Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.     

Does medicaid generosity affect household income?

Almost all recent literature on Medicaid and labor supply has used Affordable Care Act (ACA)-induced Medicaid eligibility expansions in various states as natural experiments. Estimated effects on employment and earnings differ widely due to differences in the scope of eligibility expansion across states and are potentially subject to biases due to policy endogeneity. Using a Regression Kink Design (RKD) framework, this paper takes a new approach to the identification of the effect of Medicaid generosity on household income. Both state-level data and March CPS data from 1980 to 2013 suggest that generous federal funding of state-level Medicaid costs have a negative effect on household income. The negative impact of Medicaid generosity on household income is more pronounced at the lower end of the household income distribution and on the income and earnings of female heads.     

Striking a balance: Optimal tax policy with labor market duality

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where employers may avoid making social security contributions by offering some workers “secondary contracts.” When calibrated using aggregate tax revenue data, the model delivers estimates of secondary “off the books” employment that are consistent with survey evidence for the EU14 and United States. We investigate the fiscal and welfare effects of varying the avoidable and unavoidable shares of labor income tax while keeping the total wedge constant, and find that increasing the employer component raises hours worked, output, and welfare. Partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance need not be a welfare enhancing policy mix.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice

In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive‐margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first‐best maximin utility can be achieved in the second‐best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.     

WORK INCENTIVES OF MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND THE ROLE OF ASSET TESTING

Should asset testing be used in means‐tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome when asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and nonworkers.     

A Regional Analysis of the Impact of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Wages in Mexico, 1984–2000

The conventional Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade predicts an equalizing effect of trade on wages in developing countries abundant in less‐skilled labor. Contrary to these predictions, skill premiums and skill demand increased in Mexico following trade liberalization. “New” trade theories have offered several channels through which trade can increase relative wages and demand for skilled workers. One such channel is foreign direct investment and outsourcing. Using the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) covering 1984–2000, the author examines the relationship between the demand for skill and maquiladora employment across regions and states. In contrast to previous studies based on manufacturing data for the 1980s, little evidence is found that growth in maquiladora employment is positively related to the increase in relative wages or wage‐bill share of more educated workers.     

Income Polarization of the U.S. Working Class: An Institutionalist View

We provide an institutional insight into the trend of income polarization within the U.S. working class. In contrast to the previous industrial waves, the current and ongoing industrial revolution is characterized by the replacement of “creative destruction” with jobless growth. Instead of replacing the lost jobs with new ones, new disruptive technologies eliminate more jobs in traditional labor and capital-intensive sectors than create jobs in new idea-intensive sectors. By examining the relationship between the income share of the bottom 50 percent, the middle 40 percent, and the top 10 percent and technological progress, we obtain robust econometric results. According to our results, the income polarization among U.S. workers can be associated with the shift of R&D activities from the public to the corporate sector. The concentration of innovations by corporate capital limits the power of society to reduce inequality and to provide greater social stability through “the incredible productivity” of technological progress.     

Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people

We consider optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic model where the labor‐leisure choice is the extensive margin, each household faces idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and a pecuniary cost to work, and there is no insurance market against the shocks. We show that the well‐known property of the optimal participation tax rate in the static model continues to hold in our dynamic economy, that is, the participation tax rates for some income groups with low consumption are likely negative. In dynamic models, the optimal participation tax rate depends on age and on labor income. Our numerical simulations suggest that a negative participation tax should be restricted to young households.     

ESTIMATING INCENTIVE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF NONSTATIONARY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

The distribution of unemployment duration in our equilibrium matching model with spell‐dependent unemployment benefits displays time‐varying exit rates. Building on semi‐Markov processes, we translate these rates into an expression for the aggregate unemployment rate. Structural estimation using German microdata allows us to discuss the effects of an unemployment benefit reform (Hartz IV). The reform reduced unemployment by less than 0.1 percentage points. Contrary to general beliefs, the net wage for most skill and regional groups increased. Taking the insurance effect of unemployment benefits into account, however, the reform is welfare reducing for 76% of workers.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.     

MULTIPLE THRESHOLDS IN THE NEXUS BETWEEN WORKING HOURS AND PRODUCTIVITY

Changes in working hours may have two contrasting effects on productivity: a “fatigue effect” and a “learning effect.” An increase in working hours may lead to the accumulation of workers' proficiency and skill in his or her job, while it may cause the level of workers' fatigue to increase. Our estimation results find multiple thresholds in the linkage between working time and productivity, supporting the existence of learning effect as well as fatigue effect from working time extension. The results of our study provide some implications for the recent discussion on reform of the working time system: for example, (i) the overall effects of changes in working time depend upon a variety of factors, such as the initial level of working hours and the features of the industry concerned; and (ii) job sharing may induce employers to substitute part‐timers for full‐time workers, thereby hindering workers' accumulation of skills. (JEL J24, D24, D92, O47)     

Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records

We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.     

