Evolving Electric Utility Regulatory Policy

A bstract . Current electric utility pricing methods understate the marginal social casts of electricity. Electricity prices are set to cover the utility's average cost rather than the higher marginal social cost. This mispricing hides from consumers the true cost their consumption imposes on society and, thereby, encourages them to ignore efficient conservation opportunities. Additionally, the conservation market suffers from a number of imperfections such as barriers to the acquisition of information, high upfront capital costs and the lack of conservation equipment availability. The electricity and conservation multimarket equilibrium is not achieved. The result is that society overconsumes (excess demand) electricity, overinvests in electric generating plants and underinvests (excess supply) in conservation resources. The large, yet uncertain, level of foregone conservation investment offers new opportunities for regulators and electric utility managers to improve economic efficiency with regulatory and planning policies that appropriately encourage the cost effective use of conservation resources. In the absence of the most efficient policy, marginal social cost pricing, integrated resource planning (IRP) is being adopted as a potential second-best regulatory policy and utility resource planning framework to improve energy efficiency. IRP uses mathematical optimization methods to search among many alternate resource portfolios of electricity creating and saving technologies. These methods identify the mix that best meets society's needs with the least social cost , where the social external costs and benefits of generating plant and conservation, respectively, are considered. Such a goal requires the choice of a resource portfolio that optimizes a complex objective function. As a result, the solution offers a resource action plan for electric utilities that may be Pareto-improving.     

Learning by fund-raising

From experience, fund-raisers become more efficient solicitors. This paper offers a full characterization of the optimal solicitation strategy when there are learning economies. The characterization is recursive, and does not require equilibrium computations. Our main results are that (1) the fund-raiser may now solicit a “ net free-rider”—a donor whose contribution falls below the marginal solicitation cost; (2) the number of solicitations is non-monotonic in the learning rate; and (3) a solicitation technology with high overhead but low marginal costs is likely to be optimal if income distribution in the population is relatively homogenous. The complementary case with a decreasing returns to scale technology is also considered.     

The cost of Corporate Social Responsibility: the case of the Community Reinvestment Act

A Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) cost minimization model is employed to estimate the cost to thrift institutions of achieving a rating of ‘outstanding’ under the anti-redlining Community Reinvestment Act, which is viewed as an act of voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). There is no difference in overall cost efficiency between ‘outstanding’ and minimally compliant ‘satisfactory’ thrifts. However, the sources of cost inefficiency do differ, and an ‘outstanding’ rating involves annual extra cost of $6.547 million or, 1.2% of total costs. This added cost is the shadow price of CSR since it is not an explicit output or input in the DEA cost model. Before and after-tax rates of return are the same for the ‘outstanding’ and ‘satisfactory’ thrifts, which implies a recoupment of the extra cost. The findings are consistent with CSR as a management choice based on balancing marginal cost and marginal revenue. An incidental finding is that larger thrifts are less efficient.

Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

This paper considers implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers for production economies with increasing returns to scale. We present a mechanism whose Nash equilibrium allocations coincide with the set of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers that characterizes Pareto efficient allocations for economies with non-convex production technologies. We allow production sets and preferences to be unknown to the planner. The mechanism has some nice properties such as feasibility, continuity, and finite-dimension of message space. Furthermore, it works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies.     

Valuing lead time

When do short lead times warrant a cost premium? Decision makers generally agree that short lead times enhance competitiveness, but have struggled to quantify their benefits. Blackburn (2012) argued that the marginal value of time is low when demand is predictable and salvage values are high. de Treville et al. (2014) used real-options theory to quantify the relationship between mismatch cost and demand volatility, demonstrating that the marginal value of time increases with demand volatility, and with the volatility of demand volatility. We use the de Treville et al. model to explore the marginal value of time in three industrial supply chains facing relatively low demand volatility, extending the model to incorporate factors such as tender-loss risk, demand clustering in an order-up-to model, and use of a target fill rate that exceeded the newsvendor profit-maximizing order quantity. Each of these factors substantially increases the marginal value of time. In all of the companies under study, managers had underestimated the mismatch costs arising from lead time, so had underinvested in cutting lead times.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The economics of property taxes and land values: The elasticity of supply of structures

Land values are explained by diminishing returns to a variable factor, structure, added to fixed land. The total cost minimizing structural density determined by land value, occurs where the marginal cost of increased density equals the average cost of structure plus land. Structural demand prices equal marginal costs in equilibrium determining land demands. A general equilibrium land price establishes the uses, prices and densities of structures. A simple method of calculating structure supply elasticity and the incidence and deadweight loss of property taxes is developed. Differing property tax rates are found to be efficient.     

A sufficiency result for constrained economies

This paper presents a general sufficiency result for constrained economies. The result shows that, when an equilibrium allocation satisfies the first order necessary conditions for hybrid efficiency (a new type of constrained efficiency), there exists a marginal cost pricing equilibrium in an associated economy. If this equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the associated economy, then the original equilibrium allocation is hybrid efficient. Hence. the necessary conditions are also sufficient.     

