INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND FRACTURALIZATION:AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

This paper investigates the relationship between economic inequality and the distribution of votes among political parties, namely political polarization and fracturalization. Economic inequality is captured by the Gini index, whereas new measures of political polarization and fracturalization are offered. This is the first paper to calculate political polarization and fracturalization indices by a methodology previously used for ethnic, religious and linguistic polarization and fracturalization. Empirical analysis uses data for 17 European countries and for three decades, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It is shown that increased income inequality increases political party polarization and reduces fracturalization and that political party polarization decreases with increased GDP per capita.     

INCOME STRATIFICATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY

This paper develops a new index of stratification that highlights the distinction between inequality and stratification. The stratification index captures the extent to which population subgroups occupy distinct strata within an overall distribution. The indices are group specific and control for group size. A weighted sum of group stratification indices is the third term that, together with between-group inequality and a weighted sum of within-group inequality adds to the overall Gini index of inequality.     

LIFE SATISFACTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Do people care about income inequality and does income inequality affect subjective well‐being? Welfare theories can predict either a positive or a negative impact of income inequality on subjective well‐being and empirical research has found evidence of a positive, negative, or non‐significant relation. This paper attempts to determine some of the possible causes of such empirical heterogeneity. Using a very large sample of world citizens we test the consistency of the effect of income inequality in predicting life satisfaction. We find that income inequality has a negative and significant effect on life satisfaction. This result is robust to changes of regressors and estimation choices and also persists across different income groups and across different types of countries. However, this relation is easily obscured or reversed by multicollinearity generated by the use of country and year fixed effects. This is particularly true if the number of data points for inequality is small, which is a common feature of cross‐country or longitudinal studies.     

PERMANENT INCOME, CONVERGENCE AND INEQUALITY AMONG COUNTRIES

The literature on inequality has generally focused on the analysis of annual per capita income. This paper adopts a different approach by considering the life-cycle dimension of inequality and convergence between economies from 1960 to 2000. We analyze the present value of the set of incomes individuals obtain throughout their whole life (permanent income). On the basis of this approach, various simulations are made to determine the effect on inequality in permanent income of variables such as survival rates and the long-run growth rates in current income. The results indicate that survival rates are an important source of inequality. Inequality in permanent income is about one third higher than in current income. The implication of this finding is that if the whole life-cycle dimension is not considered, the level of inequality among economies is being underestimated.     

BANK COMPETITION,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT,AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Income inequality rises with financial development initially and then drops. We reach this conclusion by numerically solving a heterogeneous agent model parameterized to the Chinese economy. The model features a banking sector with Cournot competition, and the process of financial development in the model economy begins with the deregulation of the banking sector. Based on regressions with the fixed effects and the system generalized method of moments, the empirical analysis also suggests an inverted‐U relationship between income inequality and financial development using provincial data from China. (JEL E25, G21, G28)     

DYNAMIC STATUS EFFECTS,SAVINGS, AND INCOME INEQUALITY

This article advances the hypothesis that the intensity of status preferences depends negatively on the average wealth of society (endogenous dynamic status effect), in accordance with empirical evidence. Our theory replicates the contradictory historical facts of an increasing saving rate along with declining returns to capital over time. By affecting the dynamics of the saving rate, the dynamic status effect raises inequality, thereby providing a behavioral mechanism for the observed diverse dynamics of income inequality across countries. In countries in which the dynamic status effect is strong (weak), inequality rises (declines) over time in response to a positive productivity shock.     

RELATIVITY,INEQUALITY, AND OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION

How does concern for consumption relative to others (“relativity”) affect the structure of optimal nonlinear income taxation? Our article provides three sets of answers to this general question. First, it supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher marginal tax rates. In doing so, it both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is obtained in the literature and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax rates for specific functional forms for distribution, utility function, and social welfare function. Second, the article goes beyond the literature and examines the impact of relativity on the progression of optimal marginal tax rates. By and large, we find support for greater progressivity, defined as the steepness of the rise of the marginal tax rate schedule, as relativity concern increases. Third, none of the papers in the literature, to our knowledge, examines the interplay of relativity and inequality in determining the optimal structure of income taxes. Our special analytical cases and more general numerical calculations support the conclusion that higher inequality dampens the positive impact of greater relativity on the level and the progression of marginal tax rates. More work is needed to further explore this interaction between relativity and inequality that our analysis has uncovered.     

