The company you keep: Satisfaction with life,economic freedom,and preference-policy mismatch

We examine the interaction between individual preferences for markets and state-level economic freedom as it relates to Satisfaction with Life (SWL). Fundamental tenets of economic freedom assert that societies free of excessive government involvement are wealthier and, ultimately, happier; individuals who are allowed to pursue self-interest are argued to be more motivated and more productive, and so society as a whole is better off. Though there is substantial empirical evidence that freer societies are wealthier, the evidence connecting economic freedom and happiness is less clear. We explore the relationship between economic freedom and SWL at the individual level. We examine differences between personal preferences for free markets and state policy and how this ‘preference-policy mismatch’ is related to SWL. We then briefly examine the relationship between preference-policy mismatches and individual self-reported voting behavior, including implications for Tiebout sorting. This study is the first to focus on individual economic ideology, i.e. individual level of support for free markets, and SWL in the United States. Combining individual and state level data we offer improvements to prior studies in a number of areas including an enhanced measure of life satisfaction, a richer basis for examining left-right differences than simple political identification, and an examination of the effect of preference-policy mismatches on satisfaction with life. We find significant relationships between SWL and individual support for markets, state-level economic freedom, and preference-policy mismatch. Further, preference-policy mismatch is positively associated with self-reported voting frequency. We find little support for Tiebout sorting.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND STATE BOND RATINGS

Are state bond ratings, ceteris paribus, related to economic freedom? We test for the relationship between economic freedom and an aggregate index comprised of ratings by Standard & Poor, Moody's, and Fitch. We also test for a relationship between economic freedom and the ratings by these three agencies individually. With a sample covering all 50 states for the period 1995–2008, the evidence strongly indicates that state bond ratings are positively and significantly related to overall economic freedom as well as three sub‐categories of economic freedom. Our results show that the quantitative impact of economic freedom on bond ratings is comparable to the effect of state real income and the unemployment rate. (JEL E43, H71)     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME LEVELS ACROSS U.S. STATES: A SPATIAL PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

There is a large literature estimating the effect of economic freedom on economic growth or income levels. Most studies examine the relationship between economic freedom and growth or income levels for countries, while a few examine the relationship for U.S. states. Absent in the state‐level literature is consideration of the presence of spatial spillovers affecting the freedom‐income relationship. Neglecting to account for spatial autocorrelation can bias estimation results and therefore inferences drawn. We find evidence of a spatial pattern in real per‐capita gross state product (GSP) that affects nonspatial estimates of the freedom‐income relationship. Taking into account the direct and indirect effects of economic freedom on real per‐capita GSP, we find a 10% increase in economic freedom is associated with a 5% increase in real per‐capita GSP. (JEL E02, O47, R11)     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME INEQUALITY REVISITED: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL

We investigate the causal relationship between income inequality and economic freedom using data from U.S. states over the period 1981 to 2004 within a panel error correction model framework. The results indicate bidirectional causality between income inequality and economic freedom in both the short and the long run. These results suggest that high income inequality may cause states to implement redistributive policies causing economic freedom to decline. As economic freedom declines, income inequality rises even more. In other words, it is quite possible for a state to get caught in a vicious circle of high income inequality and heavy redistribution. (JEL D63, H11)     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

The effect of democracy on different categories of economic freedom

Many empirical studies conclude that democracy increases economic freedom. However, these studies use highly aggregated indices of economic freedom, which eliminates interesting information. The purpose of this paper is to study empirically how in developing countries different categories of economic freedom are affected by democracy, measured either as political rights or civil liberties. Democracy appears to have a positive effect on the economic freedom categories Government Operations and Regulations and Restraints on International Exchange, but no effect on the categories Money and Inflation and Takings and Discriminatory Taxation. That a high level of democracy would have a negative effect on economic freedom reform receives no support in this study. The robustness of the results to the model specification and extreme points is tested.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM,SPORT POLICY,AND INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN PHYSICAL ACTIVITY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

Many countries promote participation in physical activity among its citizens. We undertake an international comparative analysis of participation using data from 34 countries in the 2007 International Social Survey Programme Leisure Time and Sports module, augmented with country‐specific characteristics capturing economic freedom and national sport policy. Gross domestic product per capita and economic freedom are associated with higher physical activity participation; past success of the national team in the Olympics is associated with lower participation, but hosting sports mega‐events is associated with higher participation. Our findings indicate that participation in sport and physical activity falls with age and rises with education and income. (JEL H59, I12, I18, J22, L83)     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES

Using 1981–2009 data for the 50 states, this article examines the relationship between economic freedom and the unemployment rate, the labor force participation rate, and the employment‐population ratio. After controlling for a variety of state‐level characteristics, the results from most specifications indicate that economic freedom is associated with lower unemployment and with higher labor force participation and employment‐population ratios. (JEL J68, K31, O43)     

