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1.
Most designated CEO successors are talented, hardworking, and smart enough to go all the way--yet fail to land the top job. What they don't realize is, the qualities that helped them in their climb to the number two position aren't enough to boost them to number one. In addition to running their businesses well, the author explains, would-be CEOs must master the art of forming coalitions and winning support. They must also sharpen their self-awareness and their sensitivity to the needs of bosses and influential peers because they typically receive little performance feedback once they're on track to become CEO. Indeed, the ability to pick up on subtle cues is often an important part of the test. When succession doesn't go well--or fails altogether--many people pay the price: employees depending on a smooth handoff at the top, investors expecting continuous leadership, and families uprooted when jobs don't pan out. Among those at fault are boards that do not keep a close watch on the succession process, human resource organizations that should have the capacity to help but are not up to the task, and CEOs who do a poor job coaching potential successors. But the aspiring CEO also bears some responsibility. He can dramatically increase his chances of success by understanding his boss's point of view, knowing his own limitations, and managing what psychologist Gerry Egan has called the "shadow organization"--the political side of a company, characterized by unspoken relationships and alliances--without being labeled "political." Most of all, he must learn to conduct himself with a level of maturity and wisdom that signals he is ready--not almost ready--to be chief executive.  相似文献   

2.
The job no CEO should delegate   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
In 1991, AlliedSignal was in poor shape: morale was low, operating margins were lower than 5%, return on equity was only 10.5%, and--most troubling--the operating management team was weak. But by 1999, when AlliedSignal merged with Honeywell, it was a strong and thriving business. Operating margins had tripled, return on equity stood near 28%, and it had a top-notch management group. How did the company right its course? Larry Bossidy, CEO of AlliedSignal from 1991 through 1999, believes the turnaround was made possible by a dramatic improvement in people processes. And the extraordinary amount of time and emotional energy he put into evaluating, recruiting, and developing great managers-tasks that most CEOs delegate--was the key to this process improvement. In this First Person article, Bossidy explains why he believes the interview "is the most flawed process in American business." He talks candidly about how he assesses candidates and what types of questions he asks references. He also describes the four leadership traits he looks for when evaluating job candidates: first, the ability to execute--that is, being able to turn ideas into reality. The second trait is what Bossidy calls "a career runway." When Bossidy hires someone, he wants to hire him or her for this job and the next job, never for the person's final position. A third quality is a team orientation--good leaders are able to work well with others. And the fourth quality is having a wide range of experience. To build their skill sets, Bossidy tries to ensure that up-and-coming executives sit in many seats en route to leadership roles.  相似文献   

3.
The success of Dell--it provides extraordinary rewards to shareholders, it can turn on a dime, and it has demonstrated impeccable timing in entering new markets--is based on more than its famous business model. High expectations and disciplined, consistent execution are embedded in the company's DNA. "We don't tolerate businesses that don't make money," founder Michael Dell tells HBR. "We used to hear all sorts of excuses for why a business didn't make money, but to us they all sounded like 'The dog ate my homework.' We just don't accept that." In order to double its revenues in a five-year period, the company had to adapt its execution-obsessed culture to new demands. In fact, Michael Dell and CEO Kevin Rollins realized they had a crisis on their hands."We had a very visible group of employees who'd gotten rich from stock options," Rollins says. "You can't build a great company on employees who say, 'If you pay me enough, I'll stay.'" Dell and Rollins knew they had to reignite the spirit of the company. They implemented an employee survey, whose results led to the creation of the Winning Culture initiative, now a top operating priority at Dell. They also defined the Soul of Dell: Focus on the customer, be open and direct in communications, be a good global citizen, have fun in winning. It turned outto be a huge motivator. And they increased the focus on developing people within the company. "We've changed as individuals and as an organization," Rollins says. "We want the world to see not just a great financial record and operational performance but a great company. We want to have leaders that other companies covet. We want a culture that makes people stick around for reasons other than money."  相似文献   

