TESTING MODELS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MARKETS: CONSOLIDATION IN THE CABLE TV INDUSTRY

Research on differentiated products markets often uses structural demand/supply models to identify firms' marginal costs as product‐level cost data are unavailable. Using unique demand and cost data from cable TV, I evaluate a differentiated products model's ability to identify marginal costs. I find firms systematically price below profit‐maximizing levels, leading to biases in the model's marginal cost estimates. I study the implications for merger simulations and find that these biases compromise estimates of merger‐related cost efficiencies, yet do not prevent these models from generating useful predictions of the price and nonprice effects of mergers.     

NONRESIDENT POSTSECONDARY ENROLLMENT GROWTH AND THE OUTCOMES OF IN‐STATE STUDENTS

We study the effects of exposure to nonresident students on the outcomes of undergraduate in‐state students during a period of high nonresident enrollment growth at the University of Missouri‐Columbia. Our models leverage within‐major, cross‐time variation in nonresident exposure for identification. We find no evidence that increased exposure to domestic nonresidents affects in‐state student outcomes and our null results are precisely estimated. We find evidence of modest negative impacts on in‐state students when their exposure to foreign students increases using our preferred specification. However, the identifying variation in exposure to foreign students in our data is limited and this result is not robust in all of our models. (JEL I23, I28, R23)     

THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PREVENTING RESPIRATORY AND CARDIOVASCULAR HOSPITALIZATIONS

This article provides estimates of the economic benefits of reducing respiratory and cardiovascular hospitalizations based on cost of illness and willingness to pay. The willingness-to-pay estimates indicate that individuals value prevention of a five-day hospitalization event at an average of approximately $2,400. Average total costs of illness per hospitalization are $22,000–39,000. A comprehensive cost-of-illness estimate that includes value of time losses for the hospitalization and at-home recovery periods provides a close approximation of total costs borne by third parties plus individual willingness to pay. Both exceed previous cost-of-illness estimates by about 10–25%. (JEL D61, I18, Q25 )     

How the source of the entrant's advantage limits entry‐deterring tying

I revisit a simple model of entry‐deterring tying—example 1 from Whinston's (1990) seminal paper—but allow the potential entrant to have either a cost advantage or a willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) advantage relative to the incumbent. I show that, compared to the usual case in which the potential entrant is cost‐advantaged, tying is less effective against an entrant with a WTP advantage because an entrant with a large WTP advantage may be able to induce the buyer to buy both the tied bundle and the entrant's product. I also show that tying but failing to deter entry can be less costly when facing an entrant with a WTP advantage than when facing an entrant with a cost advantage. For a firm facing uncertainty about, for example, the entrant's entry costs, this makes tying a more attractive entry deterrence strategy against a WTP‐advantaged entrant. These results shed light on the important policy question of which markets are most likely to be susceptible to entry‐deterring tying.     

Rational Underdevelopment*

We propose a two‐region two‐sector model of uneven development, where technological change benefits either the lagging or the leading region. In this framework interregional transfers may lead to persistent underdevelopment; by raising wages, transfers reduce the chance of the backward region adopting a new technology and taking off. Due to uncertainty about which region benefits from technological change, the backward region may rationally choose to remain underdeveloped, while the advanced region continues to pay transfers. The model provides a rationale for cases, such as Italy's Mezzogiorno, where the same rich region subsidizes the same poor region on a continuous basis.     

Urban Demand for Edible Oils and Fats in China: Evidence from Household Survey Data

Using urban household-level survey data from 1992 to 1998, we provide estimates of final demand for edible vegetable oils and animal fats in three regions of China based on an incomplete demand system. For each region, the demand for the major staple oil is price inelastic. The aggregate demand for nonstaple and condiment oils is more responsive to price changes and is elastic in some cases. All edible oils have positive income elasticity, but smaller than one. The share of animal fat in total fat and oil consumption is decreasing with rising income. Older and smaller households exhibit larger per-capita consumption of oils and fats. Exact measures of urban consumer welfare losses associated with trade restrictions on vegetable oil imports indicate that these urban consumers suffer a significant surplus loss as high as $679.19 million in 1998 U.S. dollars. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 732–753. Department of Economics and Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070; and Institut National de Recherche Agronomique Paris-grignon 75231 Paris, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: Q18, D12, Q17, O18.     

Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale

We consider a seller who can either sell exclusively through resellers, or allow potential consumers to purchase directly from him. The consumers’ willingness to pay is private information. All transactions are in the form of second-price sealed bid auctions. We show that, if the resellers can gain access to a substantially bigger portion of the market than the seller himself, the seller obtains a higher revenue by dealing exclusively through them, i.e., by committing to not sell to any consumer. The result is due to a “winner’s curse” effect: the resellers win only if the consumers that they compete against submit lower bids, i.e., if part of their customer base has low valuations. This depresses the resellers’ willingness to pay relative to what they would be willing to pay under an exclusive resale contract. Our results do not depend on the presence of transaction costs: exclusive dealing yields strictly higher revenue even when the resellers can market the item at zero cost. We would like to thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Michael Rothkopf and seminar participants at Iowa State University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics meetings, the Milken Institute, Rutgers University, SUNY at Stony Brook Summer Workshop on Game Theory, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Why is there money? Endogenous derivation of `money' as the most liquid asset: a class of examples

Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium. Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity) money in equilibrium. Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara, University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin - Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California - Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University. It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe.     

Adjustment Costs,Inventories and Output

This paper analyzes the optimal adjustment strategy of an inventory‐holding firm facing price‐ and quantity‐adjustment costs in an inflationary environment. The model nests both the original menu‐cost model that allows production to be costlessly adjusted, and the later model that includes price‐ and quantity‐adjustment costs, but rules out inventory holdings. It is shown that the firm's optimal adjustment strategy may involve stockouts. At low inflation rates, output is inversely related to the inflation rate, and the length of time demand is satisfied increases with the demand elasticity but decreases with the storage cost and the real interest rate.     

THE BROTHER‐IN‐LAW EFFECT*

When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother‐in‐law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother‐in‐law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.     

Productivity cost model of the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis with abatacept

Background: The cost of the biological drug abatacept may be partly offset by reductions in the cost of productivity losses due to employee absences and reduced effectiveness at work because of rheumatoid arthritis (RA).

Methods: This was a 1-year productivity cost model based on epidemiologic and economic data. The setting was private industry in the US and the primary outcome measure was the difference in the costs of lost productivity and drug treatment with and without abatacept (‘cost difference’).

Results: The lost productivity cost of RA for a firm of 10,000 was $1.69 million, largely due to the cost of RA-related absenteeism ($1.55 million) rather than to worker displacement ($0.12 million) or care-giving for spouses with RA ($0.02 million). In the base case analysis (excluding presenteeism), 37% of the acquisition cost of abatacept was offset by reductions in the cost of RA-related productivity losses. In some industry groups (Utilities and Finance), and in models that included presenteeism, reductions in lost productivity costs exceeded the abatacept cost.

Conclusions: Much of the acquisition cost of abatacept may be offset by reductions in the cost of productivity losses due to RA. Abatacept treatment could be cost saving in some industry groups.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

REPEAL OF PROHIBITION: A BENEFIT‐COST ANALYSIS

In spite of an estimated increase in annual alcohol‐related motor vehicle costs of $2.767 billion (1947 dollars), the net social benefit of repeal of alcohol Prohibition amounts to $432 million per annum in 1934–1937, about 0.33% of gross domestic product. Total benefits of $3.25 billion consist primarily of increased consumer and producer surplus, tax revenues, and reduced criminal violence costs. A Monte Carlo simulation shows the probability of negative net benefits is 16%. The estimated price elasticity of demand for spirits, beer, and wine are –.60, ?.56, and –.51 respectively, which is consistent with the modern literature. (JEL D61, I18, K420, I120)     

