Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.     

Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents

The theory of patent “hold-out” posits that frictions in the market for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) provide incentives for prospective licensees to opportunistically delay taking licenses with the goal of avoiding or reducing royalty payments. We construct measures of pre- and in-litigation hold-out from information disclosed in U.S. cases filed 2010–2019. Relying on both SEP and a matched control set of non-SEP disputes, we explore whether frictions in the market for licensing are associated with hold-out. We find some evidence of an association between hold-out and both SEP portfolio size and enforcement uncertainty; however, we find no evidence associating pre- or in-litigation hold-out with the international breadth of SEP rights.     

Standard essential patents and global ICT value chains with a focus on the catching-up of China

Patents, standards and their combination, standard-essential patents (SEPs), are important in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, in particular in mobile communication. We argue that SEPs are relevant in macroeconomic development and estimate the effect of a country's SEP portfolio on its value-added trade in global ICT value chains (GVC). We find that SEPs retain a higher share of value-adding domestically and that absorptive capacity is needed to join GVCs. China entered the SEP market late and is catching up rapidly. The trade effect of SEPs on China is different from that on matured economies because of the initially low value of its SEPs.     

To join or not to join: Examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules

In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the profit sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We find that vertically integrated firms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those firms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings.     

On regulations for 5G: Micro licensing for locally operated networks

Future 5G networks aim at providing new high-quality wireless services to meet stringent and case-specific needs of various vertical sectors beyond traditional mobile broadband offerings. 5G is expected to disrupt the mobile communication business ecosystem and open the market to drastically new sharing based network operational models. 5G technical features of network slicing and small cell deployments in higher carrier frequencies will lower the investment barrier for new entrants to deploy local radio access networks and offer vertical specific services in specific areas and allow them lease the remaining required infrastructure on demand from mobile network operators (MNO) or infrastructure vendors. To realize the full vision of 5G to benefit the society and promote competition, innovation and emergence of new services when the 5G end-to-end network spans across different stakeholders administrative domains, the existing regulations governing the mobile communication business ecosystem are being refined. This paper provides a tutorial overview on how 5G innovations impact mobile communications and reviews the regulatory elements relevant to 5G development for locally deployed networks. This paper expands the recent micro licensing model for local spectrum authorization in future 5G systems and provides guidelines for the development of the key micro licensing elements. This local micro licensing model can open the mobile market by allowing different stakeholders to deploy local small cell networks with locally issued spectrum licenses ensuring pre-defined quality guarantees for the vertical sectors’ case specific needs.     

Queues, not just mediocrity: Inefficiency in decentralized markets with vertical differentiation

We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active sellers supply one unit of an indivisible service at varying degrees of quality. The customers that have entered the market are randomly matched with the active sellers and prices are set by (complete information) pair-wise bargaining. In its unique steady state, the market leads to an excess diversity of quality and customers may have to suffer costly delays. Notably, efficiency is not regained as per period delay costs disappear. We also show that setting minimal quality standards, such as licensing rules by a professional college, will improve welfare (and even Consumer Surplus), relative to the free market, whenever the inefficiency is caused by a large enough excess supply.     

Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.     

The licensing of telecommunication suppliers: Beyond the EU’s Directive

The WTO agreement on basic telecommunication services does not provide detailed guidance for giving effect to member country commitments, especially in regard to the licensing reform which will be required to permit easier market access. This is where the EU’s recent Licensing Directive takes on special significance beyond its application to Europe since it is likely to be closely examined as a potential model for multinational licensing reform. For this reason, it is important to draw attention to the shortcomings of the EU directive to help ensure that they are not transported into any model/principles of licensing reform developed to give effect to the WTO Agreement.     

The Labor‐Market Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws in Nursing

We study the labor‐market impacts of occupational licensing laws on nursing, an economically important occupation. States adopted licensing of registered and practical nurses at different times, which allows us to estimate the effects of licensing on wages and participation for each nursing profession. We find that licensure raised wages by 5 to 10 percent but there is no evidence that it reduced overall participation. Additionally, we show that licensure equalizes wages within the occupation with minority wages rising faster than nonminority wages; however, licensing had a negative but not statistically significant impact on the participation of minorities in nursing.     

The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing

The licensing of technology entails a trade‐off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade‐off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U‐shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology‐specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing

There is a contentious debate about the exclusionary effects of upfront payments to be made by manufacturers to place their products on retailers’ shelves. Analyzing a two-stage bargaining process with one downstream retailer and a pool of upstream manufacturers, we find that upfront payments lead to a smaller assortment if the retailer’s bargaining power is high enough and the suppliers’ products are close substitutes.     