4.
If you were the CEO of Pitney Bowes, the postage meter maker, how would you envision the future of the business? The company has an undeniable core competence in the solutions it provides to high-volume postal service users. But with snail mail on the decline, some would say that core has about as much future as the buggy whip. In this article, Pitney Bowes chairman and CEO Michael Critelli gives us a glimpse of how he leads his company's strategy development--and how that development has supported a counterintuitive return to the company's core after decades of diversification. He and others in the company begin the process by tapping into deeply knowledgeable people and organizations to understand key trends in the business and the rate at which change is occurring. Then, it's a question of the firm reshaping the environment in which it does business, whether through R&D investments or work with regulators and policy makers who influence market forces; this is especially important in emerging markets. Focusing on a core business area enables a company to find adjacent high-margin opportunities and to offer comprehensive solutions to customers. What stands out most sharply in this account, however, is the importance of having a strategist's mind-set. Whether Critelli is reading the day's news, visiting a key account, or spending an hour with his own people working in the context of a customer mail room, he is constantly extrapolating possible long-term competitive implications from the immediate facts. Often inspired by strategic thinkers, Critelli believes that the greatest thing he can do for his organization is to shift the terms of the debate. "Rarely am I credited with sterling words or bold, symbolic actions", he writes. "Instead, I help people to see the business we are in differently and to reach a shared vision as to where we want to end up. And, little by little, things move in the right direction".  相似文献   

5.
A disturbing trend is going on in corporate America--CEO churning. Top executives are rapidly coming and going, keeping their jobs for increasingly shorter periods of time. The reason? Most boards are so unclear about the definition of leadership, they are picking the wrong people. CEO churning needn't be, say leadership experts Warren Bennis and James O'Toole. Boards can reverse the trend by following several guidelines. First, boards must come to a shared, accurate definition of leadership. Simply put, leaders must be able to move human hearts--to challenge people and make them want to scale steep peaks. Second, boards should strengthen the CEO selection process by resolving strategic and political conflicts amongst themselves. An agreed-upon strategic direction will make choosing the CEO with the right vision for the company that much easier and can clarify the job for the new CEO. Third, the board needs to measure every CEO candidate's soft qualities. Economic measures are important, but integrity, the ability to provide meaning, and the talent for creating other leaders are critical. Fourth, boards should beware of candidates who act like CEOs. Charisma and glossy pitches can be enticing, but they're rarely the stuff of true leadership. Fifth, boards should accept that real leaders will more than likely overturn the status quo. Sixth, boards need to know that insider heirs usually aren't apparent, and finally, boards should always avoid making a hasty decision. Hiring the right CEO is a slow process at best. Ultimately, the surest way for boards to pick the right CEO is to cultivate and nurture talent in the making.  相似文献   

6.
Almost 50% of the largest American firms will have a new CEO within the next four years; your company could very well be next. Senior executives know that a CEO transition means they're in for a round of firings, organizational reshuffles, and other unwelcome career changes. When your career suddenly depends on the views of a person you may not know, how worried should you be? According to the authors--very. They investigated the 2002-2004 CEO turnover rates of the top 1,000 U.S. companies and interviewed more than a dozen CEOs, each of whom had taken over at least one very large organization. Their study reveals that when a new CEO takes charge, remaining top managers are more likely than not to be shown the door. Those who leave often land in a lower position at a new company, work in a much smaller firm, or retire altogether. The news is not all grim, however. The interviewees offer some pointers on how to create a good impression and maximize your chances of survival and success under the new regime. Some of that advice may surprise you. One CEO pointed out, for instance, that "managers do not realize how much the CEO is looking for teammates on day one. I am amazed at how few people come through the door and say, 'I want to help. I may not be perfect, but I buy into your vision:" Other recommendations are more intuitive, such as learning the new CEO's working style, understanding her agenda, and helping her look good in her new position by achieving positive operating results--and soon. Along with the inevitable stresses, the authors point out, CEO transitions can provide opportunities. Whether you reinvigorate your career within your company or find fulfillment elsewhere, the key lies in deciding what you want to do--and then doing it right.  相似文献   