Group identification with (incomplete) preferences

We consider the problem of identifying members of a group based on individual opinions. Since agents do not have preferences in the model, properties of rules that concern preferences (e.g., strategy‐proofness and efficiency) have not been studied in the literature. We fill this gap by working with a class of incomplete preferences derived directly from opinions. Our main result characterizes a new family of group identification rules, called voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rules, using two well‐known properties: strategy‐proofness and equal treatment of equals. Our family contains as a special case the consent rules (Samet & Schmeidler. J. Econ. Theory, 110 (2003), pp. 213–233), which are symmetric and embody various degrees of liberalism and democracy; and it also includes dictatorial and oligarchic rules that value agents’ opinions differently. In the presence of strategy‐proofness, efficiency turns out to be equivalent to non‐degeneracy (i.e., any agent may potentially be included or excluded from the group). This implies that a rule satisfies strategy‐proofness, efficiency, and equal treatment of equals if, and only if, it is a non‐degenerate voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rule.     

MEDIA ADVERTISING AND BALLOT INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATION

Spending on political advertising increases with every election cycle, not only for congressional or presidential candidates, but also for state‐level ballot initiatives. There is little research in marketing, however, on the effectiveness of political advertising at this level. In this study, we conduct an experimental analysis of advertisements used during the 2008 campaign to mandate new animal welfare standards in California (Proposition 2). Using subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs as a proxy for their likely voting behavior, we investigate whether advertising provides real information to likely voters, and thus sharpens their existing attitudes toward the issue, or whether advertising can indeed change preferences. We find that advertising in support of Proposition 2 was more effective in raising subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs than ads in opposition were in reducing it, but we also find that ads in support of the measure reduce the dispersion of preferences and thus polarize attitudes toward the initiative. More generally, political ads are found to contain considerably more “hype” than “real information” in the sense of Johnson and Myatt [Johnson, J. P., and D. P. Myatt. “On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and Product Design.” American Economic Review, 96, 2006, 756–84]. (JEL D12, D72, K32, L66, M37)     

Institutions,Lobbying, and Economic Performance

We investigate whether the impact of institutions depends not just on their current state but also on how they came to be. In particular, we hypothesize that while economic freedom that emerges spontaneously may be growth promoting, economic freedom that emerges as a result of costly lobbying efforts may be less fruitful. In an extreme case, costly lobbying efforts may even negate the growth‐enhancing effect of economic freedom. To the extent that lobbying efforts constitute an opportunity cost of resources diverted away from investment and production, our hypothesis also implies that greater the opportunity cost of lobbying, the more efficient is the institutional environment. Panel data analysis reveals the expected positive relation between economic freedom and growth, and consistent with our hypothesis, the findings indicate that the impact of economic freedom on growth does indeed diminish as lobbying efforts increase. In addition, we find that lobbying is more harmful to growth at greater levels of economic freedom.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations

Summary. Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be `naturally' partitioned into two such domains. Received: June 17, 1996; revised version: April 15, 1997     

Cooperation,stability and social welfare under majority rule

We resolve collective irrationality in the stability set, a solution concept for voting games proposed by Rubinstein (J Econ Theory 23:150–159, 1980) to resolve the well-known paradox of voting in the core. A lack of cooperation within winning coalitions prevents their members from eliminating an alternative globally less preferred to another one when they observe the rational behavior defining the stability set. Allowing for the possibility of accompanying a coalitional vote with a binding solidarity agreement is a natural response to this cooperation failure. This leads to a new standard of behavior and a new solution concept called stability set with binding solidarity agreement or S _c -stability set. It is shown that the S _c -stability set and a newly defined version of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for simple games are not comparable with respect to set inclusion. The S _c -stability set includes the core, is included in the stability set and contains only Pareto-optimal alternatives. When individual preferences are complete linear orders, the S _c -stability set is always non-empty.      

Fully sincere voting

In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

The effects of economic freedom,regulatory quality and taxation on the level of per capita real income: a preliminary analysis for OECD nations and non-G8 OECD nations

This study of the impact of economic freedom, regulatory quality and the relative burden of taxation on the level of per capita real income/GDP among OECD nations over the period 2003 to 2007 adopts a modified version of the overall economic freedom index computed by the Heritage Foundation (2013), one with the fiscal freedom and business freedom indices removed. This study then provides panel least squares fixed-effects estimates for five linear specifications/models. Each nation during this time frame can be regarded either as a nation per se or as a de facto ‘economic region’ within the OECD. The analysis first focuses upon all of the OECD nations and then, as a robustness test, subsequently focuses only on non-G8 OECD member nations. The estimations in this study all provide strong empirical support for the three central hypotheses proffered here, namely: (1) the higher the overall degree of economic freedom, the higher the per capita real income (GDP) level; (2) the higher the level of regulatory quality, the higher the level of per capita real income (GDP) and (3) the higher the overall tax burden, expressed as a per cent of GDP, the lower is the level of per capita real income (GDP).