排污费与可转让排污许可证的比较——基于社会福利和制度实施层面的分析

排污费和可转让许可证制度是基于市场化环境规制的两种手段,这两种手段从理论上讲均能实现外部成本内部化,但可能在执行过程中带来不同的交易成本,对社会环境福利形成不同的收益。由于在制度设计上要获得厂商的边际收益函数和边际控制成本函数,但这种信息的获得很困难。对边际收益函数和边际控制成本函数的不同估计,造成的社会福利扭曲不同。在制度的实施层面,两种制度设计运作机理的不同,在现实的操作层面也会带来不同的排污结果。     

Optimal dynamic durability

Consider a firm that adjusts its production and the choice of durability for its products instantaneously. We show that when the marginal cost with the respect to durability is nonincreasing, (a) the optimal durability for both the competitive firm and the monopolist decreases over time and (b) the monopolist will produce a good with lower durability than the competitive firm. We thus lend support for empirical findings and causal observations that found the phenomenon of declining durability over time.     

The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion

Using a two‐period model this paper examines the quantity decisions of leveraged duopolists that are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the first period. When the firms have symmetric costs, a bankrupt firm reorganizes under Chapter 11. If a Chapter 11 firm experiences marginal cost relief, each firm produces a collusive output in period one in order to prevent its rival's financial demise. When the firms have asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm is liquidated under Chapter 7 upon bankruptcy. A predatory equilibrium exists, whereby the inefficient firm is driven from the market. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice

We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule.     

Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function. When effort and ability are complementary, feedback has several competing effects: it informs workers about their relative position in the tournament (evaluation effect) as well as their relative productivity (motivation effect) and it creates signal‐jamming incentives to exert effort prior to the performance evaluation. These effects suggest a tradeoff of performance feedback between evaluation and motivation which is in accordance with organizational behavior research and performance appraisal practices.     

我国文化企业跨区域并购应注意的问题研究

跨区域并购是我国文化企业做大做强的一个恰当的战略选择。文化企业具有意识形态性,边际成本递减、边际效用递增性,公众参与性和高衍生性四个特定属性。我国文化企业在跨区域并购时要考虑并购规划的周密性和目标企业信息完全性;要熟悉相关法规政策,促进人才整合,讲究并购绩效评价的综合性和长期性。     

A MODEL OF SEARCH AND SHOPPING BY HOMOGENEOUS CUSTOMERS WITHOUT PRICE PRECOMMITMENT BY FIRMS

Price setting by firms and search by customers is analyzed, relaxing two basic attributes of most search models: price precommitment and agent heterogeneity. Customers are characterized by individual demand functions for a homogeneous good and can choose to employ a threat to search. Firms noncooperatively make pricing decisions by using the individual demand curves under conditions of constant marginal cost. Firms adopt pricing rules that optimally respond to customer search histories. Bargaining power is endogenously assigned. Firms know their common marginal cost; customers, the cost distribution. The unique separating equilibrium is characterized by a lumpy distribution of prices and by heterogeneous shopping behavior by customers giving rise to "shoppers" and "nonshoppers"     

Should Firms Employ Personalized Pricing?

This paper theoretically considers a duopoly model in which all firms do not always employ personalized pricing. Our model incorporates the fact that firms engage in marginal cost‐reducing activities after they decide whether to employ personalized pricing. When the ex ante cost difference between the firms is large, the less‐efficient firm does not employ personalized pricing even when the fixed cost to do so is zero. This is because employing personalized pricing induces the rival firm to engage more in reducing its costs, which is more likely to harm the less‐efficient firm.     

Hedging to market-wide shocks and competitive selection

This paper examines hedging against a large market-wide shock in a model with heterogeneous firms and sunk costs of entry. If hedging is voluntary only the most efficient firms hedge against this shock, a finding in line with empirical evidence but at odds with standard motivations for risk management. Hedging affects the critical level of the marginal cost needed to operate in the market. A setting with mandatory hedging is associated with stronger competition than when hedging is voluntary which, in turn, is associated with stronger competition than when hedging is unavailable.     

On interpenetrating samples of unequal sizes

Summary Koop [1967] proved that interpenetrating samples of unequal sizes are more efficient than those with equal sizes for estimating a finite population total. After observing that there is a serious lacuna present in his proof, a correct proof has been suggested. The optimum choice of individual sample sizes has also been discussed for a given (i) total sample size, (ii) cost and (iii) precision, with an assumed cost structure. Finally, the resulting estimators have been compared with those based on a single sample.     

A model of rental and owner-occupied housing

A complete model of owner-occupied and rental housing is developed. The model allows for the endogenous determination of rents, the user cost of owner-occupied housing and housing tenure choice by individuals. In the short run, structure prices are endogenous, while in the long run the size of the housing stock adjusts to equate structure prices to exogenous construction costs. Comparative static results emphasize the importance of marginal tax rates and distinguishing between the short and long run for a complete understanding of the impacts of inflation on housing markets.