7.
Moving mountains     
What could be more fundamental to management, or more difficult, than motivating people? After all, a manager, by definition, is someone who gets work done through others. But how? A typical recipe for motivation calls for a mixture of persuasion, encouragement, and compulsion. Yet the best leaders, we suspect, need no recipe: They get people to produce great results by appealing to their deepest drives, needs, and desires. And so we discovered when we asked a dozen of the world's top leaders to describe how they each met a daunting challenge in motivating an individual, a team, or an organization. Their answers are as varied as human nature. Some of the leaders appeal to people's need for the rational and the orderly: Mattel's Robert Eckert emphasizes the reassuring power of delivering a consistent message, and HP's Carly Fiorina focuses on facing hard truths on setting step-by-step goals. Some, like celebrated oceanographer Robert Ballard, Pfizer CEO Hank McKinnell, and BP America president Ross Pillari, see the powerful motivating effects of asking people to rise to difficult challenges. Others focus more on the human spirit, appealing to the desire to do something, as BMW's Chris Bangle puts it, "rare, marvelous, and lasting." And quite a few inspire through example, as Dial chairman Herb Baum did when he donated $1,000 from his bonus to each of the company's 155 lowest-paid people. "If you draw the line on your own greed, and your employees see it," he says, "they will be incredibly loyal and perform much better for you." And he has the numbers to prove it. "Right now," he adds, "we're experiencing our lowest level of attrition in 11 years, and we're tracking toward another banner year because people are happy."  相似文献   

8.
Freeman KW 《Harvard business review》2004,82(11):51-4, 56-8, 147
The literature on CEO succession planning is nearly unanimous in its advice: Begin early, look first inside your company for exceptional talent, see that candidates gain experience in all aspects of the business, and help them develop the skills they will need in the top job. It all makes sense and sounds pretty straightforward. Nevertheless, the list of CEOs who last no more than a few years on the job continues to grow. Implicit in many, if not all, of these unceremonious departures is the absence of an effective CEO succession plan. The problem is, most boards simply don't want to talk about CEO succession: Why rock the boat when things are going well? Why risk offending the current CEO? Meanwhile, most CEOs can't imagine that anyone could adequately replace them. In this article, Kenneth W. Freeman, the retired CEO of Quest Diagnostics, discusses his own recent handoff experience (Surya N. Mohapatra became chief executive in May 2004) and offers his approach to succession planning. He says it falls squarely on the incumbent CEO to put ego aside and initiate and actively manage the process of selecting and grooming a successor. Aggressive succession planning is one of the best ways for CEOs to ensure the long-term health of the company, he says. Plus, thinking early and often about a successor will likely improve the chief executive's performance during his tenure. Freeman advocates the textbook rules for succession planning but adds to that list a few more that apply specifically to the incumbent CEO: Insist that the board become engaged in succession planning, look for a successor who is different from you, and make the successor's success your own. After all, Freeman argues, the CEO's true legacy is determined by what happens after he leaves the corner office.  相似文献   

9.
Sharer K 《Harvard business review》2004,82(7-8):66-74, 186
Fast growth is a nice problem to have--but a hard one to manage well. In this interview, Kevin Sharer, the CEO of biotech giant Amgen, talks about the special challenges leaders face when their companies are on a roll. Sharer, who was also head of marketing at pre-WorldCom MCI and a division head and a staff assistant to Jack Welch at GE, offers insights drawn from his own experience--and from his own self-proclaimed blunders: "I learned the hard way that you need to become credible and enlist support inside the company before you start trying to be a change agent. If you think you're going to make change happen simply by force of personality or position or intellect, you'd better think again." And change there was: Under Sharer's leadership, Amgen overhauled its management team, altered its culture, and launched a couple of blockbuster products. How do chief executives survive in that kind of dizzying environment? "A CEO must always be switching between different altitudes--tasks of different levels of abstraction and specificity," Sharer says. "You might need to spend time working on a redesign of your organizational structure and then quickly switch to drafting a memo to all employees aimed at reinforcing one of the company's values." Having a supportive and capable top team is also key: "A top management team is the most revealing window into a CEO's style, values, and aspirations.... If you don't have the right top team, you won't have the right tiers below them. [The] A players won't work for B players. Maybe with a company like GE, the reputation of the company is so strong that it can attract top people to work for weaker managers. In a new company like Amgen, that won't happen."  相似文献   

