标的企业业绩承诺与并购方商誉减值——盈余管理和审计质量的调节作用

以2011-2020年A股上市公司中签订业绩承诺协议的定向增发并购重组事件为样本,研究标的企业业绩承诺对并购方商誉减值的影响,考察盈余管理及审计质量对二者关系的调节作用。结果显示：（1）标的企业业绩承诺激进程度与并购方商誉减值正相关,业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值负相关,即目标方业绩承诺设置越激进、完成情况越差,并购方商誉减值规模越大。（2）商誉减值存在着并购双方盈余管理的机会主义行为,其中标的企业的盈余管理行为会强化业绩承诺激进程度与商誉减值的正向关系,而并购方的盈余管理行为会抑制业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值规模的负相关关系。（3）审计质量会弱化业绩承诺激进程度与商誉减值的正向关系以及业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值规模的负向关系,即提高审计质量能够抑制标的企业的业绩承诺激进行为和并购方利用商誉减值“洗大澡”的行为,降低并购方的商誉减值风险。（4）进一步研究发现,目标方参与公司治理具有两面性,即目标方股东担任收购方的董事、监事或高管,一方面会推高标的企业的业绩承诺水平,另一方面会激励标的企业努力完成承诺业绩,对收购方的商誉减值风险产生正反两种影响。     

并购商誉减值对股价崩盘风险的影响研究

本文以2009年至2018年中国上市公司为样本,对商誉减值如何影响股价崩盘风险进行研究。结果显示:商誉减值与股价崩盘风险在0.01水平上显著正相关,说明商誉减值促进了股价崩盘风险。进一步研究结论显示:当公司内部治理水平越差时,商誉减值对公司股价崩盘风险的正向影响越明显;当公司机构投资者持股比例越低时,商誉减值对公司股价崩盘风险的正向影响越明显。本文结论丰富了股价崩盘风险的影响因素、商誉减值的经济后果等相关文献,为公司缓解股价崩盘风险提供了科学依据。     

基于业绩承诺的商誉减值足额计提了吗北大核心

并购标的业绩承诺未达标与商誉减值是当下各界关注的重要问题。本文研究了根据并购标的业绩承诺未完成情况计提的商誉减值是否充分及其影响因素。研究发现,并购标的业绩承诺完成情况可被视为并购标的未来获取现金流能力的信号,业绩承诺完成越差,计提的商誉减值越多。但无论是按照“参照公司”测算出的商誉减值预期值,还是按照业绩承诺在并购时影响商誉的幅度,基于业绩承诺未完成情况计提的商誉减值总体上是不足的。进一步地,当业绩承诺距离到期日较远、或净空值较大时,上述商誉减值不足问题更严重;证监会《第8号文》的发布和交易所的问询监管对商誉减值不足问题具有一定的治理作用。进一步检验还表明,按本文方法识别出的商誉减值不足样本与事后监管方识别出的商誉减值问题样本具有高度一致性,说明本文的判断方法对商誉减值的会计实务具有重要参考价值。     

并购商誉减值如何影响股价崩盘风险

近年来,A股市场因公司并购而引发股价泡沫的案例日趋增多,并引起了资本市场的广泛关注.本文以2009-2019年A股市场发生并购行为的上市公司为样本,实证检验了并购商誉减值对股价崩盘的影响及其调节因素.研究发现,并购商誉减值具有显著的股价崩盘效应,并且商誉资产规模越大,股价崩盘风险越高.进一步研究发现,机构投资者持股占比、信息不对称程度、分析师乐观预测误差和投资者情绪,在并购商誉减值与股价崩盘关联中具有重要的调节作用.本研究对于理解并购商誉减值对资本市场稳定性的影响以及防范相关金融风险等方面,具有较强的现实意义.     

商誉不当减值行为:类型界分、原因剖析与规制策略北大核心

近年来,随着国内并购市场趋于活跃,不合理的高商誉和不规范的商誉减值问题日益突出,亟需构建合理、有效的商誉不当减值行为规制体系,以优化全链条资本市场治理体系。实践中,商誉不当减值行为呈现为确认阶段的不合理高估、计提阶段的规避行为和激进行为、披露阶段的欺诈等样态。商誉不当减值行为易发、频发,主要原因在于公司并购决策失当、业绩承诺机制异化、商誉会计处理规则过于原则化以及商誉信息披露监管机制孱弱。针对商誉不当减值行为的多样性以及诱因的多重性,要采取统合规制的策略,整合公司法、会计法和证券法等多部门法在规制公司并购决策、商誉会计处理以及信息披露欺诈等方面的协同优势,构建多层次、立体化的规制体系。     

