政治关联影响企业上交的排污费吗——基于重点环境监控企业的经验证据简

排污费是政府为保护环境、维护社会利益而制定的重要控制措施，但是很多企业通过建立政治关联降低上缴排污费。基于企业寻租理论及可持续发展理论，通过对我国重点环境监控的上市公司有关政治关联背景的高管人员的研究发现，政治关联会对企业获得政府环境优惠政策产生影响，并且与排污费成负向相关关系。监管部门应建立健全环境监管机制，限制有政治关联背景人员的行为，在选定政策免征时制定完善的规则。     

MARKETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL

The environmental problem is no different from any other economic problem. The basic problem is scarcity. Wants are unlimited while resources are limited. Once we recognize our inability to satisfy all of our ecological wants, how do we decide which wants we will satisfy? Most efforts to address environmental concerns have used political institutions to answer this question and to devise policy responses. Environmental concerns have been addressed in the same manner that socialist nations sought to address broader economic concerns. This paper argues that such policies cannot succeed in the environmental realm any better than they did in the broader economic realm. Whether the political approach chosen relies on command-and-control or “market-based” mechanisms (eco-taxes or eco-quotas) matters little in resolving government's inability to prioritize. The dispersed nature and enormity of information needed to prioritize risks and the inability of government to create the rich system of incentives necessary to mobilize human ingenuity renders effective government controls infeasible. This paper argues for greater attention to environmental problems but concludes that we can better address environmental quality by integrating ecological resources into the economy via ecological privatization. This property rights approach to environmental policy—“free market environmentalism”—may entice more economists to address the important environmental questions and devise more appropriate solutions.     

科学、价值与判断在环境影响评估架构中之整合

公共政策研拟，尤其是环境影响评估，不仅牵涉技术性科学层面，同时涵盖社会性价值评估与政策性决策判断。旨在探讨如何将科学、价值与判断等因素合理融合于环境影响评估作业过程中，并据此研拟一环境影响评估架构，作为中国台湾地区环保部门开发案审核依据之参考。本文所研拟之环境影响评估架构的理论基础包括社会选择理论、社会判断理论及多属性评估方法。通过社会选择理论分析环境政策制定的机制；通过社会判断理论解释科学与价值如何整合于政策制定及其可行性中；而通过多属性评估方法建立开发案评选的集体决策技术。以山坡地开发为例说明此架构在实践中的应用。     

Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.     

Aid,Environment and Climate Change

Aid and aid institutions constitute an important element of the global response to interlinked global developmental and environmental challenges. As such, these institutions are now being drawn into new arenas beyond the traditional focus on improving the livelihoods of poor people in low‐income countries. Development aid, by itself, cannot “save the planet.” Nevertheless, development aid and development institutions do have the potential to become important catalytic actors in achieving developmental and global environmental objectives. This requires bold reforms and political action. Without appropriate restructuring of the international institutional architecture to confront the new development context combined with the necessary complementary policy frameworks, future aid, including aid for environmental objectives, risks substantially under‐performing.     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

劳动力二元结构、产业国际转移障碍与中国对外政策选择

产业国际转移是指发生在国家之间的产业转移,即产业由某些国家或地区转移到另一些国家或地区的现象。从理论上讲,产业国际间转移呈现出一定的梯度性规律。然而,自从中国日益向世界工厂的角色转变之后,由于中国劳动力二元结构特征的存在使得这一从中国向产业低梯度国家的产业国际转移进程受到了很大阻碍。在这种情况下,理应采取各种措施与原有准备承接产业转移的低梯度国家处理好政治经济关系。文章首先介绍了国际产业转移的梯度效应,分析了劳动力二元结构下的国际产业转移障碍,即发生在中国的国际产业转移阻断现象,据此提出了中国对外贸易应注意的战略性政策选择。     

制造业绿色产品开发的风险识别研究

绿色和环保是当今社会的主题,世界各国也越来越重视环境和资源问题。开发制造业绿色产品可以使生态环境和社会经济连接为一个协调发展的有机整体,从根本上解决制造业的环境问题。然而,绿色产品开发是一项高风险性的复杂系统工程,受多种风险因素的综合影响,其中企业内部的技术风险以及企业外部市场和政策风险是主要风险,且对于每一类风险而言,具体哪些风险因素起主要作用还没有明确的结论。为此,系统地识别绿色产品开发的技术风险、市场风险和政策风险,利用因子分析方法,对上述三方面的风险分别进行信息的凝练和提取,共得到9个关键风险因子,并提出了防范制造业绿色产品开发关键风险的对策建议,以期降低绿色产品开发的风险,促进循环经济和低碳经济的发展。     