10.
Chew WB 《Harvard business review》1990,68(6):14-7, 20, 24 passim
"You can't be serious!" Mike Trail, the president and fourth-generation owner of Trail Manufacturing, stared at five older men standing in his office. "I'm afraid we are, Mike." Sandy, the most senior of the five, was polite but firm. "We won't switch over to the new equipment." Trail Manufacturing was a small Midwestern company trying to define itself in a new world of competition. Working with engineering chief Marco Duncan, Mike Trail, its young CEO, developed a program to revolutionize the company's manufacturing capability by installing six computerized machining centers. The $4 million automation program was proceeding smoothly, or at least it seemed to be, until the sixth of eight production teams, whose members included the company's most respected machinist, refused to continue participating. Mike canvased his colleagues for suggestions. "We can't let any screw machines remain in operation," Marco insisted. "The problem wasn't just old machines. The problem was--and is--the whole company. We need a clean break with the past." Shop manager Darrell Montgomery didn't necessarily disagree, but he worried about alienating Sandy. "You know what Sandy means to this place," he said. "If it wasn't for him, we never would have survived the startup." Bob Block, the company's CFO, went a step further. He questioned Marco's all-or-nothing vision and counseled compromise. "With half the new cells up, the screw machines are running a lot fewer jobs," he noted. "But they still account for over half our sales and even more of our profits. Maybe these guys are right." Four experts on change examine the crisis at Trail Manufacturing and debate Mike Trail's next step.  相似文献   

11.
The CEO is often the most isolated and protected employee in the organization. Few leaders, even veteran CEOs, can do the job without talking to someone about their experiences, which is why most develop a close relationship with a trusted colleague, a confidant to whom they can tell their thoughts and fears. In his work with leaders, the author has found that many CEO-confidant relationships function very well. The confidants keep their leaders' best interests at heart. They derive their gratification vicariously, through the help they provide rather than through any personal gain, and they are usually quite aware that a person in their position can potentially abuse access to the CEO's innermost secrets. Unfortunately, almost as many confidants will end up hurting, undermining, or otherwise exploiting CEOs when the executives are at their most vulnerable. These confidants rarely make the headlines, but behind the scenes they do enormous damage to the CEO and to the organization as a whole. What's more, the leader is often the last one to know when or how the confidant relationship became toxic. The author has identified three types of destructive confidants. The reflector mirrors the CEO, constantly reassuring him that he is the "fairest CEO of them all." The insulator buffers the CEO from the organization, preventing critical information from getting in or out. And the usurper cunningly ingratiates himself with the CEO in a desperate bid for power. This article explores how the CEO-confidant relationship plays out with each type of adviser and suggests ways CEOs can avoid these destructive relationships.  相似文献   

12.
Gavetti G 《Harvard business review》2011,89(7-8):118-25, 166
Firms in an industry typically cluster around a few strategic positions, and the intense competition on those occupied "mountaintops" makes it hard for firms to gain attractive returns. Superior opportunities lie on unoccupied mountaintops. Yet because those opportunities are "cognitively distant"--far from the status quo--strategists have trouble recognizing and acting on them. Competition, therefore, is weak. Most managers are trained to analyze economic forces when they want to identify new opportunities. But that approach usually won't uncover the kinds of ideas that overturn the status quo. Recent research on human cognition suggests that leaders would do better to use associative thinking to spot, act on, and legitimize distant opportunities. They should learn to make analogies with businesses in other industries, for example. For example, Charles Merrill launched an extraordinarily successful business when he reimagined banking as a "financial supermarket." This article explores ways to jump-start associational thinking--and to bring stakeholders along on the journey.  相似文献   

13.
Brenneman G 《Harvard business review》1998,76(5):162-4, 166, 168 passim
In 1993, when Greg Brenneman started working at Continental Airlines, it was the most dysfunctional company he had ever seen. It had been through two bankruptcies and ten presidents in ten years. There was next to no strategy. The company was burning through money. And employee morale couldn't get any worse. Today Continental is flying high. It posted revenues of $7.2 billion and a net income of $385 million in 1997. It regularly ranks as one of the top five U.S. airlines for key performance measures such as dispatch reliability. And employee turnover has been drastically reduced. What happened? In this first-person account, Brenneman, now Continental's president and COO, describes how he and the new team at Continental's helm transformed the company "right away and all at once." More specifically, he describes the five lessons he learned during this dramatic turnaround. At the beginning, there was so much wrong with Continental that he felt as if any one misstep could bring the whole effort down. But in a time of crisis, when time is tight and money is tighter, you can't afford to mull over complex strategy. With Gordon Bethune, Continental's chairman and CEO, Brenneman devised the Go Forward Plan, a straightforward strategy focused on four key elements: understanding the market, increasing revenues, improving the product, and transforming the corporate culture. He admits that the plan wasn't complicated--it was pure common sense. The tough part was getting it done. "Do it now!" became the rallying cry of the movement, and the power of momentum has carried Continental to success.  相似文献   