DO INVESTMENT‐SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES MATTER FOR BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS? EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

The observed decline in the relative price of investment goods to consumption goods in Japan suggests the existence of investment‐specific technological (IST) changes. We examine whether IST changes are a major source of business fluctuations in Japan, by estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model using Bayesian methods. We show that IST changes are less important than neutral technological changes in explaining output fluctuations. We also demonstrate that investment fluctuations are mainly driven by shocks to investment adjustment costs. Such shocks represent variations of costs involved in changing investment spending, such as financial intermediation costs. We find that the estimated series of the investment adjustment cost shock correlates strongly with the diffusion index of firms' financial position in the Tankan (Short‐term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan). Therefore, we argue that the large decline in investment growth in the early 1990s was due to an increase in investment adjustment costs stemming from firms' financial constraints after the collapse of Japan's asset price bubble.     

DOUBLING U.S. EXPORTS UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION

President Obama's National Export Initiative (NEI) is targeted at doubling U.S. exports between 2010 and 2015. We apply USAGE to quantify what the NEI would need to do to foreign import‐demand curves and domestic export‐supply curves to achieve this target. USAGE is a dynamic economy‐wide model of the U.S. incorporating recession‐relevant factor market specifications including excess capacity and wage/labor‐demand elasticities that vary with the level of employment. In our central simulation, export‐promotion policies compatible with the President's target reduce the cost of the current recession from about 70 million 1‐year jobs for the period 2008–2020 to 45 million jobs. (JEL E17, C68, E62, E65, F16)     

THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL HELP AND GIFTS ON HOUSING DEMAND AND COST BURDENS

Financial transfers are an important source of income for many households and recipients may use these funds to pay for housing services. This paper examines the separate impact of financial help and substantial gifts on both housing demand and housing cost burden. The results indicate receiving gifts has a positive and statistically significant impact on housing demand. Households receiving help or gifts have substantially higher housing cost burdens, all else being held constant. These findings have implications for the financial well-being of recipient households and ultimately, the mortgage industry . ( JEL R20, R21)     

Resource Rents,Cost Differences and Fiscal Equalization*

It has been argued that the fiscal equalization process in Australia, which transfers wealth between States, has efficiency costs. Here, I show that equalization transfers can be efficiency enhancing. Further, it is shown that under certain assumptions about inter-state differences in costs of production and resource endowments, such transfers may need to favour relatively high cost and resource rich States, such as Western Australia and Queensland, while under other assumptions about diversity, they should favour relatively resource poor and low cost States, such as Victoria and New South Wales.     

A Model of Spillovers Through Labor Recruitment

This paper develops a model where spillovers can be generated through domestic firm recruitment of employees at a multinational corporation (MNC) where more advanced technologies are employed. It is shown that both spillover and no-spilover equilibria are possible in the model, depending on the marginal costs and benefits of recruitment. Spillover benefits depend on demand parameters and the technological capabilities of the domestic firm, and spillover costs are determined by the MNC's internal wage. Compared with the no-spillover equilibrium, spillovers lead to fewer technology transfers by the MNC and higher market prices. [031, F23]     

DOES SPENDING MORE ON TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE? AN INCREMENTAL BENEFIT‐COST ANALYSIS USING PANEL DATA

This paper presents a benefit‐cost analysis of the ongoing, state‐level tobacco prevention and control programs in the United States. Using state‐level panel data for the years 1991–2007, the study applies several variants of econometric modeling approaches to estimate the state‐level tobacco demand. The paper finds a statistically significant evidence of a sustained and steadily increasing long‐run impact of the tobacco control program spending on cigarette demand in states. The study also shows that, if individual states follow the Best Practices funding guidelines, potential future annual benefits of the tobacco control program can be as high as 14–20 times the cost of program implementation. (JEL C2, H5, I1)