A公司商誉减值成因及其经济后果研究

随着上市公司商誉“暴雷”现象的发生,商誉减值成为会计实务研究的热点问题之一。企业并购会产生高溢价的商誉,会计核算中计提大额的商誉减值会影响企业未来的发展。基于A公司收购多家公司并进行业绩承诺导致高额商誉减值的案例,分析了商誉减值的成因、影响,以及减值法与摊销法下各自的经济后果,并提出相关的改进建议。     

商誉减值的同伴效应研究

现有研究主要关注公司治理和资本市场定价对商誉减值的影响,较少考察商誉减值的同伴效应.基于同伴效应理论,本文考察了同伴公司商誉减值对本公司商誉减值的影响与经济后果.实证结果发现,公司商誉减值存在显著的同伴效应;商誉减值同伴效应会受到外部环境不确定性和行业地位的影响,环境不确定性越强,商誉减值同伴效应越显著,行业领先者和跟...     

上市公司并购重组中的商誉减值问题探究

近年来,在上市公司转型扩张战略不断发展的背景下,上市公司的兼并重组已成为资本市场的主旋律,并在并购重组后引发了巨大的商誉泡沫。本文以上市公司商誉减值现状为基础,对商誉减值计量方法进行分析,提出通过对外强化商誉信息披露、加强外部监管、内部完善商誉后续计量方法等方式减少商誉泡沫,促进资本市场的健康发展。     

事与愿违:并购业绩承诺为何加剧股价暴跌风险?

本文分析了并购业绩承诺对于并购方上市公司未来股价暴跌风险的影响。一方面,依据不完全契约理论和信号理论,业绩补偿承诺可能起到降低契约摩擦和信号传递的积极作用,进而降低并购方未来股价暴跌风险;另一方面,基于并购业绩承诺制度的理论缺陷以及我国资本市场中代理冲突的特点,业绩补偿承诺也可能引致代理冲突变异并激发相关利益方的机会主义行为,反而加重股价暴跌风险。本文研究发现,并购业绩承诺使得上市公司未来股价暴跌风险加重,并且关联并购中的业绩承诺对于股价暴跌风险的影响更大,从而支持"代理观"假说。我们进一步检验了标的资产质量不确定性对于业绩承诺是否发挥信号机制的影响,发现无论标的质量不确定性或高或低业绩承诺均无法降低并购方未来股价暴跌风险。我们的研究表明,在我国现行制度背景下的并购业绩承诺制度存在显著的理论设计缺陷,因而未实现保护中小投资者并促进资本市场健康发展的政策初衷。     

Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses: Evidence and Effect on Future Performance

We examine whether managers postpone the recognition of goodwill impairment by manipulating cash flows and the consequences of such a strategy on future performance. According to SFAS 142, an impairment loss must be recognized if the reporting unit's total fair value to which goodwill has been allocated is less than its book value. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that managers delay the recognition of goodwill impairment in accounting books. However, past literature is silent on how managers convince various gatekeepers (e.g., auditors, financial analysts) that recognizing an impairment loss is unnecessary although it seems economically justified. SFAS 142 requires managers to forecast future cash flows to justify the decision to recognize, or not, an impairment loss. Therefore, we predict that managers manipulate upward current cash flows to support their choice to avoid reporting an impairment loss. We also test whether or not this real earnings management is detrimental to future performance. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2011, we document that firms suspected of postponing goodwill impairment losses exhibit significantly positive discretionary cash flows compared to various control groups. We also find that this real activities manipulation is detrimental to future performance.     

Discount Rates in Disarray: Evidence on Flawed Goodwill Impairment Testing

Discount rate selection represents a centrally material factor impacting valuation models. Given the strong reliance on discounted cash flow modelling as a basis for determining an asset's recoverable amount, the judgement exercised by reporting entities regarding rate selection is of paramount importance in influencing the outcomes of the impairment testing process conducted under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The discretion surrounding rate selection could be used opportunistically to avoid or manage the timing of impairment losses to the detriment of transparency, comparability and decision usefulness. This study provides evidence consistent with the opportunism on the part of financial statement preparers, by demonstrating the existence of variances between independently generated risk‐adjusted discount rates and those disclosed as having been used by a sample of large listed Australian companies.     

Commentary: Discount Rates in Disarray – Evidence on Flawed Goodwill Impairment Testing

Carlin and Finch (2009) compare the reported goodwill impairment discount rates to their own ‘independent’ estimate for a sample of 105 Australian firms. On the basis of this comparison they claim (but do not show) that the discretion in determining the discount rate ‘could be used opportunistically’ and ‘fundamental questions must be asked about the quality of reported earnings … produced in conformity with the IFRS regime’. This commentary points out that the research design does not permit the assessment of either of these claims.     

