Effects of broadband availability on total factor productivity in service sector firms: Evidence from Ireland

While broadband is widely believed to augment productivity, there is little firm-level evidence of a generalised causal effect. In this paper we examine whether the introduction of digital subscriber line (DSL) broadband services increased firms' productivity in nine sub-sectors within the services and distribution sector in Ireland from 2006 to 2012. Firm-level panel data on firms' characteristics are linked to spatial information on the rollout of DSL. While we do not find significant productivity effects in the services sectors taken together, we do find positive and significant effects on firm's total factor productivity in Information & Communication and Administrative & Support Services.     

On platforms,incomplete contracts,and open source software

We analyze investment incentives for a firm A owning a software platform and an application and a firm B deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform. While B's entry helps the success of the platform, B fears ex post expropriation by A and is hence reluctant to enter and invest. We show that different platform governance structures prevalent in the Information and Communication Technology industry (integrated, proprietary, standardized, open source platform) serve to balance investment incentives for the platform and for the applications.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

The impact on broadband access to the Internet of the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks

In Portugal, until recently, the telecommunications incumbent offered broadband access to the Internet, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. We estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. Using a panel of consumer level data and a random effects mixed logit model, we estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the effect of structural separation on prices and social welfare. Our estimates indicate that structural separation would cause a substantial welfare increase. These results raise questions about the policy of some countries of allowing the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks.     

Is telecommunications regulation efficient? An international perspective

This article addresses the efficiency of regulation policy in the telecommunications sector. First, the concepts of static and dynamic efficiency are reviewed, with the main policies used into achieve these goals identified, while distinguishing effective competition from industrial policy. Indicators are proposed that enable assessment of components of sector efficiency. These indicators are used to empirically investigate the link between regulation policy and economic performance for OECD Member Countries. The investigation is based on national differences in regulation policy and efficiency indicators. The results support the notion that asymmetrical ex ante regulation alone is not necessarily efficient, and that an ex ante policy, integrating an industrial policy, could favor dynamic efficiency.     

Termination fees revisited

We reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation. The interaction between these two features yields new insights; in our model: i) The profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost; ii) the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost; iii) the welfare-maximizing termination fee is below the profit-maximizing one in the absence of termination-based price discrimination, but can be above it otherwise.     

On the duration of technology licensing

We model an innovator's choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi-period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer. We find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed-fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion. Moreover, licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed-fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak. Our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods.     

Are OTT messaging and mobile telecommunication an interrelated market? An empirical analysis

OTT messengers such as Facebook and WhatsApp have gained wide popularity among mobile users while the traffic of text messaging is in strong decline. As such, there is a debate over whether both services are interrelated and constitute a joint product market, which has important implications for the current wave of mergers in the mobile industry and regulation policy. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide an empirical analysis of how the consumption of OTT messengers affects demand for text messaging and mobile voice services. We make use of an innovative dataset which includes very detailed information on smartphone usage in Norway and consider a novel approach to address this question which is embedded in the complexity of two-sided markets. Interestingly, our findings suggest that OTT messengers complement demand for traditional mobile telecommunication services for this context. Consequently, both markets are interrelated but do not constitute a joint market from the perspective of competition policy in Norway. Moreover, we find an explanation for why reductions of text messaging usage have been so drastic in some countries and an analogous development for mobile voice is rather unlikely. Finally, our empirical results provide a new perspective on the modelling of consumer utility in communication networks in the theoretical literature.