.     

防范跨国公司资本弱化避税的国际经验与借鉴

跨国公司通过资本弱化避税,造成国家税收流失。世界各国纷纷制定相关法规防范资本弱化,我国反资本弱化的相关法规制度尚不完善,因此在大力引进外资,促进资源合理配置的同时,迫切需要借鉴发达国家的经验,采取相应的措施防范跨国公司资本弱化避税。     

Tariff and tax reform: Dynamic implications

In an endogenously growing small open economy with a capital good and a consumption good, we characterize the optimal combination of an import tariff and consumption taxes under the revenue neutrality constraint. Focusing on the case in which the economy imports the capital good, we obtain two main results. First, consumption of the capital good is distorted more than the consumption good at the optimum. Second, the optimal tariff rate is positive, implying that free trade is not optimal even for a small open economy with no market failure.     

House prices and immovable property tax: Evidence from OECD countries

This paper studies the impact of changes in immovable property tax revenues on the growth rate of house prices by analysing a panel of 34 OECD countries over the period 1970–2014. Starting from the annual series of immovable property tax revenues, we isolate years of significant shifts in the property tax regime and study their impact on house prices. We find a strong negative relationship between increases in immovable property tax revenues and house prices. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of cyclical determinants of house prices, country and year fixed effects, and country‐specific linear trends. We also propose an instrumental variable strategy based on countries’ legal origins that confirms a statistically significant negative impact of such taxes in the short run.     

我国个人所得税征管现状及改革的思考

目前,我国个人所得税征管中存在着征管制度不健全,征管效果不理想;个人所得税占税收总额比重过低,工薪阶层成纳税主体,未体现税负公平等主要问题。应改革现行税制模式,实行综合与分类相结合的税制;调整和简化税率结构,采用更加灵活的费用扣除标准;增强纳税人的意识,完善个人信誉约束机制;加大对偷税逃税行为的查处、打击和惩罚力度。     

Valuation and firm investment and financing policies with personal tax biases

In this paper we examine firm financial policies in the presence of personal tax biases (e.g., favoring capital gains relative to interest and dividends). A form of the value additivity principle (VAP) for the tax bias case is established and applied to the firm's merger, investment, financial structure, and dividend decisions. As with the neutral tax VAP, the revised VAP requires transaction costless capital markets but does not require capital market completeness or competitiveness. Share value maximization is found not to be the proper goal for a firm that seeks to maximize the shareholders' current expected utility; however, it is found that share value maximization is generally a good approximate objective. Firm investment policy with financial structure irrelevance (owing to offsetting personal and corporate taxes) is examined assuming that the revised VAP holds.