The influence of firm and industry characteristics on returns from technology licensing deals: evidence from the US computer and pharmaceutical sectors

This study examines the relationships between firm and industry characteristics and firms' abnormal stock market returns accompanying the announcement of technology licensing deals. In particular, I examine the fit among firms' licensing activities, their resource endowments, and their industry context, and develop hypotheses on its impact on abnormal stock market returns after licensing deals. Analyzing 11 years of inward and outward licensing transactions in the US computer and pharmaceutical industries between 1990 and 2000, I find support for my argument that while firms profit from both inward and outward licensing, the magnitude of such profits is determined by licensing firms' resource endowments, and that these determinants have a different impact in different industry contexts. Understanding these relationships helps explain when firms should use licensing to exploit their proprietary technologies and make better predictions about the impact of licensing transactions on firm performance.     

The advent of 5G and the non-discrimination principle

5G promises to be a game changer for the extended connectivity-based value chain, encompassing a much broader set of digitalized industries than previous solutions. By reshaping competition among market players and among technologies, it changes the trade-offs underlying the application of the non-discrimination principle. In this paper, we provide a unified view of the implications of these technological developments for four instantiations of this principle that span the entire digital value chain: non-discrimination in FRAND licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs), vertical separation remedies, network neutrality and technological neutrality. We conclude that overly rigid and non-technology neutral interpretations of the non-discrimination requirement would be at odds with technological evolution and would be incompatible with the objective to maximize the overall value of digital networks.     

Promoting access to intellectual property: patent pools, copyright collectives, and clearinghouses

This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property (IP) clearinghouses, and copyright collectives as systems for promoting efficient access to licensable IP in a 'market for technology'. These systems promote downstream use of innovations by economizing on search and transaction costs in licensing, as well as potentially mitigating the conditions that lead to the 'tragedy of the anti-commons' and other coordination problems in multilateral licensing. We compare and classify different systems in terms of their features, review some existing systems, and discuss their economic characteristics.     

Licensing a technology standard

I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider inventor or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopting a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner also sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.     

Unionization structure, licensing and innovation

We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union.     

Licensing Strategies in the Presence of Patent Thickets

Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where the introduction of a new product or service often requires many complementary technologies. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called “royalty stacking,” and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as “double marginalization.” The literature, however, does not address these issues under different forms of licensing contracts. This article develops a game‐theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety of licensing forms widely used in practice and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmented, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit‐based royalty, fixed fee, and hybrid licenses. Such problems occur only under pure quantity‐based or pure revenue‐based royalty licenses when the downstream firm's bargaining power is low. It is also shown that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent is, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity‐ or revenue‐based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. First, the results show that even under the same patent ownership structure, different forms of licenses lead to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity‐based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue‐based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity‐based or revenue‐based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, especially when downstream firms have low bargaining power.     

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.      

Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family

The sharp increase in SEP declarations and declaring firms emphasizes the necessity for understanding firms’ innovation investment behavior in standardization. This paper empirically investigates whether declared standard-essential patents (SEPs) and the declaring firm’s business model (operationalized as a firm’s location in the value chain) are associated with a firm’s innovation investment behavior. To this end, we measure firms’ innovation investment behavior through average total research and development (R&D) expenditures per filed patent family for publicly listed firms from 1999 to 2018. Our sample mainly includes major SEP family declarants. We rely on a binary business model taxonomy differentiating upstream and downstream firms. Within that setting, total R&D expenditures rise with increasing fragmentation of declared SEP families, suggesting that firms adjust their R&D investments to declaration developments in standard-setting organizations (SSOs). We also show that upstream firms have significantly lower total R&D expenditures than downstream firms, which could indicate structural differences in their intellectual property (IP) and R&D management processes. Our results can help SSOs and regulators better understand firms’ innovation investment behavior.     

Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational Licensing

Recent assessments of occupational licensing have shown varying effects of the institution on labor‐market outcomes. This study revisits the relationship between occupational licensing and labor‐market outcomes by analyzing a new topical module to the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Relative to previously available data, the topical module offers more detailed information on occupational licensing attainment, with larger sample sizes and access to richer sets of person‐level characteristics. We find that those with a license earn higher pay, are more likely to be employed, and have a higher probability of employer‐sponsored health insurance offers.