14.
Turn customer input into innovation   总被引:26,自引:0,他引:26  
It's difficult to find a company these days that doesn't strive to be customer-driven. Too bad, then, that most companies go about the process of listening to customers all wrong--so wrong, in fact, that they undermine innovation and, ultimately, the bottom line. What usually happens is this: Companies ask their customers what they want. Customers offer solutions in the form of products or services. Companies then deliver these tangibles, and customers just don't buy. The reason is simple--customers aren't expert or informed enough to come up with solutions. That's what your R&D team is for. Rather, customers should be asked only for outcomes--what they want a new product or service to do for them. The form the solutions take should be up to you, and you alone. Using Cordis Corporation as an example, this article describes, in fine detail, a series of effective steps for capturing, analyzing, and utilizing customer input. First come indepth interviews, in which a moderator works with customers to deconstruct a process or activity in order to unearth "desired outcomes." Addressing participants' comments one at a time, the moderator rephrases them to be both unambiguous and measurable. Once the interviews are complete, researchers then compile a comprehensive list of outcomes that participants rank in order of importance and degree to which they are satisfied by existing products. Finally, using a simple mathematical formula called the "opportunity calculation," researchers can learn the relative attractiveness of key opportunity areas. These data can be used to uncover opportunities for product development, to properly segment markets, and to conduct competitive analysis.  相似文献   

15.
丹宣 《中国外资》2000,(12):47-48
GE的董事长兼首席行政官杰克·韦尔奇曾说:“我要以克劳顿管理学院,以及‘克劳顿式的学习过程’在GE掀起一场文化革命。”本文介绍了GE的领导艺术学院及决策者大本营-克劳顿管理学院的历史及在GE辉煌发展史中所起的作用。  相似文献   

16.
What makes an effective executive   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
An effective executive does not need to be a leader in the typical sense of the word. Peter Drucker, the author of more than two dozen HBR articles, says some of the best business and nonprofit CEOs he has worked with over his 65-year consulting career were not stereotypical leaders. They ranged from extroverted to nearly reclusive, from easygoing to controlling, from generous to parsimonious. What made them all effective is that they followed the same eight practices: They asked, "What needs to be done?" They also asked, "What is right for the enterprise?" They developed action plans. They took responsibility for decisions. They took responsibility for communicating. They were focused on opportunities rather than problems. They ran productive meetings. And they thought and said "we" rather than "I." The first two practices provided them with the knowledge they needed. The next four helped them convert this knowledge into effective action, for knowledge is useless to executives until it has been translated into deeds. The last two ensured that the whole organization felt responsible and accountable. Effective executives know that they have authority only because they have the trust of the organization. This means they must think of the needs and opportunities of the organization before they think of their own needs and opportunities. The author also suggests a ninth practice that's so important, he elevates it to the level of a rule: Listen first, speak last. The demand for effective executives is much too great to be satisfied by those few people who are simply born to lead. Effectiveness is a discipline. And, like every discipline, it can be learned and must be earned.  相似文献   

17.
Nike's advertising slogans--"Bo Knows," "Just Do It," and "There Is No Finish Line"--have moved beyond advertising into popular expression. Its athletic footwear and clothing have become a piece of Americana. Its brand name is as well known around the world as IBM and Coke. Behind the slogans and the flashy TV commercials is the vision of its founder, chairman, and CEO, Phil Knight. Since forming the company in 1962, Knight has taken Nike from a small-time distributor of Japanese track shoes to the top of the athletic shoe and apparel market. But not without a stumble. Along the way, Knight discovered that technological innovation alone could not continue to drive growth. When sales stagnated in the mid-1980s, Knight and Nike learned several hard lessons on how to build brands and understand consumers, and they transformed their technology company into a marketing company whose product is its most important marketing tool. "Ultimately," says Knight, "we wanted Nike to be the world's best sports and fitness company. Once you say that, you have a focus. You don't end up making wing tips or sponsoring the next Rolling Stones world tour." To keep the company growing, Nike began splitting its brands into sub-brands. In tennis, Nike divided its shoes into Challenge Court--for younger, more active players--and Supreme Court--for older, more mature players. That approach brought the company to a broader range of consumers while preserving the customer base. And to create an emotional tie with the consumer, Nike started advertising on TV. "Sports is at the heart of American culture," Knight says. "You can't explain much in 60 seconds, but when you show Michael Jordan, you don't have to. It's that simple."  相似文献   