一般均衡中的利率、确定性与最优规则

利率规则理论是以短期利率作为货币政策工具而发展起来的一套新的理论,它体现了货币经济学家在货币政策领域内的新的尝试和努力。在利率规则理论中,货币经济学家试图解决两个问题:利率规则冲击对非政策经济变量的短期影响是什么,以及一个好的利率规则应当具有怎样的性质。利率规则将短期利率作为非政策经济变量的内生反应函数,使得货币经济学家可以在一般均衡模型中探讨这两个问题。然而,由于利率规则从一开始就是出于一种偏好的设定,因此,讨论的结果并不符合稳健性和科学性的要求,这就削弱了理论预言的可靠性。在某种意义上,利率规则理论若想成为一门真正的"科学的艺术",它就必须为内生利率规则寻找到一个坚固的微观基础。本文梳理评述了利率规则理论在经验上和理论上的成就和不足。     

Different ways of knowing: a communicative turn toward sustainability

Despite the urgency of the ecological crisis the steady continuation of environmental degradation suggests that new ways of interpreting problems and acting with environmental integrity may need to be considered. This paper draws on a broad range of contemporary theory to argue that the conventional conceptualization of environmental problems has remained a largely disciplinary-based exercise that has relied on abstracting the environmental issues from their real-world complexity. A practical articulation of the main environmental narratives reveals self-referential discourses whose disciplinary-based practices have insulated these approaches from a broad range of contemporary theorising and different ways of knowing. The dominance of these approaches in environmental policy development has led to the continued acceleration of environmental degradation despite widespread political and social interest in its abatement. This paper provides a critique of methodologies derived from the assumptions of instrumental rationalism, and contemplates the potential for alternative ‘communicative’ approaches and strategies for dealing with environmental policy development and implementation. It is argued that a communicative approach to planning for sustainability represents a more appropriate strategy for mobilising a currently impotent environmental movement. A communicative approach by explicitly dealing with the assumptions and motivations of contested positions in the sustainability debate, it is argued, offers the most pragmatic way of developing change strategies to deal with the complex issues surrounding environmental policy development and implementation.     

我国进口粮食的风险评价

本文根据工业过程的一般规律,利用比较优势理论,分析了当前阶段扩在粮食进口是提高我国经济福利水平的内在需求,而加篱世贸组织是扩大粮食进口的外部推动力量,在此基础上,重点讨论了粮食进口的经济风险和政治风险,并给出了风险评价的量化指标。     

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen’s estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.     

On the political economy of minority rights. Three ways to manipulate a minority: Goals,rules, and border poles

Language rights for speakers of minority languages are analyzed as well-defined policy measures that are implemented in given jurisdictions. For the implementation of such rights in some countries, certain rules concerning the number and geographical distribution of the speakers of a minority language have to be fulfilled. We discuss, how a policy maker with a given attitude towards the minority can manipulate the policy to further his or her goals. We first provide a normative background for this type of language policy, a benchmark, analyzing language policy on the basis of welfare economics, first discussing why language policy is but one type of public policy, then defining and discussing the benefit or “demand” side assuming that benefits are basically proportional to the number of beneficiaries of the planning measure. We then argue that the costs of a planning measure can be described as a function of two variables, “number of beneficiaries” and “size of area of application”. This lets us analyze planning measures in a two-dimensional model fully characterized by the number of beneficiaries and their geographical distribution in the jurisdiction under consideration. Finally, we characterize the optimal size and extension of the jurisdictions where the language rights are to be implemented. It is then shown, how the policy maker can manipulate the goals of the policy, the implementation rules, as well as the borders of the jurisdictions in order to achieve her or his political goals when they differ from the cost-benefit optimum.     