Commentary: Some Further Evidence on Discount Rate Selection in the Context of Goodwill Impairment Testing

In an earlier edition of this journal, we published evidence relating to the nature of discount rates chosen by a sample of large Australian‐listed firms in the context of their goodwill impairment testing ( Carlin and Finch 2009 ). We argued that our evidence suggested that the rigour of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) goodwill impairment testing process was being undermined by inappropriate choice of discount rates on the part of many firms. In a commentary published alongside our article, questions were raised as to the validity of our conclusions and the methodology we applied in our study ( Gallery 2009 ). Subsequently, Bradbury has also contributed to the debate, raising similar concerns to those voiced by Gallery ( Bradbury 2010 ). In this brief paper, we provide further and better particulars in relation to our original dataset in a bid to assist those who have taken an interest in this debate to further inform their view of the merits (or otherwise) of the case we made in our original article.     

商誉减值测试：FASB与IASB相关规定比较

2001年下半年，美国财务会计准则委员会(下文简称FASB)发布了《财务会计准则公告第142号—商誉和其他无形资产》(SFAS142)，它取代《会计程序公报第17号——无形资产》(APB17)，成为规范商誉会计的新规范。SFAS142规定，商誉不再被摊销而是实施减值测试。关于此规定，……     

关联并购、支付方式与企业并购绩效

关联并购在我国上市公司并购活动中占主要地位,关联并购可能是关联交易的终结,但也有能成为大股东掏空上市公司的手段.在此背景下,本文通过多元回归分析探究了关联并购与并购绩效之间的关系,并在此基础上,引入支付方式,通过多元回归分析和分组检验,进一步探究了支付方式对关联并购与企业并购绩效之间的调节作用.实证结果显示,关联并购与并购绩效之间显著负相关,并购关联性与支付方式的交乘项与并购绩效显著负相关,说明支付方式对关联并购与并购绩效之间负相关关系具有加强的作用.     

管理层能力、长期激励与商誉减值

并购是管理层谋求企业快速发展的重要途径之一.近年来因并购而产生的商誉大量发生减值,因而受到广泛关注.本文以2008年至2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了管理层能力对企业并购商誉减值的影响.研究发现,管理层能力与上市公司的商誉减值水平和商誉减值概率呈现显著的负相关关系,并且这种负向关系在管理层拥有的长期激励较高时更为显著.进一步研究表明,更高能力的管理层有助于降低并购商誉减值的内在机理在于并购时展现出更强的估值能力和并购后展现出更强的整合能力,分别表现为更低的并购溢价和更高的长期并购绩效.本文从并购决策制定者和实施者即管理层的视角研究了其对商誉减值的影响因素,丰富了企业并购商誉减值的相关文献.     

Impairment of Goodwill and Deferred Taxes Under IFRS

This article discusses the effect of deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) on an impairment test of goodwill. While IAS 12.66 acknowledges that DTLs arising in a business combination influence the amount of goodwill an entity recognises, International Financial Reporting Standards are silent on the implications of this rule, in particular that DTLs trigger a ‘day one’ impairment of goodwill. To avoid this impairment charge, the professional literature suggests deducting DTLs from the carrying amount of the cash generating unit. This method appears contentious conceptually and is unable to shield the entity from an impairment in subsequent periods. The article discusses four proposed solutions to the problem, but recommends a conceptual re‐think of the mechanical recognition of deferred taxes in a business combination.     

Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market

The impact of cross‐border bank M&As on bank risk remains an open question. Though geographically diversifying bank M&As have the potential to reduce the risk of bank insolvency, they also have the potential to increase that risk due to the increase in risk‐taking incentives by bank managers and stockholders following these transactions. This paper empirically investigates whether cross‐border bank M&As increase or decrease the risk of acquiring banks as captured by changes in acquirers' yield spreads. This paper also investigates how differences in the institutional environments between bidder and target countries affect changes in yield spreads following M&A announcements. The study finds that bondholders, in general, perceive cross‐border bank M&As as risk‐increasing activities, unlike domestic bank mergers. Specifically, on average, yield spreads increase by 4.13 basis points following the announcement of cross‐border M&As. This study also finds that these yield spreads are significantly affected by the differences in investor‐protection and deposit insurance environments between the transacting countries. However, the study does not find that the regulatory and supervisory environment in the home countries of the transacting parties significantly affects the changes in yield spreads. The overall evidence suggests that regulators should judge the relative environment in both the home and the host countries in evaluating the associated risks of an active multinational financial institution and in setting the sufficiency of the banks' reserve positions.