18.
Eliot Spitzer's investigations into the mutual fund and investment-banking industries have made the New York State attorney general the de facto flag bearer of corporate reform. His exposure of conflicts of interest between investment bankers and research analyst in Wall Street firms led to the $1.4 billion global settlement between regulators and banking houses in 2003. In this interview, Spitzer describes the challenge of protecting public markets from conflicts of interest, paying particular attention to how such conflicts get institutionalized in an industry. "The cases that have gotten me and my fellow regulators most upset are the ones where we've seen senior management being tolerant of rank abuses," he says. "Because then you know that the entire structure is rotten." He also points the finger squarely at boards, maintaining that board members are drawn from pools of company and industry insiders. He cites "a void in values in a lot of boardrooms," holding up executive compensation as a powerful example. "Board compensation committees ... are self-selected and interwoven--it's a rigged marketplace." He continues, "It would be interesting to see what the world would look like if CEO pay packages had to be submitted to shareholder votes." Spitzer suggests that what's really needed is for all business leaders to reinstill throughout their organizations the critical notion of a fiduciary duty--whether it is to the shareholder or to the customer. Using the mutual fund industry as an example, he also contrasts the value of enforcement with that of regulation and articulates an important--and surprisingly limited--role for government in protecting free markets.  相似文献   

19.
Thorbeck J 《Harvard business review》1991,69(1):52-4, 56-8, 60-2
John Thorbeck is an executive with a ten-year career history of successes--and a sense of repeated failure. Just out of business school, he was marketing director at the Aspen Skiing Company for three years and helped to reverse thirteen seasons of decline. At the Timberland shoe company in the mid-1980s, he led a marketing strategy that tripled sales. At the Bass shoe company, where he was CEO from 1987 to 1990, he took the company from big losses to big profits. Now he is president, CEO, and part owner of a third shoe company--Geo. E. Keith--that is surely the oldest, perhaps the smallest, and arguably the finest shoemaker in the United States. But the high points of Thorbeck's résumé conceal a leadership education that led him only slowly to abandon confrontational management in favor of management by history, values, competence, and what he calls organizational coherence. In his first two marketing jobs, he fought wars with his opponents and won. Then at Bass, he tried to recapture the company's proud past. He revived company folklore and history, gave workers back their pride in workmanship, and used this rejuvenated company spirit to meet and win new markets. Yet he was trying to take Bass someplace its owners simply wouldn't let it go, and he left the company profitable but divided, the work force eager to go one way, owenership another. In each of his jobs, Thorbeck overlooked some vital part of the organizational community.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)  相似文献   

20.
Morriss A  Ely RJ  Frei FX 《Harvard business review》2011,89(1-2):160-3, 183
After working with hundreds of leaders in a wide variety of organizations and in countries all over the globe, the authors found one very clear pattern: When it comes to meeting their leadership potential, many people unintentionally get in their own way. Five barriers in particular tend to keep promising managers from becoming exceptional leaders: People overemphasize personal goals, protect their public image, turn their competitors into two-dimensional enemies, go it alone instead of soliciting support and advice, and wait for permission to lead. Troy, a customer service manager, endangered his job and his company's reputation by focusing on protecting his position, not helping his team; when a trusted friend advised him to change his behavior, the results were striking. Anita's insistence on sticking to the tough personal she'd created for herself caused her to ignore the more intuitive part of the leadership equation, with disastrous results--until she let go of the need to appear invulnerable and reached out to another manager. Jon, a personal trainer who had virtually no experience with either youth development programs or urban life, opened a highly successful gym for inner-city kids at risk; he refused to be daunted by his lack of expertise and decided to simply "go for it." As these and other examples from the authors' research demonstrate, being a leader means making an active decision to lead. Only then will the workforce--and society--benefit from the enormous amount of talent currently sitting on the bench.  相似文献   

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