Economics,Power, and Regulation of Multinational Corporations

Contingent — rather than secure — provisioning is the core of the institutions of capitalism. This differential access to means of life is a method of prodding labor force participation, considered “coercion” by “old” institutional economists and “freedom” by neoliberal thinkers. Status differentials, which are based on pay hierarchies and branded consumer goods, help reinforce the individual competition for differential rewards. Reform would require reconstituting the labor market, as well as financial institutions, and restructuring the rationales for income distribution.     

A POSITIVE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE*

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross‐country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward‐looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self‐reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady‐states: one “European” and one “American.” The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.     

Experienced versus decision utility: large-scale comparison for income–leisure preferences*

Subjective well-being (SWB) data are increasingly used to perform welfare analysis. Interpreted as “experienced utility”, it has recently been compared to “decision utility” using small-scale experiments most often based on stated preferences. We transpose this comparison to the framework of non-experimental and large-scale data commonly used for policy analysis, focusing on the income–leisure domain where redistributive policies operate. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we suggest a “deviation” measure, which is simply the difference between actual working hours and SWB-maximizing hours. We show that about three-quarters of individuals make decisions that are not inconsistent with maximizing their SWB. We discuss the potential channels that explain the lack of optimization when deviations are significantly large. We find proxies for a number of individual and external constraints, and show that constraints alone can explain more than half of the deviations. In our context, deviations partly reflect the inability of the revealed preference approach to account for labor market rigidities, so the actual and SWB-maximizing hours should be used in a complementary manner. The suggested approach based on our deviation metric could help identify labor market frictions.     

零工经济如何改变性别工资差距*——基于家庭与市场的双重视角

中国企业生产与性别收入分配的格局正在发生深刻变化。零工就业意味着雇佣的非正式化与收入的不稳定化，女性被大量吸纳进入零工经济的同时，参与劳动力市场和家庭的方式也发生转变，性别工资差距可能随之变化。理论分析表明，在市场领域，非正式雇佣加深了劳动后备军对工资的挤压效应，女性作为劳动力“蓄水池”，收入下降效应更为明显；在家庭领域，不稳定收入加深了劳动者的自我规训，家务劳动时间分配不均使收入差距进一步扩张。在上述两种效应下，零工经济中的性别工资差距将大于非零工经济。基于微观调查数据的经验研究结果验证了上述理论推演。劳动者“灵活性”和“安全性”的综合指标表明，只有建立灵活安全的劳动力市场机制，重视弱势群体的就业保护，才能真正推动零工经济成为“稳就业、保增长”的中坚力量。     

ON THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION*

This article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare. We calibrate our model to U.S. data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax‐financed education depend on the main source of individual household income. Households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention, whereas high‐wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban, and low‐wage workers benefit most from free education. Introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains, whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses.     

基于民工异质的刘易斯模型改造

刘易斯模型能够很好地解释我国长期低工资水平下的“民工潮”现象,但因其剩余劳动力完全同质的假设而无法解释我国当前发生的“民工荒”现象。本文依据“保留工资”高低将民工分成若干个类别,从而构建了一个基于民工异质的民工市场模型：经此改造的刘易斯模型分析的意义在于,它提供了一个能够同时解释“民工潮”与“民工荒”的统一的理论框架,揭示了“民工潮”与“民工荒”有可能交替发生,显示了破解当前“民工荒”问题的根本之策是提高民工工资,表明了“刘易斯拐点”在我国还远未出现：     

The Role of Income Effects in Early Retirement

We provide a long‐term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement by emphasizing the role of (negative) income effects. We consider a political economic theoretical framework, with actuarially “fair” and “unfair” early retirement schemes, and derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. A reduction in the wages in youth, consistent with the recent labor market trends since the massive introduction of temporary jobs, induces workers to postpone retirement, and—in the “unfair” system—leads to lower contribution rates. A reduction in the growth rate of the economy has opposite effects on the retirement decisions, leading—in the “unfair” system—to more early retirement. Aging induces a negative income effect, but has also an opposite political effect on social security contributions and retirement decisions. For an actuarially “fair” social security system, we provide conditions for the political effect to dominate; in an “unfair” scheme, numerical simulations confirm a slight predominance of the political effect, as contribution rates increase. These results may shed some light on the future of early retirement in aging societies.     

Collectivism in the labor market: Evidence from second generation immigrants in the United States

This study investigates the role of collectivism on labor market outcomes in an individualist country. We explore collectivism as an intergenerationally transmitted cultural value and analyze its explanatory power for the economic outcome of 21,000 male homogamous second generation immigrants in the US. Our collectivism proxy is derived from the country of ancestry’s historical disease environment because collectivistic values have been particularly advantageous in countries with a greater prevalence of disease-causing pathogens. Employing this new collectivism proxy that identifies collectivism more precisely than previously used cultural proxies, we find that higher scores of collectivism are associated with higher labor force participation and income earned in the US. The results on income are channeled through the number of hours worked and self-selection into jobs that require collectivistic traits. By analyzing the labor market performance of second generation immigrants, we are the first to show an occupational selection along cultural skills implying that second generation immigrants sort into occupations that demand skills on which they have a “cultural comparative advantage”.