The environment as a challenge for governmental responsibility — The case of the European Water Framework Directive

The European Water Framework Directive is shaping a new conception of integrative water protection. In this article, the consequences of the Water Framework Directive in respect to national environmental policy will be discussed in referring to the notion of responsibility which is a central concept of political philosophy and theory. It will be shown that the new conception of integrative water protection entails a fundamental change in European water protection policy and also environmental policy at all. It implies that environmental policy has not only to prevent environmental damage but in particular has to warrant a good status of the environment, such that it must maintain a good status of water or even achieve it if this status does not exist. Achieving and maintaining a good status of the environment is, however, an encompassing task. Thereby, state power will eventually be overexerted. The threat of such overexertion has to be kept in mind in discussing the perspective of the so called New Environmental Governance. It will be pointed out that the New Environmental Governance is not primarily a form of some sort of democratic participation but rather designed to improve state power in environmental politics.     

Environmental policy in the two-country-case

Summary The paper analyzes the problem how environmental policy affects sector structure, the allocation of resources, relative price (and comparative advantage) and national income in a two-country case with varying terms of trade. The frame of reference is a two-sector model in which production generates pollutants as a joint product. If a country exports the pollution-intensively produced commodity environmental policy will improve its terms of trade under suitable conditions with respect to demand. Whereas in the political debate the negative effect of environmental policy on the international competiveness of a country is stressed, the terms-of-trade effect gives more leeway to environmental policy. The effects on output, export, imports and the other variables of the system are discussed.Help for calculating the results is acknowledged to J. Eichberger. I acknowledge helpful comments from an anonymous referee. I am also grateful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support.     

A State Within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948–1973)

In this paper we analyse certain periods in the history of the Bundesbank concentrating on the determinants of central bank independence as suggested in the literature. The Bundesbank law of 1957 was born only after a long and tedious political process which outcome was initially not at all clear. It is concluded that some determinants outlined in the literature played indeed a role in the making of the Bundesbank Law of 1957. Still, the Bundesbank was put in charge of the Dmark by the Allieds and this proved to be advantagous for the new institution, as was the subsequent debate about federalism. We argue that popular backing is one of the important forces in support of the Bundesbank's independence. However, this support is not exogenous, as the Bundesbank has always tried to influence public opinion. Our analysis of the conflicts between the Bundesbank and the federal government over monetary policy suggest that if a conflict concerned interest rate policy, the Bundesbank always got its way. Even with respect to exchange rate policy, which is primarily in the realm of the federal government, the position of the Bundesbank often prevailed, as the Bundesbank behaved skilfully. The history of the Bundesbank also provides ample evidence of coordination problems with fiscal policy that may arise with two independent players. Finally, it is clear that the theory on the determinants of central bank independence overlooks that very often the government and the Bundesbank were not two monolithic entities, but that there were different views about policy.     

Rent‐Seeking,Market Structure,and Growth

We study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth, in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets. Specifically, firms compete for market share through cost‐reducing technological innovation, and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent‐seeking activities. We find that rent‐seeking affects growth in two ways: it allows firms to ignore economic competition, leading to less innovation, and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former effect is negative, while the latter is ambiguous. We show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets.     

The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATT's Article XXIII, and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding

Economic theory has yet to provide a convincing argument that can explain why the threat of retaliation under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures is not sufficient to prevent countries from violating the agreement. We consider the question of why countries violate the agreed–upon rules in the face of explicit provisions which allow them to legally adjust their trade policy. Using the GATT/WTO institutional structure and the guiding principle of reciprocity, we provide a theory suggesting when countries will choose to implement protection in violation of GATT/WTO rules, as opposed to under the relevant safeguards provisions, when trade policy adjustments are necessary between "negotiating rounds."     

Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices

The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat, such as with greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of “quantity-plus” policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms, which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments.     

Gaus,Hayek, and the place of civil religion in a free society

In The Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus uses Hayekian insights to give a contractarian justification for the specific social rules the rules that comprise the social order of a free people. But in doing so, Gaus inadvertently endorses a kind of skepticism about our ability to justify the institutions that comprise our social order as a whole. The disadvantage of a political theory so pervasively skeptical is that, while contractors can arrive at a series of specific solutions to their social problems, they have no way to assure themselves that their moral nature and their moral practices as a whole are sufficiently sound that the rules they endorse are genuinely morally binding. I argue that this problem can be solved in political practice through the adoption of a civil religion. Civil religions provide narratives and social practices that assure members of free orders that their regimes are good or justified on the whole. In this way, we can introduce the idea of civil religion into contractarian political theory as a social technology for sustaining a free social order.