股市发展与收入分配不平等

股市发展与收入分配状况的关系是金融理论界和业界广泛关注的问题之一。本文构造全球33个国家从1988年至2013年有关股市发展和收入分配不平等的面板数据,实证研究各国股市发展及自由化改革对其收入分配不平等程度的影响及内在机理。研究发现：首先,一国股市规模越大,由于门槛效应的存在,其收入分配状况趋于恶化,而流动性的提升将在一定程度上改善其收入分配状况。其次,一国股市的发展对不同收入阶层存在不同的影响。最后,股市自由化前后,股市对收入分配状况的影响存在显著差异：股市自由化之后,股市规模的扩大和股市流动性的提升将在一定程度上改善收入分配状况。     

FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY

We document a strong empirical relationship between higher income inequality and stronger recessive impacts of fiscal consolidation episodes across time and space. To explain this finding, we develop a life‐cycle economy with uninsurable income risk. We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of several European economies, including inequality and fiscal structures, and study the effects of fiscal consolidation programs. In our model, higher income risk induces precautionary savings behavior, which decreases the proportion of credit‐constrained agents in the economy. These agents have less elastic labor supply responses to fiscal consolidations, which explain the correlation with inequality in the data.     

INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY: SOME PROBLEMS

In an important recent book dealing with the measurement of income inequality with particular reference to poverty,¹ Prof. N. Kakwani derives several poverty indices, investigates the effect of negative income tax schemes with the help of those indices and gives a numerical illustration based on Malaysian data.
The aim of this note is to point out some logical flaws in his argument. Some of the ideas expressed in the part of his book we are concerned with have been disseminated for some time now² and referred to in subsequent literature;³ yet their shortcomings do not seem to have attracted anyone's attention. The introductory section gives a concise presentation of the relevant part of Kakwani's contribution. The next two sections deal with some problems with his approach.     

INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Drawing on the author's work, this lecture presents evidence on U.S. income and wealth inequality. It presents series for top income and wealth shares, and the distribution of economic growth by income groups. It discusses the mechanisms behind the evolution of U.S. income and wealth inequality from historical and comparative perspectives. It analyzes the role of public policy and in particular taxation in the evolution of inequality. (JEL D31, F66, J24)     

CORRUPTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality. Our analysis advances the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of using one of the corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise because of data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality across the United States. Finally, we exploit both time series and cross‐sectional variation in the data. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality. (JEL D31, D73, I32)     

LIFETIME INEQUALITY AND TAX PROGRESSIVITY WITH ALTERNATIVE INCOME CONCEPTS

The increased availability of cohort data and use of dynamic microsimulation models means that more attention is now being paid to longer term income concepts. Results are usually reported for only one income concept and a limited number of summary measures, and it is not clear whether results are influenced by the income concept used. This paper uses simulation methods to compare different approaches. For this purpose a very simple lifecycle earnings model was used to generate profiles of pre-tax incomes. Many comparisons were made using a flexible tax structure and four alternative income concepts. It was found that there was a substantial amount of agreement among the alternative concepts in making pairwise comparisons, with tentative support for the use of present values.     

INEQUALITY AND PANEL INCOME CHANGES: CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES

Income changes in an economy are usually assessed through the changes over time in cross-sectional variables such as economy-wide inequality. An alternative is to use panel data to gauge income changes among identified income recipients. In this article, we analyze these two approaches taken together, each measured in multiple ways. We establish that under specific conditions, it is impossible to have falling inequality together with divergent panel income changes. We also provide conditions explaining when rising inequality can arise together with convergent panel changes. We provide the intuition behind these results and show when such results fail to hold.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON URBAN AND RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY

We use three conventional inequality indices—the Gini, the coefficient of variation of income, and the relative mean deviation of income—and the Atkinson index to examine the effect of income tax rates, the minimum wage, and all the major government welfare and transfer programs on the evolution of income inequality for rural and urban areas by state from 1981 to 1997. We find that these programs have qualitatively similar but quantitatively different effects on urban and rural areas. Most importantly, taxes are more effective in redistributing income in urban than in rural areas, while welfare and other government transfer programs play a larger role in rural areas.     

THE URBAN–RURAL INCOME GAP AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA

Using new household survey data for 1995 and 2002, we investigate the size of China's urban–rural income gap, the gap's contribution to overall inequality in China, and the factors underlying the gap. Our analysis improves on past estimates by using a fuller measure of income, adjusting for spatial price differences and including migrants. Our methods include inequality decomposition by population subgroup and the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. Several key findings emerge. First, the adjustments substantially reduce China's urban–rural income gap and its contribution to inequality. Nevertheless, the gap remains large and has increased somewhat over time. Second, after controlling for household characteristics, location of residence remains the most important factor underlying the urban–rural income gap. The only household characteristic that contributes substantially to the gap is education. Differences in the endowments of, and returns to, other household characteristics such as family size and composition, landholdings, and Communist Party membership are relatively unimportant.